CONSEQUENCES OF COMMUNIST ACCESSION TO POWER IN ITALY BY LEGAL MEANS

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A003100010001-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
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• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 1, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 5, 1948
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CONSEQUENCES OF COMMUNIST
ACCESSION TO POWER IN ITALY
BY LEGAL MEANS
21 -Su. I 92,
92-1
ORE 6-48
Published on
5 MARCH 1948
COfq N0.27
FOR THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLI7,ENOE,
GELERAL STAFF,U.S.ARMY
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DISSEMINATION NOVO
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tion for the performance of official duties may be authorized by the following:
a. Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence, for
the Department of State
b. Director of Intelligence, GS, USA, for the Department of the Army
c. Chief, Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy
d. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force
e. Director of Security and Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Com-
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2. This copy may be either retained or destroyed by burning in accordance with
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
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Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended. Its trans-
mission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
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CONSEQUENCES Olgik..CCESSION TO POWER IN ITALY
BY LEGAL MEANS
g SUMMARY
1. At the request of the National Security Council Staff, we estimate herein the
consequences of Communist accession to power in Italy by legal means.
2. Even if there had been no resort to force to prevent the Communist-dominated
government from entering office, there would be a strong possibility of an early attempt
to prevent by force the consolidation of its power. The Communists, however, would
probably win the civil war resulting from any such attempt.
3. The Communists would be particularly anxious to avoid provoking a civil war.
Their policy would be one of outward conciliation and quiet infiltration until their
control of the armed forces, police, and national administration had been consolidated.
By processes made familiar in Eastern Europe, Italy would be eventually transformed
into a totalitarian police state.
4. Even a Communist-dominated Italian government must do all in its power, short
of political suicide, to maintain commercial relations with the West and to avoid a
denial of US dollar credits. The Communists would not withdraw Italian participation
in the European Recovery Program, but would resist any US attempt to supervise its
execution. From a strictly economic point of view, Italian participation is not essential
to the success of the Recovery Program.
5. Italian Communist capabilities /to support Communist action in neighboring
countries would not be appreciable. It is unlikely that the armed forces of Italy, as a
Satellite State, could ever be of value for purposes other than the maintenance of
internal security. From Italian bases, however, Soviet air and naval forces could effec-
tively close the Sicilian Channel and endanger shipping throughout the Mediterranean.
Fighter escorted bombers could reach North African targets from Algiers to Derna and
could cover all of France except Brest and Cherbourg.
6. The advantages to be derived from a consolidation of Communist control of
Italy would be such that the Kremlin would be likely to adopt a general policy of detente
in order to facilitate that development. If, however, this policy failed to prevent
Western intervention in a possible Italian civil war, Communist parties in the West
would be directed to create the maximum disruption and diversion by strikes, disorders,
Note: The information in this report is as of 17 February, at which time it was submitted to the
member agencies of the Interdepartmental Advisory Council for coordination.
The report has the concurrence of the intelligence agencies of the Departments of State, the
Army, and the Air Force, the latter two acting only with respect to its military aspects.
The Office of Naval Intelligence does not concur in this paper. Its position is as follows:
"ONI is not prepared to underwrite the detailed speculative predictions derived from the
assumption. The situation presented by such an assumption would be fluid and could
eventually take one of many paths which at the present time cannot be clearly charted."
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and sabotage. While supporting the Communist regime, the Kremlin would be careful
to permit neither the USSR nor the Satellite States to become so definitely committed
as to incur serious risk of direct collision and war with the Western Powers.
7. The fear which Communist control of Italy would arouse in Western European
and Mediterranean countries would be more likely to stimulate resistance to Commu-
nism than to induce submission. These nations would call on the United States for
greater aid and for military guarantees of their independence and territorial integrity.
2 SAT
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CONSEQUENCES OF COMMUNIST ACCESSION TO POWER IN ITALY
BY LEGAL MEANS
ASSUMPTION
1. For the purposes of this, estimate it is assumed that a Communist-controlled gov-
ernment has actually taken office in Italy by legal means.
