WEEKLY SUMMARY NUMBER 129

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A002400160001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 17, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

~i - i ~ n
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WEEKLY
SUIV~I~ARY
Number 12 9
17 Nov 1950
Docw:,ent :~a. DD
Date:~,~~ Byb,
ss. C'r~1NCF.D T0: TS S
DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
.~35o~-t
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1. Thispublication contains current intellibence exclusively
and therefore has not been coordinated with the intelli-
gence organizations of the departments of State, Army,
Navy, and Air Force.
2. This copy may be either retained, or destroyed by burning
-. in accordance with applicable security regulations, or
returned to the Central Intelligence Agency.
This document contains information affecting the na-
tional defense of the United States within the meaning
of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32; as amended.
Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by ]aw.
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_ ;
 HIGHLIGHTS .......:.... .............. 1
KOREAN DEVELOPMENTS
UN Action.. ............ .... .. 2
Military Tactics_ ................:..~ .. 2
MukdenDefenses;,, ,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 3
'British Policy ........... ......... 4
WESTERN EUROPE
The Schuman Plan , . , , , ......... ..... 5
'Berlin Economy,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 5
German Elections .................... '6
.:EASTERN EUROPE
Soviet Maritime Policy ; , , , , , , , , , , , , 8
Czech~SovietTracie,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 9
Soviet Benzol Shortage ................. 9
NEAR EAST-AFRICA
Greek-Yugoslav .Relations ............... 11
Greek Government Prospects.; , ; , , , , , , , , , , 11
India's Security ...................... 12
=LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS ............. . 14
~;
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 Chinese Communist intentions regarding Korea and
the UN decision regarding China's intervention there re-
mained the crucial issues affecting US security. The UN was
marking time pending the arrival at Lake Success of the
Peiping delegation, and most UN members still seemed pri-
marily interested in reaching a solution in North Korea short
of one requiring the use of military sanctions against China
(see page 2). Meanwhile, Chinese Communist political and
military moves gave little indication of a readiness to withdraw
from Korea or seek a political solution acceptable to the majority
of the UN members. The Chinese, however, still retain full
freedom of choice to withdraw from Korea, maintain the present
stalemate, or attempt to drive UN forces out of. Korea.
Recent Chinese Communist activities have also aggra-
vated India's border security problem (see page i2). The
advance on Tibet and increasing Chinese interest in areas
bordering India confront New Delhi- with the difficult task of
.strengthening its frontier guards at a time when it is apparently
.preparing for a showdown on the Kashmir question,
-I-
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 UN Action With UN action on Chinese Communist inter=
vention in Korea at a standstill pending the
arrival of the Peiping delegation, it is apparent that the
majority of the UN members are primarily anxious to find
some formula short of military sanctions against Communist
China which would lead to a politicaLsettlement in North
Koi?ea: ~ Current Soeiet and Chinese propaganda and actions,
however, reveal little disposition to seek a settlement on
terms which could be accepted by the UN. Peiping's peremptory
demand that the UN consider its complaints against the US and
its summary rejection 'of the invitation to be heard on the
question of Chinese intervention in Korea will make it most
difficult for the UN to negotiate with the Chinese delegates
when they arrive. Moreover, both.Communist China and the
USSR are still insisting on a "peaceful" settlement in Korea
with the implicit stipulation that UN forces be withdrawn. Mean-
while, the military tactics being employed in North Korea in-
dicate adetermination to continue to defend the area, and pre-
parations are under way against possible UN military action
against Manchuria. The Chinese Communists, however, are
still maintaining their full freedom of action. Although a ? ~' .
p?liti.cal settlement seems unlikely at this time, they still re-
i:aiin freedom of choice to prolong the present military stalemate,
irsc~ease their military effort in an attempt to drive UN forces
back to the 38th Parallel or possibly out of Korea, or even with-
draw or reduce the scale of their intervention to a minimum.
Military Tactics The tactical deployment of enemy forces
in Northern Korea continues to suggest a
defensive action.. The enemy's pressure has definitely slackened
and entrenching activities have been observed along the entire
~I
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northwestern front. Thus far, elements of four Chinese Com-
munist armies-=totaling approximately 60,000 men--have been
identified on the Korean. front. Resistance in the northeast
sector iS i.ncreasing, however, and reports have been received
indicating the possible presence of two additional Chinese Com-
munist armies in this area, which will probably be defended
strongly not only because it adjoins the Soviet border but be-
cause its occupation poses .a continual threat to UN forces to
the west.
