NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY TUESDAY 27 SEPTEMBER 1988

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89T01291R000100220001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 14, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 27, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence Daily
Tuesday
27 September 1988
Top Secret
CPAS NID 88-226JX
27 September 1988
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Contents
USSR: Reassessing Collectivization
China-USSR: Chinese Debate Relations With Moscow
UK-Iran: Renewing Diplomatic Ties
Peru: Coup Rumors Abate
Notes
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2
3
4
Burma: Increasing Troop Presence in Rangoon
5
Nicaragua: Keeping Lid on Opposition
5
Colombia: Rebels Counter Peace Bid With Violence
6
Arab States: Palestine Council Meeting Delayed
7
Saudi Arabia: Bond Market Opened to Public
7
Poland: New Premier Designated
8
USSR-Chile: Soviets Urge Nonviolent Tactics
8
Taiwan: Wrangling Over Mainland Policy
9
Bahrain-Qatar: New Talks on Hawar Islands Dispute
9
In Brief
10
Special Analyses
Panama: Noriega's Support Still Formidable
11
France: Mitterrand Reviewing Arms Control Policy
12
India-USSR: Changing Arms Relationship
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USSR: Reassessing Collectivization
A distinct shift over the past month in the official view of Stalin's
forced collectivization in the 1930s?from carefully balanced
treatment a year ago to wholesale condemnation?seems
intended to support General Secretary Gorbachev's initiatives
to restructure the farm system.
In a speech to media officials last week, Gorbachev noted that the
long-awaited Central Committee plenum on agriculture would take
place "first thing next year" but acknowledged that his program
to give individual initiative more scope through long-term leasing
arrangements was meeting strong resistance from officials and
farmers alike. He blamed the legacy of collectivization in the 1930s.
"We were in too much of a hurry to change things then, and we are
still trying to untangle ourselves," he told farmers in Krasnoyarsk
earlier this month. "We destroyed the peasantry." Gorbachev's
impromptu remarks seemingly contradict the assessment in his
anniversary speech in November 1987 that, although injustices had
be -n committed, the policy of collectivization had proved "correct."
The shift was reinforced in a Pravda article on 16 September by
historian Viktor Danilov, who flatly asserted that "no objective factor
can justify the violence that occurred during collectivization." His
estimate of the number of victims who died during the famine that
ensued in many rural areas was reportedly deleted, but the article
described Western estimates of 3 to 4 million deaths as reasonable.
This estimate contrasts with the estimate of thousands Gorbachev
used in his 1987 speech.
Comment: Gorbachev's efforts to change farms into true
cooperatives of independent leaseholders are not likely to succeed as
long as Stalin's model of tightly controlled farms is the ideologically
approved one. Even farmers whose initiative has not been destroyed
might hesitate to enter leasing arrangements out of fear of being
compared to kulaks, wealthy peasants who were dispossessed during
collectivization.
Orthodox Communists remain uneasy over the current attacks on
collectivization. "Second Secretary" Ligachev has recently come out
strongly in favor of long-term leasing, but in the past he has forcefully
defended collectivization and may believe Gorbachev is going too far
in dismantling the existing farm structure.
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Top Secret
CHINA-USSR: Chinese Debate Relations With Moscow
Chinese leaders apparently have been debating the timing and
extent of further improvements in relations with Moscow, but
Deng Xiaoping, who almost certainly has the final word on such
decisions, apparently wants to proceed slowly for now.
Uncorroborated information indicates a group of senior Foreign
Ministry officials submitted a proposal this summer recommending
closer party and governmental ties to the USSR, but as of early
September there had been no response. The proposal reportedly was
passed to Deng who, with the support of key military leaders, was
considered likely to reject it. Other unconfirmed information indicates
Beijing is waiting for specific Soviet measures on Cambodia and for
the inauguration of the new US administration before scheduling a
summit with Moscow
The US defense attache in Beijing reports China's military leaders
oppose a rapid rapprochement with Moscow; they have indicated
new preconditions for Sino-Soviet normalization may be raised. In
response to a reporter's question, China's Foreign Ministry
spokesman noted on Thursday that the USSR must withdraw Il
its forces from Mongolia as quickly as possible
Comment: Deng is probably not opposed to a Sino-Soviet summit as
such, but he almost certainly believes he can win more concessions
from Moscow by holding out and wants to keep Sino-Soviet relations
from becoming a US election issue. The spokesman's response on
Mongolia was uncharacteristically pointed and may sianal Dena's
effort to slow the normalization process.
