THE BUDGETARY COST OF THE FORCE DE FRAPPE ( A STUDY MADE BY THE ASSOCIATION "SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY") LE MONDE, PARIS, 17 JULY 1964

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A025600040013-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 3, 2014
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: July 17, 1964
• Content Type: MISC

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The Budgetary Cost of The
Force de Frappe
(A Study Made by the Association "Socialism and Democracy")
Le Monde, Paris, 17 July 1964
FDD
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"Le Monde" inserts another document in the file of the striking force
rforce de frappe 7 by publishing a study by the Association It of Socialism
and Democracy (22 rue de Pontoise, Paris 5).
This organization, which is made up of active politicians and trade-
unionists, engineers and technicians, devotes itself to concrete research
carried out from a socialist point of view. Like others, it is interested
in the military policy of the government* But before adopting an overall
position, it carried out a thorough analysis of the various facts con-
nected with the problem.
Because of the extensiveness of its documentation and its new charac-
ter, this particular study of the budgetary difficulties of the force de
frappe seems to present a certain amount of clarity in a field where the
appearance of offical documents leaves much to be desired.
-FDD
F L A.S C
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Economic considerations are certainly not decisive when it is
necessary to ensure the security of a country, and it is normal to
accept sacrifices for an effective defense. However, it is still
necessary to measure the extent of the sacrifices demanded, the
efficacy of the policy proposed; however, the government has
strained its ingenuity to hide the sacrifices, and it refuses to
reveal the contradictions in its policy.
4-rt,
We are seeking first of all to define the mAt1ng of the
figures furnished by the government or by official sources suffi-
ciently close to it to be considered unimpeachable, and we thmit
te the total without &-ii-44N.EAfor the)reliabil*ofthe itaividual
We then look into the reliability -------
of 7thesefiguresj and the uncertainaies which
affect certain decisions. This will finally lead us to ask if the
military policy announced for the future is realizable in the
budgetary framework established by the government, and to indicate
the choices which probably will be forced upon it.
I. Budget qw Proposals
The budget of 1964, "at the same time the last of the law -
program of 1960 and the first year of the application of the future
law - program 1964-1970" (opinion of Mr. Le Thevle on the credits of
the Ministry of the Armed Forces for 1964, in the name of the
Committee of National Defense and the Armed Forces of the National
Assembly, p 3) has led to discussions which permit, even before the
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presentation of the proposed law - program 1964-1970 - a proposal
iWhich Mi". Messmer, Minister of the Armed Pi5ice,d must present in
time for the Assembly to discuss it during its next session - to
get an idea of the general trend of development of military
expenses.
The military expense "package" in 1964, a total which should
not be exceeded in principle, is 20 billion (1) (more precisely
19,825,000). According to Mr. Messmer the seven year plan 1964-1970
envisages an annual increase ofethis "package" of a billion per year;
as listed in the table below:
Billions
1964
20
1965
21
1966
22
1967
23
1968
24
1969
25
1970
26
Total 161
(1) AU the figures are expressed in 1964 francs
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The plans for a definite pe4e0d conceived in 1959 which have inspired
the law-program 1960-1964 have had to be revised and their objectives
for 1970, writes Mt. Le Theule have been slightly reduced: They are
at the present time:
" - Development of a strategic nuclear force;
Organization of a striking force made up of five mechanized
or armored divisions;
J,114. and a light overseas striking division...
Progressive organization of seven brigades for the operational
defense of the territory."
(Report of Mr. Le Theule, p 4; see article of Mr. Messmer in
the Review of National Defense, May 1963, pp 748-761.)
Can these plans be kept within the "package of 161 billion
foreseen by the government? Will it not be necessary to either
abandon a large part of the objectives, or accept considerably
larger expenses, at the risk of aggravating the deficit in public
finances? This is what we are trying to determine.
(1) Equipment Expenses
Military credits are earmarked for operational expenses (section
III of the Armed Forces budget) or for equipment expenses (section
v).
