IRAQ SANCTIONS YIELD TO SPECIAL INTERESTS IN SENATE
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Document Creation Date:
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Publication Date:
October 29, 1988
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Co
Foreign Policy
Iraq Sanctions Yield to Special Interests in Senate
Omnibus foreign policy legislation
imposing sanctions against Iraq was
buried under the weight of special in-
terest concerns on Capitol Hill in the
closing hours prior to adjournment.
Although both chambers of Con-
gress had voted by overwhelming mar-
gins to sanction Iraq for its alleged use
of chemical weapons, the actual legis-
lation fell victim to delays and to de-
mands by members for special deals.
The collapse of the Iraq measure
killed several other foreign policy
measures, most notably a tightening of
U.S. arms sales laws in response to the
Iran-contra affair.
The bill's death also sparked an
unusually bitter feud between the
House Foreign Affairs and Senate
Foreign Relations committees, raising
new questions about the political stat-
ure of those panels.
Foreign Relations, in particular,
has had trouble for two years getting
its legislation onto the floor, creating
frustrations on both panels. Sources in
both chambers said the fallout from
this year's battling could jeopardize
the relationship between the commit-
tees well into next year.
As often happens at the end of
congressional sessions, Sen. Jesse
Helms, R-N.C., was at the center of
action. While he supported the Iraq
measure, Helms lodged other objec-
tions that prevented the bill from
reaching the Senate floor Oct. 21.
Although the State Department
opposed the Iraq sanctions, President
Reagan, during an Oct. 21 political
campaign trip with Helms to North
Carolina, personally lobbied the sena-
tor on other issues related to the om-
nibus bill. Had Reagan been success-
ful in swaying Helms, Congress might
have passed both the omnibus bill and
another measure authorizing U.S. con-
tributions to United Nations peace-
keeping forces. (Story, p. 3142)
Even so, a senior State Department
official said that "we escaped rather
well" from the last-minute legislative
quagmire. J. Edward Fox, assistant sec-
retary of state for legislative affairs,
voiced disappointment at the failure of
?By John Felton
the U.N. bill but said the State Depart-
ment was pleased that Congress did not
enact other measures ? including items
pushed by Helms.
Crafting a Bill
In the closing days of the session,
House and Senate leaders tried to put
together an omnibus foreign policy bill
including several items that had stalled
in Congress for one reason or another.
The Iraq sanctions were to be the
centerpiece of the omnibus bill. Start-
TERESA ZABALA
"This is a horrible way to
legislate. But somebody
must like it because we
keep doing it."
?Rep. Dante B. Fascell, D-Fla.
ing early in September, the Senate
voted three times and the House twice
to impose sanctions against Iraq to
protest its alleged use of chemical
weapons against its Kurdish minority.
House and Senate members early
in October worked out a compromise
sanctions package that met some ad-
ministration objections. Even so, Fox
said Secretary of State George P.
Shultz probably would have recom-
mended that Reagan veto a sanctions
bill as damaging to U.S. diplomatic
efforts to persuade Iraq to forswear
the use of chemical weapons.
The Senate also had attached the
compromise sanctions package to the
tax corrections bill (HR 4333). (Iraq
Copyright 1988 Congressionol Ouorterly tin
Reproduction prohibited in whok or in port except by eddoriol clients.
background, Weekly Report p. 2983)
On Oct. 20, House Foreign Affairs
Committee leaders produced their
omnibus foreign policy bill (HR 5550),
including the Iraq sanctions. As
passed by the House later that day by
voice vote, the bill had provisions on
nine issues other than Iraq, most of
them technical matters.
The major non-Iraq item was a
substantial tightening of restrictions
on U.S. government or private arms
sales to countries that support inter-
national terrorism. Every provision
but one had been worked out before-
hand between members of the Foreign
Affairs and Foreign Relations commit-
tees. The exception was an amend-
ment by William S. Broomfield,
Mich.. ranking Republican on Foreign
Affairs, putting into law a ban on arms
sales preferences for New Zealand be-
cause of its refusal to accept port calls
by U.S. nuclear ships.
Once the House passed HR 5550,
Foreign Affairs Chairman Dante B.
