INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS GROUP WEEKLY SUMMARY NO. 25 FOR WEEK ENDING 2 NOVEMBER 1948

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A004900010014-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2013
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: November 2, 1948
• Content Type: REPORT

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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS GROUP -
WEEKLY SUMMARY NO..R5 13
se ent No. c)
For week ending 2 November_ 1948
The Week in the
NO CHANCE in Class. 0
tefiCLASSIFIED
Class. CHARON!) TO: TS $
DDA Nemo, 4 Apr 77
Muth: DDA REG. 77 17O3
Date: -11.01.127.0BY:
The UN narked time this week awaiting the results of the US elections.
Strong SC action on Palestine truce violations was deferred and the problem
referred to a subcommittee. GA debate continued on the Balkan case amid
slashing Soviet bloc attacks on US ?imperialise in Greecel. In Indonesia,
hope for resumption of negotiations by the Good Offices CoMmittee dimmed.
Yugoslavia again raised its complaint of US-UK maladministration of their
Zone of Trieste.
-Op
Probable Soviet maneuver on new UN members. There are mounting in-
dications that the USSR intends to sponsor or support "blanket" admission
of all twelve applicants for UN membership. At the beginning of this
session, the Soviet delegation failed in its attempts to strike from the
agenda the Argentine proposal for the admission of all applicants receiving
the required majority of seven SC votes in spite of a vetol,. GA approval
of this resolution would mean acceptance of Austria, Ceylon, Eire, Finland,
Italy, Portugal and Transjordan. With favorable SC recommendations on
these states blocked by the Soviet veto, the GA is powerles to extend
membership barring some extra-legal move such as proposed oy the Argentines.
Faced wit1Nrowing opposition to indiscriminate Soviet vetbes of membership
applications and the consequent possibility of GA acceptanbe of such a plan,
the USSR will probably attempt a "deal" to eliminate this antagonism and at
the same time to gain admission for its five satellites (Albania, Bulgaria,
Hungary, Outer Mongolia and Rumania) now ineligible because they failed to
gain the required SC majority. Through a speciously reasonable proposal
for`blanket"admission of all twelve applicants, the USSR may seek to win
over members, such as Sweden (author of a similar proposai last year), which
would be appeased by the "universality" principle of UN mebbership.
Under a "blanket" admission plan, the nest and East wouLd gain an
equal number of additional votes, Finland probably feeling forced to divide
favors between the two blocs. The "joker" lies in the proportional advantage
resulting to the USSR by almost doubling its voting strength, thus increasing
its ability to block anti-Soviet GA decisions. Furthermore, USSR delegate
Vishinsky's preoccupation with the problem of admitting Outer Mongolia has
raised fears that the Kremlin aims at creating a precedent for the dmission
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SEEREI
of numerous new-born Asian satellites, which night be exteLnded to include
even some puppet Chinese state.
4111??
Although not opposing universality pl....;x* se, the US an UK maintain that
Charter requirements must be met in each individual case. On the other
hand, they cannot accept the Argentine hypothesis that the veto right on
membership applications does not exist. Therefore, the UK and 113 may well
seek a solution such as that approved at the 1947 session,' calling for a
review by the SC of all membership applications.
- 0 ?-?
Possible UN conse uences of a Chinese collapse. The imminent loss of
all Manchurip. threatens t e entire Nationalist position in China. Should
a Communist regime completely succeed the present Chinese Government, the
latter would undoubtedly claim China's seat as a permanent member of the
Security Council. The same result would flow from a Nationalist-Communist
coalition which would radically alter the political compleXion of the
Government. In either case the problem confronting the UN would be un-
precedented. For the first time, the Government of a permanent SC member
would have shifted over to the Communist contingent. A CoMmunist China
sitting in the SC would immediately increase the vote of the Soviet bloc
to three and would alter the present veto picture where the USSR generally
casts the sole negative vote among the permanent members. Should the
Nationalist Government succeed in retaining jurisdiction oVer even a small
portion of China, it would probably continue to send repreeentatives to
the UN. Were both "Governments" then to send delegations to the SC, the
controversy might be submitted to the International Court pf Justice. In
apy event, the resulting situation would be fraught with three important
consequences for the US in relation to the UN. It would (a) deprive the
Western bloc of its present propaganda opportunities in forcing unilateral
Soviet vetoes; (b) cut down the Western majority in the 34 and (c) exercise
a magnetic influence on such UN members adjacent to China as Siam and Burma,
drawing them closer to the Communist bloc.