Mukden Defenses .The Chinese Communists are meamvhile
speeding up pieparati.ons against possible
UN air attacks against Manchuria. Several reports have been
received Ghat industrial installations in Mukden are being dis-
mantled ared new ais? raid defenses being constructed. Despite
these reports, it is not likely that the Chinese Communists
will engage in extensive dismantling operations involving. the
movement of heavy-machinery. The--Mukden arsenal, for ex-
ample, is the principal producer in the Far East of arms and
ammunition and its dismantling would not only result in perma-
nent reduction of -its potential but would. result in a serious tem-
poxary loss of output. Even if the Chinese are merely reducing local
stockpiles of raw materials and finished products and dispersing
activities not involving the use of heavy machinery, it is certain
that they are taking vigorous action to prepare themselves
against 4he possibility of UN air attacks. These measures,
coupled with ,continued military buildup in Manchuria, propaganda
blasts against the US, and expanding Chinese Communist inter-
vention i.n Korea all indicate that the Chinese are not planning,
early withdrawal from Korea and may, in fact, be preparing for
an expansion of hostilities.
TOP SECRET
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 British Policy Despite recent Chinese Communist action
in Korea and Tibet, the British. Government
continues to recognize Communist China. The UK has warned,
however, that aggression could lead to the withdraural of
diplomatic support. It hopes that a moderate attitude on the
part of itself and its allies will result in some modus vivendi
with the Chinese Communists. In the UN arguments over the
Chinese Communist position, the British will probably try to
separate the problem of Korea from other Far Eastern issues,
will continue to favor the ad~inission of the Chinese Communists
to the LTN, and will not support measures designed to maintain
Chiang ?Kai-shek in Formosa. They will not favor, under present
circumstances, military action tending tb increase the likelihood
of war with China.
TOP SECRET
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 WESTERN EUROPE
? Schuman Plan Prospects for an early agreement to a
draft Schuman Plan have improved con-
siderably during the past few weeks, largely as a result
of a change in the French and German attitudes. Earlier
this fall, the German attitude had stiffened considerably in
anticipation that US interest in the remilitarization of Ger-
many would permit Germany to regain major. power status
and freedom from economic restrictions, without the re-
?straints'of'the Schuman Plan. The recent Pleven~Froposal,
however, by delaying a decision on German rearmament, ?has
lessened German confidence in achieving its aims without
.the Schuman Plan and has thus made Germany more willing
to compromise. The French, moreover, in order to facilitate
a compromise on the Pleven Proposal, are pressing for a
quick conclusion of the coal-steel .negotiations. As prospects
iniprove?for incorporating Germany into a more fully rote=
grated military and economic European. organization, the
French have also been led to consider more favorably Germany's
demand for termination of occupation controls, This in turn has
coritx?ibuted to Germany's willingness :to compromise on the
'Schuman Plan. The major obstacles still confronting the
negotiators are the cartel issue and the question of gr.:nting
'subsidies to the high-cost Belgian coal industry. It appears
likely that 'the Germans will compromise on the former issue
and that the French will back down from their original flat pro-
hibition against all cartels and agree to a German counter-pro-
posal~which would permit some to operate .under certain conditions.
Berlin Economy The depressed and precarious economy of
West Berlin has recently shown signs of
improvement. Consumption in the city is still 37 percen# below
the level of 1936, but there is a continued increase in the quantity
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 of goods and services available in West Berlin, and un-
employment, although still high, has fallen off somewhat,
The first effects of increased WestGerman demand for
Berlin products appeared in'September exports to the
Feder. al Republic, which reached apost-blockade record
of DM 85 million. The hand-to-mouth management of West
$erlin finances has come to an end, with the agreement of
the Federal Republic (effective 1 October) to finance DM 500
million of the city's budgetary deficit for the fiscal year
1950=51.
The possibility of Soviet interference at any time with
traffic to and from West Berlin severely limits the nature
and extent of improvements in the city's economic situation.
Despite that limitation., however, there may be some further
improvement so long as demand for goods in Western Europe
continues to be high. The US and the Federal Republic have
both been encouraging increased imports from West Berlin.
Progress has also been made toward waiving security restric-
tions and prohibition of German military production so as to
permit production in West Berlin of electronics for MDAP.
West Berlin may also be able to export a greater volume of
its manufactured goods to East Germany in the event that a new
interzonal trade, agreement is concluded.
