NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY THURSDAY 7 JANUARY 1988

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89T00113R000100050001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 27, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 7, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

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t Central
Intelligence
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National Intelligence Daily
Thursday d
7 January 1988
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ToThrSeeraL
1,11A C. 1111% ^If MAC MI
/ January 191113
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Contents
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USSR: New Pressure for Cambodian Settlement
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East Germany-France: The Honecker Visit
5
South Korea-North Korea: Airliner Bombing Confession
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Palestinians: Weighing Government-in-Exile
8
Notes
USSR-Afghanistan: Shevardnadze Discusses Withdrawal
9
West Germany: Genscher Woos Opposition
9
Poland: Electoral Reform Promises Broken
10
USSR-Switzerland: Soviets Issue Bond
10
In Brief
11
Special Analyses
Philippines: Communist Insurgency at Yearend
12
Colombia: Drug Mafia's Power Growing
14
Ton errpt
7 January 1988
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USSR: New Pressure for Cambodian Settlement
The USSR apparently is taking a tough line with the
Vietnamese-installed government In Phnom Penh on the need for
a Cambodian settlement?a tougher line than Moscow a7pears
to have used with Hanoi.
? ?./
the first meeting between Cambodian Prime
Minister Hun Sen and Prince Sihanouk told Hun Sen to work out
a reconciliation with Sihanouk because the USSR will no longer
support Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia.
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister delivered the same message
during Hun Sen's visit to Moscow after the talks and told Hun Sen
that Moscow is also discussing the issue with the Chinese. Although
the names of the Soviet officials were not reported, press and
other reports point to the deputy head of the party's International
Department, Vadim Zagladin, and Deputy Foreion Minister Vorontsov
who met with Hun Sen in Moscow
The Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister reportedly told Hun Sen that
Soviet aid to Cambodia?currently estimated at about $150 million a
year?is being squandered, that the Vietnamese economy is on the
verge of collapse, and that Moscow is not willing to continue to waste
its resources abroad. He also allegedly offered to increase Soviet aid
to Cambodia and redirect military aid to Vietnam to the civilia ector
after peace is restored.
Comment: The Soviets may be trying to convince Phnom Penh of
their seriousness in seeking a solution to the Cambodian situation.
Soviet press reports of Hun Sen's visit confirm the Soviets expressed
dissatisfaction with Cambodian use of Soviet economic aid. The
pressure on Hun Sen accords with indications over the past year that
the Soviets have also been uraina Vietnam to seek a negotiated
settlement in Cambodia
The Soviet toughness was probably designed as much to impress the
Chinese?whom the Soviets are sure to tell about the exchange.
There is no evidence they have threatened to cut off aid to Vietnam,
which would jeopardize Soviet facilities at Cam Ranh Bay, and the
Soviets have made no specific suggestions on a settlement. The
Soviet messages also may have been more convincing had they come
from Prime Minister Ryzhkov, who met Hun Sen in Moscow, or other
high-level officials. The Soviets probably will continue to limit their
pressure on Hanoi to strong suggestions and offers of logistic support
for negotiations such as Mo ? AL ? ? ? -11 11- ? I 'I uk
meeting last month.
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EAST GERMANY- The Honecker Visit
FRANCE:
East German party chief Honecker's two-day visit to France
beginning today is part of a sustained campaign to win
international acceptance of East German sovereignty; he may
also urge Paris to support Soviet arms control proposals on
short-range nuclear missiles
Honecker's talks with senior French officials?probably including two
meetings with President Mitterrand?reportedly will focus on bilateral
relations and East-West issues. Press reports indicate the French do
not want to discuss issues relating to Berlin's status but will do so if
Honecker raises them. Accordingly, the French do not olan to push
President Reagan's Berlin initiative.
Comment: The visit, although likely to be short on substance, marks
another important step in Honecker's efforts to gain full Western
acceptance of East Germany as a legitimate European state. For the
first time Honecker will be received as head of state by one of the
three Western guarantors of Berlin's postwar status.
Honecker will probably present himself as the chief East European
interlocutor with Western Europe on arms control. In a letter delivered
to West German Chancellor Kohl last month?but published only last
week?he focused on disarmament issues, stressed both Germanys'
special responsibility for arms control, and proposed talks on
eliminating short-range missiles in Europe.
