JAPANESE PERCEPTIONS OF THE US-JAPAN RELATIONSHIP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00100R000201590001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 17, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence-Agency
7 --la 6)-?
DA.LE
DOC NO FM- /4Fr ---20111/
OIR
P PD
Washington. D. C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
17 August 1988
Japanese Perceptions of the US-Japan Relationship
Summary
Despite clear evidence that for most Japanese the relationship with
the United States remains central to Japan's economic well-being and
national security, our reading of public opinion
suggests important perceptions of the United States
are changing. Many in Japan see the United States in decline and
increasingly question whether Washington can maintain security
commitments in East Asia as well as play the kind of role as Western
alliance leader that has historically benefited Japan. The pride of the
Japanese in their own success, and consequently in their changing
international role, also plays a major part in explaining their perspective on
the United States. We believe that at least some in Japan sense a new
power balance between the two alliance partners. To date, however, little
in the way of public commentary or official behavior suggests that Tokyo
will move rapidly to assume responsibilities that Japan's economic power
could afford.
This memorandum was prepared by Office of
Analysis. Information available as of 15 August 1988 was used in its preparation.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
IDEA
EA M 88-20114
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US Relations Still Number One...
Tokyo continues to regard a strong relationship with the United States as its
foreign and security policy priority. In a recent Diet speech, Prime Minister Takeshita
put his imprint on the objective, borrowing the well-worn vocabulary of his
predecessors to describe the US-Japan alliance as the cornerstone of Japanese policy.
Notwithstanding its annual repetition, Takeshita's characterization captures a perception
shared by the population at large. Indeed, a nationwide survey conducted in July found
that 75 percent of the respondents believe the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty is
important in maintaining Japan's peace and security. This figure does not significantly
differ from similar polls conducted in 1981 and 1984.
Whatever the pride in Japan over its wealth, recognized success, and economic
power, official as well as popular Japanese interest in strong bilateral ties still reflects a
belief that Japan's relationship with the United States is economically critical:
? Most important to Japanese across the board is the fact that the United States
remains by far Japan's leading export market. Over 35 percent of Japanese
exports still reach the United States each year--more than six times the volume
channeled into Japan's next-largest market, South Korea.
? Of growing significance in light of Japan's role as the world's leading financial
power, the United States also represents stable financial markets with high
returns for Japanese investors. Japanese banks, securities firms, and insurance
companies have several hundred billion dollars invested in US stocks and bonds.
Corporate financiers in Tokyo see the United States as a critical long-term
investment proposition.
? The United States remains the preferred location for Japanese overseas direct
investment. Japanese real estate purchases in the United States--which have
increased dramatically since 1980--stand at around $24 billion; over 600
Japanese manufacturing firms also operate plants in the United States.
? The United States continues to be the source of most imported technology. US
know-how is key for Japanese technologists in the civil sector, but it is
indispensable to those involved with defense, which requires US inputs to
produce state-of-the-art weaponry.
Perhaps even more fundamental than their view of the US market, Japanese
policymakers regard the alliance with the United States as vital to Japan's security.
the effectiveness of the US defense commitment has
allowed Tokyo to develop a security policy that requires only limited investment--in an
economic and political sense--in military readiness. For senior policymakers and
politicians, particularly in the ruling party, attitudes toward the United States also are a
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function of their view of the Soviet Union; here, the Japanese perspective has changed
little. Senior conservative decisionmakers remain suspicious of the Soviets because of
their continuing force modernization in East Asia as well as Moscow's refusal to
accommodate Japanese interests as Japan's economic power has grown.
Nonetheless, for most Japanese, the Soviet military threat to Japan remains
essentially Washington's responsibility. Most of the top of Tokyo's hierarchy seem to
want Japanese military capabilities to remain modest, recognizing that both domestic
political opinion and economic self-interest warrant no significant change in the only
moderately paced Japanese defense buildup.
...But Perceptions Are Shifting
Despite the seeming durability of the "fundamentals" in the Japanese view of the
United States, the perception of the benefits derived from close bilateral relations
appears to be changing. Our judgment on this score is admittedly impressionistic, but
fragmentary information suggests many Japanese perceive increasing costs and
declining returns for Japan as a result of trends in US economic performance and
political behavior
Japanese concern about US staying power as a leader of the Western alliance
has been reflected in several quarters. Most obviously, academic and editorial opinion
have begun to openly question whether a country with a massive national deficit can
sustain its role as Western alliance leader and its power in international security affairs.
Beyond pundits and editorialists, however, some Japanese security policy makers fear
increasing bilateral contention as budget-driven constraints on US defense efforts impel
Washington to push Tokyo harder to bear a greater burden
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Will the Trends Continue?
Japanese pride in maintaining economic vitality in the face of an array of
challenges--from the oil shocks of the 1970s to the appreciation of the yen in the
1980s?clearly underlies much of the critical perspective on the United States. Virtually
all projections of Japan's economic and technological strengths?by Westerners and
Japanese alike--point to continued success and accruing power, suggesting the
Japanese will grow more, not less confident in their capabilities.
Despite Japan's sense of growing power and a perception that its one-time
alliance mentor is declining, important aspects of the Japanese international role remain
ill-defined . Foremost among them is how the Japanese
see the need to reconcile their success with the responsibilities that derive as a
consequence. Some?primarily a few intellectuals --have
suggested that Japan's economic competition with the United States, notwithstanding its
profitability, is undermining the health of its primary national security guarantor. The
implication of their case is that Japan has new responsibilities and must bear increasing
costs within the alliance.
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Whatever the persuasiveness of the argument, most public opinion sampling
suggests that the majority of Japanese do not see such connections. Their view of
Japan's international role remains circumscribed by traditional perceptions of the
country as an overpopulated, economically vulnerable island nation. We believe that,
however self-serving, these views are deep-rooted. Such perceptions probably will
change over time, but to date little in the way of public commentary or official behavior
suggests that Tokyo will move rapidly to assume responsibilities commensurate with its
more contemporary attitudes or the leverage its economic power could afford.
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. ? ?
Department of State
1 - Michael Armacost, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Room 7240
Central Intelligence Agency
1 - DDI, Room 7E44
1 - Senior Review Panel, Room 5G00,
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