Deng may also hope to manipulate the timing of a summit so that
it does not enhance General Secretary Gorbachev's international
stature at his expense. China's military is more reluctant than some
in the Foreign Ministry to improve relations with Moscow, in part
because a reduced Soviet threat would almost certainly be followed
by further cuts in the already spartan level for funds allocated to
defense.
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Top Secret
UK-IRAN: Renewing Diplomatic Ties
British Foreign Secretary Howe and Iranian Foreign Minister
Velayati may complete arrangements for renewing diplomatic
ties this Friday at the UN, but the move apparently is not directly
connected to the hostage issue.
London wants to reestablish a fully functioning embassy with a
minimum of 10 diplomats, according to the US Embassy in London.
The UK all but cut ties last summer?following the beating of a British
diplomat by the Revolutionary Guard?and limited the Iranian
presence in London to one. The Thatcher government is currently
trying to still press speculation that the renewal of ties involves a deal
for release of the three British hostages held in Lebanon.
Comment: Interest in renewing ties is mutual. Tehran is trying to
expand links to the West and probably hopes the British will press
Iraq toward conciliation in the UN-sponsored peace talks. Iran
probably has been encouraged by recent British criticism of Iraq's
use of chemical weapons against the Kurds.
London's primary motivation in restoring relations is stronger
commercial ties. The Foreign Office has worried for some time that
British firms may be left out of emerging trade opportunities; the
recent decision by Paris to renew ties and growing Iranian trade
links to West Germany probably have fueled the Foreign Office's
eagerness. British officials have been more confident about posting
diplomats to Iran since a British official received assurances of their
safety during a recent visit to Tehran.
Leaders of the Church of England who are attempting to negotiate
the freedom of Anglican envoy Terry Waite are likely to hope that
stronger ties will result in the hostages' release, but London seems
unwilling to link the renewal of diplomatic ties to the hostages'
release. Tehran probably still believes that its influence with the
Lebanese Hizballah terrorists holding the British hostages has helped
encourage London to normalize relations. Prime Minister Thatcher
reportedly has been less interested than the Foreign Office in
restoring relations and almost certainly would oppose any dealings
that might undercut her advocacy of strong counterterrorist
measures.
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Top Secret
PERU: Coup Rumors Abate
Senior Peruvian military officers are increasingly concerned
about the deteriorating economy and the perception that
President Garcia is no longer managing policy, but they
apparently believe the costs of a coup would still outweigh
the benefits.
The longstanding antagonism toward Garcia among senior officers
began to build earlier this month because of their concern about the
impact of inflation on salaries and budgets. The US defense attache
reports the Defense Minister told Garcia on 12 September that
inflation, which is likely to reach 600 percent by December, is
undermining the morale and reliability of the armed forces.
To head off discontent, Garcia has promised to increase military
salaries by 50 percent and has committed the government to
undefined budget increases for each service,
Garcia has also confronted
the Defense Minister with taped telephone conversations between
military plotters, after which the Minister agreed to tour military bases
with service chiefs to talk up the proposed pay increases with fellow
officers and to discourage further plotting.
A source of the attache says that, before departing on the trip, the
military leaders agreed among themselves that a coup would be ill
advised at this point. They argued that the military does not have
solutions for Peru's economic difficulties and that the overnment
should be forced to take the heat for its own failures.
senior Army officers in
the military region around Lima assured the Defense Minister last
week that they oppose a coup. The Minister later emphasized in two
public statements that the armed forces fully support democracy, and
the US Embassy says rumors of an imminent coup have faded.
Comment: Garcia probably has preempted whatever plotting was
under way and bought himself some time with the military. Dislike of
him remains widespread in the services, but he has supporters in key
positions and no leader has yet emerged who seems capable of
capitalizing on the antipathy toward him. Garcia's declining popularity
may embolden some officers, but most robabl have no desire to
inherit the country's economic mess.
The public reaction to government austerity measures has been
milder than expected so far, but, if widespread social disorder
developed, the military would probably reassess its position. If
Marxist Alfonso Barrantes continues to be the front-runner as the
1990 election approaches moreover, the odds of a preemptive
coup will increase.
