NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T01079R000200130001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 5, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 15, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central
intelligence
a National Intelligence Daily
Saturday
15 August 1987
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Toy Secret
Contents
South Africa: No Break in Miners' Strike .................................... 4
Cuba-Nicaragua: Reaction to Peace Plan ..................................
South Korea: Rallies Highlight Political Prisoners ...................... 7
East Germany: More Demonstrations at Wall ............................ 7
Western Europe-US: Prospects for Space Station Dim ............... 8
Suriname: Foreign Exchange Problems ...................................... g
Special Analyses
West Germany-NATO: The Pershing 1A Issue .......................... 10
Central America: Insurgent Reaction to Peace Plan .................. 12
Cambodia: Reactions to Proposal for Informal Talks ................ 14
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Top Secret
!, RUFF UMBRA 25X1
The mineworkers' strike in South Africa is likely to continue for
at least several more days because neither side is under
significant pressure to compromise.
t-feast
300,000 mineworkers are on strike. Most strikers have remained on
mine premises despite union calls that they leave for home.
E~ass3r-s~a~neither the strikers nor the mineowners have tried
to resume negotiations to end the work stoppage, and, accor~dirng~to
pr.~ess=r~ep~ot~~s, union officials,will meet this weekend to discuss
strategy
At least mmewor ers ave een arres a ~, and there has been
sporadic violence between security forces and workers.~bassy
.~ej~ however, mineowners and union leaders have acted
cautious to avoid provoking a confrontation that could lead to
widespread violence and illegal strikes in other sectors. The
government continues to say it will not intervene directly in the strike.
Comment: The mineworkers' union has scored a major victory for the
black opposition movement by demonstrating the ability of blacks to
wage an effective and disciplined strike. Given the success of the
strike, the union is unlikely to settle soon without significant
concessions from the mineowners on pay and benefits. The union
may encourage brief solidarity strikes in other sectors, particularly
among affiliates of the Congress of South African Trade Unions.
Mineowners are probably willing to let the strike continue for at least
several more days, but they will soon look for ways to resume
negotiations with union leaders. Pretoria probably would not
jeopardize talks by intervening in the dispute unless there is a marked
increase in violence. International~d markets=are=anlikely~#~~be
d isruptedsuniess~thepst~rike=lasts=several~m ore:weeks;~and=other.
prod~acer_s~of~gold=will=probablyginereaseTsales to~rn_ ake=up~for any
shortfalls~in=South?Afr,-ican3production,.
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CUBA-NICARAGU~Reaction to Peace Plan
Cuba's announcement of full support for the Central American
peace plan is intended to strengthen Nicaragua's negotiating
position, ~ ~Ppzrrtxfor?.
Havana's endorsement of the plan follows an all-night discussion
between President Castro and Nicaraguan President Ortega, who
traveled to Havana earlier this week to discuss the plan. Before he left
Managua, Ortega said he had consulted with the Presidents of
Guatemala and Costa Rica, both of whom gave approval for the visit.
In a joint note issued at the conclusion of the Havana meeting, Castro
and Ortega claimed they would work toward the removal of "all
foreign military presence" in the region
Comment: -~ek~.pe.-P{a~
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wilt=hel~~e~~s-fir-f~ailer~-c~#-~heraccord-tv?-th,if~
~ac;~re~-r~ebel~s _Ortega's
highly publicized consultation with Castro-who undoubtedly is
advising the Sandinistas on strategy-may be intended to bring
Havana more directly into the negotiations.
Castro might try to embarrass the US by offering a unilateral
withdrawal of some or all of the 600 to 700 Cuban military advisers 25X1
that Havana has publicly admitted are serving in Nicaragua. A total of
2,000 to 2,500 Cuban military advisers are estimated to be there.
Castro-intending to present an image as a regional peacemaker-
"withdrew" 100 advisers in May 1985 but later replaced theme 25X1
Top Secret
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SOUTH KOREA: Rallies Highlight Political Prisoners
The main opposition Reunificatio emocratic Party and allied
dissiden groups plan rallies ~, South Korea's Liberation Day, to
highlight demands for the release of some 200 oolitical detainees.