The equipment credits in section V include, in addition to the
expenses directly connected with the production of classic armament,
for which there is established "a sort of regular system" (report
of Mr. Le Theule, p 17), all expenses connected with the establishment
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of bases and military installations (substructure), with the
production of munitions and equipment for units, with studies,
research, the development of prototypes, on which it is impossible
to realize any economies.
They include in addition expenses directly connected with the
creation of a striking force (strategic nuclear force), which have
an absolute priority and which can be calculated.
In fact, if we are to believe the military men who have edited
Century of Damocles (L'Express of 12 March 1964, p 7, has revealed
that this work, attributed to the "Grenelle Club" is the work of the
information, research and cinematographic service of the Armed
Forces), the seven year plan will retain in the period 1964-1970,
for atomic armament, average annual appropriations corresponding to
one fourth the budget of the Armed Forces. Thus, taking into account
ecL
the budget of 20 billion,plans for 1964, the increase of military
expenses up to 1970..., the probable cost of the French nuclear
strategic force will be about 35 to 4o billion francs expressed in
terms of 1963 prices" (pp 74-75).
If we-refer to the table above and we admit that these
expenses for the Strategic nuclear force may well represent an
average of 25 percent of military expenses, we are led tat.adopt
rather the total of 40 billion. On the other hand, according to
M.iiClostermann, reporter, in the opinion of the Committee of National
Defense for the Aviation Section, it is necessary to expect for these
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expenses, which represent in 1964 a total of 3,685,000,000, "andt
ascending curveof increase...of about one billion per year "for
the period 1965-1966" (report Of M. Clostermann, p 3).
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This leads us to the following table:
1964
1965
1966
3.7 billion liframcq
4.7 billion
5.7 tt
1967
6.5
tt
1968
6.5
t,
1969
6.5
1970
6.5
t,
Total 40.1 billion
But since the strategic nuclear force is to have the benefit
of absolute priority, since the Chief of State has involved his
prestige in its establishment, it is planned to establish other
forces, the approximate cost of which has been revealed either by
Mr. Messmer or by the budget reporters. Specifically, they are the
following:
an operateal&L
A. Ground Army. "The establishment ofiNforce made up of five
mechanized or armored dijaiBus...and one light division for overseas
operations, especially equipped and trained and provided with means
oper,&tiorts
appropriate forAOMMOMMOMMOOk abroad" (report of Mr. Le Theule, p 4,);
the cost of each of these mechanized divisions is about two billion
(Mr. Messmer, in the Revue des Deux Mondes, 15 February 1962, p 485);
the cost of the light division can be estimated at one billion.
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Five mechanized divisions at two billion a piece;
10'billion
one light division 1
ft
Total 11 billion
B. Air Section. Mr. Clostermann, in his report, states;
"These five armored divisions planned for 1970 provide for aerial
cover, short and long-range reconiiissance and tactical operations.
Without this indispensable aerial support, these large ground units
would be completely useless", (p 16).
It would seem that one must expect at least the following
otti`ciopincmf
ofteltne4ien work:
a. A Vtol (vertical takeoff and landing) fighter aircraft
which it is "practically impossible" to make operational "without
a series of approximately 20 preliminary machines" (p 17). It is
coet of tAe
reasonable to estimate theA production of these approximately 20
machines at one billion.
b. A light tactical aircraft "at a very low net cost, a series
of 100 of which should be initiated as quickly as possible"...(p 17).
The probable cost of the 100 machines: One billion.
c. An 8-ton cargo aircraft without which "no African'or
European operations will be open to us tomorrow" (p 18).
This machine, the Transall, should be produced jointly by
France and West Germany; the French requirements amount to 50
Transalls, at a probable cost to France of 1.5 billion.
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d. For the Brequeto 941, a transport aircraft with very short
takeoff requirements, authorizations under the program only permit
the starting of a small number of preliminary-series aircraft
between now and 1966; nevertheless, provisions should be made for
this machine and for the various materials required by the Air Force
citure6
for expellee of approximately 2.5 billion between 1964 and 1970.
