NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY TUESDAY 3 JANUARY 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00970R000100010004-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 20, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: January 3, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

Director of
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Tuesday
3 January 1984
CPAS jan duo198 25X1
anuery 7984
3
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Contents
Ell Salvador: New Guerrilla Attacks ........................................
Suriname: Labor Crisis Continues ..........................................
1
2
UN: Security Council's Role in 1984 ........................................
USSR-Italy: Criticism of Berlinguer's Initiative ........................
Guatemala: Election Maneuvering .......................................... 7
Vietnam: Reduction in Foreign Trade Deficit .......................... 7
Special Analyses
Nigeria: Implications of Military Takeover .............................. 8
USSR-Libya: Expanding Ties .................................................. 11
1
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3 January 1984
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,1 January
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3 January 1984
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The guerrillas on Friday overran the 4th Brigade headquarters in
El Paraiso and claim to have killed or wounded some 200 troops and
to have captured 200 prisoners and nearly 300 weapons. According
to the US defense attache, Army reinforcements-including elements
Recent insurgent attacks against government forces and a key
transportation target in the northern and central parts of the country
will impair military mobility.
of the elite airborne and Belloso battalions-quickly retook the
garrison. In addition, the insurgents on Sunday blew up the Cuscatlan
Bridge, the major transportation link with eastern El Salvador.
Meanwhile, the Army on 28 December began a sweep of western
Usulutan, according to the US defense attache. Two immediate
reaction battalions are involved, with a third battalion acting as a
blocking force to the north. The defense attache reports only light
contact with the guerrillas thus far.
Comment: The guerrillas evidently took advantage of the heavy
concentration of Army forces in eastern El Salvador to strike in the
northern and central regions. The attack at El Paraiso is the first time
a brigade headquarters has been captured, and it could affect the
Army's morale, which had been improving, following recent successes
in the east. The destruction of the Cuscatlan Bridge will disrupt the
transportation network and impede the military's ability to transfer
forces readily between eastern and central El Salvadov.
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SURINAME: Labor Crisis Continues
The impasse between the government and striking bauxite
workers continues, but Army Commander Bouterse's options for a
peaceful settlement are dwindling.
Surinamese Government officials, in discussions with US
Embassy officials during the weekend, reaffirmed their commitment
to the safety of some 300 American citizens in Suriname. They stated
that Paramaribo will continue to seek a peaceful solution to the labor
crisis but indicated that, if the strikers refused the government's
overtures, it would have to use armed force. According to Embassy
reporting, Bouterse blames the strike primarily on Finance Minister
Caldeira for prematurely announcing tax increases.
In a televised speech Sunday, Bouterse described the strikes as a
"serious destabilization attempt masquerading as tax problems" and
indirectly criticized the strikers as greedy. Striking workers at the
bauxite plant of the Suriname Aluminum Company. which iG under US
management, refused to return to work yesterday because Bouterse
failed to mention in his speech concessions that he reportedly had
agreed to on Friday.
During the weekend, the capital remained calm with no signs of
threats to US citizens. The Embassy commented that Bouterse
appears to be continuing to test the situation and to avoid taking any
decisive action.
Comment: With the US intervention in Grenada fresh in his mind,
Bouterse will move carefully in dealing with the crisis, but he would be
likely to use force to dispel the striking workers if he thinks the
continuing strike challenges his authority or threatens his power. If he
becomes convinced that forcible measures are necessary, he
probably will try to avoid actions against US citizens or property.
Should violence break out, US managers of the aluminum
company could be in danger of reprisals by radicals in the regime who
blame the company for the strike.
While earlier media coverage in Suriname tried to calm public
apprehension, the tone of Bouterse's speech probably was intended
to set the stage for military action if the strikers do not agree to a
compromise settlement. Although Bouterse may have promised
concessions to the striking workers, he also apparently is trying to
avoid the appearance of backing down. He may think that time is on
his side, since the strike has not spread, but the loss of $750,000 a
day in government revenues portends serious difficulties for
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Suriname's faltering economy.
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UN Security Council in 1984
Permanent Members
China
Nonpermanent Members
Egypt a replacing Togo
India a replacing Jordan
Peru a replacing Guyana
Ukrainian SSR replacing Poland
Upper Volta a replacing Zaire
Zimbabwe a
3 January 1984
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UN: Security Council's Role in 1984
The nonaligned majority and the West Europeans in the Security
Council, as well as Secretary General Perez de Cuellar, will seek an
expanded role for the UN this year in the Middle East and in other
crisis areas.