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27 September 1988
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Top Secret
BURMA: Increasing Troop Presence in Rangoon
The Burmese Government yesterday increased the number of troops
in Rangoon to block an anticipated antigovernment protest and
general strike, according to the US Embassy. Rangoon and Mandalay
were calm this past weekend, but military searches and fear of
government brutality have increased. The Burmese chief of police and
six other senior police officials were sacked after the police chief
refused to arrest opposition leader and former Prime Minister U Nu,
Comment: The display of military strength is a reminder of the
government's willingness to use force to control dissent. The
dismissal of police officers is probably intended to tell officials at all
levels to tighten discipline and to carry out government directives.
Student and opposition leaders, meanwhile, have warned against
mass protests because of the hopelessness of confronting heavily
armed troops. Some armed student protesters nevertheless will
probably try to carry out sporadic attacks against government forces.
NICARAGUA: Keeping Lid On Opposition
The regime is intensifying its harassment of internal opposition
groups despite their already weakened position and low level of
activity. Last week, unidentified assailants?probably officially
sanctioned thugs, according to US Embassy sources?brutally
attacked Joaquin Mejia, the editor of the opposition Liberal
Independent Party's newspaper and a member of the National
Assembly, after he published an article critical of the regime.
andinista officials recently warned a leader of
the opposition umbrella group, Coordinadora, not to hold a protest
march without permission last Sunday. The group's directors heeded
the warning but held a 72-hour hunger strike last weekend to protest
regime repression and an official propaganda blitz accusing them of
being controlled by the CIA.
Comment: The regime's campaign is discouraging all but innocuous
opposition activity. The harassment of Mejia, who generally has
worked within the system, suggests the Sandinistas are warning even
the "loyal opposition" that there are limits to acceptable behavior.
Allegations that the opposition is in the pay of the US are likely to
make its leaders think twice about organizing public demonstrations
and to give the regime additional justification for suppressing dissent.
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Top Secret
COLOMBIA: Rebels Counter Peace Bid With Violence
Rebel leaders have flatly rejected the government's recent peace
offer and have begun a bold offensive against military installations.
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the largest
faction and leader of the national rebel alliance, last week countered
President Barco's month-old call for guerrilla demobilization with a
vague demand for broad popular dialogue, according to the US
Embassy. FARC and its allies meanwhile launched an unprecedented
series of strikes on military and police bases, in one case detonatin ? a
car bomb at a divisional Army headquarters in the northeast
Comment: The rebels may have delayed responding to Barco's offer
in order to show that they can mount coordinated actions against the
military, reportedly a primary objective of the alliance. They probably
hope to weaken the counterinsurgency campaign by forcing the
military to divert troops from combat to protecting bases. The rebels
may also hope to undercut public support for the Barco government
by calling attention to its inability to protect vital facilities?
particularly in the northeast, where guerrillas have repeatedly
damaged the major oil pipeline and other economic targets.
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27 September 1988
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Top Secret
ARAB STATES: Palestine Council Meeting Delayed
PLO Chairman Arafat has decided to delay convening the Palestine
National Council for several weeks to get more time to seek a
moderate consensus within his own ranks.
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The US Embassy in 2bAl
Algiers reports the PLO remains divided over the venue of the Council
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Arafat is facing determined internal opposition 2bAl
to any moderation of the PLO charter. 25X1
Comment: Arafat is probably considering postponing the conclave
until after the Israeli election on 1 November and holding it in Tunis
rather than Algiers to avoid Algerian pressure. He probably believes
he needs time to gain leverage over those PLO Executive Committee
hardliners who fear he is inclined to offer excessive concessions to
open a dialogue with the US. To maintain PLO unity, Arafat will
probably try to prepare a compromise package, which might include
the declaration of a Palestine government without defined borders
or the formation of a small exile government with no independent
authority.
SAUDI ARABIA: Bond Market Opened to Public
Saudi Arabia's surprise move to expand domestic bond sales to
the general public improves prospects for the government's sluggish
financing program but risks new tension between the regime and the
conservative religious establishment. The government is limiting
publicity, but the US Embassy reports that Riyadh's new scheme
removes most restrictions on bond sales and legalizes secondary
trading. Earlier sales to financial institutions produced less than
40 percent of anticipated revenues because of bankers' concerns
about the bonds' comparatively low interest rate and about the
government's prohibition on secondary trading.
Comment: Falling oil revenues and chronic budget deficits?
$14 billion this year?make the success of the bond program critical.
