STUDY ENTITLED: SSN UNITS IN THE GSFG
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80T00246A067500440001-4
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
12
Document Creation Date:
December 27, 2016
Document Release Date:
March 26, 2013
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
April 30, 1963
Content Type:
REPORT
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
50X1-HUM
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title
18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
COUNTRY East Germany
SUBJECT Study Entitled: SSM
Units in the GSFG
REPORTI
DATE DISTR. 30 NO. PAGES 1
REFERENCES
DATE OF
INFO.
PLACE &
DATE ACQ.
comprising 16-pages
o-surface .ssi
Soviet Forces in Germany)
a study
urrace
(Group o
2. The study consists of a detailed analysis of a large
number of individual pieces of information in an .
attempt to form an over-all picture of the status of
SSM's and SSM units in the GSFG.
The study concludes that over the years since 1957,
the introduction of operational/tactical missiles of
.the light, medium and heavy types into the GSFG has
increased to a point during 1962 where SSM troop units
have become an integral part of the GSFG in the armies
and probably also in the divisions.
The over-all level of intelligence re-
5
4
3
2
1
STATE
X ARMY
#X I NAVY I X I AIR I X I NSA
1 `f
1I
ORR
JCS x
50X1-HUM-
fleeted in this study is not current. The study contains
the early Soviet tactical missile organization which was
believed to have been in effect during the period of 1958-=50X1-HUM
Distribution of Attachments
DIA
O
SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/26: CIA-RDP80T00246AO67500440001-4
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-IiAr
ND FQISI0N DIBSOIIA?ION
13 March 1963
s ACi iO iM3Pftiiclt IGAMA OBI?D IN 7 li GOER!
This st dy ocsomras itself with the important qusstlorr of tills
presence of surfs.-to-surfsos missile units in the GSYO.
We emphasise that thew ohservatioms of missiles do not
permit it is be dedused abet2str they are prsatic.-e=eroiss missiles
or missiles with actual war beads. Oar efforts wets esolnalvely
directed towards detsrsint3 that missile units were being assisned
within the GM.
The study repress to an attaspt to fors an overall piolrre
from the lone moiler of imiividua l pieces of information available.
This result is sR,1U isr.@r&3A* ri ass am1,T be evalmatod as an
intermediate, mad pe~sliaiarry study.
Organization of the stems
Part I - mtrtto ru ff srt+ssil, awls
SECRET,
1. Introduatiao of auifas.-to-surface missiles
into the am sins. 1957. 1-3)
2. Idamtifisstiam of .1 41. s and their lseatiam.
(*=be" k-5) O
3. ?actieal missile rsgimsatso and heavy missile.eetiass.
(&=bar 6)
4. al &&or and organisation of wart sd04l0 10118-
(llumb a a T-9)
5. Rvaln:tiaet. DIM* r 10)
tart Xl - ?echaieal
(will be given at a loth data)
2-9-c-t-19-T
10 01IIMM D L ATICM
No CAMMIM" IM
AaR "Plum
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/26: CIA-RDP80TOO246AO67500440001-4
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8-B-C-R-E-T
NO POM01i NATION
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V WWI= MW UNIT' IN TAR am
AgmA Z
1. The !lest reports of egnipmwt indloating missiles in the
O3}a emir" in 1957. These obssrvatians conosrned. principally the
area of the rrghth Oaards Arsy, and to a lesser degree, other areas
of the insist Zone of Ocoupetien. At that time the equipment could
not be clearly identified. It was later indicated however, that (the
equip rat observed) was probably surface-tee-aarfa a missiles, 1cb
at that deer mere introduced into the OM, probably to a limited
'!is descriptions indicated that the first observations
ware of the viers types of the 33-2 (the 101 and 102 WMMI
improved and further developed models of the former Oerman A-4),
and in the WSUMI g of 1958, the PROG type missile. U ii le the
&3-2 mss pr lsbly available in the USSR long before this time
(assumed to be the first !filly operati emal. tactical missile).
