HAITI: PROSPECTS FOR A JUNIOR OFFICER COUP A COMPARISON WITH LIBERIA AND GHANA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP04T00990R000200040001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 23, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 26, 1988
• Content Type: MISC

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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
26 August 1988
Haiti: Prospects for a Junior Officer Coup
A Comparison with Liberia and Ghana
Summary
A junior officer coup in Haiti does not appear
imminent, but various indicators suggest it remains one
of the more potent threats to the regime. Haiti is
plagued by many of the conditions that confronted
regimes in Liberia and Ghana just prior to junior
officer coups in those countries: a drifting
government, a non-responsive elite, pervasive
corruption in the leadership, and a deteriorating
economy. In addition, a similar institutional
environment exists; all three militaries are small with
little opportunity for junior officer advancement and
featuring close contact within the lower ranks.
Nevertheless, we doubt these characteristics alone
are sufficient to provoke a coup--many countries
experience similar problems without suffering military
revolts--and several factors diminish the prospect for
such an event in Haiti. A successful coup depends
highly on access to sufficient materiel and leadership
within the lower ranks, which are in short supply in
the Haitian military. Furthermore, the strong sense of
institutional loyalty in the Haitian military,
This typescript was prepared by
America-Caribbean Division, Office
Analysis, with contributions from
African and Latih American Analysis, and
Global Issues. Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, South America-Caribbean Division, ALA,
k
of African
South
and Latin American
Office of
Office of
ALA M 88-20072
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demonstrated most recently by the coup on 19 June and
not found in countries beset by tribal rivalries, would
tend to impede a coup. Potential changes in these
conditions, however, could be key indicators that the
ros ects for a junior officer coup are increasing.
The Setting
A small group of junior and noncommissioned officers (NCOs)
triggered a series of events in June 1988 that quickly led to the
fall of civilian President Leslie Manigat. On 17 June, Manigat
ordered the dismissal of Lt. General Henri Namphy, Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces of Haiti (FAd'H), and two other
generals. Namphy was charged with insubordination and placed
under house arrest. Manigat ordered a second shakeup on 19 June-
-the day of the coup--transferring several high-level officers,
including Presidential Guard leader Colonel Prosper Avril.
Although they did not plan the coup, the NCOs became its
primary implementers.
the NCOs freed Namphy, delivered him to the National Palace,
effected a power blackout of the capital, and intimidated
potential opponents with intense weapons firings as the coup
progressed. The source reports, however, that the coup would not
have succeeded without senior officer direction and access to
weapons and armored personnel carriers. Nevertheless, this
marked the first time NCOs and junior officers significantly
influenced political events in Haiti. Following the coup, about
30 NCOs were promoted to the rank of adjutant, according to the
US Defense Attache.
To assess the potential for another such uprising, we
examined junior officer coups in Liberia and Ghana to gain
insights on how the current situation in Port-au-Prince Tight
play out. Despite clear cultural distinctions between the two
regions, we believe that some conditions that provided a
hospitable climate for such takeovers in Liberia (1980) and Ghana
(1979 and 1981) are present in Haiti. From these earlier cases,
we identified eight factors relevant to the Haitian case--five
that currently increase the propensity for a junior officer coup
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and three that are working against it, at least for the time
being.
Coups in Liberia and Ghana: Lessons Learned
Liberia, the oldest republic in Sub-Saharan Africa (dating
to 1847) and Ghana, the first black African colony to gain
independence (1957), have experienced coups by junior officers or
enlisted men in recent years that have changed internal political
dynamics. The coups, largely spontaneous, released Dent Uro
frustration with entrenched, unresponsive elites.
Both governments had lost legitimacy, however,
and onl a spark was required to touch off their overthrow.
Liberia. Until the coup in 1980, Liberia was governed by a
small group of Americo-Liberians descended from freed American
and West Indian slaves, who comprised less than 5 percent of the
population. By the 1970s, pressures began to build among
Liberians of indigenous origin to have a meaningful share of
political and economic power. Under the last Americo-Liberian
President--William Tolbert, who constitutionally came to power in
1971--significant numbers of young, educated Liberians of
.indigenous tribal descent were brought into the lower elite, but
real power remained with the ruling oligarchy.
Tolbert was unable to meet rising popular expectations,
particularly as the economy deteriorated. Growing numbers of
educated Liberians were confronted by high unemployment,
escalating inflation, and inadequate housing, as the gap widened
between the wealthy, corrupt Americo-Liberian elites and the rest
of the population. Unprecedented rioting triggered by increased
prices for rice--the staple food for poorer Liberians--erupted in
April 1979. The disturbances were put down by the Army, but not
before many troops mutinied and joined in the rioting and
looting.
