INDIA-PAKISTAN: CURRENT RELATIONS AND SECURITY CONCERNS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10C00522R000100520001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 28, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 14, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
14 September 1983
India-Pakistan: Current Relations and Security Concerns
Relations between India and Pakistan have improved somewhat
over the past year, in our view. The two countries are attemp-
ting to settle a variety of nonpolitical issues through their
recently established Joint Commission. Progress on political
talks, however, has stalled over substantive disagreements on the
hatIllre of their relationship,
New Delhi wants Islamabad to affirm India's view that the
two countries would be limited to the bilateral settlement
of disputes unless both sides agreed to outside mediation.
India requires that both sides abide by a definition of
nonalignment that specifically forbids either state. the
right to grant military bases to a third power or enter
into a foreign alliance
In our view, India wants a permanent shelving of
Kashmir dispute and Pakistani recognition of the
ceasefire line as an international boundary.
the
current
Pakistan is willing to put the
Kashmir issue aside for now provided there is no change in the
status quo. It will not agree to Indian interpretations of
bilateralism and nonalignment, however.
Both India and Pakistan view the other as its primary enemy
and their improved relationship remains tenuous and could easily
be disrupted.
-- Pakistan believes India has never accepted its independent
existence and it wants to make it a weak buffer state
under Indian hegemony. Islamabad is particularly
This memorandum was prepared by the South Asia Division,
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, in preparation
for the Secretary of Defense's trip to Pakistan. Information as
of September 12, 1983 was used in preparatin of this paper.
Comments and queries are welcome and should he addressed to
Chief, South Asia Division
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concerned that India and the Soviets will cooperate to
impose their demands on Pakistan.
India views Pakistan's strong ties with China with alarm
and charges that Pakistan is using the Afghanistan crisis
to strengthen itself against India. It opooses US weapons
assistance to Pakistan and wants to maintain the Indian
Ocean area free of superpower rivalry.
Both countries have the bulk of their armed forces deployed
along their common border. India's forces opposite Pakistan are
larger and better equipped than those of Pakistan. Even with
Pakistan's current arms modernization, we estimate that India's
military superiority over Pakistan will continue to grow through
the 1980s.
Pakistan has little strategic depth opposite India. Most of
its principal cities and major lines of communications are within
100 kilometers of the Indian border. A major breakthrough by
Indian forces would immediately threaten Pakistan's most
important political, cultural, and economic assets.
Consequently, Pakistan's military strategy emphasizes a forward
defense against India.
Pakistan's armed forces have serious command-and-control,
training, and logistic deficiencies, according to our
analysis, which limit their effectiveness, even with the
acquisition of new weapons.
Pakistan has more strategic depth in the west and has
adopted a strategy of defense-in-depth opposite
Afghanistan. The deployment of only four divisions ir. the
west supports this stategy; Pakistan would have time to
move reinforcements from east to west before Afghan or
Soviet forces could threaten vital Pakistani assets.
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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
14 September 1983
Afghanistan: Status and Prospects of the Insurgency
Three and a half years after the Soviet intervention
Afghanistan, the resistance has become an effective fo
controls much of the country,
Barring a drastic change in Soviet po
in
I7 we judge the fighting
will continue over the next few years because existing Soviet
forces will be unable to destroy the resistance. Despite
improvements in weapons and training, however, we believe the
insurgents will lack the firepower and organization to defeat
major Soviet units.
The Soviets are becoming more concerned about their
difficulties in coping with the resistance
Large-scale Soviet and Afghan operations this spring and
early summer failed to weaken the resistance and the
Afghan Government still controls only about 30 percent of
the country; the same amount it controlled in July 1982.
The insurgents have expanded the war with attacks in and
around major cities, especially Kabul. The Soviets are
apprehensive over increasing guerrilla activity in western
Afghanistan and infiltration from Iran.
The Soviets have failed so far to rebuild the Afghan Army
into a force capable of effectively fighting the
insurgents.