Fascell, D-Fla., acceded to a demand
by Dan Rostenkowski, D-Ill., chair-
man of the Ways and Means Commit-
tee, that the Iraq sanctions be re-
moved from the tax bill. Rostenkowski
had objected to all non-tax provisions
added by the Senate.
Delays in the Senate
HR 5550, the omnibus foreign pol-
icy bill, officially reached the Senate
shortly after noon on Oct. 21. By then,
senators had concluded that their own
attempts to craft a similar measure had
failed. The Senate effOrt collapsed, in
large part, because Helms and other
senators demanded action on items
that the administration and House
leaders refused to accept.
Helms, according to aides and
other sources, was pressing for two
provisions that had been blocked
three weeks earlier during action on
the fiscal 1989 foreign aid spending
bill (HR 4637). One Helms provision
would have curtailed legal immunity
for foreign diplomats in the United
States. Another would have delayed a
deal under which China is to launch
three U.S.-made satellites. (Weekly
Report pp. 2731, 2540)
Oct. 29, 1988?PAGE 3141
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\IF MI/
Foreign Policy - 2
Hill Support for Guerrillas in Angola . . .
Congressional supporters of anti-government guerril-
las in Angola sidetracked, and ultimately helped kill,
legislation authorizing U.S. support for new peacekeeping
efforts by the United Nations.
In the closing days of the session, Angola re-emerged
as an issue on Capitol Hill, with backers of the anti-
government UNITA rebels there worrying about the di-
rection of U.S.-sponsored negotiations over southern Af-
rica. Those members held up the U.N. bill to express their
views. In the end, time ran out and the bill died.
President Reagan in late September asked Congress
for authority to transfer up to $150 million from Defense
Department or foreign military-aid accounts for the U.S.
share of U.N. peacekeeping costs.
Recent negotiations have made possible the resolu-
tion of several regional disputes: the Iran-Iraq War, a
guerrilla war in the Western Sahara, the Soviet occupa-
tion of Afghanistan, a civil war in Angola and the South
African occupation of neighboring Namibia. In each case,
the United Nations may provide long-term peacekeeping
forces. (Background, Weekly Report p. 1831)
Reagan's request moved quickly in the House, where
Foreign Affairs gave its approval on Oct. 4. However, the
panel for two weeks delayed sending the bill to the floor for
various parliamentary and procedural reasons.
In the meantime, Capitol Hill leaders pressured the
administration to toughen the U.S. stance in talks over the
future of southern Africa. Those talks, stalemated after
months of surprisingly fast progress, are aimed at getting
Cuba to withdraw its 40,000-50,000 troops from Angola ?
where they are protecting a leftist government ? in ex-
change for South Africa ending its occupation of Namibia.
In addition to sponsoring the talks, Washington is a
direct participant in the region's conflicts. The United
States since 1986 has supplied military aid to UNITA, the
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. By
growing majorities, Congress has backed that supposedly
covert CIA aid to the rebels.
Once the negotiations began showing promise last
summer, conservatives expressed concern that State De-
partment officials would settle for an agreement that failed
to reflect UNITA's interests. Specifically, UNITA's back-
ers demanded "national reconciliation" in Angola: free
elections and direct talks between UNITA and the leftist
ruling party in Luanda.
Their concerns were prompted, in part, by reports
quoting State Department officials implying that Angola's
internal politics might not be addressed directly in any
agreement. Instead, officials have said, Angola's govern-
ment would be forced to deal with UNITA once it lost the
protective backing of the Cuban troops.
Pressuring Reagan
At first, pressure on the administration was in the
form of letters. Thirteen conservative House Republicans
wrote Reagan on Oct. 12 asking for a "strong statement"
that the United States would not accept a peace settlement
unless the Ango-lan government agrees to "a simultaneous
resolution of the internal political situation" there.
Senate Minority Leader Robert Dole, R-Kan., sent
Reagan a similar letter on Oct. 17, three days after Sen.
Dennis DeConcini, D-Ariz., began circulating a letter
warning that UNITA could fall victim to a "poorly negoti-
ated agreement." DeConcini eventually collected signa-
tures from 50 colleagues.
Turning up the pressure, pro-UNITA members also
began linking the issue to the U.N. legislation.