Over the following year, the shaken government appeared to
drift, making no serious attempt at political or social reform.
Tolbert demonstrated little understanding of Liberia's troubles
or of how to reinvigorate his faltering regime. His difficulties
were compounded by government inefficiency, the elite's
protectiveness of itsveste4 interests, and the country's limited
economic resources.
Liberia did not have a history of coups and, although the
small 5,000-man military was unreliable and ineffective in coping
with civil disorder, the regime apparently did not feel
threatened. For control, the government relied on Americo-
Liberian officers in all senior and mid-grade positions,
unconcerned that the lower ranks were almost entirely tribal
Liberians. Although Tolbert took some steps to improve morale,
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he apparently lacked awareness of the extent of dissatisfaction
among the lower ranks.
On 12 April 1980, the anniversary of the rice riots, a small
group of soldiers led by Master Sergeant Samuel Doe forced its
way into the executive mansion, killed Tolbert, and overthrew the
government. They quickly ousted most Americo-Liberians from
senior positions and executed a number of them. Although Doe's
decision was made on the spur of the moment, the coup was
accomplished relatively easily, given the prevailing leadership
vacuum.
Ghana. By the 1970s,, Ghana, too, suffered from a government
adrift amidst increasing economic and political problems.
Although the regime in 1979 was a military one led by senior
.officers, it was widely viewed as part of the same corrupt elite
that had brought the country to the brink of bankruptcy. Ghana
labored under the heritage of internal antagonisms and economic
ruin bequeathed by the late Kwame Nkrumah, its first president
and foremost leftist, whose increasingly corrupt rule had left
the nation with a burdensome external debt by the time of his
death in 1972. Successive regimes failed to stop further
economic deterioration, and unpopular reforms contributed to
several coups. The poorly disciplined military was split by
ideological and tribal rivalries, while the senior and mid-level
ranks were corru t and relatively isolated from the rest of the
armed forces.
General Acheampong's government in the 1970s set the stage
for the downfall of the Ghanaian elite. He started as an
economic reformer, but soon retrenched and maintained power
primarily by monitoring and placating the senior officers. The
regime reacted to worsening economic conditions with a mix of
repression and conciliation that ultimately made the government
appear weak and indecisive. Senior officers finally moved to
protect their position in July 1978 by quietly replacing
with General Akuffo, chief of the defense staff.
Akuffo, closely identified with Acheampong's policies, moved
quickly to implement unpopular austerity measures. Large budget
cuts led to increased consumer prices that sparked popular
discontent. Opposition in the urban centers erupted into active
protests, including a series of strikes by the civil service.
Popular anger over the failure of the traditional ruling class,
wides read corruption, and economic mismanagement grew apace.
Finally, junior officers took the initiative to topple the
government. Capitalizing on widespread popular discontent, they
moved against the regime in May 1979. This initial coup attempt
failed and many of its leaders were imprisoned. Junior officers
and others from the lower ranks freed one of the most popular
leaders of the uprising, Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings, and
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shortly thereafter he abruptly
--and without
much planning--seized
power on 4 June 1979. Rawlings returned the country to civilian
rule later that year, but staged another coup in 1981 to end what
he considered
economic
mismanagement and corruption in the new
government.
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Factors Supporting
a
Coup
We believe five key conditions that set the stage for junior
officer coups in Liberia and Ghana are present in Haiti:
-- A Drifting Government.
A Nonresponsive Elite.
Rampant Corruption.
Economic Mismanagement.
Institutional Vulnerabilities.
Although many countries have long experienced similar problems
without military revolts, these factors have provided an
environment conducive to junior officer coups*in several Third
World countries other than Liberia and Ghana. Furthermore,
Haiti's long history of military intervention in politics,
combined with a newly-found belief among some junior officers and
enlisted men that their actions shaped recent events, make it a
country at risk.
Drifting Government. A key determinant impelling action is
the perception that the government lacks direction and that
reform is necessary to ensure political stability. In Haiti, the
new military government shows little political vision beyond
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reports most Army officers believe that Namphy is not a capable
leader, citing his ineffective tenure as President and Army Chief
from 1986 to 1988. complains that 25X1
Haiti is virtually leaderless, that many Army officers are not
qualified for their ministerial posts, and that the regime has
not yet formulated a coherent program to manage the country.
