SOUTH KOREA: ECONOMIC CHALLENGES FACING THE ROH ADMINISTRATION
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Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP04T00990R000300530001-0
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RIPPUB
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S
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11
Document Creation Date:
December 27, 2016
Document Release Date:
January 18, 2013
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1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
April 15, 1988
Content Type:
MEMO
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Lentrai intelligence Agency
,
?
Washington. D. C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
15 April 1988
South Korea: Economic Challenges Facing the Roh Administration
SUMMARY
President Roh Tae Woo's immediate economic
challenges are to hold down inflation after two years of
double-digit growth and to respond to foreign demands for a
reduction in South Korea's $10 billion current account
surplus. Determining the appropriate mix of won
appreciation and market opening to ameliorate these
problems, however, is provoking bureaucratic contention.
The Economic Planning Board (EPB) sees appreciation of the
won as the simplest and most effective response to both
challenges, but industry--a major source of financial
support for the ruling party--worries that currency
appreciation and sharply rising wages will erode its
international competitiveness. Reflecting this uneasiness,
the Ministry of Trade and Industry, among others, is
emphasizing formal market opening measures over won
appreciation to reduce the surplus, although few in Seoul
expect such an approach to bring either significant
liberalization or a tailing off in the trade surplus any
time soon.
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This memorandum was prepared by the Office of East Asian Analysis.
Information available as of 15 April 1988 was used in its preparation.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Korea
Branch, Northeast Asia Division, 0EA
EA M 88-20047
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The first test of Roh 's leadership in this
area may come after the spring wage negotiations, when
business leaders could press the government to
compensate for higher wages by slowing the pace of won
appreciation. Over the long run, the problems of the
trade surplus and inflation also could increase
pressure on Seoul to liberalize its financial sector
and to seek new ways to invest Korea's surplus
overseas.
Economic Strength
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Roh Tae Woo assumed the presidency in February with the Korean 25X1
economy operating at peak performance. After two years of 12-
percent-plus annual growth in GNP, South Korea now boasts a per
capita income near $3,000. The unemployment rate has dropped to a
meager 3.3 percent, despite large numbers of new workers entering
the labor force. In contrast to most developing countries, South
Korea's foreign debt--about $36 billion at the end of 1987--is
falling rapidly, while holdings of foreign assets are on the rise.
Inflation: Prices and Politics
Since Roh's election last December, bureaucrats and planners
in the economic ministries, the central bank, and official think
tanks have warned that the economy could face significant problems.
Specifically, they have repeatedly warned that the pace and pattern
of economic growth threaten to renew inflation. Recent statistics-
-some publicized, some not--have borne out their concern:
o Early returns for 1988 raised concern about further price
hikes outside the economic planners' target range; in January,
wholesale and retail prices jumped 0.6 percent--an annualized
inflation rate of 7.2 percent.
Political worries have added a sense of urgency to the anxiety
generated by recent indications of rising prices. With National
Assembly elections slated for 26 April, Roh wants to deprive his
opposition of the chance to make inflation an issue that could be
used against the ruling party. He has publicly said that price
stability is his top economic priority.
Uncertainty about the outcome of this spring's wage
negotiations--which run from March to May--also has exacerbated
inflationary fears. Last summer's unprecedented series of strikes,
accompanied by union organizing activity, helped produce wage
increases of some 20 percent, more than double the average annual
increase since 1980. In this year's bargaining, labor and
management appear far apart. The Federation of Korean Trade Unions
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supports wage increases ot 30 percent. Senior business leaders
have so far kept their own counsel, but surveys by the Korea
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Productivity Center indicate the business community plans to offer
only an 8- to 9-percent wage hike. For its part, the government
has shown no eagerness to intervene. In a recent press interview,
Roh seemed tolerant of labor demands, suggesting electoral politics
may inhibit official jawboning and, at least in 1988, compel
business to look to other means, such as increased automation, to
hold down labor costs. 25X1
The Current Account: Agreement on the Problem, But Not the
Solution
South Korean economists blame the country's burgeoning current
account surplus--some $10 billion in 1987, up from $4.6 billion the
previous year--for much of the inflationary pressure. According to
the US Embassy, some economists in Seoul envision a current account
surplus of $10-13 billion and a GNP growth rate exceeding 10
percent in 1988. In fact, the monthly values of new letters of
credit issued during January and February--an indicator of the
trend of exports--show 30- and 20-percent increases over the same
months last year.
Essentially, income from exports and overseas construction
projects has expanded the domestic money supply, contributing to
the inflation of real estate, stock, and commodity prices.