The 7= 1, ems first displayed to the publle during the November 1%7
Rocoow parsds. in the basis of reports, it is believed that FROG
aianiles eeuld have been introduced into G370 at approximately this time.
We have insufficient information available to indicate the
of 8/3 missiles available in the GM during the g*neral period
1957,'$, or the nature of their organisation.
2. Reeporta regarding obserratices of 3/8 missiles increased in
the .are after 1959. In these reports, t2.a chassis described was
~sTtlvalarly often the VT-T6. his means that the objects observed
were probably the 8/8 missile FROG-2, which was also displayed for the
first time at the 1957 Moscow parade, but probably not until later
introduced Into tactical (operational) units. The effective ramie of
thin weapcn (approximately 30 La.) does not speak for the direct
rtb rd1 nati on (of PROD =Its) below G.SFO (level); however, wain in 1959
iesufflolent information was available to permit an analysis of the
or&vdzation and subordination at the 8/S missiles In the MO.
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_3-
1, 19600 developed a ~, alt partiearlar]y is 1961, areas, and later garrisozss,
develop. The m aiabers, where 8/S 0118411" could be
Indicated, +Rddltion to the ~ 1,1, the SCUD vvsss in the o=) ~ ~, that the
'RW 3/4, wbir is believed to brave nr1960 a the
nal in 1960 and d tbt~-
fare poiaibls for it to be b:"ougbt ~` into the OW. OW.
3. In 1961- the frsaueaay of obo*rvatiosis regaxdjag SIS sisailos
appeared to justify the asauuQtion that a 1a3ge auaber of S/S also,,*
units wets atatia"d in tyre sesde. It wan assuimed that the units uses
subordt4atod to the OSK, and the ar;1ss respectively, In Approxiarrie)7
R. ;t. strery-tine Ssrly in 1962, a large maiber of obsarvationg iadisatad
'-he possibility that $/8 sisaile units were psr'tieipatir in C,sFG t=em
ransuvsrs. This was Mrtloularly true for the maneuvere in Marab, .%s,
and ? tl.y of 1962. It could be coasluded frm this, that the .inasryoratlen
of S/d mdaai" units was advanced to the paint that ?otrtt ?x*raise betwwm
this wsyss and other troop .lementa was possible and nscsssary.
Ali*, during the oeurse of 1962, the rwaadng of the
Artlllee7 bsops in?the Assdq artsrs of the GM, to "Chief of K*CbW
Larilef
rr ? and Artillery tool[ 'lass. Mr **Am devela
the Unfit ^tLttary distrista, and after a abort Use* In the dr in
MM; hu.,ss'not in the divisions. ? ?~M at the
4? All garrison of the 0810, "here sh ills were uuspr=Oted, we&
chAmtesl m. Am far as pond ble, the rsmber and types of S/a al ash 1M
Webs to be detarsined, is older that a determination at number and
a i na :.i on could be node.
For this
were ^rr;,~+aL+? but aLi~,try~t ~~ lL~serse and ift2
z~e
rf V.0- ?a arts available oooasias?dian error faetorcwhi vxr- ii h er, asa
at :*&a t, ;.wtja1l1- oas- omastad for by the large rans..r or r,epd rte.
s
ch oy t hers.lvee appsarsd hL01y is probebl u were consi dared in a XqpW
n4jr 09il7 in assooiati aft with other in!os
.~. ;.a rte' Sri th t~ !~ o~~. mall a-. Our ma got
- )r xrr a iiainat.d. +agencl so . %d r gtW4*Wr Sour*" of
i t lust j hawse., be swhasis.d. that up to Ibis tine we are
41 ? `? any things, blab to proof of the well fy 4md&g ATM'
;,57O) Sad the 1006004%7 for further effort, to
e,R trot c ; this iwportaet wsras. sLnri all
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/26: CIA-RDP80TOO246AO67500440001-4
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s MN ~a-MO M ew
5 ? in 1ass.ttsatiot ru.ald.
