REPRERCUSSIONS OF SYRO-EGYPTIAN UNION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000400020018-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 8, 2013
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: January 30, 1958
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
30 January 1958
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Reprercussions of Syro-Egyptian Union
1. Indications are that Egypt and Syria will soon announce a formal
agreement of political union. Although the considerations remain which
have always made an effective integration of Syria and Egypt appear im.
probable, the agreements upon which Syrian and Egyptian officials have
been laboring in Cairo during the past two weeks may have more significance
than previous gestures toward union.*
2. Developments to date: Intelligence on recent developments in
Syria and Egypt is incomplete and we have been heavily dependent upon
This Memorandum is based on the assumption of an early announce.
merit of Syro-Egyptian union in which Nasser would be the responsible
President of both countries. Subsequently, a message has been re.
ceived from Cairo (Cairo Embtel 1974)
to the effect that Nasser plans to delay announce-
ment of union two or three weeks. We believe that such a delay
might mean that the Syrian and Egyptian negotiators have decided
that the practical problems of a working union are insuperable and
are preparing to try to get by with another inoperative declaration.
In any case, a delay of two or three weeks would significantly reduce
the impact of the announcement.
21,3161%,
STAT
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Egyptian and Egyptian-controlled sources, There is, however, a strong
body of evidence to the effect that a conflict developed sometime during
the month of November between the pro...Soviet members of the ruling Syrian
coalition, supported by the Communist Party, and the advocates of a
neutralist position, mainly in the Arab Socialist Resurrectionist Party
(ASRP) and probably in league with the Egyptians. At some point the
ASRP-neutralist group apparently decided that the Communist Party was
developing a capability to win elections which, if unchecked, might give
it control of the country. This group acted first to postpone the Nov.
ember elections and then to challenge the position of the pro-Soviet group
in the government.
3, The ASRP appears to have decided to redress the balance against
the pro -Sovit group by calling in the only outside force capable of
changing the situation in its favor. At a climactic moment the ASRP
evoked the formula of union with Egypt, probably counting on the magic of
the idea of Arab unity to sweep away opposition. In fact, the Communist
Party changed its position by passing a vague resolution in favor of unity.
Bizri hurried off to try to come to terms with Nasser in Cairo, where he
met a cold reception. He was soon followed by representatives of the
ASRP who joined the military group already in Cairo in urging Nasser to
assume the leadership of a =ion of Syria and Egypt.
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4. With apparent reluctance, Nasser maneuvered to get the Syrians
to accept union on his own terms.. Since then, feverish negotiations
have gone on between Syrian and Egyptian representatives. It was
widely believed that they were seeking to produce an announcement to
coincide with the close Of the-baghdad Pact Conference and thus gain
MfaxiMUM propaganda advantage, though Nasser has recently stated that
the announcement would be delayed for two or three weeks.
5. Thus it appears that the'impetus for consunrotion of the
Syrian-Egyptian union emerged from a struggle for power within Syria.
Nasser was probably genuinely reluctant to take on thmanye/problems which
he knows leadership of the two countries would involve. The extent
of this reluctance was probably exaggerated, however, for the benefit
of the Syrians as well as of the US and USSR. Nasser probably made
the decision to accept leadership of the union in order to secure
his position and that of his friends in Syria and because of the
strong appeal of the idea of union to him and to his followers through-
out the area.
6. What kind of Union?. In view of the performance of the
Syrians and Egyptians in their previous attempts to implement the
idea of union, and in view of the very real practical difficulties
Involved, we believe it unlikely that present efforts will lead to
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actual amalgamation of the two countries. At most, we believe the
present agreement will produce, a very loose form of federal state,
with most of the present dual institutions -- Parliaments, courts,
even foreign offices -- remaining active on a separate basis, but
with a few joint institutions Superimposed.
7. The major change which is almost certain to result from
present agreements on union is the establishment of a joint Presi-
dential office, for which Nasser is the only contender. If union had
no other consequence, this alone would have profound psychological
effects throughout the Arab area. Although there are physical as
well as political factors which would impede Nasser from ruling Syria
in the direct and personal fashion in which he rules Egypt) he
probably cannot afford to give his name and reputation to the Syrian
Presidency without reserving the power to protect himself.
8. Nasser is almost certain to assume a dominant role in
Syrian foreign and defense policy. He is unlikely to have serious
difficulties in the field of foreign policy, as his pre-eminence in
this field is widely accepted among Arab nationalists. Furthermore,
there is every reason to believe that approval of and support for
Nasser's area policy is shared by members of the Syrian group
seeking union with Egypt. Previous joint command arrangements may
smooth the way for joint defense policy, although it is unlikely that
the two armed forces will be made into one operational unit.