A
Thus, for the air section, we come to the following table:
20 preliminary series Vtols
1 billion
100 light tactical aircraft
1
"
16-ton Transall cargo aircraft
1.5
"
A
Brequet 941 and miscellaneous
2.5
"
Total 6 billion
C. Naval Section. If one can believe Mr. Rene-Georges Laurin,
the "naval" reporter of the financial committee, "There exists a
doubt...as to what the Second Plan, which is to be presented to
Parliament during the course of 1964, will contain. This plan is
still in the study stage, but it is already known that it will not
provide, during the 7-year periodarrunning from-a964 to 1970, for
the construction of new tonnage exceeding 55,000 tons, including
here the construction program for atomic submarines and missile-
launching frigates"... (report of Mr. Laurin, p 25). The only
atomic submarine (6,000 tons), whose launching is expected before
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1970, has already been included in the strategic nuclear force, and
thus the figure should amount to a total of 49,000 tons.
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One can evaluate (according to Mr. J. Hebert, in the name
of the Committee for National Defense, p 8) the net cost per ton
of a modern vessel and its electronic equipment at 6o,000 francs
For 49,000 tons, this amounts to 3Abillion francs.
To this figure should be added the expenses involved in naval
aeronautics. For anti-submarine warfare, "the participation of the
naval air arm in the missions planned by NATO calls for a number of
aircraft in the vicinity of 100" (p 25). The Neptune aircraft
should be replaced by Atlantic patrol aircraft whose cost can be
estimated at 0.8 billion for the period from 1964 to 1970. As for
the Super-Frelon helicopter, which is indispensable for providing
armament for the helicopter-carrier La Resolue, even if the produc-
tion of this aircraft (should be) limited to 30 units for the needs
ai1bott-4er
of the Navy, whereas initially 200 units 411011111111 were planned for
A.
the needs of the Navy, but also for the ground army, the Air Force
and West Germany" (p 25), the expected expenditures are 0.3 billion,
at a minimum.
To summarize:
Navy:
Vessels of the Fleet 3 billion
Naval Aeronautics:
Atlantic 08 billion
Super-Frelon 0.3 tt
Total 4.1 billion
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1111 11,
The new materials, then, represent the following in the
total:
Ground 11 billion
Air 6
Navy 4.1
TI
Total t_1.1 billion
To these figures thereshould be added the sums necessary to
cover the production of armaments already obligated, as follows.
Ground
Air
Navy
3.8 billion
6.7
2.6
11
II
Total 13.1 billion
So far, we have not taken anything into consideration but
major items planned for under the heading of production of armaments.
Naw it is appropriate to add-to the expenditures to be devoted to
that purpose the very important one which are intended simply to
cover current requirements .(research, armament, miscellaneous,.
production, equipment on the ground, overhead, etc.). It is
necessary, for each of the three arms and also for the joint section,
to start with current figuresiand, providing only for a very
modestiebtation of three percent per year by comparison with the
preceding lyear, one obtains the following figures:
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Current Requirements
Air
Naval
Ground
Joint
1964 19614-1970
Expenditures Expenditures
(in billions of francs)
0.950
7.3
0.350
2.7
0.700
5.4
0.500
3.8
Total 19.2
For expenditures for equipment for the three anus and the joint
section (heading 11), that would make a total of:
Strategic nuclear force
New Materiel:
billions of francs)
40.1
Ground
11
Air
6
Navy
4.1
Covering production already obligated
13.1
Current Requirements
19.2
Total
93.5
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2) Operational Expenses
For the three sections and the joint section, the total
operational expenses provided for 1964 is 10.7 billion. This
amount, writes Mr. Le Theule (pp 14-16), Signifies that "serious
deficiencies remain": Inadequate credits provided for the mainte-
nance of materials; inadequate allowances provided for the purchase
of fuel, leading to a new reduction of existing stocks; absence
of regulations in favor of the soldier, of the draftee...nothing is
provided in short to raise the pay of the soldier (30 cents per day)
to a merely decent level.