Likely UN action on Greek case. No slackening of Soviet and satellite
interest in the Balkan dispute was evident during the first week of discussion
by the GA Political Committee. Vituperative attacks against the Western
Powers for their support of the fascist Greek Government and charges of US
imperialist maneuvers in the Mediterranean highlighted the Eastern approach.
Despite these accusations, two proposals to hear a guerrilla representative
were unanimously defeated. Strong Yugoslav support for the USSR position
dampens previous hopes that the Tito-Cominform split might reduce Yugoslav
activity against Greece.
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SW(1
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Continuation of the UN Special Committee on the Balkans, as called for
in the US-UK-Chinese-French resolution, appears almost certain. On the
other hand, any 1,ustralien plan to curtail the Special Committee and in-
crease its conciliatory powers -- a proposal probably rooted in Australian
Prime !sinister Evattls attempts to bridge the East-eat gap -- is unlikely
to secure UN approval. UNSCOB's conciliation functions naylshowever? be
strengthened in an at4iempt to satisfy itsadherents am alike the final
decision as unanimou-, as possible, Subsequent Soviet and satellite
continued abstinence in regard to UNSCOB may be anticipated.
- 0
The Berlin question. It would be wishful to pretend to see anything
conciliatory in Premier Stalin's blistering press statement accusing the
US and UK of an aggressive attitude on Berlin, impugning the six ',neutrals',
who had striven for a settlement and charging the ,estern powers with
having enterad into agreements which they subsequently repudiated. In
this instan.:e the custemary roles of Stalin and Vishinsky seem to have
been reveried and Stalin to have become the more corrosive of the-two.
His attaci: on the jest may have been calculated to offset the"propaganda
victory %chieved by the Westerngpowers in obtaining a 9-2 vote in the
Security Council. However, the realities of the situation, the success
of the airlift, the calculation of advantage and disadvantage, will deter-
mine tae Soviet course and thus even Stalin's words do not necessarily
exclude a settlement of the Berlin dispute. Following the veto, the Western
poweas have taken no further action for th? time being. They will await
wha.:ever new efforts the six "neutrals" may make in an effort to effect a
settlement.
US elections retard UN action on Palestine. Unceiainty as to US
policy pending elections, added to a double French holiday, brought already
halting UN action on Palestine to a virtual standstill last week. In the
3C, the UK and China had proposed a resolution which, after endorsing the
action taken by Acting Mediator Bunche in calling on Egypt and Israel to
withdraw to their 14 October military lines, would appointaa committee of
the five permanent SC members, Belgium and Colombia to examine appropriate
sanctions under Article 41 in the event of non-compliance. Marking time
until the US attitude could be clarified, the SC referred the Anglo-Chinese
-esolution to a subcommittee.
mew
Prom t UN measures to relieve Arab refugees likel . The resolution
or the relief of the Palestine refug es submitted last week by the US, UK,
ielgium and the Netherlands will probably be quickly adopted by the
3
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Little opposition, even from the Israeli representatives, is expected.
Substantial alleviation of the needs of 500,000 Arabs facing winter without
food and shelter should result from implementation of the resoluticn *dela
(1) sets total Arab relief requirements for the next nine months at $29,500,000;
(2) calls Upon all UN members to contribute towards the required sum; (3)
directs Secretary General Lie to establish a UN agency to administer the aid;
and (4) autherizes an immediate advance up to $5,000,000 from the UN Working
Fund, this sum to be repaid from the governmental contributiOns received.
The UN Secretariat, expressing doubts about its ability to administer these
measures, has suggested that a GA subcommittee be set up as an advisory
body to the UN relief director.
- 0"
_Newilifilm_iggyammt_Vjalatirsaltsms, under the pressure of the
deepening EasteWest crisis and US Insistence upon creation of a functioning
defense organization to which it could lend material support, the five
Brussels Pact powers have established a combined command and apparently
prepared an estimate of required US military aid. Moreover, although
previously somewhat cool to the idea of a North Atlantic defense pact in-
cluding Canada, the DS and certain peripheral countries, the WU Consultative
Council recently announced complete agreement on the principle ot such a
pact (apparently proposed by the US at the summer meetings with the WU
Ambassadors as a means of associating the US with the Western European
security bloc). These steps mark the end of the first or organizational
stage in the development of an integrated Western European defense system,
and will apparently lead to the second stage of negotiations with the DS
and Canada on a larger regional grouping and on US military aid. However,
the steps taken to date by no means indicate that WU has become an effective
force. Although a skeleton combined command has been set up, it is doubtful
whether substantial combined planning and training Or the standardization
of tactics and equipment has yet taken place. Even with US aid it will take
a long time before WU powers will be able to guarantee their own security.
