ADMINISTRATION, TRIBLE, WOLF AGREE ON REVISED PERFORMANCE PAY PLAN "BETTER THAN THE GENERAL SCHEDULE," DEVINE SAYS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP95-00535R000300030010-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2013
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: March 1, 1984
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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, sirA United. States
/ Office of
-
?404? Person ne!
4'40 Management
? 1900 E St.. NW
Washington. D.C. 20415
NOA,s Unit, Room 5E10
1202) 632-5491
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Contact:
Thursday, March 1, 1984 Mark Tapscott
ADMINISTRATION, TRIBLE, WOLF AGREE ON REVISED PERFORMANCE PAY PL
"BETTER THAN THE GENERAL SCHEDULE," DEVINE SAYS
?
(WASHINGTON, D.C.)---Donald J. Devine, Director of the U.S. Office of V
Personnel Management (OPM), this afternoon hailed an agreement with Senator
?
Paul Trible (R. VA), and Congressman Frank Wolf (R. VA) on an amended Wolf-
Trible Merit Pay bill, to reform pay for performance for managers and the Senior
Executive Service (SES).
"This is a great accomplishment," Devine said, "because it moves an
important segment of the federal work force further towards genuine
pay-for-performance. Senator Trible and Congressman Wolf are to be
congratulated."
The amendments assure annualized within-grade raises to all Merit Pay
managers in the GM-13 through 15 grades, as well as annual full comparability
raises. By contrast, many General Schedule employees must wait two to three
years for their within-grade raises, and previously, only half of comparability
was guaranteed. And a new cash award pool will be added on top of
comparability and within-grade equivalents.
"As a result, now a top rated GM-14 manager will earn up to $41,000 more
over a ten year period than will a non-Merit Pay counterpart. That is great for
our managers, who deserve it. But it is a shame that the rest of the work force
in the General Schedule can't share in these rewards," Devine said.
The amendments establish a mandatory performance award pool requiring
agencies to disburse a minimum of .75 percent of payroll to such awards with a
limit of up to 1.5 percent of payroll. This will guarantee adequate funding for
cash awards to managers who perform especially well.
1 Numerous SES reforms are included in the amendments, including removal
of the existing 50 percent limitation on the number of SES members eligible
within an agency to receive performance bonuses. TheThimie-r: --it-at limitationis-
trelslaced----with71-dcillarif).501 of 3-percent-of an -agency's .aggregate 5E5-payroll:- --,
_ _
MORE
CON 116-83-1
January 1980
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OPM/Wolf Trible Merit Pay/Page 2.
The amendments also :--removethe-_-T:45, cap-on total -SES-salary/bontis,
,c=p-ens?ati6ri. Under the current system, SESers receiving performance awards
are denied that part of the awards which brings their total compensation above
the $82,900 Cabinet Secretary salary level.
"These changes will allow our Senior Executives to receive larger awards,
and we will be able to pay them to more executives. Our valued career
executives really deserve these rewards for their performance," Devine said.
1cReduction-inrfOrce (RIF) --provisions governing SESers are also reformed by
the amendments to Assure- retention-at-the -GS475-1-eveli-for-Tfully-Tsuccessful -
cperf&frier7C Under the current system, such executives who cannot be placed in
another SES position within their agency or in another agency through OPM
placement efforts are removed entirely from the work force.
Geographic reassignment notices are expanded from the current 15 days to
30 days by the amendments and reassigning agencies are now required to cite
specific reasons for the requirement. The existing 15 day notice period for non-
geographic reassignment continues.
"I am extremely pleased that, through the great leadership of Senator
Trible and Congressman Wolf, as well as Senator Ted Stevens (R. Ak.) and
Senator John Warner (R. VA), we have developed amendments that significantly
advance the pay-for-performance principle among our Merit Pay managers and
SESers," Devine noted. "I still would like this concept extended to the rest of
the work force so we can properly reward them also. But this is a significant
accomplishment for our managers and executives."
