CLEARED Q & AS ON NATIONAL SPACE POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M00005R000300060022-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 7, 2012
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: January 22, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508
January
MR. DONALD GREGG
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs
MR. MELVYN LEVITSKY
Executive Secretary
Department of State
MR. ROBERT R. ZOELLICK
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury
COLONEL WILLIAM M. MATZ
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense
MR. GERALD J. MCKIERNAN
Chief of Staff
Department of Commerce
MS. RUTH KNOUSE
Director, Executive Secretariat
Department of Transportation
MR. L. WAYNE ARNY
Associate Director for National
Security and International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget
22, 1988
Execute" Rey
ist
,88-0062X/1
0382
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency
MR. MICHAEL DRIGGS
Assistant to the President
for Policy Development
RADM JOSEPH C. STRASSER
Office of the Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
MR. WILLIAM R. STAPLES
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
MR. JONATHAN F. THOMPSON
Executive Assistant to the Director
Office of Science and
Technology Policy
MR. HENRY CLEMENTS
Executive Officer
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
MS. NANCY RISQUE
Assistant to the President
and Cabinet Secretary
SUBJECT: Cleared Q & As on National Space Policy
The attached questions and answers associated with the recently signed
national space policy are provided for your use in responding to media and
public queries. Your cooperation in ensuring a consistent Administration
response on this matter is appreciated.
9&~ (11 L#- 4.,-.
Paul Schott Stevens
Executive Secretary
Attachment
Tab A National Space Policy Q & As
STAT
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NATIONAL SPACE POLICY
Q: How long was the policy in preparation?
A: The Interagency Group for Space (IG-Space) held its first
meeting on July ?l, 1.987, to begin revising existing
national space policy. The Senior Interagency Group for
Space (SIG-Space) held its final review meeting on December
17, 1987. The remaining time until the President signed the
new policy was devoted to final administrative preparation
of the directive, and final policy and legal review.
Q: What agencies participated in preparing the new policy
directive?
A: SIG-Space member agencies include the National Security
Council Staff (chair); the Departments of State, Defense,
Commerce, and Transportation; representatives of the
Director of Central. Intelligence, Organization of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, Office of Management and Budget, and the
Cffice of Science and Technology Policy. in addition, the
Treasury Department participated throughout the review
process.
Q: Whv did it take so long?
A: This was a comprehensive review of all aspects of national
space policy--the first since 1982.
0: The trade press reported that the interagency process
encountered numerous serious arguments among the agencies.
Will you comment?
A: Over the course of the review, a range of options
considered on the various issues. The important thing is
that any differences that existed were resolved in an
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orderly process that thoroughly examined all of the options
identified.
Did some of the issues go to the President for resolution?
A: I will not comment on the specific issues considered by
SIG-Space or the President. Suffice it to say that a
structured process exists to obtain decisions within the
interagency process when consensus cannot be obtained.
Q: Was the reestablishment of the National Aeronautics and
Space Council considered during the policy review? If so,
why was the idea rejected?
A: The idea was surfaced during deliberations, but it did not
enjoy much support. Replacing one interagency process
(SIG-Space) with another (the Space Council) accomplishes
little. The President has established an effective
interagency process not only for space, but for all
important U.S. matters that cut across agency boundaries.
To single space out for different treatment would invite
other areas to demand their own tailored deci.sicn-making
process--a sure recipe for bureaucratic gridlock. SIG-Space
works as an effective forum for senior-level consideration
of space issues, and if agreement cannot he obtained there,
an orderly process exists to elevate decisions and if
necessary, secure Presidential decisions. The very fact
that SIG-Space was able to produce this revised national
space pclicv attests-!to its effectiveness.
How did the SIG-Space process and the Economic Policy
Council's deliberations on space commercialization work --
together or separately?
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A: SIG-Space was responsible for the revision of national space
policy, integrating all the broad elements of governmental
space activity (civil and national security) as well as
private sector, nongovernmental space activities. To
encourage the private sector, SIG-Space developed policies
to make certain that the government avoids actions that may
deter or preclude the development of the commercial sector,
and within a framework that ensures that government agencies
are reliable customers for private sector space goods and
services. Consistent with this policy, the EPC, consistent
with its central role for private-sector space activities,
developed a number of significant commercial space
initiatives to further these overall national objectives for
space commercialization. In summary, the efforts were
complementary, well-coordinated, and substantial numbers of
the participants were involved in both processes.
Q: Were the reports of the National Commission on Space (Paine
Report) and Sally Ride's report on "Leadership and America's
Future in Space" used in the preparation of this revised
space policy?
A: Both of these reports were considered in the preparation of
this policy.
Q: What else was used?
