LIKELY SOVIET REACTION TO VARIOUS FORMS OF PRO-WESTERN INTERVENTION IN SYRIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000400010015-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 8, 2013
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: September 16, 1957
• Content Type: MEMO

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TS #141626-b
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
16 September 1957
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: LIKELY SOVIET REACTION TO VARIOUS FORMS OF
PRO-WESTERN INTERVENTION IN SYRIA
ASSUMPTIONS
A. That military action in the cases considered would be taken
only following provocation by Syria, involving border incidents
or recognizable subversive acts by Syria inside one of the
neighboring states.
B. That Israel does not intervene in the conflict.
JOB NO. 790090i/4
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STAT
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THE GENERAL SOVIET REACTION
1. By its recent warnings against pro-Western intervention
in Syria, especially its latest note to Turkey, the USSR has
adopted a strong public position on this issue. The USSR would
be fearful of the loss to its prestige if a government it openly
supports were overthrown, with the resulting setback to its
newly won position in the Middle East. There is also cause for
concern in Khrushchev's likely sensitivity to any major external
setback so soon after he had consolidated his leadership.
2. We believe, therefore, that forcible pro-Western
intervention in Syria would produce a major international crisis.
The USSR would make great propaganda play of alleged Western
instigation, make threatening military gestures, undertake some
sabotage and subversive actions and promptly send such limited
technical and logistical support to Syria as it could through
available channels. Beyond this, it could choose among three
broad courses of action (not wholly mutually exclusive):
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(1) overt military intervention directly against the states involved;
(2) overt aid to Syria ranging from sending as many Soviet
"volunteers as feasible to flying in Soviet aircraft to operate
from Syrian bases; or (3) attempts to secure immediate UN
and great power intercession to halt the conflict or possibly to
provide justiti cation for subseqUent Soviet intervention.
A key factor in the Soviet choice of countermoves would be
the estimated reaction of the US We do not believe that the USSR
wOuld desire to let the crisis reach such proportions as to involve
grave risks of general war. Zhukov and the Soviet military would
probably advocate caution in this respect. But the Soviet leaders
Would probably believe that their own deterrent capabilities would
enforce similar caution on the Western powers and leave the USSR
considerable maneuverability.
4. The Soviet leaders are well aware that it would be
extremely difficult fpr them to bring substantial forces to bear in
Syria ? overtly or covertly -- without violating the frontiers o
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US and UK allies, with the attendant risks involved. We also
believe that they would be sensitive to the repercussions on their
prestige, their position in the Middle East, and perhaps even more
their position in Eastern Europe if they accepted what appeared to
be a major test of Western-Soviet strengthparticularly one
involving Soviet forces, and then had to back down. Finally, they
would probably estimate that a reverse in Syria would be only
temporary, since Western chances of establishing a stable pro-
Western regime would seem limited at best.
5. In these circumstances we believe that the USSR would see
major advantages in appearing as a peace-loving opponent of
aggression by an immediate appeal to the UN. Whether or not the
intervention was portrayed as being provoked by Syria, the USSR
would label it as clearly Western initiated, and might expect that
the aggressor would be condemned by a substan tial majority in
the UN, particularly the Afro-Asian nations. By acting through the
UN, the USSR. would avoid the risks and difficulties of extensive
military countermoves. Soviet success in getting UN intervention
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would greatly enhance Soviet prestige and inevitably appear as
a defeat for the US. Moreover, by itself playing a major role
in UN or great power intercession, the USSR would help to achieve
one of its major objectives, that of securing a recognized voice
in great power action on Middle Eastern issues.
6. The duration of .the crisis might significantly affect the
Soviet reaction. If the initial intervention were rapidly successful,
the odds against extensive Soviet military support to Syria would be
increased. But if the crisis dragged on and UN action were delayed,
the USSR might step up its support of Syria, especially if growing
world condemnation of the intervention appeared to support this.
However, the USSR's estimate of the likely Western reaction would
remain the key factor in any such Soviet decision.
7. The USSR and Egypt have extensive capabilities for sabotage,
fomenting strikes, and demonstrations, and otherwise stirring up
trouble throughout the Middle East. In particular they and Syria
could extensively disrupt Middle East oil supplies. In event of
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fighting in Syria, the USSR and Egypt would probably carry out
various of these actions. Some interruption of oil movements
would almost certainly occur, and subversive activities in Lebanon,
Jordan, and Iraq would probably be stepped up. Moreover, the
USSR might make threatening gestures outside the Middle East,
as a diversionary action.
