EXCHANGE OF VIEWS REGARDING LAW OF THE SEA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08C01297R000800240010-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: February 10, 1959
• Content Type: CABLE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/24: CIA-RDP08CO1297R000800240010-9
PRIORITY (Security t..1asSiflcatlon)
FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH.
Amembassy, MF IC0, D. F.
6 726
FROM
TO
REF
F
12-
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February 10, 1959
DATE
It is noted from reference circular a team of U.,5 representatives will
visit certain Latin American countries in the month of February in connection
with preparations for the Second Law of the Sea Conference to be held in
Geneva during March-April, 1960; also, that Mexico is not one of the countries
to be visited at this time, but the recommendation of the Embassy may be made
as to the desirability of consulting with Mexico either in connection with the
present tour or later on,
The Embassy believes that consultation with Mexico is desirable. The
position of Mexico on the question is well known,, namely, that Mexico asserts
a jurisdiction over a nine-mile limit as the Mexican territorial seae based
on Mexico?s Interpretation of the U.S.-Mexican Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo of
1848 and Mexican legislation in effect (Ley General de Bienes Nacionales, 1941,
Article Non 174'. It is also well known that Mexico has firmly adhered to this
position as the minimum acceptable to Mexico in the Conference on the Law of
the Sea at Geneva, February-April, 1958; that, in fact, as reported by the
United States Delegation, the Mexican Delegation was the leader of the Latin
American bloc in opposition to the compromise formula proposed by the United
States. In this sense, it was probably pore responsible than any other Latin
America., delegation for the failure of the Conference to reach agreement on
this issue,
Nevertheless (and indeed perhaps for these very reasons) Mexico should be
considered as a very important objective in the proposed preparations. The
possibility of Mexican compromise on a territorial sea of less than nine miles
may appear to be relatively remote, but should not he automatically excluded.
The Mexican position is not well founded in international law, being
derived originally from Mexico's unilateral interpretation of the treaty; the
validity of this interpretation has never been conceded bUt rather has been
consistently denied by the United States. The Mexican position, assertedly
based on the Treaty of 1848, was not formally asserted in Mexican legislation
until 1941, almost 100 years later. It has likewise been clouded by other
legislation, which has granted rights for offshore drilling to a distance of
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INFORMATION COPY
Retain in divisional files or destroy in accordance with security regulations.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/24: CIA-RDP08CO1297R000800240010-9
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/24: CIA-RDP08CO1297R000800240010-9
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(Classification) Desp. No
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five ,kilometers, or approximately three miles,, Legally and juridically,
heexicovs claim is not impressively defensible,' and in the opinion of the
Embassy, should not be regarded as an irreducible or irremovable obstacle,
however often such is asserted by, Mexican representatives,
The current dispute, between Mexico and Guatemala over the niachiuegunning
of Mexican fishing. boats by Guatemalan Air Force planes.-9 resulting in a_ break
in diplomatic relations between the two governments, may be considered a
factor of possible influence in Mexican reconsideration of Its previous'
position, While it is a fact that Mexico has not questioned the extent of
the Guatemalan jurisdiction of the territorial sea (having merely asserted
that the Mexican fishing boats were not in Guatemalan territorial waters,
without specification of the traditional three-mile limit or Guatemala's
claimed 12-mile limit), the very fact of the incident, with its serious
repercussions, may underline the desirability of,nniformity of international
agreement on the breadth of the territorial sea, as well as definite agreements
on fishing rights which would necessarily be related thereto, Inasmuch as Mexico
has built up a substantial fleet of fishing boats on both the Gulf and Pacific
coasts, an economic need will be presented in the coming years to assure
unmolested operations of-these vessels. Food needs, rapidly increasing, are
an added factor impelling Mexico to look to nearby waters for adequate supply
of diet for its population, The Mexican waters themselves may not be adequate
for this purpose, in view of shifting patterns of shrimp and fish habitation
(W=659, Jan. 21, 1959). In the circumstances, it should be clearly to Mexico's
advantage to settle the issue of the territorial sea and the concommnitant
problem of both fishing rights and conservation,
The traditional Mexican position of seeking pacific solutions for inter-
national disputes has thus for been successfully tested in the Guatemalan
incident, and is further supported by Mexico's continued adherence to a kind
of understanding with the United States on Gulf fishing, since 1956. From this
vierpoint, some flexibility in Mexico's position might be hoped for, in that a
reasonable compromise between fixed positions on many sides of the question is
obviously the only practical solution, if .further disturbing incidents between
nations are to be avoided.
It; may also., be considered that the change of administration in Mexico on
December 1, 19581, with the termination of Lie, Padilla Nervo as Minister of
Foreign Relations and the appointment of Ambassador Manuel Tello in his place,
may permit a fresh approach and more reasonable treatment of this problem,
Foreign Minister Padilla Nerve was well-known for his unyielding position on
the territorial sea, climaxed by'his assertions in Geneva at the end of the
1958 Conference. On the other hand, the present Foreign Minister, with his
six-year experience as Mexico?s Ambassador in Washington and wide knowledge of
the viewpoints of the tLS, and its allies on problems of defense and security,
CONFIDENTIAL .
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/24: CIA-RDP08CO1297R000800240010-9
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/24: CIA-RDP08CO1297R000800240010-9
I I c.tJlslr: 6l iu I Cnd. No
D
? (Clifrssi fication) Desp. No-
m NeglC?fl, De. Fe,
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may be found less disposed to an : ab'solute.'and rigid assertio o. without,
from its tour of South and Central America- and Cuba, .the, results of Which
conversations might also be persuasive in influenci-a h1exieoes attituddm:
The foregoing considerationso while individually. of small moments may in
combination offer an opportunity for a useful approach to Mexico, The timing
of such approach would best be some time after the. United States team -retarns_
For the :Anba.ssadore.
yinond 'G,`,1e:ddy
selor. of Embassy .
cc: ARA/CMA
Buenos ?Aires':4fo arm.,. rtb :Richard ,n)
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/12/24: CIA-RDP08CO1297R000800240010-9