NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY WEDNESDAY 18 JANUARY 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00970R000100010055-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 24, 2010
• Sequence Number: 55
• Publication Date: January 18, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Ef Director of
Intellig"----- -
TaP-see*et-
National Intelligence Daily
Wednesday
18 January 1984
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Top Secret
Contents
USSR: INF Counterdeployments Announced ..........................
1
Lebanon-Syria: Prospects Fading for Security Plan ..............
2
El Salvador: Insurgent Political Problems ..............................
4
USSR: Pipeline Minister Becomes New Deputy Premier ........
5
Netherlands-US-Libya: Controversial Aircraft Sale ..............
6
USSR-Iran: Further Deterioration in Relations ........................
8
Saudi Arabia-North Yemen: Border Tensions ......................
9
UK: Labor Party's Problems .................................................... 10
Suriname: Workers Move To Negotiate .................................. 11
West Germany: Pressure on Defense Minister ...................... 12
India: Increasing Violence in Border State .............................. 14
Special Analysis
South Africa-Angola: Outlook for Cease-Fire ........................ 15
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18 January 1984
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USSR: INF Counterdeployments Announced
have been fielded in East Germany in response to 1
deployments.
TASS, in a broadcast yesterday, reported on the visit of a Red
Star correspondent to "the deployment area of operational-tactical
missiles of enhanced ranges" in East Germany. According to the
broadcast, the unit has been deployed on agreement with the East
Germans "in the framework of one of the USSR's reply measures to
the deployment of US Pershing and cruise missiles in Europe."
General Secretary Andropov announced in late November that
preparations had been accelerated for deployment of "enhanced-
range" operational-tactical missiles in East Germany and
Czechoslovakia. "Enhanced-range" could apply to the 500-kilometer-
range SS-23, or to a longer range version of the Scud.
suggest,
however, that Andropov's reference was to the 925-kilometer-range
SS-12/22
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1 18 January 1984
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LEBANON-SYRIA: Prospects Fading for Security Plan
All parties appear to be pessimistic that the proposed security
plan can be carried out, and Syria and its Lebanese allies may be
preparing to repel a rumored Lebanese Army offensive along the
Alayh ridgeline.
Druze leader Walid Junblatt told the US Ambassador in
Damascus yesterday that he would not drop his objections to the
plan. Junblatt expressed complete distrust of President Gemayel's
motives and ruled out the ossibilit of any accommodation with the
government.
Junblatt says that if the Army tries to carry out the security
agreement unilaterally "we will have war." He adds that the other
leaders of the National Salvation Front share his pessimistic view of
the situation.
Comment: Junblatt's self-confidence evidently has increased,
following his trip to Moscow. He apparently believes there is no hope
of reaching a political settlement with Gemayel and is prepared for a
new round of fighting. Although Junblatt's objections to the security
plan are minor, his hardline position appears motivated by his intense
dislike of Gemayel.
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Estimated Number og
Armed Insurgents9 by Faction
Popular Liberation Forces
2,800 - 3,500
People's Revolutionary Army _
3,000 - 3,500
Armed Forces of National Resistance _
1,400- 1,550
Communist Party's Armed Forces of National Liberation _
1,160 - 1,325
Central America Workers' Revolutionary Party _
700 - 850
Total
9,060 - 10,725
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18 January 1984
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EL SALVADOR: Insurgent Political Problems
Ideological and tactical differences within one of the laraest of the
five insurgent groups are threatening guerrilla unity.
two
maverick factions of the Popular Liberation Forces reject the group's
current leadership and advocacy of negotiations. Both factions
support the protracted war strategy of former leader Carpio, who
allegedly committed suicide last year in Managua. The top leadership
of the guerrilla alliance reportedly is trying to mediate
The maior faction calls itself the Revolutionary Workers'
Movement. it has severed all ties with the
parent organization and represents at least half the organization's
membership. Moreover, the large labor federation that supported the
Popular Liberation Forces reportedly now supports the new
movement.
The other dissident faction is the organization's combat and
logistic unit in the San Salvador area. the
faction wants to remain in the organization but insists that the
Comment: Since Carpio's death, the Popular Liberation Forces
has been wracked by internal disputes and eclipsed by the military
successes of a rival organization in the east. The seriousness of the
factionalism has been reflected in recent public attacks by the
dissidents against the organization's leadership. The new leadership
of the Popular Liberation Forces has been joined by other guerrilla
groups and by Cuba and Nicaragua in denouncing the dissidents.
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USSR: Pipeline Minister Becomes New Deputy Premier
Boris Shcherbina, the minister responsible for construction of the
gas pipeline to Western Europe, was promoted to Deputy Premier last
weekend.
