NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY WEDNESDAY 4 JANUARY 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00970R000100010007-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 24, 2010
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: January 4, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
-Tajstee+es-
National Intelligence Daily
Wednesday
4 January 1984
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Contents
Lebanon: Security Proposals .................................................. 1
USSR: Possible Approaches to Arms Negotiations ................ 2
Nigeria: Initial Moves by the Military ......................................
USSR-Japan: Soviets Standing Firm ......................................
Tunisia: Bread Riots ................................................................
Ell Salvador: Attacks Embarrass High Command ..................
Sudan: Less Emphasis on Islamic Law .................................... 7
South Africa-Angola: Ground and Air Operations ................ 8
Bangladesh-USSR: Soviet Diplomats Expelled ...................... 8
Special Analysis
USSR: Andropov's Political Gains .......................................... 9
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January
1984
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Mediterranean
Sea
Beirut
International
Airport
Proposed US
patrol area-,
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LEBANON: Security Proposals
President Gemayel's proposal yesterday for a redeployment of
three of the four Multinational Force contingents, to enable the
Lebanese Army to expand its control over all areas not occupied by
foreign forces, may be opposed by Syria and by Lebanese elements.
Gemayel is proposing a two-phase redeployment in which the
French and Italians would first expand their areas of responsibility in
Beirut. In the second phase, the Italians would expand their control to
the coastal road between Beirut and Tripoli, and the French would
take responsibility for the Beirut-Damascus Highway as far east as
Shtawrah. The US would police the coastal highway between Beirut
and the Awwali River.
Contacts of the US Embassy report that Druze leader Walid
Junblatt has accepted the terms of a new security plan sponsored
by the Saudis calling for the withdrawal of the Lebanese Forces
Christian militia from the Shuf and Kharrub regions. The Lebanese
Government's Internal Security Force would be deployed among
Sunni villages in the areas evacuated, and Lebanese Army units
would be moved to Sidon. The government also is to open the road to
the southern suburbs, and arrangements are being made for
elements of the Italian contingent to take up observer positions.
Comment: President Gemayel's reasons for proposing the
redeployment of the Multinational Force are not clear. He probably
realizes the French and Italians are likely to reject his proposals.
If the security arrangement materializes, it could ease a major
source of tension-the fighting between Lebanese Forces and Druze
militias south of Ad Damur. The deployment of Lebanese Army units
to Sidon would strengthen the government's political position among
southerners who have been demanding a government presence there.
There are no indications, however, that this plan has been accepted
by the Syrians, the Shia, or the Lebanese Forces.
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USSR: Possible Approaches to Arms Negotiations
A senior Foreign Ministry official reportedly said in mid-December
that, for the USSR, the MBFR talks are "over," but he indicated that
Moscow has some other approaches to arms control under
consideration.
the official told a colleague that some of
Moscow's allies would not be pleased at the decision to stop the
MBFR talks and that he acknowledged the negotiations had been
important to Moscow, despite the lack of progress. He explained,
however, that there appeared to be "no political will" in the West to
reach an MBFR agreement, and for the USSR, "the talks are over."
The official also said he expected little to be achieved at the
Conference on Disarmament in Europe, which opens this month.
The official said, on the other hand, the European situation
demands "urgent decisions" and "concrete results" in the near
future. He said there is discussion in Moscow of the possibility of
merging the START and INF talks and of replacing the MBFR talks
with new arms negotiations between the Warsaw Pact and NATO in
conjunction with a revived proposal for a political treaty between the
alliances. He added that Foreign Minister Gromyko supports the latter
plan and has delegated members of his staff to study its feasibility.
Comment: The official's remarks underscore the dilemma
confronting Soviet arms control policy. On the one hand, the Soviets
are reluctant to resume talks at least until they have proceeded
further with counterdeployments in response to INF and have
determined whether the US negotiating position will be affected by
anti-INF sentiment in Western Europe and by political developments
within the US. On the other, they realize that the longer talks are
disrupted. the less their chances of limiting NATO deployments.
If Gromyko indeed wants to propose a new multilateral arms
control forum, he could be preparing to do so at the CDE conference.
Recent Soviet comments indicate, however, that the USSR sees no
prospect for d INF issues in the
near future.