France and Egypt are laying the groundwork for revival of their
resolution on Lebanon. The original draft called for a cease-fire,
withdrawal of all foreign forces, recognition of a Palestinian right of
self-determination, and negotiations among all interested parties,
including the PLO. The French and Soviets have consulted in
Moscow, and the US Embassy there reports the Soviets are showing 25X1
interest but remain noncommittal.
Nicaragua may exploit its presidency of the Council this month to
publicize its claims of peaceful intentions and to urge a UN role in the
Contadora process. South African attacks in southern Angola may
cause Luanda to seek help from the Council. Turkish Cypriots might
threaten to call for the withdrawal of UN forces from their area of
Cyprus to assure that their demands receive attention.
Comment: European contributors to the Multinational Force in
Lebanon are seeking UN sanctions for their presence there in order to
strengthen domestic support for participation. Although the Soviets
have backed Syrian opposition to expansion of the UN Force in
Lebanon, they may consider a broader UN role a step toward their
goal of an international conference on the Middle East and the
removal of US forces from Lebanon.
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USSR-ITALY: Criticism of Berlinguer's Initiative
Soviet officials reportedly told visiting officials of the Italian
Communist Party last month that party chief Berlinguer's current
efforts to restore the US-Soviet arms control dialogue were of little
consequence. They said the Soviet party preferred that the Italian
party take no initiatives other than to encourage the Italian peace
movement to oppose actively the installation of cruise missiles at
Comment: The Soviets have long been disgruntled by the Italian
party's independent approach to the INF issue. They may believe that
Berlinguer's initiative could undermine their own policies by
proposing unilateral concessions by the USSR and less rigid
conditions for resuming arms negotiations. Berlinguer has proposed
the destruction of at least some SS-20s and the resumption of the
Geneva talks, along with a six-month delay in NATO deployments.
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GUATEMALA: Election Maneuvering
The draft electoral law proposed by the government is being
criticized by most of the 37 political groups hoping to contest the
elections for the constituent assembly next July. The US Embassy
says the parties want the assembly to have broad legislative powers
and to elect a provisional president. They are demanding that
candidates be permitted to run on a national at-large basis. The
rightist National Liberation Movement-the country's strongest
party-is threatening to boycott the election unless revisions are
made.
Comment: Head of State Mejia appears willing to revise the law,
and he may agree to some at-large candidacies. Few of the parties
have strong organizations outside of Guatemala City, and they
probably fear that Indian leaders and other rural delegates could
dominate the assembly if the proposed proportional representation
system is used. Mejia is unlikely, however, to allow the assembly to
name a provisional president. This would return the government to
civilian hands before the military is ready to do so and damage the
prospects of the new groups by denying them time to get organized.
VIETNAM: Reduction in Foreign Trade Deficit
Hanoi announced last week that substantially increased exports
have cut its foreign trade deficit to $630 million in 1983, a 30-percent
reduction from the level of 1982. The increase is primarily the result of
growing sales of light handicrafts and seafood to Communist and
Western countries. This announcement follows recent official
statements projecting near self-sufficiency in food and a major
increase in economic growth.
Comment: The increases in production and exports are largely
the result of favorable weather, export promotion activities, and
incentive measures introduced in 1979 to overcome severe food
shortages. They do not represent any fundamental improvements in
the economy. Hanoi's reversal of some of the incentive policies may
cut short the growth in food production. Moreover, despite the
improvement in the balance of trade, foreign exchange reserves are
practically exhausted and overdue payments of about $300 million on
the hard currency debt virtually preclude access to international
capital markets
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Special Analysis
NIGERIA: Implications of Military Takeover
Nigeria's new and strongly nationalistic military regime appears to
be dominated largely by senior northern Muslim officers. Head of
State Major General Muhammadu Buhari has promised a vigorous
campaign to curb corruption and improve living standards, but he
probably is not yet fully aware of the extent of the country's economic
crisis. Buhari's initial actions indicate that he does not plan to make
major changes in Nigeria's generally moderate domestic and foreign
policies. Washington may find Lagos more difficult to deal with,
however, if the regime-frustrated by continued economic decline-
seeks to make the West and the international financial community
scapegoats for Nigeria's economic woes. Buhari's pledge to pursue a
more "dynamic" role in foreign affairs also might lead to harsher
criticism of US policy in southern Africa and to posturing to
underscore Nigeria's nonalignment.
The coup was motivated largely by concern over the economy 25X1
and widespread corruption. senior
officers also moved to preempt "younger hawks," and Shagari's 25X1
military chiefs acquiesced in, if not supported
the takeover
,
.
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The New Leadership
The government strongly res bles Nigeria's last military regime.
It is likely to rely heavily on senior civil servants to staff key economic
positions and to carry out policy.