a. 2hst with Pratt p.rbatrility, a/s .Mailss are
.+*tlosed is mm the. 30 pt?rriss.s if the GUS. (a? inelasurs 1)
A]1 of thewo aa'rinrm MV idsntieal with those in
shieh ether troop 22M are staLiasrd. olds doss net .chid: the
possiMUty that 1 .L..11. tits semi sot be statise.d in other
parts of 010 av.ist Ze.le.
b. d/3 missiles :sour in prat.: aatbere in the southern
prat of Soviet Sam the. is the northers part.
o. 9rtionlarly 1962 on. $/3 stand lea of the typo
F40 2-4 wrs frepsntly seen teg?tbor with resist wsaposo of the
type 01 20 s^d/er !M 28. A clear sdonti fleatias is these case. one
not a1MW rises::! 1.
Thre obeervatiar sewers set only garrison obeorvrtims
but a1M .serve/ reverts at sits awl" to and ftse raedwr aetiwillss.
Is tsar .sear. * simile vats. r..st ..sta. and other troop Z ins U.
statics" is the satn g a'rtse.a.
d. lilt le the Sarni m and hi llet area oiecrrati oars p.raittsd
roosadt i on of the vsr i swm typos, with a high pr.babi 12 to of accuracy, tho
now aaouramy .rind net be sbtaLad is the case of rail movements in wiAlei
siasiles were sus oetsd. Is sort sass:, these sovemeats only We an
isdisail of the paaills steer.* aid the area into which they were being
delivered.
e. Lt the saws at seamy obserratieas in wrhish wisalles wore
asnppeted, id.atiftcatiou of the Missile was possible only 1a ezosptiosal
er6*8. Most of the reporta worto of .agorae'-oovsr d. par to d
ok*ais, on I- or 2-sal* tr il.r., pulled by a prise aver or trickk, a"
ss,.,.,c*.spaniod by several vshiale. Thdecor tpti ns iYWdea4ed, however, the
possi bl it ty of 11/6 mails 8" or -3. Those were, har..wwr, tee nsq
reports for the.. to be Mie.ilw jJILI& but probably ad.&s tre..pert,
or Supply vehicles.
a
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~-i-C-#-S-T
la pma_ aael~aiA is
_5-
MIS apereed part! eslarly prsbabl. ?has the tivegarta
,.:,rota to the diretira of a knera or sasUMad aneuaiti? Lahr (&0140-
storage area) or is the direstion at traiaiag arena, which was the ass*
in wet of the observatiess.
f. Oarrieu in tdsish am positions or malts Mere 1nnown or
ea swmed to be. Were airs da~toerdaed. in several Na... to be the
.coeaties of 1 missile alts. This fact requires sostirniaa because
transparts observed near these stations ewld be either SAM, or 3/3
t eat les. !e greatest peebshility for the pareses es of 3/3 sisal lee
p'a06 or acs f ps was ladiested bus an as arato deesripti os of a
,scissile an a that ebaris.
d. It tss sot possible in easy garrisons to soeurately
di f: ereotiatDe bet M fluid am aM missiles. Is these case. 8/3
sisallee+ at tr WAD taps were asuneed, bseassse it is srdt probable
that ssi a lams s umber of am we is the soviet Zags. The psesonse
of aM hero =A there is set to be tisoamdad, however.
6. 7!s remelts of the investigaties, together with the facts
Meted roachr sorer 3. and the evaImatios of deserters' reports, as tell
as ether isOorsaties in 1962, pesatts the folloaiag ob 'vationrs
A. Aceondias to reliable information, the Soviets dlffereatiato
b.tteos ti t, ssdtuse and 1 y 'opsrstlesal?tastieal alasilea".
It is ssiu.sd, that$
F= 1-4 belonts to the liskt sIsalle group.
SM A & I (22-1) beloss to the sodium missiles.
33-2 to ia-3 beleet to the heavy s ashes.
b. It is 9ert that the OM aver ~ ts Of
tLaedima had NM ~)?