A: IG-Space representatives used a wide variety of source
documentation including previous National Security Decision
Directives relating to space, proposals developed by the
Economic Policy Council's Commercial Space Working Group,
testimony before Congressional committees, as well as
numerous editorials and policy papers on the topic of
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America's future in space. Other key sources of information
were comparisons that were accomplished of U.S. space
activities versus those of other countries in three areas:
civil, commercial, and national security.
Q: Can you comment on the conclusions of these comparisons?
A: In general, these studies do not support claims that the
U.S. is years behind the Soviets in space capabilities,
popular impressions of "lost U.S. leadership in space"
notwithstanding. The reality is that in most important
areas the U.S. is ahead technologically. In `act, by most
important quantifiable measures (data accuracy, timeliness,
quality, and cuantity), U.S. space systems are the world's
finest and will remain so for the foreseeable future
(notable exceptions are in manned spaceflight, deployed ASAT
capabilities, and space transportation systems). Most
comparisons that appear in the trade and popular press have
highlighted the fact that U.S. manned and unmanned launch
systems suffered disastrous accidents that essentially
prevented launch of most U.S. space systems in 1986 and most
of 1987. While true, these statements rarely ao on to say
that the U.S. has made ma4or technical and policy changes to
prevent a recurrence of these launch problems. Moreover,
the successful Titan launches at both east and west coasts
late last-,rear have signalled that all U.S. expendable
launch vehicles are once again operational, and we're
confident the Shuttle will be returned to safe, reliable
operation later this year. Furthermore, during the launch
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hiatus caused by the Shuttle and Titan failures, our
on-orbit spacecraft continued to function extraordinarily
well and provided us with necessary services through that
difficult period. That fact attests to the quality of our
space systems. The U.S. does not need to duplicate Soviet
space capabilities; we must use space systems efficiently to
support U.S. requirements. The comparisons point out that
the U.S. is not preeminent in every aspect and discipline of
space activity. However, our space policy acknowledges that
space leadership in an increasingly competitive
international environment does not demand this universal
preeminence; rather, it states that the U.S. objective is
leadership in those areas critical to important U.S. goals.
Q: What are the implications of these assessments?
A: In the civil sector, the assessment revealed that the space
capabilities of our competitors are indeed growing, and in
some cases, at a more rapid rate than ours. However, in
most critical areas (space transportation and manned
spe.cef_light being notable exceptions) U.S. technological
capabilities remain the best in the world. It is clear,
though, that the launch hiatus has diminished the
traditional U.S. lead in several key science and exploration
areas--a trend that will continue until the Space Shuttle is
returned. to safe, reliable operation and we begin to launch
the backlog of important civil payloads that are awaiting
access to space.
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In the national security area, U.S. space capabilities,
under conditions short of direct attack on our space
systems, are clearly superior to those of our potential
adversaries. In the euent of a conflict involving attacks
on space systems, our technological 'Lead would tend to be
offset by demonstrated Soviet antisatellite capabilities for
which the U.S. has no direct counterpart. Nonetheless, the
national security space sector has taken a number of steps
to assure continued mission capability even if we experience
failures in our cn-orbit or launch assets, whether from
natural causes or hostile action.
In commercial space systems, U.S. efforts, although still in
an embryonic stage, promise important economic, industrial
base, and national security benefits as long as government
policies continue to provide a climate conducive to
sustained commercial growth in space-related activities.
As a direct result of these policies, American firms are
aggressively marketing launch services worldwide and, to
date, U.S. ELV companies have signed. contracts to launch 1.2
satellites, contributing approximately $500 million to the
U.S. balance of trade. Investments totaling approximately
$400 million have been made in this emerging business by
commercial expendable launch vehicle (ELV) companies, which
may result in the creation of some 8,000 new jobs. For its
part, the U.S. Government is making its facilities and
services available to commercial launch firms at direct
"nst. Martin Marietta Corporation, General Dynamics
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Corporation, and Space Services, Inc. have each signed
agreements agreements with the U.S. Government to use
national launch facilities. A streamlined licensing
process, administered by DOT, is a3ready in place.
Q: In exactly what areas are the Soviets ahead?
A: The Soviets are pursuing particularly aggressive pr.oarams in
areas of long-duration manned spaceflight and heavy-lift
launch capability which serve particular Soviet needs for
which there is not always a direct U.S. counterpart. And,
as previously mentioned, the operational Soviet
antisatellite program is a continuing and troublesome
asymmetry.
Q: Is NASA's budget adequate to ensure U.S. leadership?
