CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00530R000200190002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 17, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 28, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2012/08/17 : CIA-RDP90-00530R000200190002-3
CHAPTER ONE URAFT
INTRODUCTION
With the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, Congress
recognized the importance of timely and accurate intelligence
information about the activities, capabilities, and intentions of
foreign powers. Placement of the director of central intelligence
(DCI) under the direction of the National Security Council
emphasize the critical relationship of intelligence to national
25X1 security
National security concerns have expanded to cover more nations
and international activities and this trend will likely continue.
To meet this need it is vital that the organizations providin
25X1 intelligence to U.S. policy makers be of the highest quality
lAdIrNI\t While major investments in technical tools have had a strong
impact on collection, information assimilation, and analysis, the
critical element of adaptation and response by intelligence
organizations to their statutory missions has been through their
people. The record reflects that the high quality of intelligence
organizations and their products have p ived from heavy
25X1 investment over time in human resources
The Intelligence Community must continue to attract and retain
high quality, dedicated personnel. This is of particular concern in
light of the threat that the federal government will become
increasingly less able to attract the country's best talent to its
25X1 workforce
This issue will continue to be a challenge to the executive
branch, the Congress and the Intelligence Community. The changing
techniques of intelligence dictate new technical skills and adaptive
25X1 management
The congressional intelligence oversight committees have
directed increasing attention to human resource management (HRM).
The Congress directed that NAPA perform a comprehensive review and
comparative analysis of the civilian personnel management and
compensation systems of the Intelligence Community (IC). In this
study, the panel that the National Academy of Public Administration
(NAPA) appointed:
Examined the need for significant change in the existing
IC personnel systems given the strategic trends in the
intelligence function and the economic, social, and
demographic trends in U.S. society.
Examined these personnel systems to ascertain if they will
be adequate to attract and retain the highest quality
employees through the 1990s.
Analyzed personnel issues facing the IC that may differ
greatly from those facing the federal government in
general.
7S2c J2/3
7;9
- 1 -
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/17: CIA-RDP90-00530R000200190002-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/17: CIA-RDP90-00530R000200190002-3
ECRET
_
Compared the personnel needs and requirements facing the
individual IC agencies, with due regard for the differing
missions, risks, job requirements
and environments
of the
,25X1
organizations in the community.
The Congress directed the Academy panel
to recommend
changes,
if warranted, in legislative, regulatory, or other areas in the
personnel and/or compensation programs to improve the effectiveness
of the IC agencies' personnel systems and
to ensure they are able
25X1
to accomplish their missions in the years
ahead
The seven member NAPA panel, assisted by its project staff,
has reviewed issues which encompass:
Impact of anticipated changes in the U.S. workforce on
intelligence agencies.
Recruitment and retention , especially as they relate to
critical skill occupations, and whether personnel security
requirements adversely affect agencies' ability to get
quality personnel.
Extent to which the agency career development and training
programs support current and future mission accomplishment.
Efforts the agencies have undertaken to make their
workforces more representative of all groups within the
U.S. population, and the extent to which current levels of
effort will enable the agencies to continue to diversify
their workforces.
Different levels
agencies and how
government and
The impact of future
systems, and ways
of compensation within the
they compare to the rest of
the private sector.
intelligence requirements
these ystems might be organized
intelligence
the federal
on HRM
to meet
25X1
changing needs.
In addition, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
requested that NAPA review IC personnel costs and make appropriate
recommendations on ways to constrain these costs without adversely
affecting intelligence missions. This report addresses
tkese
25X1
issues in the context of overall workforce efficiency
Principal findings are presented in Volume I of
this report.
Supplemental information, including a great deal of comparative
(402'A*, information on each subject, is in Volume II, as is a detailed
6A-l'--discussion of scope and methodology. This introductory chapter
describes the agencies' breadth of missions and the history of
special treatment Congress
has considered necessary for these
agencies.