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NIGERIA: Initial Moves by the Military
The country is returning to normal as Head of State Buhari's
regime consolidates its position.
The Supreme Military Council has expanded its membership to 19
and has cut the number of federal ministries from 35 to 22. The
Council met yesterday to consider nominees for cabinet ministers and
military governors. Meanwhile, senior civil servants have assumed
administrative responsibility for the ministries
Economic life is returning to normal, although scattered reports
indicate some traders in the markets have closed their shops rather
than obey military demands that they lower prices. The US Embassy
reports that food supplies appear to be adequate.
Press-reports indicate that the new government yesterday made
an initial payment on part of its rescheduled debt. In addition, the
government publicly reaffirmed its intention not to leave OPEC or to
reduce the price of its oil unilaterally.
The roundup of prominent civilian politicians is continuing and
former President Shagari reportedly is in custody in Lagos. The
regime is stressing the need for "accountability" and for dealing
harshly and swiftly with corrupt politicians.
Comment: The government's new economic team is not yet in
place and the military leaders do not yet have a grasp of the
magnitude of the economic crisis. In the short term the military is
likely to continue stopgap efforts that may gain some political support
but will do little to begin turning the economy around.
Government decrees to lower prices, particularly if accompanied
by military force, could encourage widespread hoarding and cause
shops to close. A vigorous anticorruption drive probably will enjoy
broad initial support, but a sustained, forceful sweep could make
ethnic and regional tensions worse.
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USSR-JAPAN: Soviets Standing Firm
Premier Tikhonov's uncompromising statements on bilateral
relations appearing in Pravda this week suggest that Moscow does not
expect the recent Japanese elections to affect Tokyo's foreign policy.
Tikhonov, answering questions from the Japanese press, accused
the government of Prime Minister Nakasone of taking its cue from the
US in "dismantling the entire system of Soviet-Japanese relations"
established during the postwar period. He reiterated interest in
improving ties with Japan and repeated the Soviet position on INF
deployments in Europe but rejected an blame for the current
stalemate on either point.
Meanwhile, a TASS dispatch from Tokyo on Sunday strongly
criticized Nakasone's first major policy statement since the Japanese
elections in mid-December, in which he reaffirmed the importance of
US-Japanese relations. Soviet media coverage of the elections
portrayed the setback dealt to Nakasone's Liberal Democratic Party
as evidence of popular opposition to Tokyo's pro-US policies but
predicted that those policies would not change.
Comment: The Tikhonov interview suggests the Soviets expect
no real change in policy and have concluded they have little to gain
from demonstrating flexibility, at least at present. They continue to
blame Tokyo for the recent downturn in trade and other contacts,
while underlining their resolve to stand firm on the Northern
Territories and other issues troubling relations.
Moscow apparently believes that its best course is to keep
hammering away on the dangers of Japan's security ties with the US,
with the hope that Japanese public opinion will eventually force
changes in Tokyo's foreign policy. Tokyo believes it is up to the
Soviets to take the first step.
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Widespread civil disorders provoked by rising bread prices may
cause some political problems for Prime Minister Mzali but are
unlikely to have a significant impact on Tunisian economic policies.
Bread prices have doubled as the result of a government decision
put in effect on Sunday to remove subsidies on wheat. The move is
part of a broader effort to improve Tunisia's balance of payments and
stimulate the economy. Mzali had announced in a well-publicized
speech to the National Assembly last week that the government
would provide compensation to low-income Tunisians to help offset
the price increases.
Press reports indicate that up to 27 people died and many more
have been injured during violent protests in a number of cities. The
violence, supported by university students, has forced President
Bourguiba to declare a state of emergency, impose a nationwide
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Senior officials yesterday, during talks with the US Embassy,
blamed Tunisians inspired by Libya for the rioting. The officials urged
Washington to rush planned military assistance to deter further
Libyan meddling.