A: The President's FY 1989 budget, to be submitted to Congress
shortly, supports the objective of space leadership in areas
of critical importance to the U.S. while remaining
consistent with the President's commitment to deficit
reduction. "Leadership" is achie',?ed not through lust. NASA's
budget, but through the funding requested for all U.S.
government space activities, as well as the important
contributions provided by the U.S. private sector. The
budget provides for a carefully balanced strategy of
research, development , operations, and technologies for
science, exploration, and appropriate applications. NASA's
FY 1989 funding request is a significant increase over the
funds appropriated in FY 1988. NASA agrees that the FY 1989
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bucket projections support the civil leadership objectives
in the policy.
Would you explain what the establishment of this human
exploration goal means? Is this a commitment to fly people
to Mars or return to the Moon? What is the dollar
commitment associated with the Pathfinder technology program
announced in the policy?
A: This new long-range goal establishes the general direction
and focus for efforts and technologies guiding the Nation's
civil space sector.
It is not a commitment to any particular mission at this
time. It is premature now to decide whether Mars, the Moon,
cr even another body in the solar system represents the
appropriate pathway for future exploration. We first reed
to understand the many challenges that such potential future
missions would encounter. The Pathfinder technology program
consists of studies and research efforts to examine the key
challenges expected before mission-specific decisions are
made.
The funding for the Pathfinder program is contained in the
President's FY 1989 budget, to be submitted to Congress
short iv.
Q: When would a specific manned planetary decision be made?
A: Decisions on manned planetary- programs will follow when such
programs can he realistically achieved. As we learn more
about the long-term aspects of living and working in space,
identifying and meeting the technical challenges ahead of
us, the more we will understand about when and where
specific programs are possible. Until we have the results
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fmm Pathfinder, it is premature to speculate when a manned
planetary mission might be appropriate. As we study such
programs, we will also begin to understand and consider the
cost implications as an input into when the Nation could
afford the associated investment.
Q: Isn't this just another way for the Administration to delay
indefinitely a real leadership decision on America's next
big space program?
A: No. The Administration has committed to the long-term goal
of human expansion, and proposes the Pathfinder program as
the best way to reach a realistic decision on specific
missions to achieve this new goal. To do otherwise at this
time, by committing prematurely, for example to a manned
mission to Mars by a certain date, could turn out to be a
hasty, costly, and even dangerous decision based on current
data and technology.
Q: Might the U.S. and the Soviets cooperate in a future manned
= 7
A: International cooperation is a goal of U.S. space policy.
Such cooperation will consider U.S. national security,
foreign policy, scientific and economic interests. The
current U.S. - Soviet cooperative agreement on space (signed
April 15, 1.987) outlines cooperation in 16 space science
projects, all unmanned. These projects could conceivably
form the basis for discussions concerning future cooperative
manned missions, but it is very premature to speculate on
such cooperation. The U.S. has not committed itself to any
manned mission to Mars, and the current budget situation
makes such an outlook, even in the future, difficult at
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best. Moreover, we are presently rebuilding our space
cooperation relationship with the Soviet Union after a five
year interruption, and it will take some time to restore
confidence to the level at which more ambitious cooperative
projects could be considered.
In the manned realm, NASA's Space Station program continues
to be the focus of our international efforts through the er.0
of this century, emphasizing the cooperation with friends
and allies which the President is seeking.
Q: Why has the military space hudget been rising faster than
NASA's?
A: Decisions on military space spending are made within the
overall DOD budget based on the contribution that space
systems make in the overall national security strategy and
independent military requirements. Rising military space
spending reflects recognition that military space activities
are increasingly critical to our national security. Part of
the increase in DOD's space spending reflects the costs
associated with its launch recovery program initiated in the
aftermath of the ELV and Space Shuttle Challenger accidents.
Q: Doesn't this risk military dominance over civil space
activv_ties?
A: As the new space policy states, the civil and national
security sectors of the overall space effort are distinct
and independent, responding to their own requirements, yet
they are strongly interacting to avoid unnecessary
duplication. The relative magnitude of the efforts should
not be the focus of attention as each responds to
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independent requirements, and funding for one sector is not
at the expense of another.
c`: What restrictions remain on government regulation of civil
Earth remote sensing?
A: There are no predetermined limitations or restrictions on
the performance of civil Earth remote sensing systems. In
reviewing licensing applications for civil Earth remote
sensing systems, the federal government will consider
national security and foreign policy factors, including
those required by law. Such considerations have not
precluded licensing in the past. A key national space
policy objective is to encourage US-operated commercial
systems that are competitive with or superior to
foreign-operated systems.
Q: What about the Soviet lead in heavy lift launch systems;
doesn't this provide them with a significant advantage?