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9. Nasser will probably insist on controlling appointments to key
positions in Syria, but is likely to work with and through his trusted
friends in Syria like Sarraj, Syrian Army G-2, and Hawrani, leader of the
ASRP, and will let them and their organizations handle the internal affairs
of the country. He will probably seek to give theimpression of allowing
Syrians to decide strictly Syrian affairs.
10. Beyond this point Nasser faces a number of difficult decisions on
the use of his power. He and his friends must face the problem of
limiting the power of Dizri and Az= and of the Syrian Communist Party.
Nasser will probably seek to control the Communists in Syria by applying
the same techniques which he has used against the Egyptian Communist Party.
He is likely, however, to find this a great deal more difficult in Syria
than in Egypt. The abolition of political parties, which has been re-
ported to be one 'of Nasser's conditions for accepting union, would be, of
course, in accord with his political system in Egypt. It is difficult to
conceive of the ASRP accepting and complying with such a condition, but
it may be that they have been assured contol of the National Union, or
single legal party, which has been reported to be part of the plan for
Syria under union.
11. It the face of these problems, Nasser will probably seek to keep
the degree of his intervention in Syrian domestic affairs to a minimum
consistent with the security of his position as President of the union.
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Staying out out of Syrian domestic affairs would be possible for Nasser,
however, only if the political and psychological effect of union so
weakens the position and capabilitieS of Am, Bizri, and the Syrian
Communist Party that they decide to cooperate with Nasser and the ASRP
under the union. If, on the other hand the Communists and their allies
decide on an s31.out contest for control of Syria, Nasser and his friends
are likely to have serious internal security problems. The politically
articulate and active part of the Syrian public is likely to go along with
the unionduring a honeymoon period, but it is likely as time passes to
become critical of its leadership and susceptible to efforts of the
opposition to stir it to take hostile action against the group in power.
12. Although extensive Egyptian interference in Syrian affairs
might temporarily stabilize the situation, it is likely in the long run
to lead to friction and instability. Thus, Nasser is likely to become
more and more deeply involved in Syrian affairs and drawn into the use
of more of his powers in an endeavor to maintain control.
13. reactions to The initial impact
upon area opinion of the announcement of Syro.Egyptian union will be to
strengthen the position of the radical Panoarab group and correspondingly
weaken that of the conservative Arab governments. The actual position
and allegiance of very few people is likely to be changed, the radicals
becoming only a bit more confirmed in their radical doctrines and the
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Conservatives perhaps somewhat less certain of themselves and more in.
clined to move in the direction of neutralism. Such a development, how
ever, would only confirm an existing trend which, unless reversed, is
likely to continue to grow.
14. If Syro.Egyptian union 14ere clearly and obviously a success, it
would strengthen the already significant hold of Nasser and the radical
movement upon the majority in the conservative Arab countries. A union
in existence would have a continuing appeal to all Arab nationalists. If,
on the other hand, the union were an obvious failure, if conflict and
dissention broke out between Egyptians and Syrians, and if the position and
interests of the two countries appeared to decline as a result of union,
the prestige of Nasser and t-ie radical Pan.Arab position would suffer
correspondingly,
15. The Conservative Arab Governments: The governments of Saudi
Arabia, Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan would certainly regard effective union
between Syria and Egypt as a serious threat to their position. However,
all will recognize the dangers involved in publically attacking the principle
of unity and all are likely to reaffirm their support for it. They are
all likely to assert that the challenge should be met by an increase in US
assistance and plead for a change in US foreign policy toward Israel and
other issues which make its allies in the area vulnerable to the attacks
of the radical Arab nationalists.
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16. Counter.Unien: King Hussein of Jordanl of all the conservative
leaders, will feel most directly threatened because of his position between
Egypt and Syria and because of the general insecurity of his position in
Jordan. He has already sought to explore the possibility of a union of
the conservative states to counteract the influence of the Syro-Egyptian
union. He has not had an enthusiastic response. King Saud, as an ab.
solute monarch, is opposed to the idea of any sort of union. Lebanon is
unlikely to take risks in the presem situation without strong guarantees
from the US, irag is most likely to consider Husseints proposals favor.
ably, although Iraqi policy has been preoccupied with avoiding entangle.*
ment. King Hussein himself, of course, would probably be cautious about
union with Iraq alone, a situation in which Jordan would almost certainly
be over-shadowed. In any event, any moves toward union which the conser-
.vative rulers might make in order to strengthen their position would pro.
bably be presented as complimentary rather than antagonistic to Egyptian.