25X1
- 2 -
['SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/17: CIA-RDP90-00530R000200190002-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/17: CIA-RDP90-00530R000200190002-3
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
I. Changing Functions Reflect Breadth of Missions
od
SECRET
While enabling statutes are essentially unchanged, the
activities the intelligence agencies perform and the priorities
they address to fulfill their missions are continually adapted to
changing national security requirements. As recently as five years
ago, few experts outside the Intelligence Community would have
predicted the extent of the roles many of the agencies now play in
monitoring arms control agreements or tracking internat.'
financial dealings -- especially those related to drugs
"Glasnost" and "perestroika" were not in most Americans'
vocabularies, and their impact on agency missions can still not be
fully predicted. The changes evolving in the Soviet Union are of
such a magnitude that the intelligence agencies must adapt their
efforts to very new circumstances within that country and among its
allies. Certainly, the greater flow of information from what are
now overt sources creates new challenges: the issue is less one
of finding clues than making sorts.]
The need for breadth and depth in coverage of global issues
drove growth during the years 1947 - 1963. This was followed by a
build-up and a diversion of assets to provide tactical coverage of
Vietnam. After Vietnam, staffing.levels were reduced. The
post-Vietnam period of 1969 - 1979 saw a major re-emphasis in the
'Scope and focus of U.S. intelligence activities. Massive
rebuilding in the 1980s occurred! as the agencies also faced shifts
in employee skill reauirements needed
The panel sees no diminution in the growth of global issues
with important national security implications. Among the topics
which will require continuing attention are terrorism, narcotics
(and their impact on capital flows), nuclear proliferation,
unsanctioned technology transfer, arms control verification, and
trade and business practices of U.S. allies and of third-world
countries. While the agencies have different roles vis a vis these
issues, they must all adapt to these added complexities.
Although the intelligence agencies are not expecting major
)shifts in skills requirements over the next decade, they do
anticipate an increased need for people with a variety of skills.
They expect to have to develop strategies to meet unexpected
requirements, some of which may entail different expertise than now
available. i The agencies will continue to have workload surges as
unpredicted world events transpire.
3
SECR
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/17: CIA-RDP90-00530R000200190002-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/17: CIA-RDP90-00530R000200190002-3
DRAFT
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
II. History of Different Treatment of Intelligence Agencies [...ECRET
The intelligence agencies differ from other federal agencies
in many ways. Their personnel are subject to detailed security
investigations, fewer employee appeal rights, constant awareness of
their "cover" status, little choice regarding geographic work
locations, limits on personal travel, restrictions in describing
their work experience, and in some cases threats to personal safety
One of the most obvious differences is the need for secrecy.
In designating that the director of central intelligence protect
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure,
Congress emphasized the importance of secrecy in intelligence
activities.( The panel believes that President Eisenhower stated it
best when he said of intelligence:
Success cannot be advertised: failure cannot be
explained. In the work of intelligence, heroes are
undecorated and unsung, often even among their own
fraternity... -- their reward can be little except the
conviction that they are performing a unique and
indispensable service for their country, and the
knowled e that America needs and appreciates their
efforts
u) Congress further emphasized the vital need to maintain the
secrecy of intelligence activities and personnel when it passed the
Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 (50 U.S.C., 421 -
)426). This law makes it a crime for people who have or previously
had access to classified information to intentionally disclose to
unauthorized recipients any information identifying a covert
intelligence agency employee who is serving outside the U.S. or did
so in the past five years. The Act was intended to halt efforts to
identify covert agents, recognizing that such actions jeopardize
their lives and safety and damage the ability of the U.S. to
safeguard national defense and conduct effective foreign policy.