German,Elections The Landtag elections scheduled for 19
and 26 November in the US Zone are not
likely to introduce drastic changes in the West German political
scene,, but they will intensify the bitterness already existing
between. the government and the opposition over various national
issues, particularly that of West German rearmament. The
Social Democratic Party, which is. expected to retain its present
strength or even to make slight gains, will cite any losses by
Chancellor Adenauer's party as vindication of Socialist opposition.
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 TOP SECRET
to West German rearmament. The Federal Government,
however, will not be deterred from its present support of
Western defense efforts by any election result short of a
sweeping Socialist victory; Adenauer will point to the sum
total of votes cast for all conservative parties as popular
endorsement for his policies. Iri general, the Communists
are likely to suffer further losses; the Socialists will re=
fain their present strength and possibly make slight gains;
and the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Socialisf
Union will lose a substantial number of votes to the con-
servative Free Democratic Party and the various expellee
parties, although not enough to materially affect the stability
of the present Federal Government.
. Danish Government The new minority Moderate Liberal- -
Conservative Government in Denmark,
with only about one third of the seats in the lower house of the
Rigsdag, is even .weaker than its Social Democratic predecessor
and is likely to fall within two to four months. The Prime
Minister has stated that his government will support the NATO
.and increased defense expenditures, for which Social Democratic
backing can be anticipated. However, the government,: in pro-
posing measures to curb inflation and to rectify the critical
foreign trade imbalance, will most likely encounter such opposi-
tion that it will be replaced by a new coalition.
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TOP SECRET
Soviet Maritime Policy The USSR is intensifying its
interference with foreign
fishing operations ixe Soviet coastal waters and~in other
ways is'indncating that it is considering measures to extend
its control and strengthen its legal;position with respect to
the Soviet ocean peaiphezy. Despite the possibility that these
Soviet actions might provoke retaliatory measures by other
countries; which would to some extent adversely affect Soviet
overseas interests, the USSR probably considers that these
potential disadvantages would be far outweighed by the follow-
ing direct advantages: (1) increased protection against attack
on Soviet coastal areas; (2) prevention of foreign observation
of Soviet naval and militai?y activity; (3) reservation of valuable
fishing grounds for exclusive Soviet use; (4) disruption of.food
supplies of leading Western fishing nations which are receiving
US economic aid; and (5) establishment of a sEs?ong'Soviet posi-
tion based on consistent practice before the important UN
program to codify international law proceeds too far. The US;
on the other hand; would be uufaeorably affected by ali of the
foregoing factors. Extension of sovereignty or jurisdiction
over Soviet offshore waters, moreover, would establish pre-
ceden~ for arbitrary and unilateral restr'i.ctive action by..otlier::
countries, thus weakening US efforts to block extensions of the
3-mile limit, which permits maximum freedom of circulation
for US merchant and naval vessels in peace and war as well as
for US fishing vessels. 13t further attempts to exclude foreign
vessels from Soviet coastal areas, or at least to severely
limit their activity, the USSR may take one or more of the
following steps: (1) arbitrarily extend the zone of "territorial
waters" by declaration or definition; (2) establish; a zone of
"contiguous waters" subject to stringent Soviet controls;
TOP SECRET
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(3) claim special rights to interfere with navigation and
fishing in exploitation of the resources of'th.e `contin.ental
shelf"; or (4) maintain extensive "defense" zones.
Czech-Soviet Trade fihe newly announced Soviet-Czecho-
slovak ~?ade agreementf.or 1951-55,
calling for an average increase of 50 percent over 1948-50 in
the volume of trade between the two cquntries, will result in a
further curtailment of Czechoslovak trade with, the West and
may indicate an increasing Czechoslovak epncenntration of arma-
ments production. Czechoslovak exports to the Soviet Union will
be limited to products of the metal-working industry, whereas
the USSR will provide raw materials and industrial equipment
essential for fulfillment of Czech commitments. It 'is doubtful,
however, that either country will be able to fulfill the deliveries
scheduled under the agreement. Since much of the equipment
and machinery to be supplied Czechoslovakia could be better
produced by Czechoslovakia, it appears that the USSR is
primarily interested i.n integrating the two economies and
concent~attng Czechoslovak industry in other fields. It is also
unlikely that the USSR will supply ore of high enough quality for
efficient use by the Czechs, or that it will be able to supply
sufficient ferro alloys, such as cobalt and molybdenum, Mean-
while, Czechoslovak metal exports to the USSR alone are sched-
uled to exceed all foreign orders of. this type fan any previous
years, thus making in.creasi.ngiy difficult Czechoslovak deliveries
?of producer goods to the other Satellites, a.nd probably requiaing
more rigid controls over Czechoslovak labor.