Although bond sales almost certainly will increase with the new move,
the government probably must also pay a higher interest rate on the
bonds to sell enough of them to meet its revenue goals. The limited
publicity about the expanded bond program probably will help mollify
the conservative religious opposition, but that group is dogmatically
opposed to interest-bearing securities and, at a minimum, will
question the Islamic integrity of the kingdom's decision.
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7 27 September 1988
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POLAND: New Premier Designated
Poland's Communist party will nominate Politburo member
Mieczyslaw Rakowski as Premier at today's session of the Polish
parliament, according to Polish media. Rakowski, a close aide to
party First Secretary Jaruzelski, is now the party's propaganda chief
and has called Solidarity leader Walesa an enemy of the state.
Comment: Rakowski's previous hostility toward Solidarity should
calm party hardliners' fear that the regime will go too far to placate
Walesa. Rakowski advocates broadening the party's base while
maintaining its supremacy, however, and is likely to reach out to
nonparty independents?particularly leading Catholics?in forming
his government. He is also a political ally of the party's foremost
reform economist, Wladyslaw Baka, suggesting that his government
will try to push economic reforms. Many opposition leaders distrust
Rakowski, however, and he will have difficulty gaining support for his
new policies from prominent figures close to either Cardinal Glemp or
Walesa.
USSR-CHILE: Soviets Urge Nonviolent Tactics
Soviet disapproval of violent activity by the terrorist affiliate of the
Chilean Communist Party (PCCh) is leading to tension between the
party and Moscow, The Soviets
reportedly favor more moderate tactics to ensure the victory of
the "no" campaign against President Pinochet in the 5 October
plebiscite. Moscow reportedly fears that sustained violence would
push voters into the "yes" camp. A senior PCCh official said earlier
this year that the Soviets had been instrumental in influencing his
party to support a "no" vote in the plebiscite rather than a boycott,
Comment: The Soviets evidently continue to believe that the "no"
campaign is the best way to oust Pinochet and to broaden the PCCh's
political base. If the "no" campaign wins, the Soviets almost certainly
will press the PCCh to deemphasize violence and to build ties to
Chile's main democratic parties to improve prospects for playing a
role in a possible political transition. Moscow would probably
condone some limited use of violence if Pinochet wins the plebiscite,
provided that it would not irreparably damage PCCh ties to Chile's
main democratic parties or provoke severe countermeasures by the
military.
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Top Secret
TAIWAN: Wrangling Over Mainland Policy
Taiwan's ruling party has expelled a senior legislator for violating the
official policy of "no contacts, no negotiations, and no compromise"
with China when he met with senior leaders in Beijing earlier this
month and called for immediate reunification talks. The party claims
his expulsion will not affect plans to liberalize Taipei's mainland policy
further and announced late last week that some mainland residents
will be allowed to visit aged relatives on Taiwan. Younger party
members, however, have protested the expulsion and are calling for
party workers to stage a mass walkout.
Comment: Party conservatives?reacting viscerally to anything
that resembles cooperation with the Chinese Communist Party?
apparently have seized on the legislator's indiscreet behavior to try
to slow the growth of unofficial ties between Taiwan and China. They
see the new mainland policy as a security threat and are alarmed at
the burgeoning indirect trade between Taiwan and China?likely to
exceed $2 billion this year. President Li Teng-hui and party Secretary
General Li Huan, however, favor a more flexible policy toward China
as a means of moderating Beijing's policies toward Taiwan. They may
try to take advantage of public opinion favoring improved ties to
China and press ahead with a more relaxed mainland policy during
next year's legislative election.
BAHRAIN-QATAR: New Talks on Hawar Islands Dispute
Bahrain has proposed to Qatar that the two countries settle their
territorial dispute over the Hawar Islands through direct negotiations
rather than through the World Court. The US Embassy in Doha
reports that Bahrain's Crown Prince Hamad Al Khalifa and Qatar's
Crown Prince Hamad Al Thani have met twice in the past two weeks
to discuss the issue. The Bahraini Crown Prince reportedly fears
tensions between Manama and Doha might disrupt the Gulf
Cooperation Council's summit at Manama in December.
Comment: Bahrain apparently is trying to maintain contacts with
Qatar to soften Doha's insistence on bringing the dispute before the
World Court. Qatar's willingness to discuss a political solution directly
with Bahrain indicates that tensions have declined between Manama
and Doha. Fundamental differences over ownership of the islands,
however are likely to de ay significant progress toward a solution.
