TURKISH AND SOVIET INTENTIONS IN SYRIAN CRISIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000400010006-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 8, 2013
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: November 4, 1957
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMO FOR THE DCI
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REVIEWER: 018645)
1 V.
TS #141653 STAT
1November 1957
THIMELAND SOVIET INTENTIONS IN SYRIAN CRISIS
I. TURKISH INTENTIONS WITH REGARD TO SYRIA
1. The Turks are genuinely alarmed by developments in Syria and
are probably convinced that if the present coalition government is left
undisturbed, Syria will in time come tinder Soviet control. Such a
development would be interpreted as a direct threat to Turkish ter-
ritorial integrity and independent association with the Free World.
Unlike the conservative Arab states, Turkey probably holds no hope that
the Syrian situation will be changed from within. Consequently, it
tends to be action-minded in its search for a solution to the Syrian
problem.
2. This outlook has been expressed in mobilization of Turkish
forces on the Syrian border. The mobilization was probably intended to:
a. Stimulate US and NATO concern over developments in Syria
and ensure a major role for Turkey in Free World reaction;
b. Impress on the conservative Arab states which oppose
the Syrian coalition and on the coalition leaders themselves
Turkey's powerful potential for affecting developments in the
Arab world;
Istailkw@e
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c. Place Turkish military forces in a position where, if
conflict did break out in the area, they would be in a position
to employ their capabilities most effectively.
The mobilization may also have been aimed at:
O. Improving the Government's chances in the 29 October
general election, and
e. Obtaining additional US military assistance as a result
of the critical situation.
3. We believe it unlikely that the Turks would have at any point
in the crisis,orwould now seek to invade Syria without US approval
and support. They would be unlikely to risk their relations with
the US and with NATO in so uncertain a venture. Furthermore, we
believe for the following reasons that it is unlikely that the Turks
would now invade Syria even if they were confident of the subsequent
backing of the US:
a. Fear of Soviet military action against Turkey stimulated
and intensified by Soviet pullic and official statements;
b. Indications of the unwillingness, as well as of the
inability of the conservative Arab states to assist effectively
in a move to re-establish a conservative government in Syria;
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c. Poor prospects for political success due to the conservative
Arab states reluctance and probable inability to render necessary
assistance.
4. The danger of a border clash expanding into a major armed
conflict is not now great. The Syrians have armed civilians in the
border areas but few troops there. The Turks can and probably will
keep tight control over their forces. Moreover, world attention is
focussed on the area and the UM is formally seized of the Syrian
situation.
5. Danger of conflict will remain, however, as long as developments
within Syria continue to cause Turkey concern. The danger may in fact
increase after several months as world attention shifts to other
"crisis" areas. Thus, some months hence, the Turks might, if they
deemed the circumstances to be especially favorable, reopen with the US
the question of action against Syria, or possibly even choose to
interpret past,US assurances of support in the event of aggression by
Syria as authority to provoke or fabricate such an aggression.
B. Probable Soviet Reactions. in the Syrian Crisis
6. We believe that the USSR's strong stand in this matter is due
to a desire to forestall a Turkish invasion of Syria. A Turkish
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invasions by forcing the USSR either to accept the possible downfall of
the Syrian regime or to respond with interventions which risked US
counteraction against the USSR itself, would present a choice so
painful that the USSR would almost certainly prefer not to be confronted
with it.
7. The concurrence of a threatening Soviet posture towards
Turkey and the demotion of Zhukov raises the possibility that Soviet
policy in the Syrian crisis may be affected by his ouster or have been
one of the issues involved. We think this unlikelyj since domestic
issues appear to be the cause of recent Kremlin developments. The
proposition that Zhukovj keenly aware of US capabilities, had opposed
a risky course in the Middle East may be true, but it rests entirely
upon presumption, and evidence is lacking. In factj Zhukov added his
voice to the campaign of intimidating Turkey and demonstrating Soviet
support for Syria at a time when the USSRes general propaganda attack
had already begun to diminish. If his demotion affects Soviet policy
on this matter at all, its effect might well be restraining, since
Khrushchev may have felt it necessary to modify temporarily a Middle
Eastern policy which was disturbing to other Soviet leaders in order
to gain their support against Zhukov. This effect would not apply to
a later recurrence of the crisis, in which Khrushchevls boldnessj
less fettered thantefore by his colleagues, might become an important
factor.