Another major problem affecting.111, which has already been raised by
the UK, is the norrelstim of WU rearmament with the ERP. The British are
concerned lest US military aid be provided only at the expense of US recovery
program allocations; they also fear the effect of their increased rearmament
expenditures on UK recovery progress. Some British cabinet members reportedly
believe the USSR actually desires to induce Western, Europe to embark on large-
scale rearmament, counting on the resultant diversion of manpower and materials
to hamper economic recovery. The determing factor as to whether WU rearmament
and the ERP, actually two sides of the same coin, will work against each other,
will be the willingness of the US Congress to appropriate sufficient funds for
both purposes.
As negotiations proceed toward expansion of WU into a North Atlantic pact,
the question of including ether continental nations will arise. The interest
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SgEdis
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of these nations in joining any Western security bloc will be heightened by
the prospective inclusion of the US and the consequent possibility of
receiving US military aid. Italy has recently shown increased interest in
aligning itself with a Western bloc. Both Denmark and Norway have extended
feelers for US military aid. The French army Chief of Staff reportedly
believes it desirable to bring Spain and Italy into WU. Should the US
associate itself with the WU countries in a defensive alliance, it will
undoubtedly exert a powerful attraction on many other European states. On
the other hand, some WI] members have expressed a certain reluctance to in-
clude other countries which would be military liabilities and which right
compete for US aid.
e 0 e
?Ety_ty,4_c2fTriesta. The USSR may attempt to revive
in the SC the question of appointing a Governor for the Free Territory of
Trieste in an effort to remove US-UK occupation troops from this strategic
area. Such a Soviet move would not, despite the current strained relations
between Belgrade and Moscow, be inconsistent with its past action in regard
to the Territory. When Yugoslavia raised the question of US-UK treaty ,
violations in their Trieste Zone, the USSR care, albeit a trifle reluctantly,
to its support. The USSR has' consistently sought a UN Governor but failed
to accept the majority candidates, preferring an indecisive figure who would
be unable to oppose effectively a Communist coup. The UK, in an effort to
forestall a Soviet move on the governorship question is lobbying for the
Westas proposal to return the territory to Italy. Recent renewal of the
Yugoslav charges against the Anglo-American Zonal administration may provide
the USSR with an opening for reviving the old issue.
- 0 "
UN trusteeshi Soviet The midway
course which the US, China and the other moderates have charted between the
colonial (UK) and anti-colonial (USSR) powers has made possible the
constructive work so far achieved by UN trusteeship organs. The GA Trustee-
ship Committee, rocked by British accusations of "incoepetencen for exceeding
its functions and Soviet criticism of too limited activity, has survived
both charges and is demonstrating a capacity for constructive achievement.
Rejecting Soviet attempts to rake obligatory the submission of political
information on non-self-governing territories, the Conmittee adopted ,a report
defining arrangements for the submission of such information and continuing
for another year the Ad Hoc Committee set up by the GA to examine and rake
recommendations on the information received. Also it recently adopted, over
UK objections, en Indian resolution requesting members to inform the UN of
any constitutional changes in the territories under which an administering
power might cease supplying reports. The USSR, which has found the Trustee-
ship Council an effective forum for attacks on the administering powers, now
seeks to extend the trusteeship system beyond the former mandated territories
and to broaden UN activity in existing trust areas, It has furthermore
suggested that Czechoslovakia be added to the Ad Hoc Committee. The UK,
Skftrf
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irritated by recurrent criticisms of the administering powers, has expressed
fear that the TC will "degenerate into a platform for political propaganda".
British irritation on this score, however, will probably diminish as the
Council demonstrates continued capacity for constructive performance.
0 tEe
gt9a2g.9._in_tht_OEEC. Recent activities of the Organization for European
Economic Cooperation, the sixteen nation directing body for the ERP, have
caused US observers to note with satisfaction that it is finally rolling
along. The OEEC has completed work on its first annual programp approved an
intra-European trade plan and is now working on its overall four-year re-
covery program. In grappling with these practical.problems, it has shaken
Itself down and become a functioning organization. Evidently the UK,
previously accused of dragging its feet, has strengthened its delegation and
now appears to be exercising some constructive leadership.
Substantial further strengthening of the OEEC will probably be required,
however, before it can adequately perform its function of promoting European
economic cooperation and can eonvince the US Congress that this ERP objective
is being properly carried out. The OEEC has appointed a committee to examine
its present structure and recommend any improvements. It is hoped that this
may lead to more dynamic high-level direction and to the creation of a more
effective Secretariat. One likely move which is being urged by EGA will be
the appointment of a prominent political figure as permanent vice-chairman
or Director General of OEEC, in order to provide the requisite full-time
leadership.
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