2. Within the foreseeable future the assumed situation could occur only as a result
of a People's Bloc victory in the election scheduled for 18 April 1948. At least a month
must pass between that election and the inauguration of a new government. Even if
the People's Bloc were to win at the polls a majority of the seats in the National Assem-
bly, its actual accession to power might be prevented by falsification of the returns or
by force. It is assumed, however, that a People's Bloc (Communist-controlled) govern-
ment has actually been installed in office.
DIRECT CONSEQUENCES
3. THE POSSIBILITY OF CIVIL WAR.
Even if there had been no resort to force to prevent the installation of a Communist-
dominated government, there would be a strong possibility of an early attempt to
prevent by force the consolidation of its power. Such an attempt would be handi-
capped by lack of cohesion and leadership among militantly anti-Communist elements
in Italy and by Communist administrative control of the Armed Forces, Carabinieri,
and police. However, an anti-Communist insurrection, if it occurred prior to an effec-
tive purge of the Armed Forces and the Carabinieri, would be favored by the probable
piecemeal adherence of such units of those forces as were in a position to do so. The
Vatican would probably give covert support to the movement, but would not take sides
officially against the government until, in the initial disorder, ecclesiastical persons and
property had been subjected to mob attack (as in Spain in 1936) . At the outset the
conflict would be between the organized militants of the extreme Right and Left, the
mass of the population being dismayed and bewildered. Eventually the masses could
be aroused to pillage and violence by whichever side held the local advantage.
4. THE OUTCOME OF CIVIL W.
In the event of civil war in the circumstances envisaged above, the Communist-
dominated Government could probably retain an effective general control of all Italy
north of the Rome-Pescara line and of the Adriatic coast from Pescara to Bari, inclusive.
It might also hold the Taranto naval base, and Messina, Catania, Siracusa, and Agri-
gento in Sicily. Either side might prevail in the initial struggle for the possession of
Rome. Elsewhere in Italian territory the anti-Communist forces would gain initial
control.
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The anti-Communist insurgents would not only fail to overthrow the Communist-
dominated government: they could not hold the area under their initial control without
immediate and substantial foreign aid. As the probability of a Communist victory
in the civil war became apparent, however, secession movements would develop in
Sicily and Sardinia. If the Communists in the Sicilian cities had meanwhile been
subdued, it is possible that the anti-Communists could succeed in holding the two
islands.
5. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ABSENCE OF CIVIL WAR.
Having won an electoral victory, the People's Bloc would wish to exploit its advan-
tage by political means and would be particularly anxious to avoid provoking a civil war
in which it would have little to gain and much to lose. Its Communist leadership would
seek to be all things to all men: more Catholic than the Vatican, more solicitous of
middle-class interests than the bourgeois parties, more jealous of national sovereignty
than the neo-Fascists. Palmiro Togliatti has already proved himself adept and per-
suasive in this sort of duplicity. The People's Bloc would not take office as a Commu-
nist government, but as a coalition of popular parties devoted to democracy, national
sovereignty, and peace. The prime minister would probable be a non-Communist,
possibly Pietro Nenni.
Behind the scenes, however, the Communists would exercise effective control. As
in the original coalition governments of Eastern Europe, they would demand and receive
the ministries of control such as those of the Interior, Justice, Communications, and
Defense. There would follow a discreet, but rapid, Communist infiltration of the
armed forces, the police, and the national administration. The time required to com-
plete the transition might be a matter of months or of years, but the end would be a
fully developed police state under open and exclusive Communist control.
6. COMMUNIST CONTROL OF THE ITALIAN ECONOMY.
The Communists, in power, would seek to integrate the Italian economy with that
of the USSR. They could not afford, however, to forego commercial relations with the
West or to alienate dollar credits in excess of those earned by exports.
The economies of Italy and the USSR are in many respects complementary. Italy
possesses facilities and skills required to produce goods needed by the USSR and the
Satellite States, such as motor transport, electrical equipment, other machinery, and
textiles. The USSR and the Satellite States, in turn, are relatively well supplied with
products needed by Italy, such as cereal grains, coal, lumber, cotton, petroleum, man-
ganese, and chromium. For the time being, however, the area presently under Soviet
control could not deliver as much as half the coal, petroleum, and cotton required to
maintain the current level of Italian industrial production. Moreover, Italy would
remain almost entirely dependent on the West for essential imports of scrap iron, steel,
and steel products, and for the tungsten, vanadium, and molybdenum required for fine
steel and armaments production. Italy must also depend on the West for fertilizers
required to maintain domestic production of foodstuffs.