The 17-member Supreme Military Council responsible for
policymaking is dominated by Hausas and Fulanis, with a smaller
number of minority tribesmen and southern Yoruba officers who
served in the military government from 1975 to 1979. The extensive
administrative experience of these officers will provide continuity and
help to smooth the transition to military rule.
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Federal States and Triball Groups
P4aLeau
.. ongoIa
nc;o
.~ .tom 1,~'.sOx a
-n f
Gulf of Guinan
The "Holy North"=75-100% Muslim
Former Northern Region boundary
State boundary
PRINCIPAL TRIBES
Hausa and Fulani 0 Yoruba
0 Ibo
MINOR TRIBES
Kanuri
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An early test of the regime, however, will be its ability to forestall
ethnic grumbling. It almost certainly will be necessary for the
government to provide for wider representation by non-northerners in
cabinet and gubernatorial appointments.
Buhari will quickly find that he has few options for dealing with
Nigeria's worst economic recession since the civil war in 1967-70. The
military will have to contend with reduced revenues that last year were
half of their peak of $22 billion in 1980.
To make ends meet, the Shagari government during the past year
cut imports to the lowest level since 1977 and allowed short-term
trade arrearages to mount. This had left Nigeria with major shortages
of essential consumer industrial goods, record unemployment, and
total unpaid bills that were last estimated at $6-7 billion by the middle
of last year.
The new head of state has yet to announce a comprehensive
economic recovery plan. There is little the new government can do,
however, to increase government revenues, given current world oil
conditions. Buhari has pledged not to break with OPEC, and the
government probably will seek-at least initially-to resume
negotiations with the IMF for a $2.5 billion loan and with international
banks to reschedule the remaining $5 billion in short-term arrearages.
Such negotiations could prove more contentious under the more
nationalistic military, and delays in reaching an agreement will only
make economic conditions worse. Buhari has promised to meet
Nigeria's "genuine" financial commitments, but the military could
take a harder line against what it sees as externally imposed and
unreasonable demands-including devaluation-made by the IMF
and international financial institutions.
Buhari-for the most part-is pragmatic, pro-Western, anti-
Communist, and strongly nationalistic. Although the military will seek
to maintain cooperative ties with the US, Buhari will try to distinguish
his regime from the more conservative, inward-looking Shagari
government that was criticized by some Nigerians as being too
accommodating to the West. A more strident and activist foreign
policy could ensue, with greater emphasis on "Nigeria first" and
nonalignment.
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Lagos, particularly, is likely to become more outspoken publicly in
its criticism of US policy in southern Africa. During his participation in
the last military regime, Buhari was considered part of a strongly
nationalistic faction that supported Angola, Namibian independence,
and sanctions against South Africa.
Even so, major gains for Soviet and Libyan influence are unlikely.
Although Moscow and Tripoli may see advantages to the collapse of
Nigeria's US-style civilian government and the potential for a more
!nn,cpe,iden. Nigerian foreign po!!cy, Buhari's strong nationalism and
Lagos's need for Western trade, aid, and invesiirnznt will make
siy:^!f!caP;Lt:y closer t;es difficult in the near term.
The new regime probably wi!! try to by i;n,a to deal with the
economy by focusing attention on the corruption and inefficiency of
the former civilian government. Trials of Shagari's key lieutenants for
corruption and criticism of the former President's economic policies
will provide at least a temporary image of firm and decisive leadership
but are not likely to deflect attention from the country's financial crisis
for long.
The likelihood of a continued soft world oil market makes
prospects for an economic turnaround poor. The military will quickly
be confronted with the same narrow and politically unappealing
choices that faced Shagari.
Buhari is likely to find himself unable to keep promises to improve
living standards without first imposing prolonged and painful austerity
measures. The stability of his government ultimately will rest on its
willingness and ability to address the roots of the economic malaise-
overdependence on oil revenues, a bloated bureaucracy,
unproductive agriculture, and inefficient, import-dependent
industries.
Buhari also will find it difficult to control the political and ethnic
rivalries that will now shift from the political arena to the armed forces
and that over time will strain the military's cohesion. Although military
discipline and the chain of command appear to have survived the
coup, lower-ranking personnel who favor more drastic action could
become increasingly disenchanted with a government dominated by
generals if few changes appear likely. Other economically troubled 25X1
West African governments and their concerned militaries will be
watching Lagos closely as a model to emulate or avoid. 25X1
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Special Analysis
USSR-LIBYA: Expanding Ties
Libyan leader Qadhafi's reported plans to visit Moscow early this
year underscore the gradual improvement in Soviet-Libyan relations
over the last two years. Political contacts and military cooperation
between Moscow and Tripoli probably will continue to develop as the
US expands its military presence in the region and as Moscow is able
to exploit Qadhafi's increased sense of vulnerability. This cooperation
could improve the Soviets' ability to monitor activities of the US Sixth
Fleet. On the other hand, differences over ideology and approaches to
an Arab-Israeli settlement, as well as Moscow's wariness about
Qadhafi's stability, will continue to limit the relationship.