Shcherbina fills a vacancy left by a 77-year-old deputy premier
who retired in mid-1983. The former deputy premier reportedly was
blamed for a serious construction failure at an installation that
produces components for atomic power plants.
Comment: Despite continuing problems with the pipeline, the
regime apparently sees its basic completion as a major achievement.
General Secretary Andropov probably regards Shcherbina's new
assignment as appropriate recognition for his executive skill in
overcoming the difficulties that have beset this project. Shcherbina
probably will oversee the State Committee for Construction and
retain overall responsibility for major construction projects-such as
the pipeline- undertaken by various ministries.
Andropov may intend to create this kind of tension throughout
the bureaucracy. His policy of sacking executives for failure, of
promoting ministers who succeed, and of executing officials fo~d
guilty of blatant corruption all contribute to this atmosphere.
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NETHERLANDS-US-LIBYA: Controversial Aircraft Sale
Dutch Prime Minister Lubbers, during his visit this week to
Washington, probably will try to counter US objections to the sale of
Fokker aircraft to Libya.
Fokker has delivered two F-28 airliners to Tripoli and claims that
it has a binding contract for delivery of a third. A representative of the
firm told the US Embassy that discussions on additional sales have
occurred.
US-made components comprise 10 to 12 percent of the value of
each aircraft, but Washington was not consulted on the deal. As a
result, it has raised the possibility of sanctions against Fokker
A senior official in the Foreign Ministry told the US Embassy
recently that the Libyan sale was all that enabled Fokker to meet its
payroll for December and that the Netherlands Government would not
let the firm go under. The official also commented that The Hague
disagreed with efforts to isolate Libyan leader Qadhafi, and he noted
that no international sanctions against Libya are in effect.
Comment: The official may have exaggerated in asserting that
Fokker's survival is threatened. Recent sales, such as those to Libya,
have reduced an inventory problem that has seriously affected the
profitability of the company. Nevertheless, the government probably
is worried about the firm's current strained circumstances.
Lubbers is likely to stress Fokker's importance to the economy of
the Netherlands and repeat Dutch opposition to the "extraterritorial"
application of US law. He probably will note that Fokker is a
coproducer of the F-16 fighter and is a potential subcontractor under
the just-concluded Patriot missile agreement. The Prime Minister may
believe that US interest in these important NATO programs will limit
the steps Washington would be willing to take against Fokker.
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USSR-IRAN: Further Deterioration in Relations
Moscow is becoming exasperated at the current trials of Iranian
Communists in Tehran and at Iran's lack of response to Soviet
attempts to reduce bilateral friction.
TASS on Saturday condemned the Speaker of the Iranian
Parliament for his disparaging remarks about the USSR's role in
Afghanistan and criticized Iran for aiding Afghan insurgents. The
commentary warns that such "insults" could damage Soviet-Iranian
relations, particularly commercial contacts.
Late last month an article in Pravda claimed that the recently
opened trials of members of the Tudeh Party on charges of spying for
the USSR are an effort to fan anti-Soviet hysteria. It admonished
Iranian leaders that they would bear responsibility for the
consequences if the trials were not halted.
Tehran Radio yesterday reported that the Speaker of the Iranian
Parliament turned aside a formal proposal from the Supreme Soviet
for cooperative efforts to help halt the arms race. He criticized the
Soviet delivery of missiles to Iraq and their use against Iranian cities.
Comment: Relations with Iran have continued to deteriorate
since last June, when Foreign Minister Gromyko publicly complained
about Iran's anti-Soviet behavior. Since the beginning of the trials, the
Soviets have increased their criticism of Iranian aid to Afghan
insurgents, Iran's prosecution of the war with Iraq, and Tehran's
conservative domestic policies. Nevertheless, they continue to avoid
steps that could provoke a complete break or encourage Iran to
reduce its hostility toward the US.
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Saudi Troop Buildup
Saudi Avab~a
Saudi National. Guard
reinforcement ns.from Riyadh
attalion//Buq'ah'fl
Sa'dahi & North Yemeni
/"Z'N~r . ~al
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Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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A substantial reinforcement by the Saudis along their
undemarcated border with North Yemen has increased tensions in the
area.
since a border
clash late last month, the Saudis have moved about 4,000 troops and
several hundred armored vehicles to the border area near Najran.
North Yemen has not sent additional forces to the border,
~ There are only about 500 troops at Buq'ah and
about 1,000 at Sa'dah,
President Salih does not want to provoke the Saudis further by
reinforcing the area. About two-thirds of North Yemen's forces
remain south of Sanaa, where they guard against a resurgence of
guerrilla activity by the National Democratic Front.