-30-
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TABLE 1
MSPB MAJOR FINDINGS ON THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE
The following are selected major findings based on questions we asked current
and former senior executives:
o Over 70 percent of current and former executives believe that the Senior
Executive Service is not providing a system designed to attract and
retain competent senior executives.
o Current executives indicated that they saw inequities in the
distribution of bonuses and the majority (62%) felt that bonuses did not
motivate them to work harder.
o Sixty-eight percent of current executives believe that they could find a
higher paying job in the private sector. In fact, 40 percent have been
actively recruited by a private sector firm within the last year.
o The majority of executives are not staying in Government because of the
financial benefits promised in the Civil Service Reform.Act; rather, they
are staying primarily because they like their work (85%) and want to have
an impact on public affairs (76%).
o Most frequently cited reasons not related to the compensation system,
that former executives cited for leaving the Government were: feeling
that their knowledge and skills were not being used appropriately (30%),
not enjoying the work anymore (30%), and distaste for criticism of
Federal workers by the public, press, and politicians (26%).
o Over ninety percent of executives who resigned left to find more
lucrative work in the private sector. Former executives now employed
full-time have increased their salaries by more than $17,000, and are as
satisfied or more satisfied than they were in their last government
job.
o Jobs in the SES are sought after by 45% of midlevel employees and 35% of
current executives would be willing to revert to a non-SES position.
o There is no evidence that systemic personnel abuses have occurred in
the SES. However, 16 percent of former and current executives report
that one or more types of individual personnel Abuses have happened to
them, and at least 40 percent reported they personally observed
arbitrary actions happening to other executives. The desire by
management to put in their own person, and partisan politics, were the
most commonly cited reasons for the abuse.
o Executives have a mixed reaction to the broad question of whether
the goal of executive accountability has been achieved.
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Table 2
Forms of. Arbitrary Actions Personally Experienced by Senior Executives*
Action:
1) "Shelving" an SES
executive by detailing
or reassigning him or
her to lower level
dut.es, or duties not
SES in nature.
2) Trying to force
an SES executive to
resign by transferring
him or her to an office
in another geographic
location.
3) Arbitrarily lowering
an SES executive's per-
formance rating.
4) Artificially
structuring a reduction
in force (RIF) in order
to remove a specific
SES executive.
5) Arbitrarily demoting
a career SES executive.
Former Executives** Current Executives
42%
50%
31%
11%
45%
58%
13%
4%
6%
11%
*Overall, 16 percent of former executives and 16 percent of current executives
indicated they experienced one or more forms of arbitrary actions. The
percentages shown in this table are based on those 16 percent.
**Former executives include both those whoresigned and retired.
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Table 3
Forms of Arbitrary Actions Personally Observed by Senior Executives*
Action:
1) "Shelving" an SES
executive by detailing
or reassigning him or
her to lower level
duties, or duties not
SES in nature.
2) Trying to force
an SES executive to
resign by transferring
him or her to an office
in another geographic
location.
3) Arbitrarily lowering
an SES executive's per-
formance rating.
4) Artificially
structuring a reduction
in force (RIF) in order
to remove a specific
SES executive.
5) Arbitrarily demoting
a career SES executive.
Former Executives** Current Executives
71%
79%
47%
44%
30%
27%
15%
12%
16%
14%
*Overall 47 percent of former executives and 40 percent of current executives
indicated they observed one or more forms of arbitrary actions. The
percentages shown in this table are based on the 47 percent and 40 percent,
respectively.
**Former executives include both those who have resigned and retired.
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_
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listen during most of the SES-
employee testimony; and, says one of the
Christie-type witnesses, "We were
treated perfunctorily, to put it mildly.
maybe because she's on a tight deadline
for completing the report," herewith
what, in summary, Christie has to say:
"In a nutshell. I believe the jury is still
out on SES. Some, but certainly not all,
of the initiatives have yielded the an-
ticipated benefits to the Federal Ex-
ecutive and the Federal Government. I
concur with the GAO's (General Account-
ing Office) conclusion that some headway
is being made toward achieving the
following four major goals established for
the SES by Congress in its Civil Service
Reform Act of 1978:
.Improvement of managerial capabili-
ties;? Protection for executives from undue
political influence;
? More flexibility for federal agencies
in using executives:
? Accountability for executives with
compensation, retention and tenure
based on performance.
In the main, I also agree with the
GAO's assessment of progress in each of
these categories. (Admittedly, my views
on these issues are colored by my per-
sonal experience which, in turn, is a func-
tion of the organization I work for.)