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If Italy were denied imports from the West except such as might be earned by
exports from production supported only by available Eastern economic aid, the result
would be severe economic hardship. Except for a brief interval of reduced rations
attributable to administrative lag, emergency provision of foodstuffs from the East
would permit the maintenance of Italian rations at the current level. In the course of
a year, however, industrial production would decline to about half the current level, with
a consequent increase in unemployment. Thereafter a gradual recovery might occur,
but after another year the level of production could be no more than 75 percent of what
it might have been under the European Recovery Program. These consequences would
be unacceptable for internal political as well as economic reasons. Even a Communist-
dominated Italian government must therefore do all in its power, short of political
suicide, to avoid a denial of US dollar credits.
7. FOREIGN POLICY.
Communist control of Italian foreign policy would insure its immediate subservi-
ence to the basic objectives of the USSR. For both internal political and economic
reasons, however, a Communist-dominated government would seek to avoid an abrupt
severance of existing Italian relations with the West. There would, of course, be
immediate professions of friendship with the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and other
"democratic" states. The advantages of friendly association with the East would be
attested by beneficial trade agreements, Yugoslav concession of Trieste to Italy, and
Soviet sponsorship of Italy for membership in the United Nations and for trusteeship
over the former Italian colonies in Africa. These benefits, gratifying to the Italian
people, would enhance the popularity of the Government and further the consolidation
of Communist control. While capitalizing its relations with the East, however, the
Government would demand of the West the fulfillment of all commitments made to its
predecessors and even more of the same benefits.
8. THE EUROPEAN RECOVERY PROGRAM.
This attitude toward the West would be exemplified particularly in the policy of
the new Italian Government with respect to the European Recovery Program. Although
the Italian Communist Party is a member of the Cominform, it is even now permitted
to follow a special variant of the Cominform line regarding the ERP. It is not opposed
to a substantial US contribution to Italian economic recovery?indeed it feels that
Italy is properly entitled to more aid from the United States than it is scheduled
to receive. It is critical of De Gasperi's "subservience" to US "imperialism," however,
and jealous of any infringement of Italian sovereignty which could be attributed to the
Program. The Communists in office would not withdraw Italy from participation in
the ERP. They would be critical of the "inadequacy" of the assistance received (in
contrast to the "generosity" of the USSR) and they would resist any US attempt to
control the administration of the Program as an infringement of Italian sovereignty.
If US aid to Italy were continued, the Communists would seek to gain for themselves
and the USSR the credit for any consequent improvement in the Italian economic
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situation. If further US aid were withheld from Italy, the Communists would seize
the opportunity to convict the United States of "dollar imperialism" and of implacable
hostility toward Italian "democracy" and independence. In either case, Communist
control of Italy would be strengthened.
From the strictly economic point of view, the participation of Italy is not essential
to the success of the European Recovery Program. The elimination of Italy from the
Program would permit increased allocations of foodstuffs, fertilizers, chemicals, coal,
oil, and scrap iron to other countries.
9. ITALIAN Am TO NEIGHBORING COMMUNISTS.
The ability of a Communist-dominated Italian government to support Communist
activities in neighboring countries (especially in France, Spain, and North Africa)
would not be appreciable. The passage of couriers and of light supplies and equipment
into France would, of course, be facilitated, but no considerable contribution of man-
power and bulk supplies would be possible, both for logistical reasons and because for
some time all the resources of the Italian Communist Party would be required to main-
tain and exploit its position in Italy.
10. THE MILITARY POTENTIAL OF ITALY AS A SATELLITE STATE.
The existing Italian military establishment has no significant capabilities except
in relation to internal security. It is strongly anti-Communist in tradition and senti-
ment. The first concern of a Communist-dominated government would be to neu-
tralize the insurrectionary capabilities of the armed forces by a purge of the high com-
mand and a redisposition of units, to be followed by a complete political reorientation
through further purging and reindoctrination. In view of the delicacy of the internal
political situation, the latter phase of this process would have to be accomplished
gradually, in order not to provoke insurrection. Until the process had been completed
the Italian armed forces would be not only without external military capabilities but
also an actual danger to the internal security of the regime.
