NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY WEDNESDAY 1 JUNE 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000300010031-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 20, 2012
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: June 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of Top cc ret
Central
Intelligence
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uCVA/CIG
CYft 263
National Intelligence Daily
Wednesday
1 June 1983
p 5ecre
CPAS NID 83-128JX
7 June 7 Yeisi
Copy 285
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10'ecret
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Contents
Syria-Lebanon-Israel: Syria Reduces Alert
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Philippines-US: Review of Bases Agreement
3
Turkey: Political Party Banned
4
Ivory Coast-US: Houphouet-Boigny's Visit
5
Warsaw Pact: Defensive Use of Chemical Agents
6
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USSR: Chernenko Reappears
8
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Special Analyses
USSR: The Next Generation of Leaders
10
Vietnam-ASEAN-Kampuchea: Diplomatic Maneuvering
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1 June 1983
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SYRIA-LEBANON-ISRAEL: Syria Reduces Alert
Syrian forces have reduced their alert status since their command
and control exercise ended Saturday, but they remain at a higher-
than-normal level of readiness.
A decree ratifying the Lebanese-Israeli withdrawal accord was
scheduled to be submitted to the Lebanese parliament yesterday.
Assad remains opposed to the accord, and his efforts to block
Lebanese parliamentary approval could extend the debate to more
than a week.
Assad flew to Libya yesterday for talks with Libyan leader
Qadhafi.
Comment: Despite reports of greater Syrian readiness, the
likelihood of conflict has been temporarily reduced. The increased
Palestinian guerrilla activity in Lebanon that has resulted in the death
of eight Israeli soldiers this month, however, could still provoke Israeli
retaliation.
Submitting the Lebanese-Israeli accord to parliament is risky for
President Gemayel because it gives Syria an opening to disrupt
Lebanese domestic politics. It also could lead to defeat of the
resolution.
Gemayel probably would not put the agreement to the
parliamentary test unless he were confident that it would be
approved. The extraordinary powers granted to the Lebanese
Government by the parliament suggest that parliamentary approval of
the accord may not be required, but it would help legitimize the
agreement and strengthen Gemayel's domestic position.
Assad's trip to Tripoli is probably designed to emphasize to the
Saudis and the US that he is not alone in rejecting the Lebanon-Israel
accord.
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1 June 1983
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lop secret
The Bases Compensation Package
Period covered
1983 1979
Agreement Agreement
1985-89 1980-84
Duration of negotiations April-May 1983 1975-79
Million US $
Economic support 475 200
Military assistance 125 50
Military sales credits 300 250
Total commitment 900 500
Grant component 600 250
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PHILIPPINES-US: Review of Bases Agreement
Philippine and US officials have completed the review of the
Military Bases Agreement after less than two months of unexpectedly
smooth preparatory negotiations.
Under the agreement signed in Manila today, the Philippines will
receive $900 million in compensation, an 80-percent increase over the
agreement of 1979. The grant component will more than double, in
line with Manila's demands.
Unhampered US operation of the bases, however, is assured.
Manila has moderated hardline demands on access to sensitive areas
of the US facilities. Potentially troublesome issues, including labor
relations on the bases, have been relegated to other negotiating
panels and will be dealt with in the coming months.
Comment: In 1979 protracted and contentious negotiations were
required to produce an agreement. This year President Marcos
moderated demands by military hardliners throughout the talks and
played a personal role in reaching a compromise on the size of the
compensation package.
The quiet settlement of most issues in private channels also has
effectively foiled plans by radical and moderate opponents of the
government to exploit the negotiations by appealing to Philippine
nationalism. There was little criticism of Marcos or of Manila's
relationship with Washington during the negotiations. The sizable
compensation package probably will enable Marcos to undercut any
grumbling.
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3 1 June 1983
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Top Secret
TURKEY: Political Party Banned
The military government has dissolved the recently formed
rightwIng Great Turkey Party and has barred its founding members
from politics.
The move comes only two weeks after the generals lifted the ban
on political party activity, which they had imposed soon after coming
to power in September 1980. The government's decree accuses the
party's leaders of trying to revive the banned Justice Party and places
some of the founding members and supporters, including former
Prime Minister and Justice Party chief Demirel, under house arrest.