Soviet costs in the war have been considerable, according to
our estimates
-- We estimate that over 16,000 Soviets have been killed or
wounded in Afghanistan. The Afghan Army has suffered
50,000 casualties and nearly 80,000 men have deserted.
This memorandum was prepared by the South Asia Division,?
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, in preparation
for the Secretary of Defense's trip to Pakistan. Information as
of September 12, 1983 was used in preparation of this paper.
Comments and queries are welcome GO se uld be addressed to
Chief, South Asia Division
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-- The insurgents have shot down or destroyed in attacks on
airfields some 350 Soviet and Afghan aircraft (mostly
helicopters) and nearly 150 more have been lost in
accidents.
Approximately 10,000 Soviet and Afghan armored vehicles
and trucks have been destroyed or damaged.
Direct Soviet costs in Afghanistan probably total around
12 billion dollars since the invasion.
Nevertheless, we judge the Soviets still find the COStS
bearable and apparently believe that their relations with many
countries are recovering from the damage done by the invasion and
that in the long run they will overcome the resistance. We
believe there is no immediate prospect that the Soviets will
decide to reduce their military effort in Afghanistan.
We judge that the resistance fighters will become more
politically sophisticated and militarily effective in the next
two years, but they will remain vulnerable.
-- The most serious threat to the resist4nce is civilian war-
weariness apd the loss of popular support over the long term
that would directly affect the will to continue fighting.
Cooperation among insurgent bands has grown, but because
of deep ideological, political, and religious differences,
we do not foresee a united resistance movement emerging in
the next few years.
The Soviets and the Kabul regime are likely, in our view,
to continue and probably increase a wide variety of covert
and overt activities--such as arranging truces,
encouraging defections, and subverting groups--to exploit
insurgent weaknesses inside and outside of Afghanistan.
There are some Soviet options--massive troop reinforcement
or a widespread scorched earth policy against civilians--that
might drastically reduce the insurgency in the next two years.
-- Moscow would, however, be reluctant to assume the high
economic, political, and military costs associated with
these options, in our judgment.
The Soviets have started a number of economic, educational,
social, and political programs in Afghanistan that they believe
will eventually turn the country into a viable Soviet-dominated
communist state, Because of wide-
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spread insurgent activity and opposition from the Afghan people,
however, these programs have been implemented in only a few
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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
14 September 1983
Pakistan: Steadfastness on Afghanistan
Pakistani leaders view the Soviet presence in Af hanistan as
a Strategic threat. They believe,
the Soviets want to gain permanent overland access to the Persian
and the Indian Ocean littoral. They are worried that Moscow
increase its political and military pressure on Pakistan
it has consolidated its hold on Afghanistan.
they are concerned that Moscow will collaborate
with India to neutralize and divide Pakistan--perhaps by a
combination of external military pressure and subversive meddling
in Pakistan's unstable domestic politics.
;ulf
C
will
once
Ne believe Pakistan continues to engage the Soviets in
periodic talks on Afghanistan for a number of reasons:
The UN-sponsored talks provide Pakistan both with a way to
test Soviet intentions in Afghanistan and maintain
international support for its position on Afghanistan.
Pakistan keeps its channels open to Moscow because it
worries that the West will in time forget about
Afghanistan or reach an agreement over Pakistan's head as
part of a larger East-West settlement.
The refugee problem inside Pakistan has become a major
concern to Islamabad. Rising local resentments and
concern in the Army that some 3 million Afghan refugees
will become a permanent burden for Pakistan have added a
note of urgency to Pakistan's search for a political
settlement. So far, however, relations between the Afghan
refugees and locals--who belong to the same ethnic group--
have been peaceful.
This memorandum was prepared by the South Asia Division,
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, in preparation
for the Secretary of Defense's trip to Pakistan. Information as
of September 12, 1983 was used in preparation of this paper.