They ass aetpesiaod into &sgisasts and Metier
At least 2 to are subordinated to tier . probably.
however, several regiments of 1WIt type missiles.
At least acs sisatl. &St. to each arr.
The desi p*ti an *llMtis.l Asst l e iiegi mente loo been proves]
how..: rir, it !a not tear whether .I1 stela .gimsnts carry We designation.
The .; . ,,.::.natlan under the thief of the Undo Troops and Arttllory for the
owl +; 4oev is regarded an probable.
as - sa~tr~tca
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t-s-C-#-I-!
-6?
s. OM idle seetioar are statimsd in the division arse.
'Tar i-POW! iea tats 7 di?isisw and a boediastim to the " CAist at
Artillsrfw appeele prababt boom0 ty has not been prooraft? With the
dada isa '> 7 dsdle awtlera it is not believed that they all
lee at the d8-I tipss but awe liltsly a heat' N nit.* This pr bB Y
has it. bets in the fast lost althea, a !!M sdadls is rsiarded as a
'ate adril.e. for a divisim it amid be a %eavy rffit (when eel
to t I other fire !area).
d. Althooa% at least on garri eon in every di vi s1 an assa I1rrt
be award to have 9/i adsd la units, mod <hOU4gh other info, tImW
spesb for the fast that these &A units balm& to the dlviaioa, the
poeeibilltr esgp't be esal sd that this is a coincidental or an idasRiesis1
stattentt* of S2401sets of the a w a missile Resit, a hl oh could rapa'eesnt
a taetianl distribution or the possible future aubordiaatim.
f. T!r that of mw jawk dam at si.ssilas of tY -
7t1M age t LOM&WO or t- - *O/15 tppis. srbr it appear paaatbls
that bed ae+ooe was plassI in a adzed nit 1a the passe of the seats
Low maw Ilion in each Division prat up to now.
This unit would therefore have WOMPona with a :?ar49e of
beftem 20 and 65 tlloanters. The 3dviisrisaaeo Commmadvre edhauor tee- aalvift
~. smal the sears with shish th+a can ps'
ateia fire, whose sass&verability is considered ?ery good.
The mober avA orgaaisatian of the S/d units wit . i l es and
tiviiions are not yet eat rely clear. Prow the aforenaant:onmi osservaUom
cult' a prommand organisation ssm be used which late- will nod t9 bWr
m1pplesmted or soifirmsd.
As a bests for this a-sls, the 3/5 rtiseilss obaerws in
garrisons were used aeesrdim to amber 1i pr+ suaabl+e t pee.
a. The nadmer at COQ reported from 1adiv11ra1 Sarriaam rr
t otweena 2 and 6s howevers tb s was a predad s of statmaalta of
between 4 and 6.
Csas14origg the tarsi that the report pirtnr? sheMd 2 MG
quite oftezu it is swami that this dmltQ ~tarbattt74 = MW or of 3
A 3retisra os'n14 mat
$att*' t se of 6 x ?AQ?.
a-04 errs
a you=
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-7-
If it L *NWiIu 4 thAt the OBOUTY hissils 8eotisn"
also has Rod?et Laisbats? OM a probable orgs isatiaes of two Hatt+riss
of MG and 1 to 2 ftftwj" of aoaket Lis sea0^s sere probable
when twits a00W at tb* SWUM M so that t x P! Der *Heavy
l tssi be a.etisa an assspt.ac
b. L a few iarrisnes of the GM , observatime shoed a
lerge a0m6er Of 3/1 sissiles. The 6bsrrvatice00s flustuated between 8 and
1% often W1!5 81 aissilset were mentioned. Th. dsareriptiars indicated
3/8 etisoeilss of the P O types however, in smaller seeaebers ' " (38.1)
was isdie.tsd.
RA-sa thflRf~l the st as to Maber are in variances,
It snot be rid that this deal with larger troop units as with a
Ltvisieet, beese0rs the amber reported code eawpsrstirsly higher.
It seers plsnsibla that this davit with Rook** 1egias0le