NSC BRIEFING ESTIMATE OF THE WORLD SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00268R000800080079-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 2013
• Sequence Number: 79
• Publication Date: March 3, 1955
• Content Type: MISC

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415C BRIIPING nP. 477T,
EST1MATI OF T11 WORLD ITUATION
I. 0111114 yaw co TH1 PAST TIA4
The last-West struggle took on a somewhat more ominous
character.
A. This view is based on obvious confidence Sino-Soviet
Isadore that the cumulative effect of Bloc scientific,
economic, and military development, has caused a shift
in relation of forces in the world in favor of Bloc.
B. It also based on cumulative impact of series of assertive
hoc actions during the past year, e.g., Taiwan Strait,
Berlin, and Iran.
C. Ixtent of hoc confidence and assertiveness all the more
impreesive in that it developed despite repeated demon-
strations of Western firmness and the fact that the
Communist cause met with difficulties and reverses in
several non-Communist countries.
II. IHNsilApci0P,MITAllYnit1RAITTHIIIIMMOOD9PWAR
A. Abundantly clear that the Soviets making strenuous efforts
to achieve a position of military superiority over the US.
But because of the rapid pace of developments in technology,
calculations concerning the balance of military power are
unusually difficult.
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B. Nevertheless, assuming that U3 and Soviet military efforts
roughly commensurate, we do not believe that U3 nuclear
capabilities will cease to deter the USSR, at least in the
next few years.
1. Hence, Soviet leaders will probably continue to
Judge that general war with the US would inevi-
tably involve unacceptable damage to the USSR.
2. Even if they should, for a time, believe them.
selves to possess fairly substantial superiority
in missiles, they would almost certainly be un-
sure of degree of surprise they could achieve
in attack on US retaliatory power, or of decisive-
ness of such attack.
C. But tho considerations which thus deter a deliberate
initiation of general war do not remove the possibility of
limited or local wars; indeed, increase of Soviet nuclear
capabilities has made soviet leaders feel freer to adopt
aggressive posture in peripheral areas-, and probably some-
what freer to encourage or instigate armed conflict in these
areas, although probably not initially with overt Soviet
forces.
1. While US action in Taiwan Strait crisis clearly
indicated the risks involved in such situations,
possible that Sino-Soviet leaders will come to
estimate that the US would not act in a similar
manner on other occasions becauset
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(1) US could not bring effective force to bear
in a local situation, or
(2) US would be adverse to initiating widespread
Or general war.
2. Bloc leaders might estimate that a local war could
be fought without expanding into general war beeause
threat of mutual destruction was so great that
both powers would keep the war from spreading --
they might believe the latter reason would be
effective even If US and Soviet armed forces were
engaged
In making estimates like these, Bloc leaders might
be wrong. Hence if general war occurs at all dur-
ing the next few year*, it likely to result from
such a miscalculation rather than from deliberate
intent.
NOflz Joiipt Staff 'Rad Air Sore. dissent to C above.
Joint Staff disagree that increase in their nuclear capa-
bilities will probably make Soviet leaders feel"somm-
what freer to encourage or instigate armed conflict in
peripheral areas," even though Soviet forces not
overtly employed initially. Joint Staff feels increas-
ing Soviet awareness of destructiveness general war will
make for continued caution.
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USAF Intelligence agrees with Joint Staff and also
doubts that Soviet leaders would estimate that "US
could not bring effective force to bear in a particular
local situations' or that they might believe a local war
could be kept limited if US and Soviet forces directly
engaged.
III. PROBLEMS OF THE ATJ, TIC COMMUNITY;
A. The total strength of the Atlantic Community has been im-
proved in sense that individual ruropean countries economically
stronger and politically more stable than at any time since
1945. Moreover, they remain firmly committed to cooperation
among themselves and with US.
B. Nevertheless, along with the movement toward cooperation,
there exist strong countervailing tendencies,
1. kroblems create4 y7Sormatiem of Comsion Wket.
nation of trade barriers among the Six will at least in
the short run adversely affect the Ability of other
Western Europe states (the loven) to compete in Common
Market area, and will cause certain permanent alters.-
tiOra in trade patterns as cost-price relationships
changed.
a. Little hope for solution this problem by such
devices as rree Trade Area; probable outcome is that
over a period some compromise accommodation will be
worked out between so far adamant positions of France
and United Eingdom.
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b. The L'ix themselves htive many problems which =et be
overcome if they are in fast fully to develop the
opportunities inherent in the creation of an enlarged
market area.
2. Prebleme of NATO* European members regard ETC as in.
dispensable to their security, particularly because it
represents to them U3 commitment to common defense.
Differences of opinion and even of interest to be expeoted
in such an association, but we see no indication of
wavering on vital is/me of common reel etance to the
Loviet threat.
a. Nevertheless, in light of advanced weapon development,
hay been some questioning of NATO strategic concepts,
especially as to shield forces.