Government officials and central bankers have publicly said they
intend to stem the upward pressures. The Bank of Korea has begun
to siphon off excess money by issuing monetary stabilization bonds.
Economic planners are also saying that the supplementary budget for
1988 will be held below $671 million (500 billion won), even though
the more tight-fisted approach will delay many of the public works
projects promised by Roh during last year's presidential election
campaign.
An Alternative Scenario
A serious recession in the United States could dramatically
alter the economic challenge facing President Roh. With almost 40
percent of its exports--over 14 percent of GNP--destined for the
United States, South Korea would quickly feel declining demand in
the US market. The current account and trade surpluses would begin
falling, turning Seoul's attention to moderating the speed of the
decline and holding down unemployment. Instead of appreciating the
won, Seoul would probably be looking for an opportunity to
depreciate it as well as accelerate construction of many of the
public works projects Roh promised when he campaigned for the
presidency. Seoul would probably aggressively counsel labor
against wage demands that could threaten the competitiveness of
South Korean exports.
Notwithstanding these steps
on the need to curb inflation in
in the current account surplus,
government officials are at
and the seeming unanimity of views
large measure through reductions
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odds over how to effectively use 25X1
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'their primary policy tools--market opening and won appreciation.
All the ministries agree in principle that South Korea's markets
must be open to more foreign goods, but the consensus breaks down
over which imports are permissible. There also is major
disagreement over how much leeway Seoul has to accommodate US
demands for a stronger won.
Market Liberalization. The differences among the economic
ministries over market liberalization seem to be a matter of
degree--in effect, an argument over how much emphasis should be
placed on opening the economy to more imports. Ministry of Trade
and Industry (MTI) officials believe liberalization--not won
appreciation--should be the centerpiece in Seoul's strategy to deal
with lowering the current account surplus
Indeed, the plan to reduce the surplus announced
in February emphasizes the elimination of formal barriers to
imports and the repeal of various export-promotion measures,
strongly reflecting the MTI approach (see the appendix for details
of the plan).
Those who have reservations about MTI's emphasis on market
opening contend that the kind of "liberalization" the Ministry has
in mind is no guarantee that imports of the designated goods will
increase. We, too, believe that MTI's approach highlighting the
removal of formal barriers will do little to enlarge the market for
imports. In fact, MTI likes to emphasize its plans to reduce
formal impediments to trade because it believes the remaining
tariff and non-tariff barriers will render most foreign goods that
would compete directly against domestic products noncompetitive,
Seoul's recent approach to several outstanding trade disputes
also suggests market "liberalization" is unlikely to bring major
increases in imports. In the case of both high-quality beef and
cigarettes, well-entrenched domestic interests with considerable
clout are blocking concessions to US demands, even when imports--
particularly beef--would have little direct impact on domestic
producers. Pressures to permit trade in services have met similar
obstacles. Seoul has given ground only in response to a US request
that joint ventures involving foreign firms be allowed in the life
insurance business. In this special case, moreover, the opposition
was limited to a few bureaucrats who were concerned about keeping
major domestic industrial combines out of the financial sector,
rather than generated by the private sector.
With National Assembly elections set for 26 April, political
factors also are slowing any forward movement on market-openina
steps.)
Won Appreciation. More than the contention surrounding market
opening, the debate over won appreciation to stem the rise in the
current account surplus has generated controversy in South Korea.
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Appreciation or tne won would promote imports by reducing the gap
in price between expensive foreign goods and domestic products as
well as erode the price competitiveness of South Korea's exports.
Without such currency adjustments, market liberalization would have
little effect on the current account surplus, because domestic
producers would still be shielded from strong foreign competition.
A study in 1987 by the Korea Institute of Economics and Technology
concluded that a 10-percent appreciation of the won would increase
imports by 4.4 percent, reduce exports by 7.7 percent, and decrease
the current account surplus by $1.5 billion.
Members of the business community, especially export
industries, have strong reservations about the rising value of the
won--some for good reasons. For Korean producers of textiles and
footwear--who supplied over a quarter of all exports in 1987--
increased prices translate into loss of business to competitors in
Hong Kong, Thailand, the Philippines, or China. Indeed, data on
the issuance of new letters of credit indicate export orders for
Korean textiles are no longer increasing. Manufacturers of
consumer electronics and cars also are worried., although they have
less cause for concern. Even with the gradual appreciation of the
won in 1987 and early 1988, orders for South Korean electrical and
electronic goods are up over 30 percent this year. Auto exports,
up over 70 percent compared with January and February 1987,
likewise are booming.