In Paris, Honecker probably will reiterate East European appeals for
eliminating chemical and short-range nuclear weapons but will not
press the French, who remain unenthusiastic about negotiations on
such systems. The visit is not likely to do much to expand East
Germany's weak economic ties to France. Honecker almost certainly
will extend an invitation to Mitterrand for a return visit to East Berlin.
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Top Secret
SOUTH KOREA- Airliner Bombing Confession
NORTH KOREA:
Seoul reportedly will soon announce North Korean terrorists
were responsible for destroying the Korean Air passenger plane
on 29 November, a revelation that would hiahliaht the threat of
violence against the Olympics.
The surviving suspect in the bombing reportedly has confessed
that she and her male companion, who committed suicide during
questioning in Bahrain, acted as North Korean intelligence agents.
She has admitted the two planted a bomb aboard KAL
flight 858 before it took off for Bangkok.
The young woman, who was extradited from Bahrain on
15 December, reportedly has recently been cooperative with South
Korean security officials. She no longer tries to hide her fluency in
Korean and has revealed that she is the daughter of a North Korean
diplomat posted to Angola. Seoul reportedly intends to announce
the results of its investioation at a Dress conference in two weeks.
Comment: It is still uncertain how Seoul will play the issue of North
Korean sabotage but may use the woman's admission to discredit
P'yongyang, believing that publicity represents the best deterrent to
further violence. An attempt to dramatize the North Korean threat,
however, could put the international spotlight on the Olympics in a
way that would call into question Seoul's ability to provide security
for the games.
North Korea's motives remain unclear. If the terrorist act was an
attempt to frighten tourists away from the Olympics, other incidents
may follow. As an isolated incident, the airliner sabotage occurred too
early to have a meaninaful effect nn he September games
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PALESTINIANS: Weighing Government-in-Exile
PLO officials are again considering establishing a government-
in-exile but are likely to defer a decision because of factional
differences and uncertai7ties about possible diplomatic gains.
146e-raisecL-thiritlea
of a government-in-exile following thet.Aretrstlff Mt in Amman in
November,
Committee d
a dec
The full Executive
the matter in Tunis late last month but deferred
so that the structure and policies of such a government
_Chairman Arafat's
principal deputies, Salah Khalaf and Khalil al-Wazir, and the deputy
secretary general of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of
Palestine, the PLO's official spokesman, have said publicly a
Palestinian government-in-exile is not imminent
Comment: The idea of a Palestinian government-in-exile has been
discussed in the past, particularly at times when Arafat has believed
his or the PLO's political standing was waning. Ehe-ifrtpetbis-fef-the
it -at
? ? ?
lereeti-eeetspiethterttorieSome PLO officials are likely to believe
a government-in-exile would rev'talize the PLO's role as the sole
legitimate representative of the Palestinians and place Arafat on
equal footing with other Arab leadersai-owneeetrrtegetiattarrs-inritit
4sraet
Nonetheless, many PLO officials probably see serious drawbacks to
the idea. They fear it would trigger maneuvering among the various
Palestinian groups to fill the slots in the "government," increasing
rivalries and tensions within the PLO, and possibly undermining
Arafat's control. Moreover, they are concerned that some countries
that have accorded diplomatic status to the PLO might not recognize
a Palestinian government-in-exile because it might appear to endorse
implicitl the idea of an inde enden stinian state.
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8 TJnuary 1988
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USSR-AFGHANISTAN: Shevardnadze Discusses Withdrawal
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In an interview with the Afghan media at the end of his visit to Kabul
, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze claimed the Soviets would
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like 1988 to be the last year their troops are in Afghanistan. But, later
in a Soviet television interview, he said "very many questions remain
unresolved" at the UN-mediated Geneva talks between Afghanistan
and Pakistan. He said the international and the domestic aspects of
the Afghan problem are linked, but he stressed the importance of
concluding the Geneva negotiations?expected to resume next
month. Shevardnadze said the forming of a coalition government was
only the first step toward an agreement on Afghanistan's future.