Determination of the Dritish and French to acquire
strategic nuclear forces under own command creates
another major problem, and affects their ability
support forces committed to NATO*
a. DeCaullois efforts restore image of France as a great
power are also creating major difficulties.
3* jnterest in1/4Dieenearement. NATO may also be affected by
outcome of Berlin crisis, especially if West Germany role
in NATO modified* Increasing number West 1:Uropeans belies
some form of disengagement 110 and Soviet forces from
0.5..
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Iv.
Central Europe essential to reduce tensions and remove
major obstacle to German reunification.
a. At present, WE governments and noet articulate
public opinion wary of disengagement schemes prow
pounded by 1g$914 These regarded as designed to dis-
arm and divide Octet while leaving Coviet position in
EE essentially undisturbed however, WE mitht in
time be more receptive to disengageLent concept,
particularly if linked to some acceptable formula
of Luropean aecurity.
b. Germany the crux of disengagement problem. Adenauer
generany hard and unyielding toward all disengagement
proposals, but pressure increLsing witbing West
Germany for re-examination of whole compler of issues
relating to reunification. 'aen Adenauer dies, or
even before, these issues will be subjet to public
debate. Almost certainly any successor Government
will be more receptive.
UND;:tallTaA'AZ MILD.
While underdeveloped world will remain a principal arena
of Zast-est struggle, course of the burgeoning social
revolution in much of this area will be determined largely
by the developing aspirations of indigenous peoples and
by success or failure of their leadership in dealing with
basic economic, social, nd political problems.
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B. Especially in the past year, has been a halt, perhaps
only temporary, in adverse treads in some of 'newly
independent countries.
1. In several of those with some experience since
independence, leaders have tended to become nore
conscious of scope and complexities of the problems
with which they confronted.
2. Some also more aware of the threat posed by the
Communists, especially where Communist Party has
grown substantially in strength or has actually
challenged non-Communist loaders. Also eons Asian
countries have become more conscious of potential
of Communist China.
3. Adverse trends, however, continue in many areas.
Striking developments during past year in underdeveloped
world baa been sharp increase in the number of military
regimes.
1, A fundamental cause is abeence* in most of under-
developed world* of experience necessary to run an
effective government which can cope with modern
problems.
2. Advent of military-dominated governments could bring
certain favorable factors to bear in their respective
countries, but there are dangers involved. In
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particular, ir US should give them assistance and
they prove ineffective or become increasingly authori.
tartan, 115 will be confronted with situation similar
to that it has faced it Latin ?'smerica as result of
its friendly relations with dictators.
(switch to 11-4-58)
A. Thile smic short term trends, especially in under-
developed world, more favorable in 1958 than 1957, under.
lying adverse trend created by rapid growth Uno.Coviet
power continues.
1. Startling Giant Leap Forward and Commune experiments
were subject our recent }XE on gkesent 'irencle in
rimattLEURI (NIE 13-2-59, 10 February). If
accelerated growth and semi-total mobilization
Peiping's power continues, as we think likely, vs
faced with increasing grave threat in Far East.
Outlook for USSR over period Seven Tear Plan (1959.065)
covered in our annual Coviet review (NIE 11.4-58, 23 December).
1. Foreign policy aspect mentioned already .. increased
confidence and assertiveness of Soviet policy, and
resultant impact on risks of war.
2. Underlying tlis increased assertiveness is Uoc's grow.
ing military strength, especially in missiles (briefed
on last week) but also in conventional force. Soviets
apparently continue believe in large and diversified
ostablisimient (ef. Malinovski's remarks to Lvedes udd
his criticism of Nia0).
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V
squally important are pace of Soviet scientific,
technological progress plus continued economic growth
at rate now double ours.
a. MUst expect further scientific successes (man in
space, etc.) Their all-out effort develop
masaive scientific base now paying off.
b. Economically, 7.1sar Plan goals seem realisable,
except in agriculture. Estimate Soviet GNP will
grow at around 6% through 1965.
c. If US average annual rate is 30, Soviet GNP will
be only about half ours in dollar terms t 1965.
Alt in toms, of Uses to. which GNP out Soviets
already comparable to us, e.g.) dollar value Soviet
defense expenditures (i.e. what their effort would
cost us) already about equal to that of US.
Achievements Soviet economy have also beccae vitally
important element in impact ofSSoviet policy abroad;
1. They provide growing ability to support aid,
credit programa, also use trade as political
weapons
2. Psychological impact on underdeveloped states
of successful Sino-Soviet example.
4. Internally, no serious challenge to Khrushchev leadership
likely so long as his health vigorous. In absence such
challenge or major policy setback, he unlikely return
to Stalinist terror.