CASE A - LIKELY SOVIET REACTION TO INTERVENTION BY
IRAQ ALONE, OR TOGETHER WITH JORDAN AND/OR
LEBANON
8. Unless the Soviet estimate of Iraqi-Lebanese-Jor danian
military capabilities is higher than our own, the USSR would probably
think that they were unlikely to succeed in their designs, and,
with US/UK and Turkish forces not directly involved, it is almost
certain the USSR would not intervene directly. Instead it would
attempt by threats and intimidating military moves to deter
subsequent Turkish or US/UK support to the invaders, and to warn
the states concerned that the USSR might be compelled to intervene if
they did not withdraw.
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9. The USSR would almost certainly press immediately for
prompt UN intervention to enforce a cease fire. It would label the
US, UK and Turkey as being the real behind-the-scenes aggressors,
and seek to make the test of their denials their willingness to
support strong UN action. The USSR would threaten that unless the
UN acted, it might have to intervene. Alternatively, it might call
for great power intervention and mediation with Soviet participation.
10. Meanwhile, to enhance Syrian resistance, the USSR would
strongly urge Egypt to send troops and planes to Syria's support.
Though Soviet aid would be channelled largely through Egypt if
time permitted, some degree of direct Soviet technical and logistical
support to Syria would also be likely. H wever, the USSR probably
would not risk broadening the conflict (at least initially) by sending
in numerous "volunteers". The USSR would employ sea lift, if
feasible, and probably clandestine overflights over Iran and Iraq,
despite their Baghdad Pact status; some overflights of SE Turkey
might be undertaken, but the USSR would seek to limit the risks of
Turkish reaction.
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CASE B - - LIKELY REACTION TO MILITARY INTERVENTION BY
TURKEY ALONE OR TOGETHER WITH THE ABOVE
ARAB STATES ?
11. In our view the USSR would feel compelled to react much
more strongly and immediately in this case, because of the increased
prospects of early Western victory. It would almost certainly adopt
a highly threatening posture, including partial mobilization along
Turkish and perhaps Iranian frontiers.
12. But we believe that the USSR would still see great initial
advantages in diplomatic and UN action for an immediate cease-
fire and withdrawal, In the case of Turkish intervention alone it is
unlikely that any alleged provocation justifying the intervention
would be convincing to the world. In this case the USSR could
expect support from most Afro-Asian States, and many abstentions
from other countries. The Soviets would probably estimate that
a condemnation-withdrawal resolution could be obtaine din a very
few days, unless the US vigorously opposed, and that in this event
the US would be very seriously embarrassed. If the Turks had been
joined by one or more Arab states, the Soviet chances of a majority
would be less but the USSR would still expect a large number of
favorable votes.
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13. We believe the attractions of this course would be such
that the Soviets would almost certainly make it their initial move.
Should they do so, they might continue troop movements and other
threatening gestures, as being likely to promote rapid UN action
rather than the reverse. H wever, the Soviets would probably limit
their military help to Syria, at least during this initial period of
UN consideration, to technical and logistical support. The Soviets
would also encourage active Egyptian support of Syria, as well,
of course, as sabotage and all possible disruption and subversion
in the capitals of any Arab States joining with Turkey.
14. If a UN resckttion brought a halt to the Turkish action, the
USSR would move to participate as actively as possible in the
settlement and to insure a pro-Soviet government. If, on the
other hand, the Turks persisted notwithstanding the UN resolution
and, as is probable, appeared likely to overthrow the present
Syrian government and occupy Damascus, the USSR would be
confronted with the choice between major military action and
acceptance of this result.
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15. If the Soviet leaders considered that the prevailing
climate of opinion would sharply inhibit Western countermoves, and
that Syria could be effectively assisted they might risk sending
"volunteers"; they might ellen risk some overflights of SE Turkey
where Turkish air defenses are weak and the chances of a clash
limited. In fact, the USSR might estimate that such actions would
influence the We stern powers to accept a cease fire. However, we
believe that the USSR would be reluctant to take the risks of
extensive military intervention in Syria. The Soviet leaders,
conscious of their limited capabilities in this connection as com-
pared to those of the ' We stern powers, would regard such inter-
vention as difficult to carry out and of dubious effectiveness against the
Turks. It would also entail substantial risks of US-UK counter-
measures. Finally, if a UN resolution were in existence, large
scale Soviet intervention would be an inappropriate response.