TM to PcsklbtclrI,
Comment: Shevardnadze's stress on a settlement and Moscow's
desire to remove its troops by the end of 1988 are probably in part
aimed at creating the impression internationally that the Soviets are
serious about withdrawing. Although Moscow may be trying to
impress on Kabul the need to accept more than cosmetic power-
sharing arrangements as part of any long-term settlement, the
Soviets probably do not intend to withdraw unless assured of leaving
behind a Marxist-dominated coalition. g+e-eehiera43e-elaraaseetze
visit-aect-thie-mention-ef-probleals-torbet esuivedsin-Genevasmarbe
setling-tbaslagestoreevietwaftemple-terstilf t-bfame-for-theirpresence
ifi-Mghenestaa49444e-61S
WEST GERMANY: Genscher Woos Opposition
West German Foreign Minister Genscher is stressing the interests his
Free Democratic Party shares with the opposition Social Democrats,
in part to gain leverage on his Christian Democratic coalition partners.
Earlier this week, he told journalists all West German parties now
share a "new thinking" on disarmament and a positive view of Soviet
leader Gorbachev's reforms. He said he agreed with the Social
Democrats' view that short-range nuclear missiles should not be
counted on to offset conventional disparities?a position at odds
with official West German and NATO policy
Comment: Genscher is trying to take credit for the major parties'
consensus in favor of a new phase of detente with Moscow, even
though the government and the opposition differ over the specifics
of arms control. An FDP spokesman, for example, recently praised
Bavarian leader Strauss for "adopting" Genscher's view of
Gorbachev during his recent trip to Moscow. The Foreign Minister
is drawing fire from the Christian Democrats, who resent his
grandstanding and fear a coalition switch by his Free Democrats.
Genscher is unlikely to switch soon, however, because his influential
cabinet position is contributing to a major electoral resurgence by his
party. Polls show Free Democratic voters strongly favor the current
coalition, and the FDP continues to differ sharply with the Social
Democrats over economic policy
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POLAND: Electoral Reform Promises Broken
The Polish Government has published guidelines on electoral reform
that restrict candidate selection to committees controlled by the
regime and its political allies. Selection committees will be chaired by
a representative from the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth, a
front dominated by the Communist party. The committees can select
a maximum of two candidates for contested posts and exclude any
nominees about whom "justified reservations" arise. The guidelines
are regime proposals for "public consultations" and have not yet
been legally adopted
Comment: The proposals fall well short of the far-reaching,
"dramatic" reforms promised last fall by a leading party liberal and
will draw severe opposition criticism. They will also disappoint
members of Cardinal Glemp's advisory council who have called on
the regime to open public life to Catholic participation. A vocal
lay-Catholic backlash might still force the regime to modify the
guidelines, which a regime spokesman described as not yet final.
Nonetheless, the restrictive nature of the proposals indicates the
regime's determination to limit access?even to local offices?to
candidates it approves.
USSR-SWITZERLAND: Soviets Issue Bond
On Tuesday, the USSR offered?through a West German-owned
Swiss bank?its first sovereign bond, a 10-year, $78 million issue
denominated in Swiss francs. The borrower will be the Bank for
Foreign Economic Activit form LI?Al 1-shtorgbank, the
Bank for Foreign Trade.
Comment: If successful, the offering may pave the way for Moscow to
borrow substantially more on larger bond markets like London. The
USSR had been expected to enter the Eurobond market since it
settled with holders of outstanding Tsarist bonds in the UK in 1986. In
addition to providing longer repayment periods and lower interest
rates than syndicated loans, bonds would give Moscow access to a
larger pool of funds because they can be held not only by nonbank
financial institutions like insurance companies and pension funds but
also by private investors. Although investors will determine whether
Moscow's first offering succeeds or fails, the small size of the issue
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Middle East
talks with Israel, 25X1
Lebanon's Shia Amal seeking UN help to revive
nH
suspended in 1985, according to US Embassy in Beirut ... Tel Aviv X
satisfied with current standstill Syrians
probably behind Amal
? .
move
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,
Syrian Vice President Khaddam and Foreign
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yesterday began three-day tour of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman,
and United Arab Emirates probably will explain Syria's
Iran
policy and seek Arab aid.