With respect to improving the com-
petency of our top level managers, I see
little substantive change since the SES
was established. Granted, we have very
good, ongoing executive development
programs designed to serve both SES
members as well as possible candidates
for the SES. However, many similar pro-
grams were in place and available prior
to 1979. I took part in such programs in
the early 1970's.
Furthermore, as was true before SES,
we still encounter reluctance on the part
of many individuals?and their agencies
for that matter?to commit themselves to
leave their positions for a long period of
time in order to take advantage of these
opportunities. In short, I think excellent
training and executive development pro-
grams are available to members and
potential members of the SES; however,
there still remains an all-too-prevalent
view that such programs are not worth
the time away from the organization and
will not have any beneficial impact on
their future in the SES.
In line with a finding by the GAO on
this subject, I feel the overall competen-
cy of Federal executives is affected more
by the inadequacy of pay and benefits re-
quired to attract and retain the talented
people we need in the SES than by the
quality or availability of executive
development'programs.
With regards to safeguards against
politicization of the SES, I know of no
reason or of no situation that would lead
me to question the GAO's findings on this
Federal Managers,
Senior Executive Service:
Where the System
Needs Fixing
HIGHLIGHTS
? It's worked better than rumored since the Senior Executive
Service was inaugurated in 1979.
? The unfulfilled compensation promises are the most flawed
aspect of it right now but it has other problems as well, both
real and in perception.
? Thinks the Pentagon's Tom Christie: fix the procedural and
substantive weaknesses and give it more time to mature.
Earlier this year, as part of fulfilling a
requirement to come up with an evalua-
tion of how well the Senior Executive
Service (SES) has worked since it was set
up in 1979, Chairwoman Pat Schroeder
(D-Colo.) of the House Post Office and
Civil Service Subcommittee on Civil Ser-
vice held a series of hearings. Testimony
on SES came, from among others, some
Federal members of the SE S itself.
One of these was Tom Christie, Direc-
tor of General Purpose Programs, (his of-
fice does cost-effective analysis and
evaluation of tactical air, land and naval
forces including summary evaluations of
alternative programs and proposed
weapon system acquisitions in terms of
"affordability, effectiveness, feasibility
and capability") in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense.
"I guess we (he was one of six that he
knows were called) were asked to testify
because we received meritorious awards
under two (White House) Administra-
tions." Christie, at least, has a basketful
of those. While working for the Air Force
from 1955-73 (with a year off to obtain
a Masters degree in Applied Mathematics
from New York University in 1962) and
in the OSD (Office of the Secretary of
Defense) Program Analysis and Evalua-
tion Office since, he has earned the Air
Force Scientific Achievement Award (in
1965, 1970); Outstanding Performance
Awards (10 times); Air Force Meritorious
Civilian Service Award (in 1973); DOD
(Department of Defense) Distinguished
Civilian Service Awards (in 1979, 1981,
1983); Defense Meritorious Executive
Award (in 1980); the Distinguished Ex-
ecutive Award in 1983.
Some highlights from his testimony
embellished by Christie for Government
Executive:
48
? In contrast to the original theory that
a newly created SES-designated job
would be open to applicant competition,
"Actually, when somebody sets up one of
these SES slots, three-fourths of the time
he already has somebody in mind to fill
it."
? However, in the Pentagon, "On pro-
motions and filling vacancies, I've seen
very little politicization. We're more free
of that than I understand exists in most
other agencies and certainly more than
you find in the field."
? The SES concept "should work in
the field, where you have more of a pro-
duct. It (the appraisal system) is unique-
ly difficult in a staff job like this one
where we don't have a product in the
sense that agency field line operations
do."
Beyond that, "I've served on a lot of
those (appraisal review) boards. Every-
body does it differently and we haven't
had a uniformly high quality of review
people. We need a measure to equate pro-
ductivity to the job?and we're getting
there, but slowly. The appraisal system
is done probably as well as it could be
done, but it's cumbersome. We need
something better."
? Contrary to rumors of "cronyism" in
review-board analysis of recommenda-
tions for an SES-employee bonus/promo-
tion, "In the Pentagon, we have checks
and balances, review boards on review
boards. The paperwork load is huge and
most of the time you go on the
paperwork?including even when the
boss of the person didn't write up the
recommendation very well. Rarely, in all
the boards I've been on, have I known
personally the person being considered."