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The problems created by the absence of a firm course for the
country are compounded by a lack of cohesion within the senior
officer corps. The current regime is less organized andfless
unified than the former Manigat or military-led provisional
governments,
the recent coup also has added to the distrust and
factionalism within the military because some officers originally
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supported Manigat's attempts to reshuffle the military
leadership. for example,
three distinct factions exist. The largest supports Namphy; the
two others are led respectively by Major General Williams Regala,
Minister of Defense and Interior, and Colonel Jean-Claude Paul,
Commander of the Dessalines Battalion.
Nonresponsive Elite. Sentiments for direct action against a
rudderless government are intensified when junior officers no
longer believe political leaders are protecting their interests.
the recent promotions of numerous
senior officers in Haiti has fueled dissension among junior
officers overlooked for advancement. In the view of these junior
officers, senior leaders are concerned primarily with protecting
their individual perquisites. Even the newly-promoted NCOs have
complained that the High Command has not sufficiently recognized
them for their pivotal role in the coup,
Rampant Corruption. While many Third World leaders use
their position for self-enrichment, excessive corruption--at the
expense of military preparedness--can provide the impetus for a
junior officer coup. Corruption is no stranger to Haiti, but
the High Command is
Furthermore, new levels of
rake-offs--on top of recent cuts in US and other foreign securit
assistance--appear to be diminishing military readiness.
corruption and favoritism have
destroyed the effectiveness of many military units.
growing increasingly avaricious.
virtually
Economic Mismanagement. Junior officer coups also are more
prevalent against a background of severe and worsening economic
problems. Haiti's recent coup appears to have accelerated the
country's economic deterioration under way since most US and
multilateral aid was suspended following the electoral collapse
last November. Venezuela, West Germany, and France, which
continued to support Haiti aftet the electoral debacle, have
reacted to the coup by reducing economic aid. According to the
US Embassy, Port-au-Prince will find it increasingly difficult to
raise enough foreign exchange to maintain such critical imports
as wheat and petroleum at current levels in the coming months.
Growing consumer shortages, in turn, are likely to heighten
inflation and to increase junior officer dissatisfaction with the
High Command's handling of the ecOnomy.
Institutional Vulnerabilities. Institutional factors,
particularly the size and capabilities of the military, also can
influence the likelihood of a junior officers coup. The
relatively unsophisticated and poorly disciplined FAd'H has
approximately 8,800 men under arms. In Haiti--as in Liberia and
Ghana--a small force, with cleavages between senior and lower
ranks, facilitates close contact among junior officers and NCOs
without significant interference from above. In addition, the
Haitian military offers little opportunity for promotion in the
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middle and lower grades, while a disproportionate number of
Haiti's 900 commissioned officers hold senior rank. Junior
officers, most of whom are relatively better trained and
educated, reportedly chafe under this top-heavy leadership, whom
them regard as unprofessional.
Factors Working Against a Coup
Although these conditions suggest Haiti would be prone to a
military revolt from below, several key factors--present in the
cases of Liberia and Ghana--currently are absent in Haiti. Given
the elements favoring a coup that already exist, however, changes
in these factors would be broad indicators of a serious threat.
Access to Resources. One of the key elements in the success
of any coup is the availability of sufficient resources to
undertake an uprising. Lower-level officers in small militaries-
-as in Liberia and Ghana--often hold positions of greater
responsibility and thus command more resources. In Haiti's case,
however, all of the military's artillery and armored equipment
presently are held by three units located in or near Port-au-
Prince, with all armored vehicles assigned to the Presidential
Guard. These three primary tactical units are commanded by
colonels and have close ties to the current military leadership.
Respected Leader. Another factor that has facilitated the
success of junior officer coups in other Third World nations is
the existence of a charismatic leader within the lower ranks who
can galvanize discontent and effectively direct a revolt. We
have no evidence that such a figure is present in the FAd'H.
Nevertheless, we believe that this constraint--like the first--
can be overcome if the junior officers approach a s ?athetic
senior officer for assistance--as they did in June.
Institutional Loyalty. A major factor working against a
junior officer coup in Haiti, and a condition absent in many
countries that have experienced such uprisings, is the compelling
sense of institutional loyalty within the FAd'H. Factionalism
caused by ethnic rivalries is a potent motive behind many junior
officer coups. In Haiti, however, the military is not beset by
ethnic strife and takes pride in its status--aside from the
Catholic Church--as the country's only national institution. The
junior officers and NCOs involved in Haiti's recent coup were
motivated to protect the military as an institution and forwarded
their concerns within the chain of command,
We have no evidence that these
individuals considered seizing power for themselves.
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Outlook
We believe a junior officer or NCO coup, while not imminent,
remains one of the more potent threats to the Namphy regime.
Despite the many conditions favoring a coup, we have no evidence
that any officers currently are engaged in such plotting.