Comments and auPri9s are welcome and should be addressed to
Chief, South Asia Division
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We doubf Islamabad is ready to shift its stand on the issue
in ways .that would damage US interests. So far in the indirect
talks at Geneva, Pakistan has remained steadfast in its
insistence that a political settlement is contingent on
withdrawal of Soviet troops. According to
statements by senior Pakistani officials:
a
-- Islamabad supports the Afghan insurgents in order to make
it more. difficult for the Soviets to consolidate their
hold on Afghanistan. An active insurgency is crucial to
Pakistan's diplomatic campaign to keep Afghanistan- before
world opinion as an issue that can be settled only by the
withdrawal of Soviet troops.
A political settlement acceptable to the Zia regime would
have to permit the voluntary return to Afghanistan of the
Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Islamabad knows the refugees
will not return home unless the Soviets first withdraw
their troops.
Pakistan has consistently refused to recognize the Babrak
regime. Islamabad knows that recognition is its trump
card. It is doubtful that it would play it until a pull-
out of Soviet troops is. largely completed and most of the
refugees have returned home.
Pakistan's current policy on Afghanistan receives strong
support from conservative religious parties at home and
vital friends abroad, such as Saudi Arabia, China, and the
US. Pakistan's strong stand on Afghanistan and its
support for an active insurgency enables it to argue more
effectively with the Saudis, the US, and China that it
needs and deserves enhanced diplomatic, economic, and
military support.
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Washing, In. C 20505
DILtECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
14 September 1983
Pakistan: implications of Military Commitments to Arab States
Pakistan's approximately 18,000 military personnel stationed
in the Middle East and North Africa are becoming an important
vehicle for achievement :of Islamabad's foreign policy goals.
Pakistan has reaped significant benefits from the program,
according to our analysis:
-- Salary remittances have provided an economic boost.
-- Islamabad has acquired new sources of arms procurement.
-- Pakistan has become one of the largest non-Arab recipients
of financial support from the oil-rich Arab states.
Pakistan's military personnel have gained valuable
training on advanced Western and Soviet military
equipment?including Soviet aircraft?which has given them
a netter u-iderstandin of the capabilities of the Indian
Air Force.
Je believe the military assistance, however, also carries
risks:
-- The longer the Pakistani troops stay abroad, the greater
the risk that Pakistan will become embroiled in local or
regional conflicts to which it is not a party.
-- Pakistan's international image is tarnished by charges
that it provides "soldiers for hire" to radical regimes
such as Libya.
morale within the armed forces
Louid oe damaged by the disparity between overseas and
domestic salaries and by discrimination against Pak'
Shia personnel by the recipient countries.
ani
This. memorandum was prepared by the South Asia Division,
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, in preparation
for the Secretary of Defense's trip to Pakistan. Information as
of September 12, 1983 was used in preparation of this paper.
Comments and queries are welcome a should be addressed to
Chief, South Asia Division
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We judge Pakistan will continue and may even expand its
military ties with the Middle East in order to ensure Arab
political support and economic assistance. In our view, as long
as Pakistani personnel demonstrate competence and Pakistan
maintains a stable and moderate government with Islamic
credentials, there will be a market for its military personnel in 25X1
the Middle East and North Africa. We believe that concern over
external and internal threats to stability brought on by the
strife in Lebanon, the continuing Iran/Iraq conflict, and Iran's
Shia religious fanaticism might well prompt the Gulf states to
request even larger foreign military contingents. 25X1
Our analysis suggests, however, that several factors could
slow an expansion of military ties or lead to a reduction in
requests for military assistance:
-- The limited capacity of the recipient countries to absorb
more military personnel.
-- Competition from other states to supply military advisers.
-- The risk that Pakistan could be drawn into regional
conflicts.
-- The limited number of skilled technical personnel in
Pakistan.