are asking to t~ii~F"i Roh and President Chun to discuss the issue
1
Comment: Workers and the public are focused on labor unrest and
associated disruptions, making a large turnout at the political rallies
unlikely-although the presence of young radicals could lead to
violence. Opposition party hardliners may see the prisoner issue as a
way to discredit Seoul's promise of democratization and deflect
recent public criticism of the opposition's own factional bickering and
inflexibility in the constitutional reform negotiations.~rs=
-femur-=jai ks~iargely~designeds#o~or-tray
F~s~-as-eor~~ira~i~tct~t~o~pet-a#~in~;-h~nusgsf~advw~,
EAST GERMANY: More Demonstrations at Wall
About 300 young East Germans demonstrated near the Brandenburg
Gate on 13 August, the anniversary of the Wall's construction. The
demonstrators shouted in German, "The Wall must go,"
"Gorbachev," and "Berlin, Berlin," according to media reports. East
German security police kept a low profile at first but ultimately made
about 10 arrests following minor scuffles.ffelAderaasrastxatlor~.era
t~hesVllest~Ber~in~si~fe of=t~e~xa#e~~epo~ted~l~in~1'r~d~ed~orrr~er~i~izeras~fi-
-?ast=CEr~a~rar
Comment: Spontaneous expressions of dissatisfaction from youth
over the regime's restriction of travel and free expression are growing
in frequency. In early June, about 1,000 young East Germans clashed
with police while trying to hear a rock concert being played across the
Wall in West Berlin. The youth appear enthusiastic about Soviet
General Secretary Gorbachev's reforms, but their actions are likely
to add to the regime's reservations about imitating Moscow. East
German leader Honecker, who visits Bonn next month, will be
especially sensitive until then to protests and border incidents that
highlight the unpopularity of his policies, but he is unlikely to take
harsh action against them. He may also worry that the temporary
lifting, during his visit, of East Germany's standing order to shoot
anyone illegally crossing the border will become known and catalyze
embarrassing escape attempts
Top Secret
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7 15 August 1987
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Tee Sp~rpt
WESTERN EUROPE-US: Prospects for Space Station Dim
A senior European Space Agency official told US diplomats this week
that ESA members now believe joint space station negotiations with
the US, in their present form, are likely to fail and that they are
reevaluating whether any form of space station cooperation with the
US is possible. ESA members believe US insistence on a dominant
role in station management contradicts the concept of a genuine
partnership and that US insistence on explicit language permitting
national security uses is offensive to ESA neutrals. ESA convenes on
Thursday to assess the state of negotiations and to consider other
unspecified forms of cooperation arrangements
Comment: ESA's position may be a negotiating tactic, but it also
almost surely reflects the failure of such moderates as West Germany
and Italy to persuade neutrals-Sweden, Switzerland, and Austria-
to accept US proposals on national security use. Pessimism may also
result partly from the realization that ESA budget constraints will
probably force tough choices about the extent of possible West
European participation in the space station. Caught between
shrinking space budgets and military use and management issues,
ESA officials probably have concluded then now have little to lose by
trying to force US concessions.
SURINAME: Foreign Exchange Problems
Government difficulties in trying to increase foreign exchange
availability are likely to continue, aggravating the country's economic
problems. Press reports indicate the military has secured access to
the vital Moengo bauxite mines, which have been closed by insurgent
activity. The US Embassy reports that a government decision to allow
businessmen to import goods freely with foreign exchange obtained
on the black market, however, has done little to alleviate shortages of
raw materials and food products because the money has been going
for other consumer goods. The government reportedly has only
enough foreign exchange to supply 20 percent of the basic food items
most needed. As a result, the rate of inflation has accelerated sharply
as local businesses, faced with rising costs for importedci raw
materials, have begun ignoring official price guidelines.
Comment: Any economic relief generated by reopening the Moengo
bauxite mines may be short lived because of the vulnerability of the
mines to renewed insurgent attacks. Public criticism of Head of State
Bouterse's handling of the economy is likely to mount as prices
increase and shortages become increasingly commonplace. The
economy will become a major rallying point for the opposition parties
as the national election campaign heats up this fall.
Top Secret
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8 15 August 1987
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Middle East ~ Israeli Prime Minister Shamir begins visit to Romania Monday .. .
u President Ceausescu will urge him to agree to international
~? ~ ' conference on;Arab-Israeli peace . ; .-also seekng~aid of Israeli
lobby to win US renewal of favored trade status:
'~FY~
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agricultural, snarling relations with West.
roles unclear ...foreign relations officials in conflict with
State Agro-Industrial Committee ...personnel not in place, key
Gorbachev's "restructuring" interfering with operations of Soviet
meet reduction targets under old, accord ...farmer opposition:
New narcotics agreement with US commits Bolivia to eradicate
roughly 4 percent of coca crop within one year,... La Paz unable to
administrative, resource problems major obstacles.