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Pakistani troops leaving Saudi Arabia,
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Africa
. 7,000 to withdraw by March ... Riyadh probably will 25X1
eep air defense troops understrenoth Saudi army cannot fully
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? Algerian President Bendjedid, Libyan leader Qadhafi to visit Tunis
next week ... President Ben Ali expects intense pressure to
accept Libyan inclusion in treaty linking Tunisia with Al eria
Mauritania ... Tunis, Tripoli resumed ties last week
Surinamese Army killed several rural black noncombatants,
according to US Embassy... likely to become contentious issue
between military, new civilian government to be installed soon
could jeopardize resumption of aid from Netherlands.
Sudanese security warning government that Iranians are trying to
form Hizballah cell in Khartoum
... reflects increasing Sudanese concern about Iranian intent to
expand influence in area.
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11 7 January 1988
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Polls Show Filipinos Increasingly Concerned About Insurgency
USIA commissioned a national survey in the Philippines in mid-1987 and found that Filipinos
ranked the insurgency behind unemployment and the high cost of living as a major national
problem. Those who believe the NPA poses a serious threat increased from 50 percent in a
survey taken in late 1986 to 75 percent in last year's poll.
Residents in NPA-contested areas believed more people join the NPA out of dissatisfaction
with local government services and justice than because of poverty. The more affluent
'residents of Manila believe poverty is the primary reason behind joining the NPA.
Other key findings:
? 43 percent saw "ordinary people" as becoming less sympathetic to the NPA.
? Only 1 percent said their primary source of information on the NPA came from
Communist lectures, or teach-ins. The vast majority received such information from the
media.
? Only 57 percent of rural respondents were aware of the two-month cease-fire a year ago;
in NPA-contested areas, those most affected by that cease-fire, only 44 percent of the
people knew a cease-fire had been declared.
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Special Analysis
PHILIPPINES: Communist Insurgency at Yearend
Hardliners regained leadership of the Communist Party of
the Philippines last year and adopted more militant tactics,
including sabotage, use of landmines, and the assassination of
US servicemen. The New People's Army?the party's military
arm?has not yet been seriously challenged by the ineffective
Philippine armed forces. The NPA will probably continue to grow
slowly in numbers and influence this year and may mount larger
attacks if it can acquire heavy weapons from abroad.
The party's failure to gain politically from the constitutional plebiscite
or the congressional elections last year weighed heavily in its decision
to portray the Aquino administration as a US puppet and to turn to
more violent tactics. Party members who advocated a political
struggle have lost credibility and funding, and some political front
members have been driven underground by anti-Communist
vigilantes.
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CIA estimates the number of full-time guerrilla regulars increased
from about 17 000 early in 1987 to about 18 000 at the end of the
year; ! the NPA exerted ? 25X1
some degree of control over more than 20 percent of all villages.
Philippine military statistics also show the number of violent incidents
and armed forces casualties?more than 1,100 soldiers?increased
only slightly as compared with 1986, but the number of NPA raids on
harder targets such as outposts and police stations, increased by
nearly 40 percent. Manila became a favored site for terrorism; the
.
NPA carried out more than 100 assassinations?far mre than in any
other year?including that of Cabinet Secretary Ferrer.
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The attacks drew widespread criticism, but the NPA, which previously
had avoided attacks on major economic targets, defended its
destruction of bridges and powerlines as a legitimate means to
weaken the government. The NPA last year also used landmines more
widely and proficiently than ever before, damaging or destroying
23 military vehicles and killing nearly 100 soldiers,
External Support
The party devoted considerable effort last year to acquiring more
foreign assistance and heavier weapons and may have had some
success in obtaining funding from Libya and at least the promise of
arms from North Korea. It also opened a direct line of communication
to the Soviet party,
continued
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The Philippine party's political front concentrated on obtaining funds
from leftist organizations in Western Europe, Japan, Australia, and
the US. A party spokesman admitted receiving money from donors in
25 countries last year, and the Philippine military estimates the
contributions may have exceeded $8 million last year as nomr? ared
with $2.5 million in 1986.
The Next Few Months
The insurgents are in a good position to sustain their momentum.