The United States generally benefits from Pakistan's
military assistance program. Cooperation between Islamabad and
the Arab States strengthens the military establishments of
moderate governments while dampening Pakistan's financial demands
on the United States and minimizing the US visibility in this
sensitive region. Only in the training of Libyan pilots and
small numbers of Palestinian guerrillas do Pakistan's military
ties run counter to US interests. We assess that a setback to
the military assistance program, accompanied by a reduction in
Arab economic assistance to Pakistan, would increase political
and economic strains in Pakistan and increase Islamabad's
requests for US economic and military aid.
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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
14 September 1983
Pakistan-China-US: Arms Technology Transfer
We believe Pakistan will probably safeguard the new US arms
it receives to protect the arms supply relationship unless major
strains develop in relations with the united States. Pakistan
still considers its relations with China more durable than those
with the United States and in the past has given Beijing access
to western arms technologies. Nonetheless, Pakistan reaards
advanced US weapons as the key to its military
to continue the security assistance program,
modernization
wants
and
-- Islamabad is aware of US concern about unauthorized
transfers of US weapons to China and has signed a General
Security of Military Information Agreement with the United
States.
-- The resolution last winter of the ALR-69 radar warning
receiver issue to Zia's satisfaction and the delivery of
the first F-16s has strengthened Islamadad's faith in the
US security relationship.
Pakistan
has close military ties with China that
include a past history of transferring
arms technology and agreements with Beijing on joint
weapons development and technology exchange.
French
During his visit to Beijing in November 1982, President
Zia signed an agreement that contained provisions for
Chinese-Pakistani cooperation in weapons development and
production.
This memorandum was prepared by the South Asia Division,
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, in preparation
for the Secretary of Defense's trip to Pakistan. Information as
of September 12, 1983 was used in preparation of this paper.
Comments and queries are welcome-and should be addressed to
Chief, South Asia Division
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Circumstantial evidence suggests Pakistan gave China
access to the US AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missile in
1982, probably to facilitate modifications to Chinese-made
attack planes that Pakistan was acauiring.
e believe Pakistan will protect US arms technology as long
as the US security relationship is perceived in Islamabad as
providing tangible benefits. Major strains in relations with the
United States over the nuclear- issue or new disputes on arms
agreements could undermine Islamabad's confidence in the United
States and threaten the security relationship, possibly causing
Pakistan to share US weapons or technology with China. Even if
US-Pakistani relations remain strong, however, there is
that China at some point will gain access to Pakistan's
given the intimacy of Pakistan's ties to China.
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a risk
US arms,
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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
14 September 1983
Pakistan: Prospects for President Zia
President Zia ul-Hag is coping successfully with the current
disturbances in Pakistan--the-most serious threat to his rule so
Ear. We believe his regime's capable handling of serious anti-
government rioting in Sind province coupled with the
unwillingness of Pakistanis in other provinces to join the
protest movement increase the chances that Zia and the Army will
continue to guide Pakistan's political future for at least the
next one to two years. ?
Zia's authoritarian regime has avoided overly repressive
policies, though it has dealt firmly with organized
demonstrations. It has given the country more than six
years of domestic stability and substantial economic
progress.
-- Zia also has dealt effectively with external threats. fie
has stood up to the Soviets on Afghanistan, while keeping
channels open to a negotiated settlement; he has improved
relations with India; and he has succeeded in gaining
major economic aid and arms assistance from the United
States.
The President ultimately depends on the Army to remain in
power. Most senior officers support Zia's plan for a phased
return to civilian government and a permanent oversight role for
the armed forces
-- No ruler, however, can be certain of the Army's support if
it is called upon to nut down civil disorders, particu-
larly in the all-important province of Punjab.
Zia's main opposition, the Movement for the Restoration or
Democracy (MRD), a coalition of eight opposition parties, is
This memorandum was prepared by the South Asia Division,
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, in preparation
for the Secretary of Defense's trip to Pakistan. Information as
GE September 12, 1983 was used in preparation of this paper.
Comments and queries are welcome and should be addressed to
Chief, South Asia Division
SECRET
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poorly organized and so Ear has lacked both a popular issue or an
effective leader to e a nationwide anti-Zia campaign.