16. As to direct military action against Turkey itself, we
believe that such action would be highly unlikely, but we cannot
e xclude it altogether, especially if the UN were to go on to a
Korea - type resolution calling for action by member states to
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defeat the "aggression". We believe that, in the absence of
contrary indications, the USSR would probably believe that a Soviet
attack on Turkey would be taken by the US as invoking NATO
obligations, and hence would create grave risk of general war;
even if the Soviet action were under a UN resolution, the Soviets
would probably regard the risk as substantial. Moreover, in
deciding whether to accept this risk, the Soviets would probably
calculate that the Turkish success would be short-lived. Even if
Turkey had been joined by one or more Arab states, the USSR would
expect a widespread Arab reaction against Turkey (and the US as its
apparent sponsor), which could subsequently be turned to major
Soviet advantage in the Middle East. Hence, despite some short-
term loss of prestige, the Soviets would not consider themselves
confronted with a serious lasting setback.
17. While the above reasoning seems to us to weigh heavily
against any Soviet resort to direct military action, we repeat that
we cannot exclude such action wholly, having in mind particularly
Khrushchev's personal stake in avoiding even a short-term personal
defeat. - 11 -
E.
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,
CASE C - LIKELY SOVIET REACTION IN THE ABOVE CONTINGENCIES
CONTINGENCIES IF THE US AND UK GAVE
SIGNIFICANT LOGISTICAL SUPPORT
18. Since the USSR would regard any intervention in Syria
as being US/UK instigated and supported, we believe that it would
expect further significant US/UK aid to Turkey and/or its Arab
partners once the intervention had begun. Assuming that such aid
was demonstratable, the USSR would use it to back up its diplomatic
and propaganda efforts to label the Western powers as the real
aggressors and to secure UN intervession.
19. The USSR might also regard such overt US/UK aid as
permitting the USSR to justify publicly similar Soviet support of
Syria, in more open fashion than otherwise. It might resort to such
open assistance as sendinevolunteers", or Soiriet planes and pilots to
operate from Syrian bases. On the other hand the fact of such
US/UK support would be additional evidence of their
determination and might reinforce Soviet caution. On balance
we consider that the USSR probably would remain unwilling to
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CRET
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v-1-31
take the risks of extensive military counteraction for the
reasons given in Case B above.
CASE D- LIKELY SOVIET REACTION IF LARGE SCALE SOVIET
EMPLOYMENT OF VOLUNTEERS, FOLLOWING TURKISH
INTERVENTION IN SYRIA, LED TO US/UK OR POSSIBLY
NATO INTERVENTION IN SUPPORT OF TURKEY
20. By this time the crisis would already have reached a stage
of acute tension; the initial series of moves and countermoves would
have resulted in a direct confrontation of Soviet and Western forces
involving grave risk of miscalculation leading to general war. The
immediate issues in Syria would be overshadowed by great power
maneuvering on a broader scale.
21. If the USSR had already gone as far as to send numerous
"volunteers" to Syria it would mean either that the USSR had been
confident that doing so would not lead to such strong Western counter-
moves or that it was willing to take such a risk. In either event the
momentum of the crisis would have carried the USSR to a point where
backing down would be very difficult. But by this time, unless other
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factors emerged to affect their estimate, we believe the Soviet
leaders would see grave risks of general war in the light of
demonstrated US/UK or NATO unwillingness to retreat Three
billed alternatives would be open to the USSR: (1) to initiate general
war; (2) to continue the local conflict, presumably at a serious
disadvantage, or to attempt to broaden.ttby other local actions; or
(3) to seek a way out through such means as a cease fire, UN
mediation, or a great power conference.
22. We believe that if the USSR had not become engaged to a
greater extent than a large scale volunteer force and some overflights,
it would seek to avoid general war. Despite the loss to its prestige if
it appeared to back down, the USSR might even see considerable
advantages in being the power which proposed a peaceful solution to
the impasse.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
SHERMAN KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates
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