Eventually, the political reliability of the armed forces having been assured, an
effort would be made to increase their military effectiveness. The USSR would assist
in their reequipment and training, but only to the extent necessary to create an effective
local auxiliary force of limited capabilities. It is doubtful, in any case, whether the
Italian armed forces, under Communist control, could ever be of value for purposes
other than the maintenance of internal security. If Mussolini, in twenty years, could
not create forces willing to fight with determination for empire in the Mediterranean, it
is unlikely that the Communists could create, from the same material, forces more
willing to fight the Western Powers at the bidding of the Kremlin.
11. SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILTES FROM ITALIAN BASES.
Through Communist control of Italy the USSR would gain potential access to
bases in Italian territory. From such bases Soviet air and naval forces (the latter
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S OPET ,
primarily submarines) could endanger shipping throughout the Mediterranean and
could effectively close the Sicilian Channel to traffic. From the Catania airfield com-
plex in Sicily, Soviet bombers with fighter escort could range as far east as Derna, Crete,
and the Aegean; from Cagliari in Sardinia, they could reach westward to Valencia and
beyond Algiers. North Africa, between the limits indicate, would be subject to such
air attack.
Although a Soviet ground offensive westward or northward from North Italy would
be hindered by the barrier of the Alps, fighter-escorted bombers from that area could
reach most of that part of France beyond range of similar attack from the Soviet Zone
in Germany. Only Brest and Cherbourg would be beyond their reach.
EFFECT ON SOVIET STRATEGY AND POLICY
12. IN THE EVENT OF A PEACEFUL TRANSITION.
The advantages to be derived from a consolidation of Communist control of Italy
would be such that the Kremlin would seek to avoid action likely to jeopardize that
prospective development. With a view to minimizing the US reaction and the possi-
bility of US suspension of essential economic aid to Italy, the USSR might well take the
initiative to ease the general international tension, assuming an attitude of goodwill
and sweet reasonableness without actually yielding on any essential point. This
attitude, if it did not deceive US policy makers, would at least render their position
more difficult by influencing public opinion and tending to put on them the onus of
any continuation of international tension.
In consonance with this policy the Communists would move circumspectly to
consolidate their control of Italy, and the Communist parties in other countries would
be directed to exercise equal care to avoid provocations and allay antagonisms. For
the time being, Communist activity would be directed into legitimate political chan-
nels and, even so, would not be pressed too vigorously, except for propaganda exploita-
tion of the Italian example of a popular front for peace and democracy.
13. SPECIFIC MEASURES IN SUPPORT OF ITALY.
While following the general policy indicated above, the USSR would probably adopt
the following specific measures in support of the Communist-dominated Government
of Italy:
a. Economic support of selected Italian industries within the limits of Soviet
capabilities. (See paragraph 6.)
b. Support of revision of the Italian Peace Treaty on terms advantageous to
the new government, with particular reference to a division of the Free Territory of
Trieste between Italy and Yugoslavia, giving Trieste to Italy. US and British opposi-
tion to this solution would manifestly be resistance to expulsion from their own
"imperialist" stronghold in Trieste.
c. Support for the admittance of Italy to membership in the United Nations.
The United States and United Kingdom, having hitherto supported the admittance of
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Italy, could not reverse their position without expdsing hostility toward Italian
"democracy."
d. More insistent advocacy of Italian trusteeship over the former Italian
colonies in Africa. The Western Powers could not oppose this solution without exposing
both their hostility toward Italian "democracy" and their own "imperialist" ambitions.
Acquiescence, however, would permit a Soviet lodgment in Africa.