North Yemen's Foreign Minister discussed the problem in Riyadh
with Saudi officials last week. King Fahd and Salih conferred on
Sunday at the Islamic Conference in Casablanca.
Comment: Saudi leaders almost certainly do not want a military
confrontation with Sanaa. The Saudis have long suspected Yemeni
intentions, and they probably have overreacted to the clash last
month. Riyadh, on the other hand, may try to exploit its local military
superiority and North Yemen's dependence on Saudi financial
assistance to push Sanaa to make concessions on border
demarcation.
Discussions between Riyadh and Sanaa are unlikely to produce a
quick resolution of the border problem. Salih will want to avoid more
clashes with the Saudis, but he will not yield to their demands.
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UK: Labor Party's Problems
Labor leader Kinnock's efforts to rebuild the party as the only
credible alternative to Prime Minister Thatcher's Tories may be dealt a
blow if leftwing spokesman Benn regains a seat in Parliament.
Benn lost his position in the general election in June. He has been
selected as Labor's candidate for a byelection expected to be held in
March in a normally safe Labor constituency.
Comment: Kinnock probably owes his election last fall as party
leader to Benn's absence as a contender. Although Kinnock generally
sides with the party's left wing, he has tried to promote unity by
making some concessions to moderates on domestic issues and on
membership in the EC and by emphasizing attacks on Thatcher. He
continues to support unilateral nuclear disarmament, but he has
focused his criticism on "US-controlled" cruise missiles while
reaffirming loyalty to NATO and advocating improvements in
conventional forces.
Opinion polls and the results of local council byelections indicate
that Kinnock's strategy has recaptured some support for Labor. More
important, the voters again appear to regard Labor, rather than the
Social Democratic-Liberal Alliance, as the main opponent of the
Tories.
These gains, however, will be threatened by Benn's return to the
limelight. Benn retains strong support among Labor activists, and, if
he returns to Parliament, he is likely to outshine the less experienced
Kinnock.
Benn has said that he will not challenge Kinnock or moderate
deputy leader Hattersley until after the next general election.
Nonetheless, he will be a central figure in efforts to keep the party
loyal to favored leftist policies, especially unilateral disarmament.
Kinnock will now be forced to campaign for Benn. The loss of a
safe seat would refute Kinnock's claims that he is making Labor an
effective political force.
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SURINAME: Workers Move To Negotiate
Striking bauxite workers have established a six-member
committee to negotiate with the government, according to the
US Embassy and a Surinamese press report. This move follows a
decision last Thursday by management of the Suralco plant to
suspend its collective bargaining agreement with the labor union and
possibly terminate some workers when the plant reopens. The
Embassy reports some bank and insurance company workers are
continuing to strike, and bus operators in the capital struck for
several hours on Monday. Despite rumors of an imminent teachers' 25X1
strike, most schools have remained open.
Comment: The bauxite workers apparently are concerned that
the protracted strike could result in the permanent shutdown of
Suralco's operations or, at a minimum, in the loss of many jobs when
the plant reopens. These concerns might cause them to scale down
their demands and to concentrate on economic rather than political
grievances. A teachers' walkout, however, could stiffen the resolve of
the bauxite workers and might even precipitate a broader protest
against the Bouterse regime.
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Defense Minister Woerner today will explain to the Bundestag
defense committee his reasons for forcing NATO Deputy Supreme
Commander Kiessling into earl retirement. General Kiesslin was
dismissed as a security-risk
Important members of the Social Democratic opposition are calling
for Woerner's resignation, and Christian Social Union Chairm
Strauss has urged the government to provide an explanation.
Comment: Woerner and other senior officials in the Defense
Ministry ultimately could be forced to resign if their case against
Kiessling is not conclusive. Woerner's position in the government
reportedly had already been weakened by policy disagreements with
Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher. Kohl probably would
not be able to deny Strauss the Defense Ministry if Woerner resigned
and Strauss demanded the position.
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INDIA: Increasing Violence in Border State
Local officials of the Congress Party, almost certainly with the
support of the national leadership, have been fomenting riots in the
sensitive border state of Jammu and Kashmir. The US Embassy
reports several hundred persons were injured and up to nine killed in
clashes with the police over the past three days. Chief Minister
Farooq has publicly accused Prime Minister Gandhi of coordinating
the demonstrations in the predominantly Muslim state as part of a
campaign to topple his government.