NPA hit squads?in reaction to internal criticism of the selection of
low-level targets?are likely to kill fewer, but more prominent,
Filipinos and almost certainly will attempt to assassinate US citizens.
The NPA also probably will increase the use of mines as the Philippine
armed forces receive more US-supplied trucks and armored vehicles.
Even if the military and the government can develop and implement a
counterinsurgency program, they will be hard pressed to make gains
against the NPA this year. The armed forces are already constrained
by poor leadership and training and will be distracted early in the year
as the senior leadership retires. Moreover, there is no indication that
the civilian agencies, whose budgets and programs are now subject
to legislative debate, are prepared to contribute effectively to the
counterinsurgency effort.
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Special Analysis
COLOMBIA:
Drug Mafia's Power Growing
The recent release of drug baron Jorge Ochoa is a measure of
the influence drug traffickers have gained over virtually every
branch of the Colombian Government. Bogota faces great
political and security risks in trying to find a legal and safe way to
extradite traffickers and is increasingly unlikely to expel Ochoa
or other kingpins
From the outset, efforts to extradite Ochoa were stymied by daunting
legal barriers. Since the Colombian Supreme Court invalidated a
1979 extradition treaty with Washington, the US has tried to persuade
Bogota to use other mechanisms, including an 1888 extradition
treaty, the Montevideo Convention, and state-of-siege powers
granted under Colombian law:
? President Barco has been reluctant to use the 1888 treaty or
the state-of-siege powers?the most expedient mechanisms,
which also put the extradition decision on his shoulders alone.
? Alternative legal processes are slow and tortuous and shift the
onus to the intimidated Supreme Court.
The traffickers have the best attorneys in the country, including
several former Supreme Court judges, according to the US Embassy.
In addition, the traffickers have penetrated the Justice Ministry, the
Supreme Court, and the Congress, giving them access to the
government's strategies. They use that access and influence to create
a variety of barriers to extradition, such as arranging to be tried in
Colombia on the same charges as are pending in the US, thus
avoiding expulsion on the basis of double jeopardy
During recent Colombian congressional hearings, Ochoa's attorneys
were on the dais, feeding embarrassing questions to the committee
chairman in an attempt both to discredit the extradition process and
to elicit from the Minister of Justice the government's plans for
handling Ochoa and other traffickers.
Threat of Retaliation
The constant threat of retaliation sa s the government's will.
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Over the past four
ears, no Minister af-Justice has survived the extradition pressures
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continued
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unscathed?one was killed, one was wounded, some resigned, and
others have acquiesced. The current Minister told Embassy officials
that threats to his life as well as compelling legal arguments caused
him to revoke the arrest warrant needed to hold Ochoa for
extradition, opening the way for his eventual release.
-thsrOth?orargaTTIzatian
lieel-some-400-pope1rr8agats-scau1tng-liltely1ergete-4er--
ceetaliatioar4ne4uding-RresiDent-Barco-artel-close4amily?
.membereH
Although Barco denies he was cowed by such threats, they almost
certainly influenced his decision not to order Ochoa's expulsion
unilaterally.
a-constitutionaLauto
.poorltimppie.a.goyersmentattprays.wouleUme_Deen hard Dressed
lo-defenelt-Imitittin through a speech by his Minister of Justice, Barco
has responded to increasing criticism of Ochoa's release by stating
the aovernment followed the only available legal course of action.
In a move probably aimed at mending relations with the US, Bogota
has issued a new warrant for the arrest and extradition of Ochoa and
other top traffickers, under provisions of the Montevideo Convention.
The Embassy also has unconfirmed reports that Barco is considering
invoking state-of-siege powers to expedite extradition procedures.
Such steps might help fend off international demands for more
forthright action and reduce the pressure the narcotics interests are
increasingly applying to Colombia's institutions. Nevertheless, it is
doubtful the government will be able to surmount the leaal and other
options open to Ochoa and other traffickers
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Top Secret
25X1
15 7 January 1988
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/12/18: CIA-RDP89T00113R000100050001-5
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/12/18: CIA-RDP89T00113R000100050001-5 _
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Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/12/18: CIA-RDP89T00113R000100050001-5