Benzol Shortage Recent Soviet efforts to buy 50,000 tons of
benzol in. Italy and even larger quantities
in France are the first indications of a Soviet deficiency ut this
strategic commodity and probably reflect increased production
of war material, particularly explosives. The shortage may
tw
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 have been caused in part by shipments to Korea of a-ilitary
items which utilize benzol as raw material. The annual
Soviet output of 170,000 tons of benzol (about one-third the
US production) is believed to have been sufficient for pre-
Korea requirements.
Benzol has a number of highly important uses in
military production. The grade of benzol being sought by'
the USSR is the type used in the production of explosives,
stabilizers for smokeless powder, nerve gases, synthetic
rubber, nylon, plastics, aniline dyes, insecticides, and
synthetic detergents for exterminating lice and controlling
typhus. Less pure grades of benzol are used as a blending
agent for raising the anti-knock rating of aviation gasoline.
In addition to supplying its own needs, the USSR
may have decided to pur?~hase export surpluses of benzol
in Western Europe in order to delay the expanded US
synthetic rubber program. The USSR undoubtedly realizes
that the reactivated US snythetic rubber program will require
substantial imports of benzol from Western Europe.
 I
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D TOP SECRET
O
Greek-Yugo Relations The chances for improved Greek-
Yugoslav relations have been in-
creased by Tito's recent return of 57 former prisoners of
the Greek guerrillas, by his promise that 174 of the Greek
children held in Yugoslavia would soon be returned, and by
the recent statement of Premier Venizelos indacatirig that
Greece is willing to have emergency food supplies for
Yugoslavia pass through Salonika. Nevertheless, the question
of Yugoslavia's interest in the small Slavo-Macedonian minority
of northern Greece'is likely to remain a source of irritation
between the two countries for some time to come, even if full
diplomatic representation is restored in the near future. in
view of Tito's deep involvement with Slavo-Macedonian nationalist
aspirations fn competition with Bulgaria and the Cominform,`he
can scarcely be expected to stifle all of the Slavo-Macedonian
agitation emanating from Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, the ex-
igencies of the situation may persuade Tito to exercise more
cautious supervision over some of the more obvious outlets,
such as Yugoslae radio broadcasts in Greek and Slavo-Mace-
donian.
Greek Government The minority Venizelos-Papandreou
Cabinet seems destuaed to hold on a
little longer. Ex-Premiers Plastiras and Tsouderos, leaders
of the largest opposition party, would probably prefer to con-
tinue their organizational preparations for parliamentary
elections next spring rather than precipitate a perhaps pre-
mature test of strength by making an all-out attack on the
present Cabinet. The King seems to be in no hurry to make the
momentous choice-between a new national election and a
military-type dictatorship--which collapse of the present
~'i ?
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Cabinet would necessitate. Meanwhile, Populist chief
Tsaldaris, to whose tacit support the Cabinet looks primarily
for. surQival, still remains an' important factor i.n the situation;
despite his departure from the Cabinet because of the Piraeus
port scandal, he has managed'to hold dissatisfied Populist
Deputies in line, has purged a former Populist minister in-
volveda.~ an older scandal, and has achieved some vindication
by"winning a libel suit against the Athens newspaper Vima.
Despite these factors, however, the Venizelos-Papandreou
Cabinet remains vaalnerahle to sudden squalls anal, in any
event, is i.n no position to get on with the task of reconstruction.
and reform laid out for it by ECA. .
India's Security The prospective success of Communist.
China's drive to gain control of Tibet--
coupled with indications of Chinese interest in Nepal, Sikkim,
and the Kachi.n tribesmen of northern Burma and with previous
Indian Communist moaes to establish contacts in Tibet--creates
a serious problem of border security for India. If India is to
find troops to police its borders adequately, it must now face
the difficult choice of adding to an already heavy military budget
or withdrawing troops from Kashmir at a time when a show-
down with Pakistan .and the UN on the election of a constituent "
assembly in Kashmir is apparently in preparation. Under the
circumstances, India may feel compelled to leave its own border
guard force unstrengthened, thus increasing its vulnerability
to subversive influences projected across the border.;
With regard to the related question of Nepal, however,
India appears likely to act more positively. Details of the
current upheaval in that state are still lacking, and there is
no evidence that it has any direct connection with ttbe Chinese
Communist menace in Tibet. Nevertheless, there appears to
be little doubt that high Indian officials were at least aware of,
TOP SECRET
rPi
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 if n.ot actually in support of, the armed insurrection being
staged by the Nepalese offshoot of the Indian Congress Party..
and by sympathizers operating across the Indian border. A1-
though the Indaan Government is attempting to disassociate it- .
self officially from the Nepalese revolt, it may well decide'to
strengthen its security'?position by ga.king over control of Nepal's
administration much as it did in the case of Sikkim in 1949.