The portion of operational expenses in the total military
expenses has already been reduced as a result of the cessation of
operations in Algeria (from 67.5 percent in 1962 to 54.2 percent in
1964; report of Mr. Le Theule, p lt). Now about 60 percent of these
expenses are connected with forces now in service, which one can
vary to a certain extent; but about 40 percent of these expenses
represent expenses for the maintenance and operation of installations
and equipment and they are very rigid; it is hardly possible to carry
out any economies here. Possible reduction of forces after 1964 are
contrary to announceAproposals. ("At the end of 1964, the Armed
Forces will reach a level close to the figure fixed as an objective
by the long term plan", report of Mr. Le Theule, p 14); it is
difficult to see how operational expenses could be reduced without
abandoning objectives; we are then forced to consider them as having
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gr,
to be more or less stable, if not increasing. According to
Mr. Le Theule again, "p 17) "the credit in section III have actually
varied little from 1963 to 1964, despite a new reduction of forces.
The latter will not decrease to any considerable extent after
December 31, 1964. It is then to be expected that section III will
increase in future years, for it certainly will be necessary one day
to improve the status of military personnel and, in addition, the
operational expenses of the nuclear strategic force, when it reaches
its full development, will be considerable. Many suggest a reduc-
tion of the length of military service, in order to effect new
economies.. .the resources which one could expect from this would not
be very important".
Following the reasoning of Mr. Le Theule, one can estimate
that operational expenses will increase at a minimum of about 0.5
billion per year, as indicated in the following table:
Billions
1964
10.7
1965
11.2
1966
11.7
196q,
12.2
1968
12.7
1969
13.2
1970
13.7
Total 85.4
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Thus we arrive at the following general total:
Heading III
Heading V
Total
(billions of francs)
85.4
93.5
178.9
This figure is larger by nearly 18 billion francs than the package
of 161 billion foreseen by Mr. Messmer. This is the result to which a
there is
preliminary analysis has led us. Now, ONIMMEMMMOOMINIrAa very good chance
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that this result 4111 has been put at too low a figure because it was ob-
1111 tamed without taking into account two fundamental hypotheses con-
cerning the correctness of the 1964 budget and the probable margin of
error. An analysis Aich is pushed further will demonstrate that these
hypotheses are well founded.
II. The Incertitudes
First Hypothesis. Up to now, we have assumed that the 1964 budget,
on which our reasoning is based, is an honest and realistic budget in
which expenditures have not been underestimated. As for Mr. Clostermann,
he does not admit this, for he writes in regard to the Air budget that
he does not see how the four large projects of the government (page 3)
can be brought to completion, and he states that the credits (of 1964)
to be paid cannot cover any of the operations already programmed or planned.
"The absurdity of these figures leaps to the eye," he affirms (page 5),
after an analysis of the "new operations" of the Air portion of the finan-
cial legislation, and he "readily understands the embarrassment of the
official services". He therefore has every reason to believe that the
figures in the 1964 budget are lower than the announced requirements,
while the expenditures of the ensuing years will also have to be raised.
Second Hypothesis. We also assumed that the margin of error within
which the expenditures connected with the new operations could vary would
remain within reasonable limits.
Mr. Clostermann considers, not without optimism, that, of the four
large projects which must be financed, "two can be calculated exactly:
the five divisions, heading V of the Air budget for 1964 and the draft
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law for aeronautical construction...? (page 3). He does not feel the
same certainty over the missiles with nuclear warheads and the SSBS
(strategic surface-to-surface
carrying Submarines...
Now, Mr. Clostermann has
perience, like our own, leads
ballistic missiles) or omm the missile-
reason to be skeptical, and American ex-
us to believe that expenditures for the
strategic nuclear force must be quite considerably larger than the figures
currently being planned for. American experience has often been mentioned
and its validity has sometimes been questioned - "the French studies have
been simpler and better adapted, while the selection of paths to be fol-
lowed was facilitated by the previous experimentation of the Americans"...
(Siecle de Damocles rAge of Damocles 7, page 75); so let us consider
only the experience of our country. The first draft legislation, sub-
mitted in late 1960 and passed in 1961, provided I! only for making the
atomic bombs operational by means of the credits, which it should have
multiplied by two or three.