In an Oct. 13 letter to Secretary of State George P.
With the House bill ready for Sen-
ate action, members of both chambers
worked feverishly to get a deal in the
final hours before adjournment. The
main stumbling block was Helms' de-
mand that Congress pass at least one of
his amendments.
Helms was especially insistent,
aides said, because an informal House-
Senate conference was about to drop a
version of his diplomatic immunity
amendment from the anti-drug bill (HR
5210), then in the final stages of negoti-
ation. House Majority Leader Thomas
? S. Foley, D-Wash., acting at Shultz' re-
quest, had led the opposition to the
diplomatic-immunity amendment.
As the hours ticked away on Oct.
21, Reagan entered the picture to
lobby Helms on several issues, includ-
ing one of the most obscure provisions
on the omnibus House bill. That pro-
vision would enable the United States
Information Agency to continue
beaming programs overseas as part of
PAGE 3142?Oct. 29, 1988
its "Worldnet" television program.
The agency's authority to provide the
"Worldnet" service expired on Oct. 1,
and the bill would have extended it for
another year. "Worldnet" is a pet
project of agency director Charles Z.
Wick, one of Reagan's closest friends.
Reagan and Helms traveled to
North Carolina together for a cam-
paign event. The president's persua-
sive powers apparently failed to sway
Helms, who, by long distance, contin-
ued to hold up HR 5550 until the
House accepted his diplomatic-immu-
nity amendment.
The House bill encountered other
problems. At one point or another,
eight senators placed holds on it. One
was Edward M. Kennedy, D-Mass.,
who objected to the New Zealand pro-
vision. Another was Gordon J. Hum-
phrey. R-N.H., who wanted to add a
provision allowing the administration
to spend unused foreign aid funds in
Israel and other countries.
Copyright 1988 Congressional Ouorterly
Reproduction prohibited In whole or in part emcept by edrtoriol drents
A Republican leadership aide,
who asked not to be identified, said
most of the other objections "dropped
off one by one" until Helms remained
as the major obstacle.
Helms did offer to modify his dip-
lomatic immunity amendment to calm
Shultz' objections. Under one proposal,
the president could cite U.S. national
security grounds to waive the new re-
strictions on diplomatic immunity.
But Shultz continued to oppose
the Helms amendment, Foley stood
fast in refusing to allow it, Helms
blocked action on the omnibus foreign
policy bill, and eventually time ran
out. Shortly before Congress ad-
journed early on Oct. 22, the Senate
referred HR 5550 to Foreign Rela-
tions, effectively killing it.
Pell's Complaint
As the Senate took up the tax bill
in the early hours of Oct. 22, Foreign
Relations Chairman Claiborne Pell.
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Foreign Policy - 3
. . . Helps Kill Funds for U.N. Peacekeepers
Shultz, the leaders of the House Foreign Affairs Commit-
tee ? Chairman Dante B. Fascell, D-Fla., and ranking
Republican William S. Broomfield, Mich. ? explicitly
conditioned the U.N. money: "Any use of these author-
ized funds to support a process which does not include a
total Cuban troop withdrawal and reconciliation leading
to free and fair elections in Angola would, in our view, be
directly contrary to the intent of this legislation."
The administration accepted that statement, but op-
ponents of UNITA objected to putting such language into
law.
The House passed the U.N. bill (HR 5551) on Oct. 20
by voice vote, with little debate. One opponent of aiding
UNITA, Rep. Howard Wolpe, D-Mich., praised the State
Department for putting the Angolan political issue on a
"separate track" from the overall negotiations.
Placing 'Holds' on the Legislation
When the U.N. bill reached the Senate, DeConcini
and others began demanding more explicit assurances that
the administration would not drop its support of UNITA.
They did so by placing "holds" on the bill, a customary
device by which any senator can block legislation by de-
manding that it not be brought up.
In addition to the Angola issue, senators questioned
the bill on other accounts: Some worried about taking
money from the Pentagon and foreign aid budgets; others
were reluctant to approve money for forces to monitor
agreements that have not yet been signed; and various
committees got into a procedural dispute.
DeConcini got a quick response to .his hold. Lt. Gen.