Comment: Farooq has incurred Gandhi's displeasure by leading
efforts to unite the opposition before national elections in the next
year. Gandhi has tried to lay the groundwork for imposing direct
national control over the state by charging Farooq with rigging the
elections that brought him to power, failing to maintain law and order,
and permitting secessionist movements allegedly supported by
Pakistan. The Prime Minister, however, may stop short in her efforts
to bring down Farooq. She probably fears that his ouster would set off
protests by his Muslim supporters and further strain relations with
Pakistan.
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Top Se?p(W
Latest South African Cross-
order Operation
Botswana
wazilan
South
Africa}
t esotho)
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amutete
j 'Groo f ntein
South African airstrikes
17 December 1983 - 10 January 1984
South African bases _
l
in Angola
for operations
;Operet
:y~-f'~~Etosha Par j
00 ^
0 100 KILOMETERS
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Special Analysis
SOUTH AFRICA-ANGOLA: Outlook for Cease-Fire
A lull in the fighting in southern Angola probably is in the offing.
Last Friday South Africa announced the complete withdrawal of its
conventional forces in Angola, following its largest cross-border
operation since 1981. All but a few reconnaissance units are likely to
withdraw south of the border in the next few days. Pretoria has
indicated that it will begin observing a 30-day trial cease-fire on
31 January to facilitate Western efforts to break the stalemate in the
negotiations on Namibia. At the same time, however, Pretoria will
maintain the capability to react forcefully and quickly to any efforts by
Angolan and SWAPO forces to move back into the salient that South
African troops had occupied. A collapse of the cease-fire could result
in greater Cuban involvement in the fighting.
The operation that began 6 December involved more airstrikes
than were flown during any previous incursion, including some against
targets 250 kilometers inside Angola. Minister of Defense Malan
claimed in an official press statement on 8 January that South African
forces had captured a major SWAPO headquarters; killed a total of
432 Angolan, Cuban, and SWAPO troops; and destroyed 25 Soviet-
manufactured tanks. Last Saturday British and South African
journalists reported observing a convoy of captured Soviet-
manufactured equipment being evacuated by South African forces.
Pretoria asserts its forces had been trying to preempt a planned
SWAPO incursion into Namibia. South Africa also might have hoped
to distract Angolan and Cuban forces from a counteroffensive against
UNITA insurgents. A main objective, however, probably was to push
Angolan, Cuban, and SWAPO forces farther north in preparation for
the cease-fire.
Pretoria's offer of a cease-fire may have been based on
the assumption that a standdown would enable it to maintain a buffer
zone north of the Namibia border.
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Angolan Resistance
Luanda offered stiffer resistance to the South African operations
than on any occasion in the past two years. In early December one of
several Angolan armored units that had recently deployed to the
forward defense line engaged a South African force. Late in the
month Angolan and Cuban surface-to-air missile units along the
forward defense line fired on South African fighter-bombers for the
first time.
South African reports claim that on 3 January two Cuban
battalions joined a counterattack by Angolan and SWAPO forces
against a South African unit. This was the first significant engagement
between South African and Cuban forces since the Angolan civil war
of 1975-76. According to Pretoria, a Soviet military officer
coordinated this operation.
Although South African officials are publicly exuberant about
their victory, heavy South African losses have prompted critical
editorials in both the English and Afrikaans press. The government
has admitted that 21 South African soldiers were killed or are missing,
Neither side is likely to end all military activity during the trial
cease-fire. South Africa will continue to conduct aerial
reconnaissance to monitor Angolan forces, and Malan told the US
Charge on 11 January that ground reconnaissance patrols would
operate north of the Namibian border. In press statements Malan has
insisted that South Africa would renew operations in southern Angola
"regardless of consequences" if Angola or SWAPO took advantage
of the truce.
Angola also is likely to send reconnaissance patrols into the area
vacated by the South African forces, and these forces could engage
South African patrols. Both Angola and SWAPO, however, could
profit from a respite from attacks. They probably will not give South
Africa an excuse over the next few weeks for reneging on its
commitment to withdraw.
The cease-fire is unlikely to hold beyond the trial period-if that
long-unless both sides are willing to tolerate minor military
engagements.
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The aggressive Cuban posture in the last round of fighting
suggests that Havana may play an active role in any fighting that
results from the collapse of the cease-fire. The Soviets probably
intend to provide more military support to the Angolans, as the arrival
of MIG-23 Flogger aircraft in Luanda earlier this month demonstrates.
The discussions in Moscow last week among the Soviets, Cubans,
and Angolans are the latest indication that the USSR and Cuba are
taking the deteriorating security situation in Angola seriously. The
Soviets, however, are likely to continue to allow Havana to take the
lead in combat operations.
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