NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY SATURDAY 21 JANUARY 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00970R000100010067-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 24, 2010
• Sequence Number: 67
• Publication Date: January 21, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

Director of
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Saturday
21 January 1984
CPAS NID 84-017JX
21 anua
COPY 2 8 5
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Top Secret
Contents
Israel-Lebanon: Pressure for Another Pullback ....................
1
Eastern Europe-USSR: Concerns About Leadership ............
3
El Salvador: Military Preparations ..........................................
5
Philippines: Opposition Issues Ultimatum ..............................
Poland-US: Reaction to Relaxed Sanctions ............................
7
8
Nigeria-US: New Regime Seeking Support ............................
9
South Africa-Angola: Military and Political Developments .... 10
South Africa-Mozambique: Optimism on Talks .................... 10
Morocco: More Unrest ............................................................ 11
North Korea-US-South Korea: P'yongyang's Motives .......... 11
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21 January 1984
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Too gac M
BEIRUT
INTERNATIONA
AIRPORT
Mediterranean
21 January 1984
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ISRAEL-LEBANON: Pressure for Another Pullback
The Israeli military apparently favors at least a partial withdrawal
from southern Lebanon, and government officials reportedly believe
that Israel will have to pull back its forces if the US withdraws its
contingent from Beirut.
A respected Israeli journalist says Israeli military leaders are
dissatisfied with mounting guerrilla attacks on their forces in the south
and the lack of progress in negotiating an extension of Lebanese
Army authority into the Kharrub region and then into Sidon.
The Israeli coordinator for Lebanese affairs, Uri Lubrani, recently
said he believes the US will withdraw its contingent from Lebanon
between May and July. According to Lubrani, Israeli public opinion
will then force either a partial or a full Israeli withdrawal. He added
that another spectacular terrorist attack against Israeli forces could
lead to an earlier pullback.
Lubrani stressed that Israel is trying to arrange agreements
leading to the resumption of Lebanese Government authority in those
areas vacated. He believes, however, that ultimately Lebanon will be
Comment: The Israeli military probably would prefer to leave
Lebanon completely rather than just pull back. Another partial
withdrawal would require substantial investment in new facilities
would not result in appreciably fewer casualties.
If the Lebanese Army still refuses to move outside the greater
Beirut area by May, however, Tel Aviv will be likely to make its own
security arrangements with the local population and move its forces
at least to the Zahrani River. It also mi ht tr to carr out a partial
disengagement from the Bekaa Valley
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EASTERN EUROPE-USSR: Concerns About Leadership
East European officials appear concerned that General Secretary
Andropov's illness has made the Soviet leadership indecisive, and
some reportedly fear this has allowed military leaders to assume a
more active role in foreign policy.
Polish officials claim that uncertainty over Andropov's health is
affecting the USSR's behavior toward Eastern Europe. One says that
the Soviets seem unsure how to manage bilateral relations and that
progress on some issues has stalled. Another says the Soviets have
not been exercising their usual direction of aid provided by CEMA to
Hungarian party leader Kadar reportedly is uncertain about who
is in charge in Moscow and about continued Soviet support of
Hungary's innovative policies. An official in Budapest says some
Hungarians believe that the Soviet military has moved into a power
vacuum created by Andropov's illness and that it is playing a more
direct role in formulating policy.