Comment: The intensity of the disturbances highlights the failure
of government efforts to sell its program to the poorer Tunisians that
would be most affected and reflects the general frustration many
young Tunisians feel over the lack of employment opportunities. The
riots will cast doubts within political circles on the leadership abilities
of Mzali, who, over the past year, has won approval from Bourguiba
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The swift intervention by Army units indicates the government
is prepared to act decisively to restore order, as it did during
widespread labor riots in 1978. The protests may force some
compromises on the issue of price increases, but they are unlikely to
dissuade Bourguiba and his advisers from their broader commitment
to reduce government expenditures for economic and social
programs
The regime undoubtedly is concerned
that Libya plans to increase subversion in Tunisia
soon. Nevertheless, Libyan involvement in the current disturbances
probably is slight, and the approach to the US clearly reflects an
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EL SALVADOR: Attacks Embarrass High Command
Salvadoran military officials have told the US defense attache that
some 80 troops were killed or wounded and about 40 were captured
in the recent attack on the 4th Brigade in and around El Paraiso. The
officials say most of the damage resulted from the destruction of the
brigade's ammunition depot.
The attache has learned that the 12 to 15 recently recruite ationa
Guardsmen deployed at the end of the Cuscatlan Bridge that was
dynamited on Sunday were distracted by a firefight, enabling other
guerrillas to attach explosives to the bridge and detonate them.
Comment: The attacks do not alter the current tactical stalemate,
but they caught the Salvadoran armed forces by surprise and are
embarrassing to the high command. Insuraent forces are likeI to be
emboldened by their successes.
SUDAN: Less Emphasis on Islamic Law
President Nimeiri's Independence Day speech last Saturday
suggests he plans to reverse course and gradually deemphasize the
role of Islam in government. He stressed that his recently instituted
Islamic reforms would be applied judiciously and would not supplant
Sudan's constitution, its presidential system, or its sole political party.
Nimeiri also intends to repeal a
religiously inspired law that set harsh penalties for breaches of
discipline in the armed forces. He reportedly has ordered
references to Islam be deleted from future legislation
Comment: Nimeiri's speech will calm fears by many Sudanese
that he was about to turn Sudan into a strict Islamic state. His
moderate tone and the repeal of the armed forces act probably will
reassure key constituencies in the military, the civil service, and the
Sudanese Socialist Union. Since Nimeiri's return on 12 December
from his recent visit to foreign capitals, there has been a noticeable
absence of rhetoric extolling Islam, new reli iousl ins ired
regulations, and harsh Islamic punishments.
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South African
ufier zone
n
South
Atlantic
Ocean
bia
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Zambia
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SOUTH AFRICA-ANGOLA: Ground and Air Operations
A senior South African military officer says operations within
Angola-now in the fourth week-are continuing, noting that infantr
units have killed more than 50 SWAPO guerrillas
Meanwhile, Luanda announced
yesterday that President dos Santos had informed the UN Secretary
General that it would accept the South African offer of a 30-day truce
beginning 31 January, provided South Africa promises to carry out
the UN plan for Namibian independence without imposing "alien
conditions."
Comment: Although South Africa apparently is continuing its air
and artillery strikes against Angolan garrisons, there is no evidence of
large-scale infantry clashes. As long as the conflict remains at the
present level, Luanda probably will not withdraw from its forward
defense line or pull back its air defense equipment. There is as yet no
evidence that Angola has informed South Africa of its conditional
acceptance of the truce offer. In any event, the South Africans are
unlikely to drop their insistence on linking Namibian independence to
withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola.
BANGLADESH-USSR: Soviet Diplomats Expelled
Bangladesh has expelled 15 Soviet diplomats in the past several
days in retaliation for the Embassy's support for the country's leftist
political parties. Moscow, in a formal protest, denies President
Ershad's accusations and is
threatening to undertake `appropriate reciprocal measures." A
Soviet press commentator has accused the US of urging the
expulsions.
Comment: Ershad, who believes he has solid evidence of Soviet
meddling, wants to limit foreign contacts with his opposition as he
attempts to move to civilian rule. He is concerned about the size of
the Soviet mission, the largest in the country even though relations
between Bangladesh and the USSR have declined in recent years.
Moscow may retaliate by expelling some Bangladeshi diplomats or by
further reducing its modest economic and military assistance.
