INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS GROUP WEEKLY SUMMARY NO. 18 FOR WEEK ENDING 3 MAY 1949

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A004900010035-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2013
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: May 3, 1949
• Content Type: REPORT

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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS GROUP
.OFFICE OF REPORTS -AND ESTIMATES
CENTRAL INTEiLIGENCE AGENCY
NOTICE: This document is a working paper, NOT an
official CIA issuance, and has not necessarily been
coordinated with other ORE .producing componenta
represents current thinking by one f!,roup of s
in CIA0 and is designed for use by others engag ii
similar or overlappirgt studies. The opinions exprei
herein may be revised before final and official. ib
cation. It is intended solely for the info'rm
the addressee and not for further dtssertination
Copy for:
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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS GROUP
WEEKLY SUMMARY NO. 18
For week end ng 3 May 1949
The International Week
Volume II
The Jessup-Nalik negotiations over lifting the Berlin blockade
still occupy the center of the East-West stage. Meanwhile, ten
Western European Foreign Ministers are meeting in London this weak
to approve final plans for the Council of Europe. At Lake Success
the UN General Assembly approved, 46-6 (Soviet bloc) creation of a
special committee to study plans for a UN armed guard. The Assembly
also passed a resolution approving resort to the peace treaty pro-
cedure in the Mindezenty case, meanwhile retaining the matter on
the agenda. Additional machinery for international conciliation
was also approved by the GA.
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN A NEW CFM MEETING
A Should the Berlin blockade be lifted, it would reflect the
USSR's desire to: (1) regain its lost initiative in the East-West
struggle; (2) slow down the growing consolidation of the West
through some relaxation of East-West tension; and (3) seek a new
agreement on Germany as a whole which would forestall the orienta-
tion of Western Germany toward the West and expand Soviet oppor-
tunities for political exploitation in this area. The Kremlin's
decision would reflect a recognition of the numerous unfavcrable
developments which have occurred since the abrupt end of the London
Council of Foreign Ministers meeting: (1) the Marshall Plan, which
includes West Germany, is no longer a plan but an effectively func-
tioning program; (2) Western Union is a fact and ratification of
the Atlantic Pact a virtual certainty; (3) the Soviet-predicted US
depression has not materialized; (4) the postwar Communist tide
has receded in France and Italy; (5) the three Western Powers have
reached agreement on uniting Western Germany and establishment of
a West German state is near; and (6) the airlift has sustained
Berlin through the winter while the Western counter-*)lockade is
weakening the Soviet zone economy. Under these circumstances the
Kremlin may appreciate that its own repudiation of four-power
control in Germany led the Western Powers to accept partition and
to proceed with the creation of a Western-oriented republic.
Moreover, the USSR's "hard" policy toward Germany has shown meager
results. At the same time, Soviet cold war tactics, particularly
the Berlin blockade, have led to a far greater counter-reaction
than anticipated from the West.
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The Kremlin may therefore judge the moment opportune for an
attempt both to reduce the sharp pressure of Western counteraction
to Soviet expansionism and; if possible, to delay the further in-
tegration of 7estern?Germany with the West. , Any lifting of the
blockade will tie in with the current Soviet "peace" offensives
eghleh will probably be brought to a crescendo timed to coincide
with the date of the GPM.
At any CFM meeting the USSR, appealing to an increasingly
articulate German nationalisms will press for an immediate peace
treaty, formation of a centralized "democratic" German government
and probably withdrawal of occupation troops, proposals already
foreshadowed in the Warsaw communique. Some of the Soviet themes
heard in London will undoubtedly be repeated, such as freedom for
"democratic" trade unions and political parties to operate in all
zones and a Soviet voice in the Ruhr. Whether the USSR approaches
a new CFM meeting with a genuine purpose to reach some agreement
or merely with a plan to feign such a purpose, it may also present
some new proposals designed either to entice or to embSirass the
Western Powers. As in the past, the USSR might resurrect some
Western proposal long since outdated, which it had previously re-
jected. Thus the Kremlin might associate a proposal for the with-
drawal of troops from Germany and an immediate peace treaty with
a willingness to enter into a watered-down four-power guaranty
against a renewal of German aggression as proposed by Secretary of
State Byrnes in 1946.