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First Law-Program
Authoriiation
of Program
Credits
Payment
Provided
Granted Provided
(in billions)
Opened
1960
0.420
0.420
0.322
0.322
1961
1.005
1.012
0.602
0.570
1962
0.971
1.253
0.83921
0.718
1963
0.897
2.406
0.856
1.093
1964
0.695
3.360
0.894
2.536 (1)
Totals
3.988
8.451
3.513
5.239
(1) Provisions of finance law 1964
The rate of these figures is revealing: The error in this
field has been not 10 or 20 percent but 200 or 300 percent; unless,
this hypothesis is not to be excluded neither for the first nor
A
for the second law program, the leaders of defense policy deliberately
underestimated their figures, in order to obtain approval more easily:
Per4 they are convinced that once the first expenses have been
made, it will be difficult to stop the completion of the program for
/Pi eine,
fina*ial reasons.
A
Now, without even speaking of H Bombs ("normally, Pierrelatte
should operate before the end of 1967, its cost price, five billion
f516
riisteellowsgiree francs, should be respected. However, all
problems will not be solved then. The problem of miniaturizing the
bomb will remain...It is probable that it will be necessary to
establish a tritium plant", report of Mr. Le Tpule, p 22), atomic
submarines, ("one might ask if the planned date, 1969, is not too
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optimistic"'; ibid p 23) or missiles, it seems impossible to even
determine the size of the expenses for the construction of the test
center in the Pacific. "Numerous difficulties have to be solved,
which are due mainly to distance. A large enterprise is involved,
which is responsible for part of the increase of the credits
necessary for the nuclear strategic force. If a comparison is
desired concerning the scope of the work to be carried out, one
could say that it is a problem of construction a little Pierrelatte
on an at-oil ai\the end of the world!" (mid, p 23). And we know
now that it certainly will be necessary to construct the tritium
plant; its cost will not be less than one billion.
The Choice
The most prudent estimates based on the almost complete
acceptance of official statements, leads us to state that the
government will be forced, if it respects its program to exceed4MV
'the.
at least 18 billiony -titie package which it AmErecumme for itself in
A 4
the period 1964-1970 - In fact, As we see it, it could very well
exceed this figure several times. Unless it accepts a very heavy
inflation of military expenses, and inflation whose economic and
political repercussions could be formidable the government must make
economies. But what economies are possible, even in holding to the
figure of 18 billion?
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1) Could One Make Economies in
Equipment Expenses?
Current needs and production already contracted for are
practically incompressible; it is not possible to make any large
economies here.
The nuclear strategic force is on a priority basis; if it was
0114\
necessary to reduce these expenses bus.18 billions, it would be
necessary to give up almost all the programs! Such a decision,
Which wolild>ave to be made very rapidly, would cause an abrupt
slaw-down in certain sections of industry, and without doubt social
difficulties, at the same time that it would signify the abandonment
of projects which had been judged indispensable.
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FDD
FLASC
2) Could They be Found in Expenditures for Operation?
An important and increasing portion of the expenditures for opera-
tion is connected with the force de frappe, and therefore it cannot be
compressed. In order to achieve an economy of the order of 18 billion
franca, it would doubtless be necessary to reduce the number 111 of effective
troops in uniform by about 40 percent, particularly in the ground forces...
This would bring about serious personnel difficulties and doubtless would
prevent the attainment of A! certain WM of the goals which have been
established by the government. This would also call for a thorough re-
form of the military service. Whereas a short period of service is ex-
tremely expensive, contrary to the opinion which is frequently expressed,
we should orient ourselves toward a period of service of 15 or 18 months,
as to specialties? 7:
very much diaerentiatedit eliminating aE6ut 50 percent of the contingent.
That sort of service is contrary to the French tradition of equality of
responsibilities. If it is not adopted, there will scarcely be any other
solution than a professional army.
It'appears to us, then, that it is impossible for the government,
within the limits of the program which it has planned and the time limits
it has set, to carry out the program which it has drawn up. It therefore
should either abandon a large portion of that program or accept a very
appreciable augmentation of expenditures. Doubtless it will be obliged
to compromise - that is, to do partly one and partly the other - and
without any satisfactory result.
In about 1970, it is generally said, the responsibility for military
policy will become too heavy to bear. We think that the first serious
problems are beginning to arise right now.
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