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Special Analysis
USSR: Andropov's Political Gains
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The results of the Central Committee plenum and the Supreme
Soviet session indicate that General Secretary Andropov's prolonged
physical disability has not yet halted his progress in consolidating
power. Although Andropov was unable to attend the meetings, his
influence was apparent in all of the personnel moves approved by the
plenum and in his domination of media coverage of the events. Those
promoted-Vorotnikov, Solomentsev, Chebrikov, and Ligachev-are
either his proteges or supporters. As a result of the negative impact of
Andropov's absence, the leadership took pains to give him extensive
publicity. Soviet television devoted more time to his nomination as a
candidate for the elections in March to the Supreme Soviet than to
coverage of the meeting of the Supreme Soviet itself and implied that
he will still be around for the elections.
This demonstration of political strength at a time of physical
weakness suggests that:
- There are no other obvious contenders in the Politburo.
- Andropov's illness is not regarded by his colleagues as
imminently life-threatening or permanently incapacitating,
and it did not prevent him from working behind the scenes
to ensure the promotion of his choices.
- The promotions had the strong backing of Andropov's key
allies- particularly Defense Minister Ustinov-whose own
interests were served by strengthening Andropov's
position and who see no good alternative to his
leadership.
- Despite the negative political impact of Andropov's illness,
Party Secretary Chernenko and Premier Tikhonov, his
chief opponents, were too weak to sway the Politburo on
what probably was a test of the General Secretary's
leadership.
Andropov's prolonged absence almost certainly increased his
allies' doubts about his staying power and the willingness of his
opponents to maneuver against him. His allies-including Ustinov,
party secretary Gorbachev, and Foreign Minister Gromyko-are likely
to have supported the personnel moves with the succession in mind.
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They probably viewed Andropov's candidates as leaders they could
work with comfortably when he leaves the scene, and they are likely to
believe the moves will strengthen their own positions. In addition, all
of the appointees have past party management connections with
heavy or defense industry that Ustinov would find particularly
appealing.
Andropov's Speech
than pushing on policy matters.
Andropov's political gains may have been won at some cost. His
speech, which was read to the Central Committee in his absence,
contained no significant initiatives. This suggests that the price of his
victory on the personnel changes may have been some agreement to
temporize on policy. For example, Andropov's vague references to
the prospect of major change in economic planning and management
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The Soviet leader placed even stronger emphasis than he has in
the past on the need to increase labor discipline and executive
responsibility and to make better use of hidden reserves. This
approach appears to have considerable support in the leadership. It
probably had at least some impact on the improved economic
performance this year-an upturn that may have reduced the sense
of urgency for more fundamental changes.
Andropov's speech and the subsequent discussion in the
Supreme Soviet suggest that there will be little change in economic
priorities or strategy. His emphasis on the need to eliminate waste
indicates that the gains planned for consumer-oriented sectors would
have to be achieved through increased efficiency. Moreover, the plan
figures for,this year do not point to a major change in resource
The failure of Andropov to address foreign policy issues and his
statement that "everything necessary" had been done to keep
defense capacity at a "proper level" also probably indicate that the
leadership wanted to allay public concern about the international
situation and focus attention on domestic policy.
Prospects
The personnel changes strengthened the political position in the
Politburo of Andropov and of Ustinov and his other allies. Andropov's
ability to capitalize on his success will depend on whether he can
resume a more active role. If so, his added political support may
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enable him to mount an assault on Chernenko and Tikhonov that
could culminate in an effort to replace them at the plenum in the
spring.
Andropov needs to replace these adversaries to gain firmer
control over policy implementation and the party and government
bureaucracies. His ability to direct economic policy is constrained by
Tikhonov's continued presence as Chairman of the Council of
Ministers, which gives Tikhonov primary responsibility in that area.
Chernenko, as the senior party secretary under Andropov and
ideological chief, still constitutes a brake on the General, Secretary's
efforts to mobilize the party machinery for his purposes.
Two of Andropov's allies, Vorotnikov and Gorbachev, are in a
good position to replace Tikhonov and Chernenko, and Andropov
may now have enough support to push for the change. If so, criticism
of both Tikhonov and Chernenko may soon become more pointed.
If Andropov fails to make the kind of recovery that he and his
colleagues evidently anticipate or hope for, however, all bets will be
off. Rivalries among his supporters-especially Gorbachev and
Romanov-would then be likely to come to the fore as they maneuver
in a succession process that almost certainly would prove far less
orderly than the last. Increased signs of political jockeying by
prospective heirs would be one of the surest signs that Andropov's
days are thought to be numbered.
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