For their part, economic policy makers in Seoul recognize that
a strong won is necessary to deal with the trade surplus and expect
to remain under pressure from Washington, but they also are feeling
the heat from businessmen, who are against any rapid moves.
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/Ministry officials privately told
the US Embassy that they were being deluged with complaints from
businessmen when the won broke the 770-to-the-US-dollar mark in
February. With the won now above 750, the flow of complaints
undoubtedly has become even heavier.
The Outlook: In the Short Run, Roh Is the Key
Despite the lines that have been drawn in the debate over
policy to stem the current account surplus and dampen inflation,
the pattern and politics of decisionmaking in Seoul suggest that
action at the top may not be swift. Roh's initial impulse has been
to delegate economic decision making to his Cabinet ministers
/In our view, one result
of this approach is likely to be ineffectual interministerial
compromises. The February plan for reducing the current account
surplus is an example. The plan purported to be an across-the-
board attack on the surplus, but avoided any commitment to roll
back the exchange rate advantage South Korea gained in 1987 or to
eliminate nontariff barriers to imports.
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LI/en ii ton eventuaily takes a stronger hand, his views of the
economy as expressed in conversations with US officials indicate he
still may not realize how rapidly Korea's outlook has improved. In
a meeting with the US delegation to his inauguration, for example,
he spoke of the Korean economy as still being in its "infant"
stage, suggesting that progress on trade would have to be step by
step. Even if Roh was being disingenuous in characterizing Korea's
economic status, other factors also are likely to impede his
inclination to act swiftly. Before weighing in, Roh would have to
consider the short-term political costs. To appear to be conceding
to foreign demands--whether it be for currency appreciation or
market opening--would hand both the opposition and others, such as
the students and radicals who have already identified trade
problems as part of their "cause,," a potential issue. We believe
these political factors are short-term influences on Roh's
perspective, but he nevertheless may decide that the need to
burnish his credentials as a democratic politician open to public
concerns is more pressing than the advantages of trade reform.
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In any case, we expect economic developments in 1988 to
aggravate existing differences of opinion over market opening
versus won appreciation. To head off the increased inflationary
pressures caused by Korea's trade surplus, economic planners and
central bank officials are likel to push for more won
appreciation.
If businessmen have to pay a high price for labor peace in the
spring wage negotiations, they almost certainly will press Seoul to
ease, if not reverse, the pace of won appreciation. The business
community will undoubtedly appeal to the ruling party--which it has
supported financially during both the presidential and National
Assembly election campaigns--to put the central bank and the
technocrats at the EPB in their place, and to ignore their
arguments about the dangers of reigniting inflation.
The Longer Term
Notwithstanding the impediments to market opening and
significant won appreciation in the short run, several developments
indicate that economic policy makers may be laying the groundwork
for changes over the long term. For example, a widely reported
seminar paper presented by a Korea Development Institute researcher
in mid-February emphasized that Seoul would have to accelerate
currency appreciation in tandem with market liberalization to halt
the growth in the surplus. The paper also broke ground in
providing a domestically oriented rationale for cutting the
surplus, arguing that failure to do so would reduce economic
efficiency, skew investment and output, stimulate inflation, and
exacerbate trade friction. EPB officials also have begun
publicizing the domestic advantages of won appreciation, pointing
out the beneficial effects from restrained growth on the money
supply and inflation. They have also cited the effect of a
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stronger won in encouraging investment in production for domestic
rather than foreign markets, and in helping alleviate trade
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A broader effort appears under way to educate the public--and 25X1
perhaps the senior political leadership as well. In response to a
mid-February request from the ruling Democratic Justice Party, the
EPB recommended that a panel from government, academia, and
business should compile a set of recommendations similar to the
Maekawa Report on economic restructuring prepared for Japan's Prime
Minister Nakasone in 1986 . An EPB 25X1
official may have been describing one objective of the effort when
he told the US Embassy that a public relations campaign would be
necessary to convince people that consumption of luxury goods,
particularly from abroad, was not unpatriotic and that imports
helped expand consumer choice and reduce prices. 25X1
A failure to deal with the current account surplus presents
other, long-term problems for Seoul. Even under the best
circumstances, a tapering off in the growth of the current account
surplus--and an easing of its inflationary pressures on the
economy--are unlikely until next year, when price changes induced
by won appreciation should be fully reflected in the volume of
imports and exports. In the meantime, Seoul will have to begin
grappling with how to invest the proceeds from its surplus
overseas. Korean officials so far have avoided the issue by using
surplus foreign exchange to repay foreign debt. But Seoul is
running out of debts to repay and instead will have to look for
opportunities to place an increasing portion of the current account
surplus abroad.