The decree does not affect Turgut Sunalp's Nationalist
Democracy Party or Turgut Ozal's Motherland Party. They will
compete for the conservative vote in the general election scheduled
for 6 November.
Comment: The generals know that Demirel still commands a
substantial following.
Domestic reaction to the move is likely to be muted. The council
also has banned any discussion of the action. The generals, however,
are likely to come under heavy criticism in Western Europe.
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I op secret
Felix Houphouet-Boigny
78, ILK ruled ror 23
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politician . . has II selkissurancc
horn 01 01 c pericncc . . .
steeped in French culture.
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1 June 1983
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Top Secret
IVORY COAST-US: Houphouet-Boigny's Visit
President Houphouet-Boigny's major objective during his official
visit to Washington beginning next Tuesday will be to reaffirm his
country's close ties with the US and to seek assurances that the US
remains committed to protecting its friends in the Third World from
Soviet and Libyan subversion.
Comment: Houphouet probably will urge greater Western
economic assistance to moderate African states as the most effective
way to stem outside meddling. The US Embassy reports Houphouet is
increasingly concerned that economic and political instability in West
Africa, especially in neighboring Ghana, could provide new
opportunities for Moscow and Tripoli to exploit, and the resulting
disturbance could spill over into Ivory Coast.
Although Houphouet generally supports US policy in southern
Africa, he may urge that Namibian independence not be linked to
Cuban withdrawal from Angola. Most lvorians would prefer a radical
black regime in Windhoek over a continuation of white rule.
The President also is likely to raise anew the need for improved
terms of trade for commodity producers, in particular better prices for
Ivory Coast's exports of coffee and cocoa. He believes the free
market operates to the detriment of developing countries because of
the market strength and financial control of developed states.
The Ivorian leader appears especially interested in strengthening
ties with Washington at a time when his country is coping with its
most severe recession since independence was gained in 1960. The
government has had to respond forcibly to occasional outbreaks of
public unrest to demonstrate its resolve to carry out austerity
measures.
France is Abidjan's major source of aid, trade, and investment,
but Paris has its own economic problems and younger Ivorians want
to reduce the paternalistic influence of the French. As a result,
Houphouet views the US as an increasingly important source of
assistance.
Houphouet will not allow differences over specific economic
issues to interfere with his country's strong relationship with the US.
He almost certainly will continue to work with the US and the leaders
of French-speaking African countries to try to contain conflicts and
reduce radical influence in the region.
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5 1 June 1983
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WARSAW PACT: Defensive Use of Chemical Agents
Warsaw Pact countries evidently continue to believe that chemical
warfare agents can play an important role in defensive as well as
offensive combat situations.
the wartime missions of Warsaw
Pact chemical warfare units still include the intensive contamination
of terrain with chemical agents.
such concentrated applications would be used in defensive tactical
situations.
a chemical warfare
company in support of a FROG rocket battalion in Poland has a
mission of terrain contamination. In order to help cover the retreat of
the battalion, the company would chemically contaminate the area
through which enemy forces would have to advance.
three battalions in the Romanian Army are equipped to lay down
chemical barriers using spray devices to apply a thick layer of liquid
contaminants in a 10-meter-wide strip. The Romanians have nerve
agents and blistering agents.
Comment: Warsaw Pact doctrine has long provided for both
offensive and defensive use of chemical agents, delivered primarily by
missiles, rocket and cannon artillery, and aircraft. The use of these
agents in a defensive role could seriously impede NATO
counteroffensive operations.
Chemical warfare defensive systems in NATO may be vulnerable
to highly concentrated ground contamination and aerosols. Liquid
chemical agents would severely test the protection afforded by NATO
charcoal-fiber garments, which are designed for protection against
low concentrations of chemical agents
If NATO forces have to operate in heavily contaminated terrain,
they will first have to give priority to decontaminating the area. This
would substantially reduce NATO mobility and would give Warsaw
Pact forces more time to reorganize.
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6 1 June 1983
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USSR: Chernenko Reappears
Politburo member Chernenko made his first public appearance
since 30 March during ceremonies in Moscow yesterday for his
deceased Politburo colleague, Arvid Pe!she. Western correspondents
had been told earlier that Chernenko had been ill but was back at
work. A party newspaper editor told the US Embassy last week that
Chernenko would address a Central Committee plenum on ideology
this month and that General Secretary Andropov would deliver a
concluding statement.