A retired Polish official claims that greater involvement in
decisionmaking by military leaders worries East Europeans, who
prefer a more conciliatory approach to East-West problems. He hints
that East German leader Honecker expressed similar concerns last
fall in discussions with Polish leaders
Comment: Andropov's continued predominance in the Politburo
is evident, despite his failure to appear in public. The Soviet General
Staff traditionally has an influential voice in Politburo decisions where
national security responsibilities are concerned, but there is no
evidence from Soviet sources that Andropov's illness has increased
their influence. The current deterioration in East-West relations
probably results more from the shootdown of the South Korean
airliner, INF deployments, and other events than from a shift of
influence in the leadership
East European worries about growing East-West tensions
centering on INF deployments are made worse by uncertainty about
the situation in Moscow. An apparent lack of decisive Soviet
leadership also could have important implications for policymaking by
the East Europeans. Normally cautious leaders like Czechoslovakia's
President Husak may be even less inclined to undertake new
initiatives, while Romania's President Ceausescu and others may see
an opportunity for more suit of separate national
interests
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EL SALVADOR: Military Preparations
The presidential election scheduled for late March is increasingly
motivating both the government and the guerrillas to undertake
military operations.
Press reports indicate that the Army yesterday launched a major
sweep of southern Usulutan Department-long an insurgent base
area and arms transshipment point. The US defense attache had
reported before the sweep began that senior Army leaders were
considering committing two immediate-reaction battalions to such an
operation. According to the attache, however, most Army units
currently are resting and refitting.
The most significant of several scattered clashes during the week
was a guerrilla probe against the railroad bridge across the Lempa
River. To strengthen the security of another key transportation link to
the east, the.attache reports some 375 National Guard personnel
Comment: The Army operation in Usulutan probably initiates the
next phase of the government's "national campaign," which began
last summer in San Vicente. By dislodging the guerrillas from their
base areas and following up with civic action programs, the
government apparently hopes to encourage a large voter turnout,
demonstrate its control over the countryside, and underscore its
commitment to reforms.
The sabotage of the Cuscatlan Bridge on 1 January increasingly
appears to have been the opening move in a rebel plan to isolate the
east. Destruction of the railroad bridge or the seizure of the dam-in
addition to giving the insurgents a psychological victory-would make
it much more difficult for the government to reinforce the region
during major attacks.
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PHILIPPINES: Opposition Issues Ultimatum
All major opposition groups earlier this week signed a statement
demanding that President Marcos make major political reforms before
14 February or else face a boycott of the National Assembly elections
scheduled for May.
The statement was published in Manila's newspapers. It is a
comprehensive list of demands aimed at limiting Marcos's
presidential decreemaking powers, ensuring that the conduct of the
elections is fair, and guaranteeing that the new Assembly will have
actual legislative power.
Comment: Despite earlier disagreements on a boycott,
opposition groups are gambling that Marcos's need for their
participation in the elections will overcome his reluctance to grant
major political reforms. He has shown no indication thus far of
meeting the opposition's new demands, however, and he probably
will not do so before the deadline. As a result, political parties that
otherwise plan to take part in the elections may be forced to join a
boycott in order to retain their standing as members of the
opposition.
As the deadline approaches, Marcos is likely to respond with
A boycott would benefit the Communist Party of the Philippines.
The party has been supporting the boycott movement through its own
political front groups and through moderate opposition alliances it
has penetrated. If a boycott occurs, it also will demonstrate the
ineffectiveness of legal reform strategies advocated by the moderates
and will intensify political polarization.
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POLAND-US: Reaction to Relaxed Sanctions
Polish commentators have dismissed as insignificant recent US
steps to ease sanctions, and the regime probably will continue to work
for the removal of all sanctions
The Polish news agency claimed yesterday that, despite the US
moves, Washington continues an unfriendly and "illegitimate" policy
and still seeks to complicate Poland's economic difficulties. It said
that restoration of normal relations requires an end to economic and
financial restrictions, and it demanded that the US compensate
Poland for losses caused by the sanctions.
Comment: The Poles are likely to use the latest US moves to
bring additional pressure on the West Europeans. The authorities also
will continue to show some moderation in domestic policies in order
to improve their image in the West. The regime's hesitation about
bringing 11 former Solidarity leaders to trial and its apparent
willingness to consider seriously the church's proposal for private aid
to agriculture probably reflect Warsaw's hope to restore more normal
political and economic ties with the West.