14. IN THE EVENT OF CIVIL WAR.
If Communist accession to power in Italy should provoke a civil war (see paragraph
3) , the Kremlin would seek to support the Communists to the maximum extent con-
sistent with avoidance of a general war, and at the same time would seek to prevent
Western support of the anti-Communists by means of a nonintervention formula simi-
lar to that of the Western Powers with respect to the Spanish Civil War. If that tactic
succeeded, the USSR might still pursue a general policy of detente (paragraph 12) pend-
ing consolidation of a Communist victory in Italy. If it did not, the Kremlin would
call on Western Communists to prevent or curtail Western intervention in Italy by
exertion of their utmost capabilities for disruption through strikes, disorders, and
sabotage, but avoiding armed insurrection. In any case, the Kremlin would be careful
in Italy (as in Greece) not to permit either the USSR or its Satellites to become so
definitely committed as to incur serious risk of direct collision and war with the
Western Powers.
REACTIONS ELSEWHERE
15. GENERAL.
The assumed Communist accession to power in Italy would be significant not only
as the first actual extension of Communist (Soviet) territorial control (except in China)
since the conclusion of World War II, but also as the first instance in history of a Com-
munist accession to power by popular suffrage and legal procedure. So unprecedented
and portentous an event must produce a profound psychological effect in those coun-
tries threatened by Soviet or Communist aggression and still striving to retain their
freedom.
Moreover, whereas in Eastern Europe Communism had overrun lands long in dis-
pute between the East and West, in Italy Communism would have taken possession
of the most ancient seat of Western Culture. In particular, devout Catholics every-
where would be gravely concerned regarding the safety of the Holy See.
Communist control of Italy would bring the power of Russia to the shores of the
Mediterranean for the first time in history, and that at the point best suited for com-
mand of that Sea. The strategic implications of that development would be appreciated
in all Mediterranean countries and in Great Britain.
The fear of Communism and of Soviet aggression which these considerations would
arouse would be more likely to stimulate resistance than to induce submission. Lack-
ing confidence in their own powers of resistance, however, the nations of Western Europe
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and the Mediterranean would call upon the United States for greater aid and for mili-
tary guarantees of their independence and territorial integrity.
16. THE UNITED KINGDOM.
The British Government would regard a Communist accession to power in Italy
with grave concern, as threatening both the strategic position of the Western Powers
in the Mediterranean and the political stability of Western Europe. The British would
wish to join with the United States in a prompt and vigorous program of combined
counteraction. They would urge greater US economic support and military guarantees
for Western European and Mediterranean countries. The British would also initiate
staff consultations with the older Dominions, and would probably secure their support.
British demobilization would be suspended and British naval and air units in the
Mediterranean would be reinforced. The development of a strategic position in Africa
would be expedited. The adoption of these measures would increase British dependence
on the economic and financial support of the United States.
17. FRANCE.
The accession of a Communist-dominated government to power in Italy would
revive in France an acute sense of Communist menace and so would favor the fortunes
of De Gaulle. His political appeal requires also, however, a pronounced lack of confi-
dence in the existing regime. If, at the time, the French public lacked confidence in
the eventual success of the Schuman Government's economic program and in its ability
to cope with the new situation, the Government might fall, in which case De Gaulle
would come to power. If, on the other hand, there were a reasonable prospect of eco-
nomic improvement and the Government's action to control Communist exploitation
of the new situation were prompt and vigorous, it would probably retain sufficient
public confidence to withstand the shock of a Communist advance to the French
frontier.
In the absence of civil war in Italy, the French Communists would presumably be
directed to restrict themselves to political action, in consonance with over-all Soviet
strategy (see paragraph 12). In the event of civil war in Italy, however, they would
probably be directed to exert their utmost capabilities for disruption through strikes,
disorders, and sabotage. This policy would be intended to prevent Western interven-
tion in Italy by neutralizing France and diverting the United Kingdom and the United
States, even at the sacrifice of the French Communist Party. The French Govern-
ment could eventually suppress the French Communists, but meanwhile the Commu-
nists would have won the Italian civil war and the economy of France would have been
seriously damaged.
18. AUSTRIA AND WESTERN GERMANY.
Communist accession to power in Italy might convince the Austrian Government
that it was expedient to reach an understanding with the USSR. It would not have that
effect on the political leaders of Western Germany. If the Vatican appeared to be
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endangered by the turn of events in Italy, there would probably be a strong anti-
Communist reaction among the Catholic populations of Austria and Western Germany.