Because only Subcommittee Chair-
woman Pat Schroeder of all seven
GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVE
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On August 7. 1776. tsiacKsmiu
drew Farnsworth of Wilfred Cor
Mass., wrote the "Cannon Buyer. Con-
tinental Congress, Philadelphia." Said
he:
"To whom it may concern:
"I strongly favor the action token by
representatives of the Colonies on July
4, 1776. Since I want to do my part to
help. I want to know if you could use on
extra cannon. I have a small block
smith shop here in Wilfred Corners
which I run myself. I have never made
a cannon, but I'm sure I could do it. .
"I would only charge for the metal
I put into it plus a little to help my fami-
ly buy corn meal and meat for the win-
ter. Please let me know what kind of
cannon you want and where you want
it, and get started right away."
Fifteen years and 78 letters later,
author John Rickey's "Free Enterprise
Patriot" has, with biting humor, made
its point: If the War of Independence
had been fought under today's bureau-
cratic rules, this is how it might have
been "with one exception. . . we
probably wouldn't have won."
An evening's entertainment in
"red tape humor" is available from
Government Executive for only
$4.00 each, softcover ($6.95 for the
Library Edition). Simply fill out the
coupon below or write in the num-
ber 200 on the business reply card
bound into this issue. Mail with
your check for the correct amount
to Government Executive, 1725 K
St., N.W., Washington, D.C., 20006
Payment must accompany order.
Name
Address
City State Zip
Make check out to "Patriot"
and mail to
Patriot, Government Executive Magiudne
1725 K St. NW
Washbigton, D.C: 20008
50
specified in the law have been adhered t
quite scrupulously. From my own per-
sonal experience in the DOD, I believe not
only the letter but also the spirit of the
law has been followed.
I'm not sure I have much of anything
substantive to say on the issue of in-
creased reassignment flexibility. In
general, I agree with the intent of this
facet of the legislation?to provide agen-
cies more flexibility in matching ex-
ecutive talent to specific agency needs
and to provide executives, themselves,
with better opportunity for transfer
within and between agencies.
While I understand the concern on the
part of many SES members with the
potential for arbitrary actions being
taken by their agencies, I feel this in-
creased flexibility is a much-needed
mechanism for improving the usefulness
and effectiveness of Federal executives.
It is the last of the four goals?
accountability with compensation, reten-
tion and tenure based on performance?
where I seriously question our progress.
A necessary part of implementing this
goal and determining the performance of
executives is, of course, the performance
appraisal system mandated by Congress.
We have implemented such a system in
our agency and use it for the purposes
intended.
In addition to developing and maintain-
ing performance appraisals for SES
members who work for me, I also have
served on performance review boards and
performance evaluation panels within
OSD. In these capacities I have seen the
system at work first-hand. Performance
appraisals are used annually to assess in-
dividual performance, to determine
eligibility for rewards and as bases for
other personnel decisions. Contrary to a
GAO finding on this matter, my ex-
perience is that our system also relates
an individual's performance and contribu-
tions to the accomplishment of his
organization's objectives.
While I believe my agency has im-
plemented the appraisal system quite ef-
fectively, and that the quality of the per-
formance plans and appraisals have im-
proved significantly over the years, I do
question whether the system has, in fact,
improved performance or communica-
tion; and, ultimately, whether it has been
worth the large commitment of time by
executives. The GAO report reflects a
similar finding.
Clearly, it is the issue of compensation
in its many aspects, including reductions
in the planned bonus-and-award system,
that has left most members of the SES
with a feeling of betrayal and has led
ultimately to many of them questioning
the utility of the SES in general. I agree
wholeheartedly with the findings of the
GAO on this matter. The reductions by
Congress and OPM (Office of Personnel
Management) from the Civil Service
umber of bonuses that could be awarded
annually to members of the SES is, in
fact, viewed as a "breach of contract"?to
use the GAO's phrase?by most of those
members.
These reductions have created morale
problems. They have forced agencies and
organizations into decisions, for example,
which result in the same few top per-
formers beihg rewarded annually (with
almost equally outstanding executives go-
ing unrewarded) or result in a "spreading
the wealth" policy whereby more top per-
formers are rewarded every two or three
years rather than annually.
In any event, the system that SES
members signed up for in 1979 is not the
system that has been implemented.