;rust as the USSR will approach a new CFM meeting without
abandoning its basic long term aim of dominating Germany, it must
expect the Western Powers to remain firm in their insistence on:
(1) a federalized state along the lines of the projected West
German republics assuring free elections and enjoyment of civil
rights; (2) maintenance of existing 'lest German currency reforms;
and (3) freedom of the International Ruhr Authority from any Soviet
veto. Therefore the USSR may be willing to settle temporarily for
some ostensibly "neutral" solution which will at least delay the
final consolidation of a Western-oriented republic and, by giving
the USSR some voice in all Germany, enable it to Pursue its long
term aims. It might hope by reasonable concessions to draw the
Test into some such "compromise." While it is unlikely that the
USSR would agree to inclusion of the Soviet zone in the projected
West German states if only because of the Western victory this
would symbolize, the Kremlin may be willing to make some reason-
able terms which would accomplish roughly the same objective. In
accepting such a course the West would run a double risk as to what
political course the Germans would follow and as to whether the
USSR would really carry out any undertaking not to interfere in
German political activity. Moreover, regardless of any temporary
detente on Germany, the fundamental differences between the USSR
and the Western Powers are so deep-seated as to offer little hope
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that the .CFM can bridge them permanently. if Germany is to be
unified, the ultimate choice lies between a Communist and a non-
Communist Germany, alternatives so mutually exclusive as to rule
out any enduring compromise.
A second alternative is failure to agree In the CFM and a
consequent formalization of the East-West partition of Germany,
In this case, the USSR would eventually set up an all-German
'vpeoples' government in its zone and let the West run the risk of
giving offense to German nationalism. Moreover, the West would
ultimately be faced with a completely communized Eastern Germany.
Despite CFM failure to roach any agreement, the USSR is un-
likely to reimpose the Berlin blockade. To be sure, there are
cogent reasons for its reimposition. It would renew the strain of
the airlift and the long term attrition on the inhabitants of west-
ern Berlin while reducing to a minimum the political value of the
West,s present foothold in the midst of the Soviet zone. The USSR
could cite the permanent split in Germany as invalidating the whole
basis of a quadripartite control in Berlin0 nroortheless, by re-
imposing the blockade the USSR would: (1) aggravate East-West
tension anew; (2) further stimulate Testern rearmament; (3) again
cut off the Eastern zone from Western imports; and (4) sacrifice
the propaganda advantage of having generously lifted the blockade
in search of peace. If it did not reimpose the blockade, the USSR
could at least leave the CFM with the boast that it had made every
effort to reach an understanding with the "iesto Thus, if it is
assumed that the USSR seeks some relaxation of Eact-"Test tension,
it would at least have achieved this objective of a temporary de-
frosting of the cold war.
o
Soviet revival of the Trieste issue. The reported Soviet
intenTTim to request the Security Council to consider, for the
third time this year, the question of a governor for the Free
Territory of Trieste indicates that the Kremlin may be settiaia the
stage for a showdown on this area. After a prolonged deadlocit, the
USSR in February suddenly announced that a British nominee Ine ac-
ceptable. The US, UK and France, however, were no longer inter-
ested in a governor and have since adhered to their April 3_948
proposal to return the Territory to Italy. The Soviet shift was
doubtless induced by a desire to hasten withdrawal of US-UK ?coupe-
tion forces. The possibility of using the Trieste question as a
further bargaining point at any approaching CFM meeting may have
been an additional Soviet reason for raising the problem at this
particular time. While renewed SC consideration will probably
achieve no immediate result, it will pave the way for either Soviet
acceptance of the tripartite plan or a Soviet proposal to divide
the territory on a zonal basis between Italy and Yugoslavia,
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Rumored Latin American-Arab deal on colonies.. An Areb-Latin
American "Iirigraing Arab support Tor a resolution on the Itali-
an colonies for LA opposition to the admission of Israel this
session is reportedly in the making. The proposed colonies res
(elution apparently recommends that: (1) the US, UK Franco, Egypt
and Italy study the disposition of Libya as a whole and report to
the regular GA in September; (2) these five states, plus Ethiopia,
make a similar report on Eritrea; (3) the five states consult with
the Trusteeship Council and/or the Interim Committee in connection
with the proposed study; and (4) the GA reserve action on Italian
Somaliland but request Italy to submit trusteeship plans for the
colony. Such a comparatiliely innocuous resolution might be accept-
able to a GA majority as it does not predetermine the disposition
of any colony and permits postponement of the entire issue to the
September GA. There is, however, no indication that the Latin
American and Arab blocs have yet reached agreement. Moreover, the
UK reportedly opposes any Italian participation in a commission
studying Cyrenaica, one of the key features of the Latin American
plan,
Zinehenko a nointment stirs UN. Secretary General Lie's pre-
cipita e appo n mi;17-6F-RUEsfaTni-Zinehenko as Assistant Secretary
General in charge of Security Council affairs following the resig-
nation of Arkady Sobolev probably stems from Lie's desire to retain
a senior Soviet official on the UN Secretariat at almost any cost
in order to counteract Soviet accusations of discrimination against
the USSR. Zinchenko was practicelly imposed upon Lie. Although
the Syg reportedly suggested Dr. A. A. Arutiunian (of the Soviet UN
delegation) and Nikolai Roschin (Ambassador to China) as replace-
ments, he was brusquely told they were unavailable. Soviet repre-
sentative Gromyko hinted that UN delegate Jacob Malik might be a
candidate, but Lie vetoed this suggestion (he apparently has dis-
liked Malik since the latter suggested changes in Lie's annual
report to the General Assembly, a draft of which was sent to
Sobolev in Moscow via the Soviet delegation pouch).