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15 August.19.87
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Top Secret
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Special Analysis
WEST GERMANY- The Pershing 1A Issue
NATO:
The West European Allies remain firmly behind NATO's position
that the US warheads for West Germany's 72 Pershing 1As should
be excluded from the talks in Geneva, despite a growing public
perception that the Pershings are the only remaining obstacle to
an agreement. The West German Christian Democrats, however,
worry that Washington may not hold fast on this issue. Bonn's
efforts to appear flexible-including recent suggestions that it
mighf compromise on the Pershings in exchange for reductions
in Soviet Scud short-range nuclear systems-risk undercutting
Alliance positions.
Leaders in the INF basing countries and France-without
exception-are prepared to defer to Bonn on the question of whether
NATO should insist on exclusion and modernization of the Pershings.
This deference might erode, however, if Chancellor Kohl's
government cannot suppress differences within the coalition between
the conservatives and the Free Democrats. Officials in Belgium and
the Netherlands probably would be prepared to sacrifice the
Pershings to get an INF agreement and, no doubt, would deviate from
the NATO consensus if it appears the West Germans are leaning
toward compromise. Officials in the UK, France, and, to a lesser
extent, Italy are more committed to exclusion of the Pershings. 25X1
The Scene in West Germany
Domestic pressures on the Kohl government to show flexibility on the
Pershing issue have increased since General Secretary Gorbachev
accepted the global double-zero on INF last month. The opposition
Social Democrats and the Greens are urging that the missiles be
scrapped, and even key Free Democrats are saying publicly the
Pershings must not block an INF accord. The West German public
supports arms reductions overwhelmingly, and a large majority of
voters almost certainly would prefer to sacrifice the missiles to attain
an INF agreement.
Bonn so far is stressing that exclusion of the Pershings from an INF
accord is a NATO and US position, not an isolated West German
demand. The Christian Democrats' reluctance to speak out forcefully
on the Pershings reflects their reluctance to risk losing another battle
against Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister Genscher, a Free
Democrat, especially because they question Washington's resolve on
Tom Secret
10 15 August 1987
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the issue. Because party leaders want above all to avoid the
impression that any surrender on the Pershings had been forced by
US pressure, they probably would abandon their defense of the
missiles at the first sign of US wavering
Bonn continues to delay any decision on modernizing the Pershings.
A West German representative stressed to US officials last month
that the modernization issue must be separated from exclusion,
because politicians currently would be unable to sell a modernization
decision to the public.
Kohl's Options
The Chancellor's first preference is a global double-zero INF
agreement involving no constraints on the Pershings. His second
choice could be to return to ideas expressed earlier this year-a
global zero-zero agreement on LRINF-with equal limits above zero
on SRINF or agreement to defer SRINF to follow-on negotiations. The
elimination of the Pershings-either by destroying the US warheads
now or precluding modernization'of the missiles later-without new
concessions from Moscow would be the least palatable option for
Pershing-Scud Swap Hinted
West German and US press reports over the last several weeks have
cited authoritative sources suggesting that Bonn might agree to the
elimination of the Pershings if the USSR reduced its Scud B force in
Eastern Europe. A public statement along these lines by Kohl's chief
foreign policy adviser probably was intended primarily to justify the
.continued exclusion of the Pershings from the INF negotiations while
demonstrating Bonn's flexibility on the issue.
Kohl probably is not enthusiastic about the swap idea and almost
certainly would not pursue it in discussions with the East Germans or
Soviets without consulting the Allies in advance. The Chancellor is
particularly anxious to avoid giving Washington a pretext to question
Bonn's steadfastness on the Pershings. West German officials
probably have not considered the possible dangers to NATO of this
approach, particularly in the event-probably unlikely-that
Gorbachev were to accept such a swap in an effort to open
negotiations on systems of less than 300-mile (500-kilometer) range.
Toa Secret
Top Secret
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Top Secret
especial Analysis
CENTRAL AMERICA: Insurgent Reaction to Peace Plan
The Nicaraguan insurgents will be the biggest losers if the
Central American peace plan is implemented as scheduled.
Their external support and sanctuary will be eliminated by
November, and they will play no role in cease-fire negotiations
or, short of accepting amnesty, none in the political process.