Top Secret
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NIGERIA-US: New Regime Seeking Support
The newly appointed Foreign Minister, in his first meeting with US
Embassy officials, asserted that Lagos is looking to Washington for
support and needs help in achieving a foreign policy "triumph" to
improve its domestic standing. The Embassy reports that most
civilians in the cabinet, particularly those heading the key petroleum
and finance ministries, lack experience and are not even leaders in
their own fields. Meanwhile, the government announced that it has
more than 460 former officials in custody, and it issued a decree
enabling it to hold persons suspected of malfeasance for up to six
months without trial.
Comment: The composition of the cabinet could reflect in part an
attempt to install politically untainted people. Most of the better
qualified Nigerians, however, probably were reluctant to become
associated with a government whose prospects are uncertain. In any
case, the paucity of experienced civilians in top posts will complicate
the task of economic recovery. The number of former officials being
detained apparently has declined, suggesting that the regime has
finished its initial screening and will proceed with arraignments soon. 25X1
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SOUTH AFRICA-ANGOLA: Military and Political Developments
that Foreign Minister Botha on ay rejected the Angolan reply to
Pretoria's offer of a cease-fire beginning on 31 January because
Luanda linked it to a settlement on Namibia. The Embassy believes
that Botha left open the option of a unilateral South African
withdrawal.
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(South Africa's public
rejection of Angola's counterproposal lays the groundwork for
Pretoria to dela completing its withdrawal or possibly to retract its
cease-fire offer.
SOUTH AFRICA-MOZAMBIQUE: Optimism on Talks
US diplomats report that South African and Mozambican officials
are pleased with the working group discussions held earlier this week
in Pretoria and Maputo. Although both sides indicate that the
economic talks went well, results in this area depend on achieving
agreement on the removal of African National Congress guerrillas
from Mozambique and on verification procedures. South Africa wants
to take two or three weeks to consider Mozambique's proposal for a
nonaggression pact, but Maputo hopes to persuade Pretoria to act
more quickly. Meanwhile, the Mozambican National Resistance is
threatening to intensify attacks on economic targets in Mozambique
unless it is included in the discussions.
Comment: Continued progress toward rapprochement hinges
largely on resolving differences over South African support for the
insurgents and the use of Mozambique for sanctuary by the African
National Congress. Either insurgent group could launch attacks that
would strengthen the position of suspicious hardliners in Pretoria and
Maputo. Mozambican moderates apparently believe that delaying
negotiations increases the risk that the talks might be disrupted.
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the US Embassy reports
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Top Bec req
Unrest in Morocco
Top Secire~
I Ptlurltania
A
f o Disturbance
Army deployment
150
I I
Kilometers
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Isolated incidents of violence-most caused by students-
continue, and Army troops have intervened in some areas to restore
order. The US defense attache in Rabat says regular Army units were
airlifted yesterday to several towns in the north, and the US Consulate
in Tangier reports that clashes between troops and demonstrators in
Comment: The use of the regular Army to maintain order
indicates the regime's growing concern that the situation is getting
out of hand. Incidents thus far do not appear to be coordinated, but
there has been an increase in Islamic fundamentalist agitation. As
long as incidents remain isolated, security forces probably can
maintain control. If disorder spreads throughout the country,
however, the government will face hard choices involving price
rollbacks and the more extensive use of military force.
NORTH KOREA-US-SOUTH KOREA: Pyongyang's Motives
The North Korean party newspaper yesterday published an
authoritative article that underscores Pyongyang's intent to use its
recent proposal for tripartite talks as a way to initiate direct
discussions with the US on troop withdrawals. The North states that,
before there is a dialogue between the two Koreas on reunification, a
peace treaty ensuring the withdrawal of US troops has to be
concluded with Washington.
Comment: Pyongyang almost certainly has no illusions that US
withdrawals can be achieved any time soon, but it is trying to take the
tactical initiative. South Korea will continue to resist talks that do not
include China as well as the US.
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