If communications through Italy to Austria were interrupted the resultant increased
strain on the German transportation system would have serious economic effects.
19. SPAIN.
The accession of a Communist-dominated government to power in Italy would
revive Spanish memories of the Civil War and would cause Spaniards of all shades of
political opinion (except the few genuine Communists) to rally against the Communist
menace. The only practical rallying point would be Franco, whose position would be
greatly strengthened by this tendency. Franco would exploit the threat to Western
strategic interests in the Mediterranean to seek an escape from political isolation into
close political, economic, and military relations with the Western Powers.
20. FRENCH NORTH AFRICA.
Any marked change in the Mediterranean area would have a disturbing effect on
the unstable situation in French North Africa. Communist accession to power in Italy
would facilitate, in some degree, Communist infiltration of the Italian population in
Tunisia. The European population of North Africa is generally anti-Communist, how-
ever, while the North African nationalists are interested in exploiting the divisions and
distractions of Europe for their own, not Communist, purposes.
21. LIBYA.
The idea of an Italian trusteeship might appeal to the Italian population of
Tripolitania, but the idea of a Communist regime would not. The Arab majority would
resist by force of arms the reimposition of an Italian regime of whatever political colora-
tion. The British military occupation would remain secure.
22. EGYPT AND OTHER ARAB STATES.
Communist accession to power in Italy and consequent Soviet penetration into the
Mediterranean would alarm the Arab governments. Normally, in fear of the USSR,
they would turn to the United States for support. If, however, the United States were
continuing to support the partition of Palestine, an Arab rapprochement with the USSR
might well occur. The Arabs would have no illusions that any Soviet support which
they might receive in their own conflict with the West would be disinterested. They
might hope, however, that the USSR's need for Arab support in its conflict with the West
would be such that the USSR would desist from efforts to undermine the existing order
in the Arab States so as to facilitate their realignment. This eventuality is contem-
plated, not only by Arab extremists, but even by responsible elements. The existing
Arab Governments, however, would be unlikely to follow such a course unless compelled
to do so by overwhelming popular reaction.
Although not generally receptive to Communism, the long-established Italian com-
munities in the Arab States would serve as channels of Italian Communist infiltration.
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Most of the 50,000 Italians in the Arab States are concentrated in Egypt, where they
constitute the second largest foreign colony. They are fairly well integrated into
Egyptian national life, and are generally conservative and anti-Communist. More sus-
ceptible to Communist agitation would be the 600 Italian ex-prisoners employed in the
Dhahran oilfield in Saudi Arabia.
23. GREECE.
Communist accession to power in Italy would have a disheartening effect on the
Greek people, already discouraged by the endless struggle with the Communist-led
guerrillas. There would be no large-scale defections to the Communist cause, however,
since the division between Communists and anti-Communists has already been sharply
drawn by civil war. The old bitterness against the Italian people (which all but died
out after the Italian surrender) would revive. It is just possible that there might re-
vive with it a spirit of Greek patriotism like that of 1940, which might lead to greater
political solidarity in the face of national peril and to more effective collaboraton with
US officials in Greece. The sense of greater danger would certainly lead to demands
for increased US support and possibly for US military intervention.
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DISTRIBUTION
The President
Secretary of State
Chief of Staff to Commander in Chief
Secretary of Defense
Secretary of the Army
Secretary of the Navy
Secretary of the Air Force
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
Chairman, National Security Resources Board
Chief of Staff, US Army
Chief of Naval Operations
Chief of Staff, US Air Force
Director of Plans and Operations, General Staff, US Army
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations)
Director of Plans and Operations, US Air Force
Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, Research and Intelligence
Director of Intelligence, General Staff, US Army
Chief of Naval Intelligence
Director of Intelligence, US Air Force
Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Secretary, Joint Intelligence Group
Secretary, State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee
Executive Secretary, Military Liaison Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission
Director of Security and Intelligence, Atomic Energy Commission
Chief, Acquisition and Distribution, OICD, Department of State
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/01 : CIA-RDP78-01617A003100010001-5
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/01 : CIA-RDP78-01617A003100010001-5
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1
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
2252-S-1948
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/01 : CIA-RDP78-01617A003100010001-5