A: Not necessarily. U.S. launch capability responds to
identified launch requirements, as it did curing the Apollo
program when the Saturn V provided the necessary lift. The
current and planned family of U.S. launch vehicles meets all
current U.S. launch needs. On the other hand, we do not
completely understand how the Soviets will use their heavy
lift capability. It could certainly give them new
capabilities for manned space activities or planetary
missions. It could also allow them to duplicate military
capabilities we have achieved using lower weight systems.
in addition, the President has recently (1-4-88) approved
the management and funding plan for the Joint DOD-NASA
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Advanced Launch System program which will address the future
U.S. need for more capable launch systems by the end of the
1990s.
Q: What role do U.S. commercial space ventures play in this new
policy?
A: The policy clarifies and reaffirms the government's
commitment to rely on the private sector for space-related
coods and services where feasible and commercially
available. Both "feasible" and "commercially available" are
defined in the policy. It directs that U.S. government
actions that preclude or deter commercial space activities,
except for national security and public safety, are to be
avoided. By seeking to eliminate laws and regulations that
unnecessarily impede the private sector, the policy seeks to
encourage the private sector and allow the space environment
to become another arena for free enterprise.
Q: What does the policy have to say about commercial launch
vehicles?
A: Commercial launch operations are recognized as an integral
part of the Nation's launch strategy. DOT's lead role
within the government for establishing Federal policy and
regulatory guidance affecting commercial launch operations
is reaffirmed. The policy also directs government agencies
to encourage a domestic commercial launch industry by
contractinc for necessary ELV launch services directly from
the private sector whenever feasible. It also provides
guidelines for the use of government launch-related
facilities by U.S. commercial launch operators.
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Most of the policy seems to focus on launch systems are.
commercialization. Does this imply that space science is
being downgraded?
A: No, quite the contrary. Under this policy, the first
objective of U.S. civil space activities is to expand
knowledge of the Earth, its environment, the solar system,
and the universe. This policy, and the implementing
guidelines, reaffirm the long-standing objective of
supporting a vigorous and far-reaching program of space
science.
What about unmanned space exploration? Are we ending this
program?
A: No, not at all. The policy guidelines state that NASA will
conduct a balanced program of manned and unmanned
exploration. The new guidelines on unmanned exploration
make the importance of this activity to the achievement of
overall space objectives clear. The fact is that we need
both manned and unmanned exploration, with determinations
made on the basis of cost, safety, suitability, and expected
results given the specific mission objectives involved.
0: What is the significance of the policy statement on space
debris?
A: We have long recognized that space debris could have an
impact on future space missions. NASA and the Air Force
have had the problem under study for several years, and the
DOD has addressed the issue in its own space policy
statement last year. Space debris is a long-term problem
which has complex technical. and economic implications. An
interagency group will be established to consider this issue
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gully and to make recommendations on actions we can take
Q:
that are cost effective and consistent with mission
requirements.
Isn't this (space debris) an international problem?
What
are other countries doing? The U.N.?
A:
In the long run, solving the space debris problem will
require action by all major spacefaring nations and
organizations. Several countries have expressed concern
about the problem, and the issue has been mentioned in the
committees of the International Telecommunications Union and
in the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.
However, the general feeling is that it is premature for
discussion in the U.N. and that it would be a mistake to
rush through politically-driven measures to deal with this
problem. We do not believe there are any simple, easy
solutions to the space debris issue.
on continued
government support for research and development of advanced
space communications technologies?
A: Our review reaffirmed that space communications are critical
to a wide range of U.S. goals. ITASA's past work in
developing and transferring communications satellite
technology to industry resulted in a commercial space
communications program of unparalleled success. The policy
recognizes the need for an active U.S. Government role in
developing appropriate space communications technologies to
meet special government. needs.
Q: In your guidance and implementation section, you refer to
studies of financing alternatives for the space
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infrastructure developments. What are space infrastructural
elements?
A: These are the elements not used up or degraded by their role
in supporting a specific mission. Ground and (eventually
space) deployed support facilities; nonrecurring development
and production costs; space utilities; space habitats, etc.,
are examples.
Q: What are the objectives of the infrastructure financing
study?
A: We would like to understand the opportunities and potential
for enlisting the private sector capital sources in the
initiatives, risk assumption and the profit potential of
space undertakings. The desirability of such undertakings,
the specific mechanisms, the legislative or regulatory
procedures, the relationships to the mission-responsible
agencies, the cash flow and profitability are essential
expected results.
Q: Does the policy say anything about SDI?
A: The policy does state that DOD will ensure that the military
space program incorporates the support requirements of the
Strategic Defense Initiative.
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(THE FOLLOWING Q & As ARE NOT TO BE HANDED OUT)
Why is there no mention of U.S. space reconnaissance in the
policy? (OR) What can you tell us about satellite
reconnaissance?
A: As you know, the U.S conducts satellite photoreconnaissance
for monitoring arms control agreements. As a matter of
policy, this subject is not discussed outside of classified
channels, and I prefer not to address it.
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STAT
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