The protest movement in Sind Province this summer was
launched largely by the Pakistan People's Party of former
Prime Minister Bhutto. The PPP has strong support in
Sind, Bhutto's home province, and succeeded in rousing
violent protests by playing on local grievances against
the Punjabi-dominated government and Army.
The PPP has substantial support among the urban and rural
poor of Punjab, but has found it difficult to mobilize
this support in the absence of a strong leader. Most of
the PPP faithful look to Bhutto's daughter Benazir, but
she has been kept under house arrest for the past two and
one-half years.
President Zia has promised to hold provincial and national
elections by March 1985, amend the Constitution to creatc a
strong presidential system, and withdraw martial law. His
statements suggest he will bar hostile opposition parties--
including the PPP?from participating in the elections. These
parties and some influential interest groups believe they are
losing ground under Zia and could coalesce against him.
Given the right, circumstances, we believe a nationwide
opposition movement could arise rapidly and with little
warning. In such an event, the Army probably would replace Zia
with another general who would negotiate a return to civilian
-rule on terms the Army could accept.
In our view, the Army would attempt to preserve the
present US-Pakistan relationship, but if a Pakistan
People's Party government succeeded in taking over, US-
Pakistan ties, as well as Pakistan's stand on Afghanistan,
Probably would be significantly weakened.
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Central Intelligence ,'"\encv
Waslitrip,r1.0.C20S05
DIRFCTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
14 September 1983
Pakistan: Perceptions of Relations with the US
US-Pakistani relations have improved since 1980, but these
gains are fragile. The two nations' Afghanistan policies and
regarding Soviet
aims in South Asia are convergent
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caution
interests.
However,
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US arms
embargoes
in 1965 and
1971 plus the temporary suspension of
economic aid in 1979
have convinced most Pakistanis that
Washington
is an unreliable
ally.
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Pakistani
otticials
in general are receptive to expanding contacts with the
US.
Few Pakistani officials believe, however, that the US
would support Pakistan if it were attacked by India, and
there are doubts about US willingness?and capability?to
co,71e to Pakistan's assistance in the event of a Soviet
')Z V1
attack. some army officers
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believe Zia has placed too much trust in Washington and
believe that the US may again abandon Pakistan after the
Afghanistan conflict is resolved.
-- According to Pakistani
weapons is the
support. The
officials, the sale of advanced
yardstick by which Islamabad measures US
F-16s are especially welcome and are a
crucial symbol
of the US commitment to Pakistan.
21i
Ponular nercep
ons of the US are more 'ambiguous,
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-- US military and economic assistance is widely publicized
and appears to have made a positive impact. However, most
Pakistanis reject US Middle East: policy, which they charge
This memorandum was prepared by the South Asia Division,
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, in preparation
for the Secretary of Defense's trip to Pakistan. Information as
of September 12, 1983 was used in preparation of this paper.
Comments and queries are welcome and should be addressed to
Chief, South Asia Division
SECRET
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is biased in favor of Israel. Many are suspicious that
the US remains hostile to Tehran because it cannot
tolerate a "truly Islamic government" and believe Pakistan
would be subject to similar pressure should it follow
Iran's example.
Many Pakistanis, including those with ties to the military
and the, bureaucratic .elite, condemn US policy on nuclear
nonproliferation as applied to Pakistan. They assert it
is intended to prevent the development of domestic nuclear
Power facilities and to retard Pakistan's ability'to
achieve economic independence. They reject as
hypocritical US claims it is attempting to stop the spread
of nuclear weapons and point to Washington's willingness
to continue assistance to India, which has exploded a
nuclear device.
Zia's political opponents are attempting to exploit US
military and economic assistance to portray the President
as a US puppet. Politicians on the left and center
repeatedly assert that Zia could not survive without US
support. Scattered anti-American incidents occured during
recent anti-regime demonstrations in Sind Province.
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