Lie's arbitrary action has created considerable bad feeling
among various UN delegations and senior UN Staff officials. The
Chinese, Canadian and French delegates are considering strong pro-
tests against the appointment since it was made without prior
consultation. Secretariat officials are irate over Lie's filling
the position so promptly, thus virtually conceding to the USSR
that the Asyg for SC affairs must be a Soviet national. Lie has
also been criticized for not refusing to act until a written
resignation was received from Sobolev himself, although it is ad-
mitted he could have done little to protect Sobolev had the latter
resigned under duress. In defense of his actions, Lie states that
Gromyko insisted Sobolev's resignation and the new appointment
"move together."
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Reports that Sobolev is already working in the Soviet Foreign
Office again indicate the feilure of the Kremlin to differentiate
between USSR and UN employment, as first evidenced in the Gueitchev
inoldent. Should Sobolev return to New York with the Soviet UN,
delegation, as Gromykc indicated, be would probably continue to
direct the undercover activities of Communistsand fellow travelers
on the Secretariat.
.AFL-Ciaittlaeement speeds_provess towards new labor inter-
national. Infornal agreement of the AFL and7TrY-Tantly to support
plans for the formation of a new, anti-Communist world labor fede-
ration will probably hasten early achievement of that long-awaited
goal. The AFL-CIO action will reinforce the determination of non-
Commenist national labor groups still in the World Federation of
Trede Unions to withdraw from that organization prior to the Milan
WFIVmeeting on 27 June, The AFL-CIO agreement, which must be
approved by the executive boards of both US labor crganizations,
Is also likely to dispel the fears of the smaller Western European
national labor groups about the wisdom of joining an international
in which only one of the US organizations might be represented.
While these smaller countries will probably accept the British
Trades Union Congress pr000sal for a June conference in Geneva,
they can, however, be expected to press for: (1) small nation
sponsorship of any general conference called to draft a charter for
the new federation; (2) guarantees against its "domination" by the
big powers; and (3) location of the new international seat in a
small nation.
o
Resistance to ja anese ITU members111.2. Opposition to ex-
elusiV=97control of span s external relations is evident from
the attitude of other nations toward Japanese earticipation in the
forthcoming Paris conference of the International Telecommunications
Union. The US maintains that through formal adherence to the
Atlantic City Telecommunications Convention, Japan has become a
member of the ITU wiJA1 full rights to participate in its confer-
ences. France, however, has not issued Japan an invitation,
objecting that the Far Eastern Commission, not SOAP, has the power
to authorize Japan's adherence and that prior to FEC decision on
this point, Japan could not have legally adhered to the Convention
nor become an ITU member. Chinese, Dutch and Indian support of the
French legal interpretation indicates unwillingness of some FEC
members to yield ground to SOAP in the control of Japan's foreign
relations rather than any opposition to Japanese membership in the
ITU. France, however, may also fear opening the way to ITU member-
ship for Germany.
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Setbacks to US views on FOI. US ideas of freedom of infor-
mation7vIsifirrer-.riertback this week should the GA
Social Committee approve a draft Freedom of Information Convention
containing two features which the US has stated it will not accept.
First, a 'Mexican proposal would add to the Convention a code of
ethics which the US considers unenforceable. This code reflects
ideas the USSR and its Satellites had vainly tried to work into the
Convention many times. Under it, correspondents must "report facts
without discrimination, promote respect for human rights and funda-
mental freedoms, further international understanding and contribute
to the maintenance of international peace and security." By adding
this language to Article IX instead of inserting It in the Preamble,
a moral obligation was converted into a legal one. As a result, a
government, with UN sanction, could expel a foreign correspondent
whenever it felt that any of his dispatches impeded "international
understanding." The US will strive to have the GA overrule this
decision, failing which it will refuse to ratify the Convention.
Secondly, under the provisions of the existing International
Telecommunications Convention, a government may stop outgoing mes-
sages which it considers dangerous to national security or a
violation of its own law. Thus failure specifically to except the
FOI Convention from the legal operation of the ITU Convention would
countenance "back-door" censorship which the US contends should be
outlawed. The powerful alignment of Asiatic, Latin American and
Soviet blocs which supports this "back-door" censorship makes the
outlook for General Assembly reversal of the Committee action very
dim. These reactions bring home the inescapable conclusion that
the liberal Anglo-American concept of freedom of information is a
minority view in this world -- still an inspired exception rather
than the rule. Only powerful US pressure could induce some coun-
tries to accobd even lip service to these liberal aspirations.
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