4. REFERRING TO PRESIDENT'S REMARKS ON RECOGNITION OF EAST GERMANY, TITO SAID HE WISHED TO CLARIFY CERTAIN POINTS.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-00036R001000160025-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2013
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: December 6, 1957
• Content Type: CABLE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/02/10: CIA-RDP83-00036R001000160025-9
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FROM: CABLE
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DATE
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Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.
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FORM NO. ---
JAN I 947 Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/02/10: CIA-RDP83-00036R001000160025-9
( 40 )
Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/02/10: CIA-RDP83-00036R001000160025:9
it1G TELEGRAM Department of State
39
Action
EUR
Info
RMR
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SP
INR
SECRET
FROM: Belgrade .
TO: Se retary of State
NO: 934 December 6, 6 p.m. (SECTION TWO OF THREE)
T, c4 6 erwit. IL!".
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4. Referring to Pr sident's remarks on recognition of East .!jap
Germany, Tito said h wished to clarify certain points. His
Control:
Rec'd:
3976
December 6, 1957
6:22 p.m.
corcro:
ripte
LIMIT DISTRIBI ION
PASS WHITE HOUSE
action was not hasty o
air for over a year.
not been for Soviet atta
It was not planned as move
Adenauer nor, as had been s
of deal between him and Khrus
continuation of independert fo
principles long enunciaf,i.d. Unt
Yugoslavia could not have free na
East European states and its influe
would ask us to realize that it was
given Yugoslavia's middle position an
as based upon principle that way must b
great issues between blocs. I inquired
imp.?___:.4,9,..laS.12.m.sLa_v2252y2p1./12.1 could t4
of other div untries such as Korea, C
na if his principles imp
fact o lowed by attempts to final solution.
that query, wit me help from Foreign Secreta
ill-considered and had been in the
would have been done sooner had it --------
s early in 1957 against Yugoslavia-:- _
to make things more difficult for----
gested in Western press, result
chev. It represented logical
ign policy based upon
1 recognition was Accorded
in its relations with
ce would diminish. He
gical development
should be accepted
foUnd to settle
these principles
na and Indo-
sitallaniSTOf
to got out of:
, by some-
replfto general e on of East
Germany was decided on its merits lone and repres ted?
7iiOsitive" step. Yugoslav decision-was based on its own
appraisal and recognition of other countries would ha
be similarly decided as Yugoslavia did not want to "sub
pate its foreign policy to bloc consideratipns" (Whateve
that may mean).
, -
liseiflari?sfurther
BLE FOR, IWIITAINING
O DFASI3*?I011 OR
."?();,e-TY1O-WIN A.dCORDANCE
1_ji, 13A-.' 1957
clarification
of Yugoslav position
vis-a-vis UNLESS "UNCLA
REPRODUCTION FR
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-2- 934, December 6, 6 p.m. (SECTION TWO OF THREE) from Belgrade
vis-,a-vis US and USSR, following emerged. When I commented upon
increasingly hard line of Soviet policy (Gromyko press conference,
-note on N.E. to US and declarations at launching of satellite),
Tito said he is convinced present Soviet declarations do not
represent long-term intentions. He said West should not react
so sharp'ly' to Soviet declarations and remarked some of our
Generals indulged in bellicose speeches as well. We should by
now be accustomed to sharp speeches and lotibecome too alarmed.
I recalled that circumstances should not be overlooked when-
aggresive declarations were made, attended as they were by
fall of Zhukov. Tito replied he was convinced Zhukaes fall
was not result of foreign policy considerations but was purely
internal. I asked him how he interpreted removal of Zhukov to
which he replied it was internal matter and therefore he could
not properly comment. He would say, however, that West should
deal "with whole complex of Soviet policies" and not worry too
much about personalities. I said given type of government in
USSR this was not so simple as our experience withviolated
agreements fully demonstrated. Tito did not deny this but said
he was still convinced process of liberalization in Soviet Union
will continue. Russian pecple expect and await such development
and pressure for it will continue. It would be wrong to assume
that Soviet foreign poli?,7 is purely matter of internal develop-
ments and personalities. It represents foreign policy of power-
ful Socialist country developed as result of many interests.
VH:HC/7
SECRET
RIDDLEBERGER
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1957
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FORM NO.
JAN 1 947 Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/02/10: CIA-RDP83-00036R001000160025-9
(40)
Declassified and Approved For Release 2014/02/10: CIA-RDP83-00036R001000160025-9
ICNG TELEGRAM Department of State
39
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EUR
Info
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INR
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SECRET
FRO elgrade
TO S retary of State
NO: 934,
Pcl
Control: 4052
Reed: December 6, 1957
9:35 p.m.
ecember 6,-6 p.m. (SECTION THREE OF THREE
LIMIT DISTRIB 4 ON
PASS WHITE HOUSE
Animmafts...1.
6. I said we hid p0
party declaration in
repudiate some earlier
Declaration of 1955 and.
Tito had signed. Tito sa
Manifesto in Moscow could r
had not signed. Too many co
drawn from speculation in West
to positions it had enunciated
Party Manifesto that there were
between it and USSR. Perspectives
somber, Tito said, caught as it is be
thought basic principles of Yugoslav
seeking as.iit does a relaxation of tens
Failure tc make progress on disarmament
kHi-
- ad West shown more confidence in Khrus4c
ght have been different.. He thought.pres
ituation was extremely dangerous and hoped
renewed efforts to reach agreement with USSR.
COPY TO:
At '
CM TG
ibly seen reflection of this in recent.,.
scow
scow which, however, seemed to ?????????????ms
ostulatea embodied in Belgrade
scow Declaration of 1956 which
anyone who read recent Party
dily see why Yugoslav delegation
luaions, however, should not be
press. Yugoslavia stuck
though it was clear from
ferences of principle
or Yugoslavia are
een two blocs. He
reign policy,
on, were right.
s discouraging.
v earlier things
t ilicernational
at would make
ugoslavia
would continue to work for solution on. basis of ts inde-
penbent judgment and will continue its efforts to ve good
reltations with both blocs. CP Manifesto should no be over-
i.
dramatized and it will take time for process in Sovi t
clef_
Union to become manifest.
'T..,7f Returning to question mf Ut-Yugoslav relations Tito
lhe. hoped economic relations could continue as before. He
x.eealled hope he expressed last year that eventually he cou
Aget away from grants and more toward credit and loan basis.
Be said Yugoslav Government intends, to do everything it
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lIITTLI OC.21"-aR1 ?11 12 Alin. 1C1=r1
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-2- 934, December 6, 6 p.m. (SECTION THREE OF THREE) from Belgrade
can to intensify agricultural production so that it will
not perpetually ask for grant aid. He was hopeful that
within several years our economic relations would be on
an expanded but altered basis which would make it easier
for both.
8. Comment and recommendations will follow shortly.
VH:OES/10
SECRET
RIDDLEBERGER
S
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10
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1957
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