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VI.
a. If E died probably would again be period jockeying
for power, but this unlikely to basically affect
continuity of regime's policies.
b. Over very long run, loss of belief in ideology and
increasing influence of non-ideologically inclined
professionals may moderate Soviet outlook, at at
present see no prospect of such fundamental change
on Soviet scene as to diminish regime's will add
ability project externally its rapidly growing
power.
c. Nor do we see much prospect diminution Chic
threat over any but very long run. Although Leap
Forward and Commune innovations have caused same
5ino=Eoviet friction, these highly unlikely threaten
their solidarity against West.
(switch back to 100-59)
Curing the next few years, world situation will continue
to be affected fundamentally by course of the Fast-West
struggle, by social revolution in the underdeveloped
world, and by scientific, economic, and technological
developments.
1. Since bloc rate economic growth will almost certainly
remain above that of West, will narrow still further
economic gap between the two power blocs.
-10-
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2. Balance of military power between Soviet Union and the
US will almost certainly remain such ao to deter
ddliberate Bloc initiation general war.
3. Nevertheless, Gino-Soviet Bloc leaders impressed hy
their own economic, scientific, and military progress,
will almost certainly pursue an increasingly vigorous
and assertive foreign Policy, with resultant heightencd
risks.
Bloc, in its drive to gain superiority over the West and
to exercise predominant influence in the underdeveloped
world retains certain advantages.
1. aile the West has greater resources, richer diversity
of skills and talents, and formidable power, Bloc
ban a more effective organisation for focneeing its
more limited resources to accomplish a particular end.
2. Bloc has a tactical advantage under certain cercum.
stances because of its ruthless disregard for human
lift and for processes of orderly change .- it seeks
radical change in its favor, while the West seeks
gradual change that will not jeopardize accumulated
human values of the past.
C. However, extent to which the Bloc can exploit its
advantages will depend to important degree on skill with
which its leaders pursee their objectives. Finally, and
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moat importantly, it will depend on the effectiveness
with which West on the one hand reacts to assertiveness
of the bloc, and on other seizes opportunities to take
initiative iteelf.
?12?
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1et
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/ 01/7
11. Tams IN SOVIET CAPABIIIT)ES AND macits
A. hhile some short term trends :fore favorable in 1958 and 1957, under-
lying adverse trend created hy rapid growth Sino-Soviet power continues.
1. Startling developments of Giant Leap Forward and COWMUAOS..",*
were subject our recent NIE on Present Trends in Courunist China
(NIE 13.2-59, 10 Februari). If accelerated growth and semi-total
mobilization Peiping's power continues, and we think this likely, we
will be faced with increasing threat to our positions in FE.
B. Outlook for US.511 over period Seven rear Plan (1959-65) covered in
our annual Soviet review (NIE 11-4-58, 23 December).
1. Some of it I've mentioned already -- hardened tone, increased
confidence, assertiveness behind Soviet policy, and resultant impact
on risks of war. While Soviets still wish avoid serious risks of
general war, they probably believe Bloc can increase pressure on Zest
without incurring same degree of risk as would have previously.
2. Underlying LIoscowis increased assertiveness is knee's growing
military strength, especially in missiles (briefed on last week), but
also in conventional forces. Soviets apparently continue to believe
must retain large and diversified military establishment (cf. !Lalinovski's
remarks to Swedes and his criticism of NATO).
3. Equally important are the pace of Soviet scientific, technological
progress and continued economic growth at rate now double ours.
a. !,hist expect further scientific successes (man in space, etc.)
Their all-out effort develop massive scientific base now
paying off.
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Oft
?
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b. Economically' 7-Isar Plan goals seem realisable,
except in agriculture. Intimate Soviet GNP will grow
at around 6% through 1965.
C. If US maintains average annual rate of 34%, Soviet
GNP will be about half ours in dollar terms hy 1965.
But in terms of use tolithIttjlajaScmiots alrea4Y
comparable to us. Dollar value of Soviet defense expendi-
tures (i.e. what their effort would cost us) already about
equal to that of US.
d. Achievements of Soviet econosy have also become a vitally
important element in impact of Soviet policy on world
situation:
1. growing ability of USSR to support aid, credit
programs, also use trade as political weapon.
2. Psychological impact on underdeveloped states of successful
Sino-Soviet examples.
4. Internally, no serious challenge to Khrushchevls leadership
likely so long as his health vigorous. In absence such challenge or
major policy setback, he unlikely return to Stalinist terror.
a. If K died probably would again be period jockeying for
power, but unlikely this would basically affect continuity
of regime's policies.
b. Over very long run, loss of belief in ideology and
increasing influence of non-ideologically inclined professionals
may moderate Soviet outlook. But at present we see no
prospect of such fundamental change on Soviet scene as
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to diminish regime's will and ability project externally
ita rapidly growing power.
c. Nor do we see eny hopeful prospect diminution Chico
threat over any but very long run.
C3NCLUSION
5. In sum, therefore, while world situation in 3_958 had certain
hopeful aspects (especially flattening out of unfavorable trend in
underdeveloped world), we heading iato ominous period. In particular
threat posed by Sino-Soviet power still on increase, with no diminution
as yet in sight.
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