Comment: As long as Chernenko retains his seats on the
Politburo and Secretariat, he is a potential alternative to Andropov. A
review of Chernenko's most recent book in Pravda on 24 May implies
that the worker discipline campaign, which is associated with
Andropov, had been overdone.
His appearance and the continuing
signs of respect that he received in the press while absent suggest
that he is prepared to play a vigorous political role.
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8 1 June 1983
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Top Secret
Special Analysis
USSR: The Next Generation of Leaders
6enetal Secretary Andropov is 68 and has heart problems. If he
should (fie soon, virtually the same group of senior leaders who
selected' him last November would meet to choose his replacement.
The most powerful members of this group also are the oldest, and the
ne.xt leaden would likely be of their generation. The senior leaders
could easily dominate the ruling group for another five years, but they
a1/ 0(01i/flue to look to the more junior leaders for allies.
In the middle ground between the seniors and the juniors, the
most powerful and able individual seems to be Vladimir
Shcherbitskiy. At 65, however, time is running out on his chances to
make it to the top.
Shcherbitskiy, as the party chief of the Ukraine, is a full member
of the Politburo. Nonetheless, he needs to move to a post in Moscow,
which would allow him to keep his Politburo seat while he waits for
those senior to him to leave the scene.
Six Candidates
Only six of the 22 Politburo, candidate Politburo, and Secretariat
members are less than 65. Of this group, the 52-year-old Mikhail
Gorbachev seems to be in the best position to assume the top post
eventually.
As a full Politburo member, Gorbachev helps make national
policy. As a secretary, he administers its execution and selects key
personnel
Although Gorbachev has spent much of his career as an
agricultural manager and currently supervises the Food Program, his
dual leadership posts give him political influence beyond his seeming
limitations. Andropov apparently has given Gorbachev strong support
at a recent meeting of all the party's regional secretaries. He might try
to maneuver Gorbachev into position as his successor, but may not
live long enough to do so.
Nikolay Ryzhkov, 53, became a secretary without ever having
served in a party post, but Andropov chose him to make an extensive
study of national economic problems. This is an even broader
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continued
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Top Secret
assignment than the one Gorbachev assumed for agriculture, and it
might presage his elevation to the Politburo.
Vladimir Dolgikh, 58, is a candidate Politburo member and the
secretary who supervises the industrial sector. His political strength is
unclear, but he could eventually take his place among the most
powerful members of the leadership.
Grigoriy Romanov, 60, is party boss in Leningrad and a full
Politburo member. He is openly ambitious and reportedly is
personally disliked by some of his colleagues. It is past time for him to
be given a new assignment, and his future is difficult to predict.
Geydar Aliyev, 60, may have risen as high as he can go as a full
Politburo member and as a first deputy premier. Unlike Andropov,
Aliyev was a career KGB professional and his colleagues may thus
view him as a threat. Slavic members of the leadership might look
down on Alyev's Azerbaydzhani background.
Eduard Shevardnadze, 55, is the vigorous and able party leader
of Georgia, but he may have to live down the appearance of having
sided with Secretary Chernenko before Andropov took over. He is a
candidate Politburo member, but he also may be handicapped by
ethnic prejudices and his regional isolation.
All six of these younger men have had careers that put them in
charge of large party entities or major regional economic or
agricultural undertakings?or both. They thus have more in common
with such former leaders as Khrushchev and Brezhnev?or with
Shcherbitskiy than with Andropov, Chernenko, Defense Minister
Ustinov, and Foreign Minister Gromyko.
Under Brezhnev, local leaders were promoted up through the
ranks without transferring them to other areas; consequently, the
current generation of junior leaders lacks the wide experience their
predecessors acquired.
Career Path for Newcomers
New appointments to the Politburo are unlikely until incumbents
die or are otherwise removed. There is a standard set of other jobs
that qualify their holders for a seat on the Politburo, but almost all of
those positions are already filled.
The Secretariat probably is the best staging area for younger
leaders to join the leadership group and eventually move into the
Politburo. Yegor Ligachev, 58, a former regional party secretary, who
recently was appointed chief of the party personnel department, is a
candidate for a secretaryship.
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Top Secret
There also could be other appointments to the Secretariat from
the large number of regional party secretaries. Such recruitments
have traditionally been the prime source of a general secretary's
strength.