The nature of the uniqueness of the Intelligence Community is
further demonstrated through the special handling processes for
intelligence program and budget review within the executive branch
and in Congress. Security requirements dictate that the
\intelligence agencies also be exempt from the Federal Labor
Management Relations Program, from portions of the Freedom of
Information Act, and from various ?rovisions of law of
government-wide applicability
The courts have consistently recognized the special nature of
intelligence work. j In one case in which an employee was prosecuted
for disclosing classified intelligence information to a news
publication (U.S. v. Samuel Loring Morison), the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit noted in its decision, which was left
intact by the U.S. Supreme Court, that:
- 4 -
PECRE
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/17: CIA-RDP90-00530R000200190002-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/17: CIA-RDP90-00530R000200190002-3
URAFT
LSECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Intelligence gathering is critical to the formation
of sound policy, and becomes more so every year with
the refinement of technology and the growing threat
of terrorism. Electronic surveillance prevents
surprise attacks by hostile forces and facilitates
international peacekeeping and arms control efforts.
Confidential diplomatic exchanges are the essence of
international relations. None of these activities
can go forward without secrec3
The U.S. Supreme Court also ruled that the Merit Systems
Protection Board (MSPB) did not have the authority to review
either the substance of an underlying security-clearance
determination or the due process procedures associated with it in
the course of reviewing an adverse action. The Court noted that
placing the burden of proof upon the government "would involve the
Board in second-guessing the agency's national security
determinations. We consider it extremely unlikely that Congress
intended such a result when it passed the Act and created the
Board." (Dept. of the Navy v. Thomas E. Egan)
A further marked difference between intelligence agencies and
their federal counterparts lies in their personnel systems. Over
the years, Congress has given IC agencies varying levels of
authority to appoint staff, determine occupational requirements,
set pay rates, evaluate employee performance and terminate staff
without regard to the normal Civil Service rules.) The majority of
'CIA's authorities were granted in its enabling legislation.) The
NSA's independent personnel syten1 was authorized by the NatAonal
Security Agency Act of l959, (4n the wake of severe security
)problems, because the need for secrecy in its job structure mad
it impractical to be subject to Civil Service Commission oversight
The DIA and military intelligence authorities were granted
more recently (1984 and 1987), and were largely based on the
agencies' inability to attract and retain top staff, given their
inability to compete with the more flexible systems of NSA and
CIA./ The FBI's excepted authorities were extended to all staff by
an Executive Order in 1941, but FBI operates within Title 5 U.S.C.
p_y_jec_hagAisnjt;Lr.,itg_sjforasci Congress has not granted special
kpersonnel authorities for the intelligence components
/within the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and
Research.
When it created the CIA Retirement and Disability System
(CIARDS) and the Federal Employees Retirement System (PERS)
Special Category, Congress recognized the special needs of those
CIA employees whose duties are especially hazardous or entail
special security requirements .1 While these kinds of demands may
- 5 -
[SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/17: CIA-RDP90-00530R000200190002-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/17: CIA-RDP90-00530R000200190002-3
taix r I ::)ECREZI
J25X1
j25X1
25X1
j25X1
125X1
25X1
not be equally placed on all IC personnel, it is important to
recognize that they do exist for some. The human resource
management (HRM) systems of the IC agencies must be able to
effectively meet the special needs of those employees who work
under these unique requirements, as well as those less exposed to
personal danger or cover demands.1
III. Observations on Counterintelligence
The secrecy endemic to intelligence work has generated a wide
range of personnel security processes in all IC agencies. These
practices make up a critical part of the larger charge of
protecting intelligence sources and methods from foreign espionage
-- a charge levied by law on tile cryptologic services, the DCI and
all intelligence agencies.
While the agencies operate under similar statutes and
together prepared and adopted a DCI directive (1/14) on security
procedures,lpractices vary greatly, as does the extent to which
counterintelligence issues are woven into agency training and
career development programs.
Ultimately, the panel decided to limit its review of
personnel security issues to those that could affect recruiting.