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Probable Soviet Reaction to a Lessening of the Crisis.
8. During the caning weeks, the military tension along the
Turkish-Syrian border may abate and this factor, in combination with UN
action and Turkish reassurances, may indicate that the chances of an
invasion have lessened considerably. Indeed, recent posture of Soviet
leaders suggests that the USSR will not seek to maintain an atmosphere
of crisis. The Soviet leaders would probably estimate that, under
these circumstances, continued Soviet charges of imminent aggression
would lose their plausibility and compromise the USSR's pose as a dis-
interested defender of the Arab underdog. Instead, the USSR would
probably allow the crisis to subside and attempt to capitalize upon
this outcome by claiming that its protection had saved the Syrian
regime.
Probable Soviet Reaction to Turkish Intervention.
9. The USSR's repeated warnings against Turkish intervention in
Syria and declarations that it would support Syria make it extremely
likely that it will feel compelled to react strongly in some form to
such intervention, lthough it has carefully avoided openly committing
itself to any particular course of action. The USSR would be
reluctant to accept the loss to its prestige which would occur if
a government it openly supports were overthrown. It would be even more
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concerned over the resulting setback to its newly won position in the
Middle East and the corresponding strengthening of the US position
in that area.
10. We believe, therefore, that armed Turkish intervention against
the Syrian government would produce a major international crisis. The
USSR would adopt a highly threatening posture, probably including threat-
ening military gestures along the Turkish frontiers and in the Black
Sea. It would continue to make great propaganda play of alleged Western
instigation. In addition, it would almost certainly promote sabotage
and subversive actions, and send such additional technical and logistical
support to Syria as it could through available channels. Beyond this,
it could choose among three broad courses of action (not wholly
mutually exclusive): (1) overt military action by Soviet forces
directly against Turkey; (2) such assistance to Syria as sending Bloc
"volunteers" and/or air attacks on Turkish forces in Syria, perhaps by
Soviet aircraft and pilots flown in to operate from Syrian bases; or
(3) attempts to secure immediate UN or great power action to halt the
conflict or possibly to provide justification for subsequent Soviet
armed. intervention.
11. A key factor in the USSRts choice of countermoves would be its
estimate of the US reaction. We do not believe that the USSR would
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desire to let the crisis reach such proportions as to involve grave
risks of general war. But the Soviet leaders would probably believe
that their own deterrent capabilities as well as other factors would
also induce caution on the part of the Western powers and leave the
USSR considerable maneuverability. However) the Soviet leaders are
also well aware that it would be extremely difficult for them to bring
substantial Soviet forces to bear in Syria quickly without violating the
frontiers of US and UK allies, and thereby incurring risks of direct
conflict with US and NATO forces. We believe that the Soviets would
be reluctant to takd these risks unless they were ccnfident that the
US and UK would not react with armed force, and they probably vould
not be confident in this regard. While the Soviet leaders may redard
their recent announced launching of ICBM test vehicles and an earth
satellite, together with their belligerent statements, as reinforcing
the inhibitions on Western military counteraction, we believe that
they are also impressed with the announced US determination to support
Turkey. We do not believe that they would estimate that their successes
have significantly changed US intentions in event of a Soviet attack
on Turkey.