The Generational Difference
The outlook of the leadership cannot fail to be changed by the
addition of younger men. Even today there is a substantial difference
between the experiences of the majority?the seniors?and the
handful of those in their fifties.
Of the current leaders, only one had joined the party during the
civil war. Two others, including Ustinov, joined in 1927 during the
height of Stalin's struggle with Trotskiy.
Gromyko and Chernenko joined in 1931, as millions of peasants
were forced into collective farms, sent to prison camps, or died as a
result of famine. Andropov and six others joined the party in 1939,
while Premier Tikhonov joined in 1940.
Thus, the three men who represent the postwar generation in the
current leadership?Gorbachev, Ryzhkov, and Shevardnazde?were
small children or had not yet been born when most of the others had
experienced revolution, civil war, the purges, and the German
invasion. Ryzhkov joined the party in 1956, when Khrushchev
delivered his secret denunciation of Stalin.
As other younger men move into the leadership circle, the
struggles and dangers of the Stalin period will have personal
relevance to fewer people. The newcomers may not have a Stalinist
conception of the US as a capitalist "colossus" intent on destroying
their country, but their memories will tend more and more to include
only the period since the USSR became a superpower.
The next generation of leaders will for a time arrive with narrower
career experiences than the current generation has. The junior
leaders now in place are former regional managers, not the foreign
affairs professionals who serve as staff for Andropov, Gronnyko,
Ustinov, and Chernenko.
These leaders, and those who come after them, will have a clear
view of Soviet military power?and a set of values and attitudes that
will cause them to insist on preserving and increasing that power.
While it is not known at this stage how firmly their views are set, the
younger leaders probably will be even less flexible and more assertive
than their predecessors.
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Top Secret
Special Analysis
VIETNAM-ASEAN-KAMPUCHEA: Diplomatic Maneuvering
Vietnam is increasing its efforts to obtain international support for
its policies toward Kampuchea. There are tentative signs that these
moves may lead ASEAN to adopt a more flexible strategy on
Kampuchea that would counter possible criticism that it is the
intransigent party in the conflict. Although neither Hanoi nor ASEAN
appears ready to make major changes in its approaches toward
Kampuchea, each side will continue testing the other for signs of
geritiine shifts in policy
The major dry season fighting in Kampuchea has ended, and
Hanoi has moved quickly to follow up its military successes with
diplomatic gains. To underscore the strength of their military position,
the Vietnamese are heavily publicizing a limited troop withdrawal now
under way and have agreed to consider a Thai proposal that
Vietnamese troops be pulled back 30 kilometers from the Thailand-
Kampuchea border.
Hanoi also has renewed its longstanding invitation to Thailand's
Foreign Minister Siddhi to visit Hanoi for discussions on Kampuchea,
and Vietnamese Foreign Minister Thach is scheduled to visit the
Philippines early this month. Senior Thai officials say Thach has asked
to call on Siddhi, who will meet him next week. The US Embassy in
Canberra reports the Vietnamese also have indicated a willingness to
receive Australia's Foreign Minister to discuss Kampuchea.
In addition, Hanoi is probing for weak spots in ASEAN unity.
Behind the scenes, Vietnam is dangling new hints of flexibility before
Malaysia and Indonesia?the two ASEAN states it believes are most
susceptible to a solution in Kampuchea that does not involve a total
withdrawal of Vietnamese troops.
Despite these moves, there are still no signs that Vietnam is
willing to negotiate except on terms involving recognition of the
regime it supports in Phnom Penh and the maintenance of a
Vietnamese presence in Kampuchea. There also is no evidence of a
real change in Vietnam's military posture in Kampuchea. The troops
continued
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that have been withdrawn were located in an area of only sporadic
resistance activity, and some have already been replaced by
Kampuchean troops.
ASEAN Reactions
Hanoi's moves are prompting ASEAN to reevaluate its strategy
toward Kampuchea and demonstrate more tactical flexibility.
Limited Flexibility
There are limits on ASEAN's willingness to soften its tactics
toward Hanoi. ASEAN has emphasized that a final settlement would
have to conform to UN resolutions calling for a complete Vietnamese
withdrawal. As a result, the current diplomatic maneuvering is not
likely to lead to fundamental changes in ASEAN policy toward
Kampuchea, including its support to the resistance.
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