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 Puerto Rican Revolt
The Latin American response to the
Puerto Rican revolt,
although by no
.
means hostile to the US, disclosed widespread sympathy. for '
the idea of Puerto Rican independence. Latin Americans
universally deplored the attack on President Truman; the
greater pari: showed some understanding of the US position
in?Puei~:o Rico; and very few condoned the violent methods of
the Puerto Rican nationalists. Until Puerto Rico is given an
opportunity to vote on the specific question'of independence,
however., US policy in. Puerto Rico will attract the watchful, .
and often critical, attention of Latin Americans at large, as
well as the inevitable attacks of anti-US and Communist
elements,
Venezuelan Assassination The assassination of Lt. Col.
Carlos Delgado Chalbaud,.the
late president of. the Venezuelan military junta, will probably. '
result in less cordial relations between .Venezuela and the
USe Delgado exerted in foreign and domestic affairs a modes= '
acing influence on the other two junta members and showed ~a ~ '
generally cooperative attitude toward the US. The surviving '
junta members will probably remain in power and may be
joined by Lt> Col, Felfx Roman Moreno, the armed forces
Chief of Staff. It is already apparent from the prompt sus-
pension of constitutional guarantees and the existence of a
state of emergency that every precaution will be taken to
avoid internal disorders, No major disturbances are likely
to occur in the immediate future, but the loss of Delgado will .`
probably lead to a more repressive policy which may eventually ~'
provoke serious violence and prevent for a long time any pro-'
gress toward the establishment of a cpnstittiftional regime. ?.
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The "reported increase in the activity of professiional
revolutionaries in the Caribbean is probablq due both to their
desire to act before the expected general war emergency, makes
international revolutionary activities more difficult and to the
continuing support they recieve from those who believe that
the overthrow of "dictator" governments by any means is ..,
justified, This heightened activity distinctly, increases the
possibility of such attempts in the near future.
"
STAT
STAT
 i
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DISTRIBUTION "
1.. .... The President
2,3,4,5..... Secretaa~y of State
6,7,8..: ,, .. Secretary of Defense
9......... Secretary of the Army.
10......... Secretary of She Navy
11......... Secretary of the Air Force
12. < ....... Special Assistant to the President,.W,A.Harriman
13,14,15.... , Chairman, National Security Resources Board
16,17....... Executive Secretary to the National Security Council
Y8...... , . , Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Aix?
19, ........ Secretary, joint Chiefs of Staff
20... , ..... Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
21,22....... Chief of Staff, US Army
23,24,25..... Chief of-Naval Operations .
26;27,28. ?.... Chief of Staff, US Air Force
29, , . , ..... Assistant Chief of Staff,_ G-3, Operations, US Army
30......... Deputy Chief of Staff, (Operations), Air Force
31:........ Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, (Operations)
32......... Director of Plans and Operations, US Air Force
33,34,35..... Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department .of State
36,37,38,39,40,41, .
42,43,44,45,100 Assistant Chief of Staff, G~2, Intelligence; US Army
46,47,48,49,50,51,
52,53,54,55,56,
57,58,59,60, Director of Naval Intelligence
61,62;63,64,65,66,
67,68;6Q . , ,Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, US Air Force
70......... Director of Intelligence, Atomic Energy Commission
71......... Executive Secretary, Military Liaison Committee;
Atomic Energy Commission
72,73,74,75,76,77,
78,79,80,81,82,
83,84,85. , Chief, Acquisition and Distribution Dav,, OCD, State
86......... Chief, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
87. > , ..... ; USAF Rep, on Joint Strategic Survey Committee
88:. , , .. , .. Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
89,90.. , .., > . , Administrator, Economic Cooperation Administration
91, , ....... Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
92, ........ Secretary, Joint Intelligence Group, Joint Staff
93.....:... Deputy Director, Joint Staff
94,95,96. , ... Director, Armed.Forces Security Agency
97......... Ambassador at Large, Philip C. Jessup
98. , :...... Secretary of the Air Force
99. , ....... Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
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 Dooument No. ?U I
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U. S. GOVERN\1EN'f Pf21N1'ING OFFICN:
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