Deregulation of capital outflows--essentially the elimination
of regulations that require official approval for the transfer of
even a few thousand US dollars over-seas--would stimulate foreign
investment as well as ease inflationary pressure by providing an
external outlet for surplus funds. This decision also is caught up
in interministerial policy differences, however. According to the
US Embassy, economic reformers want to begin to loosen capital
controls by first abolishing restrictions on normal foreign
exchange transactions. They believe the step will reduce domestic
manufacturers' opposition to won appreciation.1 Whatever the
merits of their policy arguments, proponents of financial
deregulation will need Roh's support to overcome the opposition of
entrenched bureaucratic and business interests--a battle on a
complex subject he is unlikely to join until after the 1988
political season and the Olympics are behind him.
1 The Ministry of Finance, and perhaps the Ministry of Trade and
Industry as well, appear to see such actions as directly
undercutting their power. An end to capital controls would give
the private sector freedom to tap deregulated foreign capital
markets, eliminating the bureaucracy's ability to ration credit--a
major source of MOF and MTI influence.
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APPENDIX
Key Elements of Seoul's New Package To Reduce the Current Account
Surplus
Eliminating import restrictions
Beginning in April, the Ministry of Trade and Industry will approve
import licenses for 145 additional items. The step puts 95.4
percent of the 7,911 items in the South Korean tariff nomenclature
in the "liberalized" category, although as in the past the action
does not guarantee that newly liberalized items will be imported.
There may be no demand for them, or other barriers could prevent
importation.
Seoul will remove 48 items from its import surveillance list, which
is used to prevent sudden surges in imports. Also, Seoul plans to
ease import inspection and quarantine procedures by the end of
April. Experience suggests extended negotiations will be necessary
before all procedural problems are overcome.
Reducing import tariffs and export loans to promote balanced growth
of imports, exports, and domestic demand
Seoul is preparing to cut tariffs on 117 items, but the quantity of
imports benefiting from the lower rate will be limited. The
government also will cut tariffs on 319 items--including
cosmetics, fertilizers, and computer equipment--from a list of 982
for which the United States has requested reductions.
Maintaining the won at a level equitable relative to the currencies
of trading rivals
Retaining parity would keep South Korean exporters more competitive
than those in Japan or Taiwan. Since September 1985, the won has
risen only 16 percent compared with 41 percent for the New Taiwan
dollar and 67 percent for the yen.
Reducing special excise taxes to increase domestic demand
Seoul will reduce the 40-percent excise tax on video-tape recorders
and the 20-percent tax on subcompact cars to stimulate domestic
sales. Higher domestic sales could slow export expansion, as well
as increase auto parts imports---an estimated 30 percent of the
components in Korean cars.
Lifting restrictions on foreign exchange transactions
Seoul intends to change its foreign exchange regulations to allow
individuals to hold as much as $5,000 in foreign currency, to raise
the ceilings on the foreign exchange holdings of insurance and
securities companies, and to eliminate reporting requirements for
service transactions and book imports that involve $10,000 or less
in foreign currency. The ceilings for insurance and securities
companies are likely to continue to rise--increased portfolio
investment overseas is an easy means of relieving the pressure
placed on the domestic money supply by the current account surplus.