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Top Secret
In Brief
Europe
International
Middle East
East Asia
Americas
? Liberal Party member Frederick Bolkestein named Netherlands
Defense Minister on Friday as government survived parliamentary
crisis ... predecessor forced to resign earlier this month for poor
performance in previous position.
? French Socialists gained slightly, extreme-right National Front
declined in cantonal elections Sunday... lowest voter turnout
since World War II ... conservative parties will probabl kee
control of most departments after runoffs next Sunday
? Slovene reform advocate Franc Setinc has resigned from
14-member Yugoslav party Presidency... publicly attacked
Serbian party chief Milosevic for manipulatinaeihnic tensions ...
foreshadows more leadership changes
? Foreign Ministers of Group of Seven countries, at UN this week,
will probably approve recent antinarcotics proposals of joint task
force ... France somewhat skeptical, but topic probably high on
summit agenda again next year in Paris
? Japanese firming up plans for funeral of Emperor Hirohito, who
remains in critical condition ... to occur 40 days after death ...
government, banks, stock market to close for week at most ...
businesses likely to follow suit.
? Press reports say Taiwan predicting 1989 exchange rate will
average 28.5 New Taiwan dollars to US dollar ... would mean no
significant appreciation since late 1987 ... ensures export growth,
trade surplus.
? US Embassy says Salvadoran President Duarte ordered separate
judicial, military investigations of alleged Army massacre of
10 peasants last week ... government concerned guilty findin
might damage human rights image, threaten foreign aid.
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10 27 September 1988
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TOD Secret
Special Analysis
PANAMA: Noriega's Support Still Formidable
Recent reporting strongly suggests Defense Chief Noriega has no
plans for early retirement.
Noriega is considering running for
president in May 1989 and has ordered a poll to assess his chances if
the election were honest. He probably sees the election as a solution
to the political crisis that will legitimize his regime and allow the
military's continued dominance of politics
Noriega's recent actions regarding the possibility of renewed
negotiations with the US also appear designed to keep his options
open. He has sent tentative signals in recent weeks that he remains
receptive to talks with Washington, but his public statement on
Monday that the US had made the initial approach appears aimed
at scuttling negotiations for the time being
Noriega's traditional supporters are feeling the strain of 15 months of
political and economic crisis in Panama, but they probably still see
more risk than reward in breaking with him:
-- Despite the recent surge in strikes, organized labor?a
traditional bastion of military support?has shown no interest
in uniting with the largely middle-class opposition, which it
sees as too probusiness.
some officers privately favor
Noriega's departure, fear of losing their perquisites?or their
lives?in an attempt to oust him continues to inhibit the
formation of any dissident group within the military.
? The regime coalition remains united in spite of evidence of
growing differences between Actina President Solis Palma
and his cabinet
Noriega is no doubt concerned about the recent labor strife, but, the
military's takeover of key public services indicates he has not been
intimidated and is resolved to hang onto power. Noriega is probably
prepared to use greater force if necessary to quell future labor unrest,
although he will first try his usual tactics of intimidation and
negotiation. The recent decision by striking workers to return to work
without additional government concessions has probably increased
his confidence in his ability to retain control.
As long as Noriega is confident that he still has military support, he is
not likely to give up power. He may quickly change his mind, however,
if his tactics fail to stem labor unrest or begin to cost him support in
the military.
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TOP Secret
France
Top Secret
27 September 1988
Mitterrand: Ensuring His Place in History
With no higher office to run for and without a
strong domestic policy agenda, Francois
Mitterrand may try to perfect his place in history
through lasting accomplishments in arms control
and other foreign policy areas. The role of
venerable helmsman suits the French President,
who prefers dealing with broad concepts rather
than details. Foreign affairs and defense are his
constitutional prerogatives, and he can operate
with greater freedom than in the domestic arena.
Focusing on international affairs would allow
Mitterrand to skirt the mire of everyday domestic
politics, he is
displeased with much of the Socialist Party for
criticizing his opening toward the center.
the 72-year-old
President as clearly irked that speculation about
who might succeed him has begun so soon after his
triumph at the polls in May.