The head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Near East Department
reportedly told an Egyptian diplomat recently that Qadhafi would
arrive in Moscow early this year, meet with General Secretary
Andropov, and sign a treaty of friendship and cooperation. Since the
two sides agreed "in principle" nine months ago to sign the treaty,
progress toward closer relations had seemed to falter.
Soviet officials had privately suggested the treaty negotiations
had been put aside, and Soviet media have been ignoring it. 25X1
Expanding Ties
Qadhafi has turned to the USSR because he has come to feel
more threatened by the US since 1981. High-level political contacts in
the 1970s were rare, but in 1981 Soviet and Libyan leaders met on
three separate occasions, including a visit by Qadhafi to Moscow.
Qadhafi's second in command, Major Jallud, also visited Moscow that
year and conferred with Premier Tikhonov and top military officers.
Jallud was again in Moscow last March, when the two sides
announced the agreement in principle to sign the treaty of friendship.
The commander of the Libyan Air Force arrived in Moscow in
December for talks with his counterpart.
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Egypt
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AI`Jufrah. Afield:
uriq!Fr cgnstruction
o bey
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The pace of military cooperation picked up considerably when
Qadhafi began allowing Soviet naval warships and naval aircraft to
make periodic visits to Libya in the summer of 1981. Over the past
14 months, the Soviets and Libyans conducted two combined naval
In addition, the Soviets are completing a new airfield with a 4,400-
meter runway at Al Jufrah that could accommodate medium bombers
equipped with air-to-surface missiles. Libya, however, does not yet
have such aircraft,
The Soviets, however, could use Al Jufrah for IL-38
reconnaissance aircraft that currently deploy to Libya. Another-and
less likely-possibility would be the deployment of naval strike
aircraft to the airfield as a counter to the US presence in the
Mediterranean.
Differing Objectives
The USSR has long valued Libya's active opposition to US activity
in the Middle East, its efforts to foster the emergence of radical
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regimes, and its hard currency purchases of Soviet arms. The Soviets
also presumably have welcomed Libyan efforts to undermine pro-
Western governments in the region.
Despite these shared interests, Moscow and Tripoli differ over
long-term objectives. The Libyans aspire to head an Arab and Islamic
bloc of n ions that will challenge the supremacy of the superpowers.
The differing approaches by the USSR and Libya to a settlement
of the Arab-Israeli dispute are a matter of public record. The Soviets
support Israel's existence within its pre-1967 borders and have
openly criticized "extremist Arab circles" for calling for the
elimination of a Jewish state.
Qadhafi's willingness to support dissident groups in pro-Western
countries serves Soviet interests, but the Soviets are worried about
his erratic behavior.
Moscow has not always provided the support Qadhafi seeks. Its
generally cautious approach was evident during the fighting last
summer in Chad. The USSR gave Libya some logistic support,
including assistance from some Soviet technicians at Aozou airfield in
northern Chad and made a demarche in Washington cautioning the
US about any military action against Libya
Military and political ties between Moscow and Tripoli are likely to
continue to improve if US military involvement grows in the Middle
East and North Africa. Qadhafi realizes that the USSR is his best
source of support to counter US pressures, and the Soviets clearly
value Libya as a check on Western influence in the region.
Expanded access to Libyan ports could become an important
convenience to the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron. Nonetheless,
Libyan access is not crucial to the Soviets' ability to maintain the
squadron, and development of major facilities is unlikely. Regular
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deployments of naval reconnaissance aircraft to Libya, on the other
hand, would improve the Soviets' ability to monitor the US Sixth Fleet.
Frictions over political strategy and military access will continue
to limit the relationship even if a treaty of friendship and cooperation
is signed. Such a treaty-like the 10 the USSR has with other Third
World countries-would not involve any firm Soviet military
commitment to Libya. Moscow wants to avoid being made
responsible for any of Qadhafi's actions that might lead to a direct
The Soviets, however, may calculate that such a formalized
relationship will reassure Qadhafi and deter US action against Libya.
The Soviets also may hope that a treaty would serve to remind the US
of the USSR's determination to strengthen its influence in the Middle
East. At the same time, the USSR is likely to try to reassure Egypt and
AI eria that such a eaty would pose no threat to them.
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