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SOUTH KOREA: ECONOMIC CHALLENGES FACING THE ROH ADMINISTRATION
DISTRIBUTION:
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1 - WILLIAM CLARK, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIAN AND
PACIFIC AFFAIRS, RM 6205,
1 - HARRY DUNLOP, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF KOREAN AFFAIRS, RM 5313,
1 - ROBERT SUETTINGER, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF ANALYSIS FOR EAST ASIA AND
PACIFIC, RM 8840,
1 - WILLIAM PIEZ, DEPUTY ASSISTANT, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC
AFFAIRS, RM 6205,
1 - KENNETH C. QUINONES, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, EAP/RA, RM 4310,
1 - TED KLOTH, OFFICE OF KOREAN AFFAIRS, RM 5313,
1 - BILL NEWCOMB, INR/EC/CER, RM 8442,
1 - JOHN MERRILL, INR/EAP, RM 8840,
1 - JOSEPH A. MUSSOMELI, OFFICE OF KOREAN AFFAIRS, RM 5313,
1 - TONY INTERLANDI, OFFICE OF KOREAN AFFAIRS, RM 5313,
1 - WILLIAM WALLER, CHIEF/DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, RM 3829,
1 - PETER ITO, PM/ISP, RM 7424,
1 - JIM PRZYSTUP, POLICY PLANNING STAFF, RM 7330,
1 - DAVID JOHNSON, S/S/O, RM 7516,
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
1 - JAMES A. KELLY, SPECIAL ASST TO THE PRESIDENT & SR. DIR. FOR ASIAN
AFFAIRS, RM 493,
1 - STEVE DANZANSKY, SPECIAL ASST TO THE PRESIDENT & SR. DIR. FOR INT'L
ECONOMIC AFF, RM 363,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1 - DR. KARL JACKSON, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIA AND
PACIFIC AFFAIRS, RM 4E817,
1 - RADM EDWARD BAKER, JR., DIRECTOR, EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC REGION, INT'L
SECURITY AFFAIRS, RM 4C839,
1 - LTC JOE FLANZ, HQDA (DAMI/F11/NORTHEAST ASIA), RM 2A474,
1 - CAPT. WALTER ANDERSON, DEPT. OF ARMY/CURRENT INTELLIGENCE/NE ASIA,
RM 2B515,
1 - JAY SLOAN, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, EA/P, RM 2C238,
1 - COL. STEVEN DELP, DB-2D, RM C2951,
1 - GUY ARRIGONI, DE-2, RM B6823,
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1 - LTC. RICH FISCHER, OJCS/J-5/NE ASIA/KOREA DESK, RM 20977,
1 - COL. JAMES MORGAN, JR., DIRECTOR FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE, RM B7940,
1 - ROGER BIESEL, DB-2 D 1, RM C2230A,
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COMMERCE DEPARTMENT
1 - JOAN MCENTEE, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE, RM
5898,
1 - SCOTT GODDIN, OFFICE OF PACIFIC BASIN, RM 6854,
1 - KIM FITZGERALD, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE LIAISON, RM 6854,
1 - MEL SEARLES, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC,
RM 3820,
OFFICE OF THE USTR
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PACIFIC, RM 322,
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DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY
1 - RANDALL FORT, OFFICE OF SPECIAL ASST. TO THE SECRETARY FOR NAT'L
SECURITY, RM 4324,
1 - WILLIAM BARREDA, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY, RM
4428,
1 - PATSY HAAS, OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING & PORTFOLIO
INVESTMENT, RM 5320,
1 - TODD CRAWFORD, OFFICE OF DEVELOPING NATIONS FINANCE, RM 5221,
OTHER
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1 - ALFRED PERSI, ASIA TEAM LEADER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY, RM
5546S,
1 - GLEN HALM, OFFICE OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, ILAB, RM S5006,
INTERNAL
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1 - NIO, ECONOMICS, RM 7E47,
1 - CHIEF DO, RM 3D01,
1 - CHIEF, E RM 5E18,
1 - CHIEF, OGI/FSIC/PI, RM 2G28,
1 - CHIEF, OGI/ECD RM 3046,
1 - CHIEF, OEA/NEA/KOREA, RM 4043,
1 - CHIEF, OEA/NEA/JAPAN, RM 4031,
1 - CHIEF, OEA/NEA/STI, RM 4G43,
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1 - CHIEF, 0EA/SEA DIVISION, RM 4F24,
1 - DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF EAST ASIAN ANALYSIS, RM 4F18,
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1 - CHIEF, FBIS/ANALYSIS GROUP, RM 3S05,
1 - DDI, RM 7E44,
1 - SENIOR REVIEW PANEL, RM 5G00,
1 - OCA REGISTRY, OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS RM 7B24,
1 - PDB STAFF, RM 7F30,
1 - CHIEF, LDA/EAD/AB, RM 1H18,
6 - CONTROL BRANCH, OFFICE OF CURRENT PRODUCTION AND ANALYTIC
SUPPORT, RM 7G07,
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SUPPORT, RM 7G50,
1 - INTELL. LIAISON STAFF, OFFICE OF CURRENT PRODUCTION AND ANALYTIC
SUPPORT, RM 7G50,
1 - CHIEF, PRODUCT EVALUATION STAFF, RM 2F42,
1 - NIC, ANALYTIC GROUP, RM 7E47,
1 - CHIEF, 000/EA DIVISION, RM 5000,
1 - CHIEF, DDO/E ?M 5C45,
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