Hopefully, the Fiscal Year 1984 ap-
propriation, which lifted the earlier
limitation of 20%, is a harbinger of per-
manent improvement in the system. An
increase in the number of deserving SES
members who can receive awards should
go a long way toward overcoming the
negative attitudes that have developed
over time concerning this aspect of the
program.
Certain elements of the SES program
such as performance appraisals, bonuses,
training opportunities, etc., are indeed
significant considerations. Far more im-
portant, however, to the excellence of the
SES, and thus to the effectiveness of
federal agencies, is the issue of SES
salary rates. Unless this continuing prob-
lem is solved, I am pessimistic about our
ability to hire and retain the top quality
executives we need to make our Govern-
ment operate efficiently.
Until we face the issue of paying ex-
ecutive salaries competitive with those of
similar positions in the private sector, we
have little hope of developing the highly
competent executive corps envisioned in
the 1978 Act. Until Congress and the Ex-
ecutive Branch come to grips with this
overriding issue, there will continue to be
a valid question concerning the effec-
tiveness of the SES.
? The statistics presented in the GAO
report and also gathered by the Grace
Commission in its assessment of Ex-
ecutive level and SES pay are ample
testimony to the problem. The large
numbers of executives who have left the
Government since the SES was formed,
and the greater financial rewards in
retirement compared to continuing to
work, are but two examples of the prob-
lems arising. from the limitations placed
on Executive salaries.
Such action (providing the obvious
"fix"?economically though the political
resistance would be predictably fierce)
will go a long way, if not all the way,
toward restoring the credibility of the
SES program and toward making the
SES what we intended it to be five years
ago, the elite management corps of the
Federal Government."
GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVE
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11,1
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? ? , ivsags 1.1i ao, 170.1
STAT
MSPB: SINGLES BEAT THREE OF A KIND
The Merit Systems Protection Board has denied the
request of Special Counsel K. William O'Connor to
consolidate hearings on charges that three civil service
and postal union leaders violated the Hatch Act. The
Board assigned the case to an administrative law judge,
and said it's up to him whether to consolidate the
hearings.
MSPB: SES DOESN'T MEET GOALS
The Senior Executive Service isn't meeting its goals,
according to a new study released by the U.S. Merit
Systems Protection Board.
The study, based on two surveys of members of the
SES, says the federal executives plan on staying in the
government. But:
? 75 percent said SES doesn't provide a compensa-
tion system that attracts and retains competent
executives. Former members of the SES reported that
they earn an average of $17,000 more than their
counterparts and are happier now outside of govern-
ment service.
? 50 percent thought they aren't protected from
arbitrary action. (16 percent said they've experienced an
arbitrary action.)
? 40 percent thought that the system isn't free from
improper political influence.
? Even so, 60 percent said they aren't leavtng ?
although 40 percent said attempts had been made to
recruit them to the private sector.
("The 1984 Report on the Senior Executive Service,"
Office of Merit Systems Review and Studies, Merit
This is Your
ERA"- PERSONNEL ?
`-'u/DE
NEWS
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VOLUME III, Issue 11, March 18, 1985
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SHORT TAKES
? Comparable Worth Hearings Set. Rep. Mary Rose
Oakar, D-OH, chairwoman of the House employee
compensation and employee benefits subcommittee, has
scheduled hearings on sex-based wage discrimination
for March 25 and 28.
The hearings will focus on the GAO report on
"Options for Conducting a Pay Equity Study of Federal
Pay and Classification Systems."
Oakar says the report demonstrates that a pay equity
study can be done in the federal government.
? NFFE to Tower, NFFE to Tower, Come in, Please.
The National Federation of Federal Employees says it
will begin organizing about 650 air traffic specialists in
the New England region, now that it's won a favorable
ruling from the Federal Labor Relations Authority on
the scope of the potential bargaining unit.
? Retiring Women Shortchanged? Rep. Patricia
Schroeder, D-CO, says she is looking into whether
women are treated unfairly by the civil service
retirement system.
"The system gives a much better return to people with
more years of service and higher final salaries," says
Schroeder. "Since women work for shorter periods of
time than men and generally have lower earnings,
women get substantially less for their contributions than
men."
"The system itself doesn't discriminate against
women," she added. "But for several reasons, women
still end up with far less retirement income than men."
The same point was made last month in a private
contractor's study of CSRS released by OPM.
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