12. In these circumstances we believe that the USSR would see
major advantages in appearing as a peace-loving opponent of aggression
by an immediate appeal to the UN. In urging Syria to bring the threat
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of Turkish attack before the UN, the USSR has already shown its
readiness to use the UN on the Syrian issue. Whether or not the
intervention was provoked by Syria, the USSR would label it as Western -
initiated, and would expect that it would be viewed as aggression by
a substantial number of UN members particularly among the Afro-Asian
nations. By acting through the UN,. the USSR would avoid the risks and
difficulties of extensive military countermoves as well as the possible
political disadvantages resulting from the appearance of Soviet forces
in the Middle East. Soviet success in getting UN intervention would
greatly enhance Soviet prestige and inevitably appear as a defeat for
the US; the USSR would consider that the US could not oppose UN action
without very serious embarrassment. Moreover, by itself playing a major
role in UN or great power intercession, the USSR would help to achieve
one of its major objectives, that of securing a recognized voice in
great power action on Middle Eastern issues.
l3, We believe the attractions of this course would be such that
the Soviets would almost certainly make it their initial move. Should
they do so, they would almost certainly continue to make threatening
gestures, as being likely to promote rapid UN action rather than the
reverse. However, the Soviets would probably limit their military
help to Syria, at least during this initial period of UN consideration,
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to technical and logistical support. The Soviets would also encourage
active Egyptian support of Syria, as well as sabotage, disruption and
subversion in any Arab States joining with Turkey.
14. If a UN resolution brought a halt to the Turkish action, the
USSR would move to participate as actively as possible in the settlement
and to insure a pro-Soviet government. If, on the other hand, there
were no UN resolution or if the Turks persisted notwithstanding a UN
resolution and, as is probable, appeared likely to overthrow the
present Syrian government and to occupy Damascus, the USSR would be
confronted with the choice between major military action and acceptance
of this result.
15. Especially if the Soviet leaders considered that the prevaiing
climate of opinion would inhibit Western countermoves, they might send
a token force of "volunteers;" they might risk some ozialiAtz. of
-Iran. and Iran
are we-at and the chances of a clash limited. They might also under-
or even of Southeast Turkey, where Turkish air defenses
take air attacks against Turkish forces in Syria. In fact, the USSR
might estimate that such actions would influence the Western powers to
accept a cease fire. However, we believe that the USSR would be unlikely
to try to oppose Turkish forces by large scale use of Soviet aircraft
or ground forces -- vrlunteer or regular -- in Syria. The Soviet
leaders would probably regard such intervention as difficult to carry
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out on a scale large enough to be effective against the Turks without
entailing substantial risks of US countermeasures. Finally, if a UN
resolution were in existence, large scale Soviet intervention would
be an inappropriate response unless specifically authorized by the
resolution. &ftiimali41014milaw
enough to avoid provoking Western count?rmactVni, believing that such
token assistance, even if ective, would be preferable to the loss
of prestige 4t dant upen sending none at all in the face of imminent
16. As to direct military action against Turkey itself, we
believe that such action would be unlikely, though we cannot exclude it
altogether. We believe that, given the explicit US warnings in this regard,
the USSR would probably believe that a Soviet attack on Turkey would be
taken by the US as involking NATO obligations, and hence would create
US counter-action against the USSR itself, with the attendant risk of
grave risk of/general war. Moreover, in evaluating the alternatives to
accepting this risk, the USSR would expect a widespread popular Arab
reaction against Turkey (and against the US as Turkey's apparent
sponsor), which could subsequently be turned to major Soviet advantage
in the Middle East.
17. While the above reasoning seems to us to make unlikely any
Soviet resort to direct military action against Turkey itself, or the
large scale commitment of forces within Syria, we cannot tholly exclude
10 .0
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the possibility of such action, having in mind the possible Soviet
belief that the US would not in the last analysis accept grave risk
of general war. Moreover, even if the Soviets neither attacked Turkey
nor sent forces on a large scale to Syria, it is possible that they
would take a series of actions with respect to Syria, and on the borders
of Turkey, which would nevertheless involve risk of miscalculations
leading to broadening of the conflict.
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