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Top Secret
Special Analysis
FRANCE: Mitterrand Reviewing Arms Control Policy
President Mitterrand's public support for arms control over the
past year is designed to increase France's leverage, strengthen
European cooperation, and encourage progress in arms
control?particularly on conventional arms?at a time when
movement seems possible. His main objective is to dispel
France's reputation as a spoiler on arms control. Because he is
still refining his agenda on arms control, his visit to Washington
this week presents an opportunity to influence his views
Mitterrand believes France's negativism on this issue has reduced
French influence, and he wants Paris to be a player, particularly on
NATO SNF modernization and on conventional disarmament. He also
believes the warming of East-West relations should be exploited to
produce further progress in arms control. He hopes as well to build on
an increasingly close relationship with West Germany and to win
economic and other concessions in exchange for insulating West
German Chancellor Kohl from Allied pressure to make such difficult
decisions as accepting the follow-on to the Lance missile.
Mitterrand nonetheless has vacillated about what his priorities are.
Before the NATO summit earlier this year, for example, he played
down the importance of SNF modernization and questioned the
usefulness of short-range nuclear systems. More recently, however,
he has toned down these criticisms and concentrated instead on
conventional force and chemical weapons issues.
Focusing on Conventional Arms
The US Embassy in Paris reports Mitterrand is particularly concerned
about the slow progress of discussions on conventional arms, and he
has stated repeatedly in recent months that conventional forces
should come first on the arms control agenda. He reportedly is trying
to bring French policy on conventional arms control closer to that of
other West European governments without abandoning France's
opposition to bloc-to-bloc negotiations. The Embassy says he
convened a brainstorming session of Foreign and Defense Ministry
officials earlier this month to ensure that French positions do not
hamstring negotiable Western proposals.
Mitterrand believes that the conventional stability talks later this year
will be political and should not be stymied by "complicated military
factors," according to the Embassy. It is this attitude that probably
led the Defense Ministry to brief him on the conventional imbalance in
Europe.
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Defense Minister Chevenement's Visit
Chevenement will be in Washington at the same time as Mitterrand but is heading a separate
delegation. He will highlight arms control topics but has other issues on his agenda:
Arms Development Cooperation. Chevenement lacks the technical expertise former Defense
Minister Giraud had in this area. Although he has said that French participation with the US in
codeveloping arms will go forward, he will probably take a hard look at how French industry
might benefit from such projects and fror'n possible joint development of a follow-on to the
Lance missile. The French Navy's interest in buying the US-built F-18 fighter is a high-priority
topic, not only because Chevenement recently postponed trials on a French aircraft carrier,
but also because the F-18's competitor, a carrier version of Dassault's Rafale, will not be
available before 1996. The US defense attache reports the only solution to the issue
Chevenement would accept is one that would preserve Dassault's identity as a French
company.
Military Use of Space. The French military has its own communications satellites but will not
have an imaging system until the early 1990s, when France expects to launch the first Helios
satellite from its joint program with Italy and Spain. Helios is to have photographic, infrared,
and electronic intelligence capabilities. The French will probably want the satellite to evaluate
the performances of Soviet ABM and early warning radars in particular. Paris is looking as
well for cooperation?most likely with the US and its EC partners?in the fields of optics,
radar, electronic intelligence, early warning, and surveillance, according to the defense
attache.
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Reassessing Position on Chemical Weapons
France has long supported the negotiations in Geneva on a chemical
weapons convention but has hindered progress out of concerns
about verification and protecting its own program. Paris probably
still hopes to slow chemical weapons negotiations that Bonn has
been pushing hard to complete and continues to press its proposal
permitting parties to maintain a minimum security stockpile during
a 10-year reduction period. The Embassy recently reported that
disagreement exists within the Foreign Ministry on this issue
and that senior officials?including Mitterrand, Defense
Minister Chevenement, and Foreign Minister Dumas?may agree to
deemphasize the idea if other interim proposals appear promising.
Views on NATO SNF Modernization
French support for, or acquiescence in, a NATO decision next year to
deploy a follow-on to the short-range Lance missile would be critical
to winning West German support for the Lance program. Mitterrand
has long seen NATO SNF modernization as undermining prospects
for arms control and as furthering a strategy of flexible response,
which France opposes. He also thinks that playing down the need?
or, at least, the urgency?of SNF modernization will aid Kohl, who
wants to postpone a decision on the Lance follow-on
Mitterrand has tried to get the Soviets to agree to major conventional
cuts by threatening to push for NATO SNF modernization within two
years if Moscow refuses. One of his aides at the Elysee has also
hinted that French SNF modernization might not go forward if the
Soviets are cooperative. Although opposed to SNF negotiations, the
French are more sensitive than most Allies to West German concerns
and probably would accept some movement toward NATO-Warsaw
Pact talks.