Nonetheless, its members were well aware of increased incidences
of espionage cases in recent years (Walkers, Howard, Pelton,
etc.), and this gave rise to concerns on the level of emphasis on
personnel security in the Community
The panel would thus like to go on record in strong support
of the IC's efforts to upgrade personnel security and more fully
integrate it into all HRM aspects. The sensitivity of supervisors
to changes in an employee's attitude, lifestyle or behavior must
become an increasing part of an agency's counterintelligence
program. The panel believes all intelligence agencies have
adequate authority to aggressively pursue this, while respecting
employee rights as U.S. citizens,
IV. Value of Flexible Human Resource Management Approach
The intelligence agencies expect budgets and staffing levels
to stabilize, and the NAPA panel generally concurs in this view.
However, solutions to the deficit problem could produce another
cycle of personnel reductions. At the same time, collection
capabilities acquired when resources were increasing -- and the
changing climate in the Soviet Union -- have led to an information
explosion, causing the agencies to need more analytical
125X1 capability, either human or artificial.)
-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/17: CIA-RDP90-00530R000200190002-3
Declassified
25X1
25X1
in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/17: CIA-RDP90-00530R000200190002-3
DRAFT
,25X1
To meet changing requirements and enhanced data availability,
the intelligence agencies will need to attract, _retain, train andSEaujr
retrain a workforce with the skill mix that will meet national L
security needs. These efforts will have to be accomplished in a
climate of constant or declining staffing levelsjwithin a labor
market undergoing major changes. )Yet, there are limits to the
intelligence agencies -abilities, and to that of the IC as a
whole, to do realistic long-range HRM planning. Perhaps because
they have concentrated on reacting quickly to international issues
or crises, the agencies do not have well-developed HRM planning
strategies. The issue is whether their personnel systems are
flexible enough to function effectively in a dynamic lob market,
and meet the needs of their changing workforce.'
The CIA and the NSA have the greatest legal authority to
respond to these challenges. Under its 1984 legislation, the DIA
has made major changes in its personnel systems and now has the
tools to more readily meet these challenges. The military
department intelligence components have had considerable
difficulty in recent years. The Civilian Intelligence Personnel
Management System (CIPMS), scheduled to begin phased
implementation in January 1989, is expected to provide the tools
needed to bring about many of the improvements those organizations
need./
V. Organization of this Report '
This report addressed a range of HRM issues, but its key
focus in all of them was to examine whether additional, specific
flexibilities would help the intelligence agencies accommodate
periods of stability and growth. psupriallv given the imminent
25X1 changes to the U.S. labor force
Chapter two examines changing workforce demographics and
values, and is designed to set the stage for the following
chapters. Chapter three focuses on the intelligence agencies'
staffing levels over time, their efforts to recruit and retain top
quality employees, and the extent to which personnel security
requirements affect those efforts. Chapter four discusses
training and career development programs and examines each
agency's removal authorities and pro .r. s available to outplace
25X1 employees, should that be necessary.
Chapter five reviews the intelligence agencies' efforts to
recruit and promote women and members of minority groups, and the
extent to which the agencies took advantage of their growth
environments to make their workforces more diverse ones. Chapter
six describes the key differences between the federal Civil
Service pay system and those of the intelligence agencies, and
examines some other government and private sector compensation and
benefits practices. It also offers pne1 rrrmmndations on
25X1 specific proposals by two IC agencies.
- 7 -
L['SECRET
_
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/17: CIA-RDP90-00530R000200190002-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/17: CIA-RDP90-00530R000200190002-3
DRAFT
Chapter seven provides background information on SECREI
congressional concern about past lack of coordination on HRM
change within the IC, and describes three alternatives for
coordinating human resource policies among the intelligence
agencies. Finally, chapter eight offers the panel's perspectives
on several areas which transcend individual HRM issues. They deal
with heightened HRM flexibility, the relation of strategic and HRM
planning, the link between enhanced flexibility and improved
productivity, and the value of enhanced accountability when more
25X1 flexible management systems are in place.
390 December 2, 1988
8
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/17: CIA-RDP90-00530R000200190002-3