Colin L. Powell Jr., Reagan's national security adviser, on
Oct. 21 wrote DeConcini pledging that U.S. support for
UNITA "has not been, and will not be, a bargaining chip in
the negotiations for Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola."
Powell asked DeConcini to allow a vote on the U.N.
funding bill, promising in return that members of Congress
would be consulted before any of the money was spent.
That letter satisfied DeConcini, who released his
hold, an aide said. However, other senators kept their
holds on the bill, among them Jesse Helms, R-N.C.
Congressional and administration sources later
swapped blame for the death of the measure. Hill aides
said the administration made a tactical mistake by wait-
ing too long to request the money. "The administration
tried to get this at the last minute by sneaking it through,
and that raised the hackles of some people," said a Senate
GOP leadership aide, who asked not to be identified.
Admitting the last-minute rush, State Department
chief lobbyist J. Edward Fox said some members wanted
to "make a statement" rather than pass legislation.
Outlook for Negotiations in Doubt
Still unclear is whether the maneuvering in Congress
will affect the negotiations over Angola and Namibia. The
talks have stalled in recent weeks, primarily because of
disagreements over a timetable for the Cuban withdrawal
from Angola. No date has yet been set for the concluding
round of talks, meaning that a Nov. 1 target date for an
agreement set by all the parties probably will be missed.
In his letter to DeConcini, Powell warned that the
Cuban pullout "will be delayed" if the United Nations
does not have enough money for the planned 7,500-mem-
ber peacekeeping force to monitor an Angola-Namibia
agreement. However, two State Department officials said
that warning was highly speculative, and members of
Congress apparently gave it little credence.
?By John Felton
D-R.I., rose to bemoan the fate of the
Iraq sanctions.
Normally one of the most re-
served men in American national poli-
tics, Pell was visibly frustrated as he
said that "I feel I have been a bit
shortchanged...."
Pell recited the history of the Iraq
legislation, noting that the Senate had
taken the lead on Sept. 9, with a bill
imposing a wide range of export and
import sanctions on Iraq. Then, he
said, "special interests got into the
act" and the House passed a milder
bill lacking provisions that had drawn
objections from farmers, the oil indus-
try and others.
Referring to the dropping of the
sanctions from the tax bill, Pell said:
"Now we are in a situation where a
parliamentary maneuver in the House
of Representatives has aborted the
Iraq sanctions legislation altogether."
House members did that, Pell said,
"in hopes of forcing the Senate to act
on a package [HR 5550] that was
objectionable to some senators...."
Pell complained that the "wishes
of one or two members of the House in
senior positions [are] violating the will
of the Congress." He named no one,
but an aide later said he was referring
to Fascell and Rostenkowski.
The committee aide put the sena-
tor's complaint in stronger terms, say-
ing that Fascell had tried to "black-
mail" the Senate.
Fascell, in an interview, heatedly
disputed Pell's statement and insisted
that the Senate, not the House, was
responsible for killing the sanctions.
Fascell said the House had sent the
Senate a "clean" bill ? HR 5550 ?
with provisions approved by members
of both chambers. And a senior aide to
Fascell said the House had revised sev-
eral provisions of HR 5550 at the re-
quest of Helms and other senators.
"I can't understand the insistence
on putting the Iraq sanctions on the
Copyright 1988 Congressional Quarterly Inc.
Reproduction probibtted on whole or in pod except by ednoriol clients.
tax bill, when there was a bill before
the Senate which incorporated the
agreement" on Iraq and other issues,
Fascell said. "Helms didn't get what
he wanted, so he killed the bill. What
am I supposed to do about that?"
A spokesman for Helms, Foreign
Relations minority staff ? director Jim
Lucier, said other senators helped
block the bill. Among them, he said,
were "five or six Democrats" who op-
posed the New Zealand provision.
Fascell disputed that contention,
noting that the Senate could have
passed HR 5550 without the New Zea-
land provision and returned it to the
House. The Senate erred, he said, in
trying to force the House to accept non-
germane amendments ? diplomatic
immunity and Iraq sanctions ? on
measures such as the drug and tax bills.
"This is a horrible way to legis-
late," Fascell said. "But somebody
must like it because we keep doing
it."
Oct. 29, 1988?PAGE 3143
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