Opportunity for the US
Mitterrand wants movement in arms control, but his specific goals
are still in flux. His instinct as he enters his second term is to nourish
the West German connection and to improve on his reputation as
a statesman by taking a more flexible view of the military balance.
His presence in Washington provides the opportunity to discuss the
necessity and timing of proposed NATO decisions and the attitudes
of other Allies. According to a press report, France might even make
a major policy departure and consider including its own short-range
nuclear forces if the Soviets make significant conventional cuts.
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Indian Arms Agreements, 1982-87
Billion US $
2.5
USSR
0 1982
83
84
85
86
87
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Special Analysis
INDIA-USSR: Changing Arms Relationship
Soviet Defense Minister Yazov will probably raise the prospect of
new weapons deals during his current visit to New Delhi in an
attempt to solidify the Indo-Soviet arms relationship. Despite
some recent highly publicized deliveries, the Indians are
ordering less military hardware from Moscow as they try to
develop their own defense industry and shop for high-technology
items in the West. New Delhi will continue to buy from the
Soviets, however, because Soviet prices are attractive and
because it wants to maintain close ties to Moscow.
The US Embassy in New Delhi speculates that Yazov may discuss
the availability of advanced Soviet weapons, such as the MIG-21U
Mongol jet trainer, the T-80 tank, and the MI-35 attack helicopter.
He may also bring up possible technological cooperation on India's
indigenous Light Combat Aircraft project. The Indians, however,
appear to favor Western aircraft for their jet trainer and are making
progress on their own tank and attack helicopter programs with help
from Western firms. And for its Light Combat Aircraft project, India
has used Western technology transfer agreements and bought
Western subsystems that the Soviets usually have been either unable
or unwilling to match. Yazov must offer highly sophisticated systems
at most favorable terms to raise much interest in New Delhi.
Advanced Soviet Weapons
New Delhi has acquired some of the Soviets' most advanced weapon
systems over the past year or so as Moscow has sought to protect its
position as India's major arms supplier:
? India became the first country to lease a nuclear-powered
submarine, a Soviet Charlie-l-class.
? It was the first recipient of Soviet TU-142 long-range
antisubmarine warfare aircraft.
? India got the first export of the MI-26 heavy lift helicopter and
some of the earliest exports of lgla-1M portable surface-to-air
missiles.
? India acquired MIG-29s last year after the Soviets agreed to
provide advanced subsystems they had previously been
reluctant to export.
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the Indians have agreed in
principle to buy the A-50 Mainstay AWACS from the Soviets. New
Delhi, however, has turned down offers of coproduction rights on
the MIG-29 and of Koni-class frigates and additional Kashin-class
destroyers; India apparently is confident it can fill these daps in its
force structure with indigenous designs and production.
No Growth in Arms Purchases
Despite the deliveries of major items this year, Indian military
purchases from the USSR appear to have peaked. The two countries
are not signing enough new purchase agreements to maintain current
levels of arms deliveries into the 1990s. Moscow's aggressive
marketing of advanced weaponry at favorable terms, however, may
slow the general decline in arms purchases.
The usually attractive terms of Soviet military sales, including
low prices and interest rates and payments in soft currency and
manufactured goods, have helped India acquire a massive arsenal
that gives it a strong advantage over its neighbors. Diplomatic
reporting indicates, however, that New Delhi is putting an increasing
premium on sophistication and technology transfer in defense
purchases so that the investment will pay dividends for India's
developing industrial and technological base. New Delhi wants to
move from buying and coproducing arms to designing and building its
own major weapons systems, and Moscow so far has shown little
inclination to match the technology transfers and subsystem sales
that New Delhi gets from the West.
Outlook
The Indo-Soviet arms trade probably will decline, but only slowly.
New Delhi cannot afford to disregard Moscow's favorable prices and
terms. The Indians also will preserve access to a reliable supplier that
can provide advanced items?such as the Mainstay?that India
cannot produce quickly enough or acquire from the West. The arms
relationship also gives India access to spare parts for its Soviet
equipment and a counterweiaht to Pakistan's US and Chinese
patrons.
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