DRAFT IG REPORT COMMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89-00244R001804350008-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 18, 2012
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: March 2, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/18: CIA-RDP89-00244R001804350008-8
\4--INTERNAL USE ONL
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Operations Division, FMJ/OL
Chief, New Building Project Office, OL
STAT
STAT
STAT
SUBJECT: Draft IG Report Comments
1. As you requested, we have reviewed the draft memorandum to the
Inspector General (IG) on New Headquarters Building (NHB) plumbing
concerns. We believe h t the memorandum is somewhat misleading and should
be clarified.~ t~ did talk to me and members of my staff recently,
but since his concerns were not well defined, our responses were broad. We
are available to discuss these and other NHB concerns at any time. The
following comments are keyed to the draft memorandum prepared by
Subject: Renovations for OIT/Commo in the NHB.
Paragraph la: The NHB contractor used Autoflow valves versus
Griswold. The Government could only provide a performance specification
in the design. We have used Griswold valves in the Agency for many years
because of familiarity, availability, etc., but-the performance is the
important part, not the brand. There were initial problems with the
performance of the Autoflow valves after water was introduced into the
system. As a result, General Services Administration (GSA) required the
contractor to make modifications (or else replace the valves) at no cost to
the Government. These corrections were made to GSA's satisfaction. If the
valves were, in fact, not installed, then it is a-latent omission by the
construction contractor thus owed to the Government. This would not be a
design problem.
However, after some discussion with you, it is apparent that there is
confusion over which air handler or project Mr. Sandin is referring to in
his memorandum. That makes it difficult for us to respond. The
circumstances indicate that the air handlers may be the units that were
relocated on the first floor between columns 13 and 15 and and columns A
and F. If this is so, there are some important details that should be
considered. Autoflow valves were removed by an FMD contractor as part of
the requested relocation and were replaced with Griswold valves at FMD
direction. Rumors were beginning to circulate around the site
that there were problems with the Autoflow valves as originally installed.
These rumors were later confirmed as noted above. By removing these
valves, we essentially "bought" them as originally installed. This would
have meant that the Agency would have to fund the repairs of these
relocated valves.
STAT3P0
Orig -
i~l--z---OL-/NBPO--Sub}2t
1 - OL/NBPO Chrono
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In hindsight, FMD probably saved time and money by replacing these
valves at that time. It could not have been readily determined if these
Autoflow valves worked because they were removed prior to testing of the
AHU units. At that time, OIT had an urgent need to occupy the space which
preceded the Fast Power Supply (FPS) and pressure and flow tests for the
chilled water that served these units. At the appropriate time, all
remaining units in the NHB installed by the NHB contractor were tested and
certified by GSA.
Paragraph lb: From the description, there was indeed poor
workmanship in this instance, but it may not have had an operational
impact. Full extension may not be required for operation of these air
handlers at full capacity. The Autoflow or Griswold valves limit the flow
through the coils therefore cancelling the full flow condition of the
valve. In other words, since our initial chilled water system is
overdesigned for expansion over the years, the pressure at the flow control
valve will vary. Flow control valves maintain a constant flowrate across a
cooling coil thus ensuring optimum operation over time. The flowrate
required is generally much less than what would flow unrestricted through
wide open valves. In any event, we believe the NHB contractor should have
corrected his poor workmanship.
Paragraph lc: This subject has been discussed at length with GSA),
FMD and many parties involved. The specification was written to apply only
to domestic water piping, an oversight on the designers part. At the rate
we renovate computer areas, the problem would be rectified in due time.
Our piping is grounded on both sides of the dissimilar metal connection
thus mitigating the galvanic action causing corrosion. There are memoranda
available on this subject if further discussion is required. As you know,
contractors search for this type of omission in specifications in order to
submit claims or to shortcut industry standards. GSA has adjudicated
countless claims and attempts at shortcuts as does any construction
manager. GSA with NBPO concurrence did not choose to pursue this issue
since there was considerable potential for delay and price gouging.
Paragraph 2: The second half of the sentence overstates the
problem of locating any similar situation. The majority of valves are
readily accessible by lifting the plastic laminate computer tiles without
any'damage to walls. Further, we have a finite number of computer type air
handlers in the NHB and they can be verified as to valve orientation or
whether valves exist at all. We encourage any knowledge of missing valves
to be brought to our attention for resolution. If there continues to be a.
claim of missing valves, then we are prepared to reinspect all AHUs to
verify the presence of such.
STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/18: CIA-RDP89-00244R001804350008-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/18: CIA-RDP89-00244R001804350008-8
STAT
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/18: CIA-RDP89-00244R001804350008-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/18: CIA-RDP89-00244R001804350008-8
29 February 1988
STAT
STAT
MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General
Inspector
SUBJECT: Renovations for OIT/Commo in the New Building
REFERENCE: IG 88-0192, 26 February 1988
1. According.to
Chief, IN Facilities
Division (FMD), Office of Logistics, FMD undertook renovations
at OIT's request (because OIT had redesigned their layout,
moving computers). The renovations comprised moving some wall
partitions and three "air-handler units" (units producing cold
air from chilled water running in pipes below the raised
floor). When doing this work, FMD found:
a. that the three air-handler units needed Griswald
(brand name) valves installed. These valves control the
water flow and are. an Agency standard. FMD had the valves
installed (new, not replacements). This was a design flaw.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/18: CIA-RDP89-00244R001804350008-8
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ADMI,_-_,ISTRATIVE--INTERNAL USE OS---?
b. that open-close valves on the water pipes (at the
point where cold water was being tapped off for the three
air-handler units being moved) had been installed pointing
.down and could not be fully opened because the valve
handles would hit the concrete floor as they were being
turned and could not be turned further. FMD had these
valves repositioned 180 degrees, and they now point up.
This was faulty workmanship.
c. that couplings of pipes made of dissimilar metals
(copper and steel) at these same points were not
dialectic. FMD had dialectic couplings installed to
prevent future corosion. GSA, in examining the contract
IL 14
wording on the couplings,;b~ that the specifications
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were ambiguous,-sa that v-s could not force the original
contractor to redo all the coupling work.
2. All three problems presumably exist elsewhere in the
same OIT space and elsewhere in the new building where similar
piping is found, but a lot of drywall and flooring would have
to be torn up to find out.
STAT
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/18: CIA-RDP89-00244R001804350008-8