Syrian union.
17. The Baghdad Pact: Coming at the time of the Baghdad Pact Con-
ference, the dramatic announcement of Syro -Egyptian union would be likely
to give impetus to already strong, tendencies within the Pact to demand more
affirmative support from the US. Since the union would be regarded as a
force competing with the Pact for regional support, it would have some
initial unsettling effect, anl if it worked out successfully this effect
might be substantial.
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16. The Israeli reaction: The Government of Israel is certainly
gravely concerned by moves toward union of Egypt and Syria. Israel has
several times announced that it would not tolerate such a union and would
use force to prevent it. Under present circumstances, however, it appears
unlikely that the Israelis are prepared to embark on another action similar
to the Sinai invasion of November 1956. They are probably aware that the
union of Egypt and Syria is unlikely soon to increase the military strength
of the two countries. They probably feel that there is at least an even
chance that the union of the two countries will produce political problems
which will actually weaken them. Although they are skeptical of Nasser's
neutralism, they may feel that the increase of Egyptian influence in Syria
will, at least temporarily, reduce the pace of Soviet penetration. We
believe it likely that the Israelis will check the status of military pre-
parations for both defensive and offensive action against the Egyptians
and Syrians, and await developments.
19. The US Position: The Egyptians and their Syrian friends have
taken care to see that the US has from the beginning been given their
versinn of developments within Syrian and of preparations for Syro-Egyptian
union, which emphasized that the issue in Syria was neutralism and Arab
nationalism versus Communism and pro-Soviet policy. Both countries have
made approaches to the US to point out that developments leading to
Syro -Egyptian union were in the interests of the US and urging that the US not
claims to neutralism
interfere. The implication of these approaches has been that Nasser's /
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were being borne out in his actions with regard to Syria, and that the
US should at least not oppose these developments. Although this account
was probably designed to influence the US not to oppose Syrian-Egyptian
union, we believe that it io generally in accord with the facts.
20. The Soviet Position: The Soviet Government was apparently
aware some time ago that Nasser was taking action to reduce General
Pizri's power and that Egypt was entering into the contest between the
pro-Soviet and neutralist groups. There have, however, been no indi-
cations of active Soviet participation in the events leading to agree-
ment on union. They may have chosen to follow a passive course' because
they feel that Azm and Bizri were going too fast and too far in forcing
obligations upon them, because they feel that over the long run Nasser's
type of neutralism will do as much to deny the area to the West and
prepare the ground for Soviet domination as more costly and dangerous
methods, or because they believe that
to encourage radical Arab nationalist
interests throughout the area.
There
Syro-Egyptian union is likely
trends favorable to their general
is evidence that the Egyptians
have sought to represent events in Syria as being in the Soviet interest
and have sought to influence the Soviets to accept Syro-Egyptian union.
It seems likely that the Soviets will soon publicly announce their
support for Syro-Egyptian union.
21. Probable Developments: A precise estimate of the consequences
of Syro-Egyptian union is imposn_ble in advance of the announcement of the
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ANNECT
terms of union. We believe, however, that, as a result of union, Syrian
domestic affairs are likely to come under the control of a coalition of the
ASRP and the military group around Sarraj, and that Nasser will exercise
a kind of veto authority over personnel and policies and dominate Syrian
foreign and defense policy. In many ways, Syria will remain a separate
country. Although the Communist Partys power is likely to be reduced
and the pro...Soviet elements removed from the top echelons of government,
their influence will remain. The country is likely to continue to be
riddled by factionalism. Chances are at least even that there will be serious
conflicts between Syrian and Egyptian leaders within the next year or so.
22, - The Conservative Arab states are unlikely to take effective counter..
action in response to the Syro.Egyptian union. The influence and prestige
of the radical Pan-Arab movement represented by Nasser is likely to increase
throughout the area as a.result of the union at least in the short run.
23. The Soviet Bloc is likely to continue its established approach
to the Arab states. It is unlikeay to withdraw or modify economic or
other support as a result of Syro.EgyPtian union or even as a result of
the demotion of Azm and Dizri or the harassment of the Syrian Communist
Party. It will continue to seek to establish economic control and psychologi.
cal influence over Syria and Egypt and to encourage antagonism tgward the West.
FCR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
Sherman Kent
Assistant Director
National Estimates
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