Furthermore, the High Command apparently recognizes the potential
for such an uprising.
is concerned that
discontent among Presidential Guard NCOs who participated in the
last coup is permeating the ranks of other major units in the
capital. As a result, the High'Command intends to separate the
NCOs by sending some to training courses and reassigning others
to units outside Port-au-Prince.
A junior officer, coup in Haiti, in our view, would be more
likely to occur spontaneously rather than as a calculated plot.
Some discrete event--such as failure to meet military pay
schedules or a recurrence of violent popular protests--would
probably be the spark. Although it would be difficult to
predict, several specific indicators could portend an increase in
the potential for such an uprising:
Continued loss of respect for the regime's Military
leaders, who devise no plan to address the nation's
problems.
Failure of senior officers to placate junior officers
perceiving that their careers are stalled and that they
are not being amply rewarded.
Growing complaints that corruption within the High
Command is weakening Military preparedness and
threatening the well-being of the country as a whole.
The emergence of a popular junior officer or NCO capable
of leading the military rank-and-file.
Steady deterioration of the economy and growing popular
unrest.
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APPENDIX
Junior Officer Coups: A Historical Perspective
Successful coups by junior officers or enlisted men in
Liberia (1980), Ghana (1979 and 1981), Burkina (1983 and 1987),
and Burundi (1987) have raised concern that junior officer coups
are a growing phenomenon. Junior officer coups have accounted
for more than 40 percent of all military coups over the past five
years, compared with only 20 percent in the early 1960s. Almost
all have occurred in countries with a small, relatively
unsophisticated and poorly disciplined military.
The interests of lower ranking officers often differ from
those of their military and political superiors. Senior
officers' ties to the political elite and junior officers'
perceptions that the high-level officers gained their positions
through patronage often put the two groups in conflict. In
analyzing the more than 30 junior officer coups that have
occurred during the past three decades, we have identified three
types of coups in which junior officers often have taken the
leading role:
Revolutionary coups, which bring profound change to both
the political and socioeconomic environment. These coups
are usually accompanied by a unifying ideology--such as
nationalism or Islamic fundamentalism--which tends to
have a greater influence on junior officers who are less
entrenched in the existing system and are attracted by
radical alternatives. The 1969 coup in Libya that
brought Qadhafi to power is an example.
Reform coups, in which participants view themselves as
the protectors of the country's values. Corruption,
government inefficiency, and economic mismanagement often
provide the impetus for action. In El Salvador, for
example, the 1979 coup was motivated by a desire for
moderate social reform, an improvement in human rights,
and an end to corruption.
Intraelite coups, which reflect the desire of one
military,.faction to enhance its status vis-a-vis another
group. The issues of pay, perquisites, and supply
shortages are major factors prompting these coups--which
account for more than half of all junior officer coups--
asjunior officers usually bear the brunt of such
shortages. Supply deficiencies--a scandal involving the
purchase of defective weapons--helped motivate a junior
officer coup in Egypt in 1952.
A key ingredient for success is the extent and strength of
the junior officers' organizational network. Ethnic and
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educational linkages appear to be particularly important, largely
because young officers have had few opportunities to develop
other associations. In El Salvador,
the "tanda" system--based on military academy graduating
classes--provided a association for coup plotters in both 1960
and 1979.
Another determining factor is a lack of cohesion within the
senior officer corps. A split in the senior ranks, or their
promise not to intervene on behalf of the regime, often clears
the way for a successful challenge by junior officers. In some
cases, junior officers may act to preempt a coup attempt by
senior officers, as was the case in Libya in 1969. In other
cases, junior officers have turned to a particular faction or
patron in the senior ranks to spearhead their opposition to the
regime. A patron who can lend legitimacy to the cause is often
in a position to monitor the loyalty of essential units. For
example, in Burundi last year, the NCOs who successfully launched
the coup turned to Major Pierre Buyo a to help consolidate their
action and lead the new government.
The chances for success are significantly improved when the
coup plotters are in command of or have connections to specially
trained units. For example, Captain Ngouabi in the Congo (1968)
and Captain Kong Le in Laos (1960) were commanders of paratrooper
units, while Qadhafi was a communications officer. Such contact
gives the junior officers access to better disciplined recruits
and control over critical logistics.
Finally, research shows the presence
like Qadhafi or Thomas Sankara in Burkina
the outcome of a coup. The participation
especially one who has been imprisoned or
the government--is an important factor in
junior officers. Leaders who can clearly
alternative to the status quo and unite their peers in pursuit of
a common objective have proved hard to stop.
of a charismatic leader
(1983) can determine
of such a leader--
otherwise persecuted by
rallying the support of
articulate an
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