Salvadoran and Guatemalan insurgent operations will not be
affected in the near term, but guerrilla groups in both countries
worry that Managua intends to live up to its commitment to end
all assistance.
The Nicaraguan insurgents have publicly supported the peace plan by
focusing on provisions that would force the regime to grant full
political freedoms to its opponents, according to press reports.
Privately, however, the rebels have told US Embassy officials they
remain skeptical about Sandinista compliance should US assistance
The Nicaraguan guerrillas are most upset with provisions that would
cut off all external aid to them in 90 days, while freezing them out of
negotiations for acease-fire. They appear willing to accept a
cease-fire negotiated through intermediaries but probably would balk
at attempts to disarm them
The Salvadoran guerrillas claim the plan does not apply to them. They
and the Guatemalan rebels have stated that their insurgencies-
unlike that in Nicaragua-are internally based and independent of
foreign support. Both argue that a peaceful settlement re uires direct
negotiations with their respective governments
Impact on the Insurgents
The morale and effectiveness of the Nicaraguan guerrillas would be
hit hard by a cutoff of US military aid and Honduran sanctuary. Many
would leave Nicaragua, hide out, or accept amnesty, sharply reducing
military activity. Significant numbers, however, probably would
continue the fighting-albeit at reduced levels-indefinitely. ~~ 25X1
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Top Secret
The Salvadoran and Guatemalan insurgencies are likely to feel few
effects in the short term if the plan is implemented. Nevertheless,
the Salvadoran insurgents 25X1
feel the Nicaraguan Government betrayed them by signing the peace
proposal. They worry that Managua will live up to its commitment to
end assistance to their cause. In addition, they believe the plan
undercuts the legitimacy of the guerrilla movement and its rationale
for continuina the war, according to the Embassy in San Salvador.
Insurgent Strategy
Nicaraguan insurgent leaders will probably continue calling for direct
negotiations with the Sandinistas while urging the Central American
democracies to tighten verification procedures. At the same time,
they are likely to look for contingency funding from the US to maintain
their combatants in place until Sandinista noncompliance can be
proved.
Recent discussions among Nicaraguan rebel leaders indicate that
ideological differences and personal rivalries may complicate efforts
to develop a common strategy to expose Sandinista cheating on
democratization provisions. Insurgent Directorate member Alfonso
Robelo wants guerrilla leaders to begin political activities in
Nicaragua soon, according to Embassy reporting, and he presumably
is pressing other members of the Directorate to take advantage of
any openings. Some rebel leaders-like Robelo-may return to
Managua if the Sandinistas lift the state of emergency, while more
conservative ones-such as Adolfo Calero-are unlikely to do so.
The Salvadoran insurgents have accepted President Duarte's call for
negotiations on 15 September but have not endorsed the peace plan.
They are unlikely to change longstanding preconditions for
negotiations-including power sharing-that the government has
previously rejected. The guerrillas in both EI Salvador and Guatemala
will continue fighting, and the Salvadorans, who have urban networks
in place, may resort to terrorism to show they still must be reckoned
with. The Guatemalan insurgents-largely contained in isolated areas
of the country-have little capability for increased offensive action.
Top Secret
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Top Secret
Special Analysis
CAMBODIA: Reactions to Proposal for Informal Talks
The Foreign Ministers of the member countries of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations will meet tomorrow to
develop a consensus on a recently proposed Vietnamese-
Indonesian formula for discussions on the Cambodian question.
After the meeting, Thai Foreign Minister Siddhi flies to Beijing for
consultations and to Pyongyang to meet with Prince Sihanouk.
The mixed reaction of Sihanouk and his international backers to
the formula makes informal talks on Cambodia unlikely before
the UN General Assembly session this fall, if at all.
The so-called cocktail-party plan announced by Vietnamese Foreign
Minister Thach and Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar on 29 July
calls for an initial meeting by the two Cambodian sides-presumably
Prince Sihanouk and Hun Sen, Prime Minister of the People's 25X1
Republic of Kampuchea-on equal footing, without title~.~r.,~,--
preconditions. The Vietnamese~p~assured Mochtar and of
diplomats that they do not object to includin Khmer Rou a leader
Khieu Samphan in Sihanouk's entourage 25X1
Hanoi has also tried to appear flexible by agreeing to "consider
positively" an Indonesian invitation to join a later meeting of all
concerned parties. Both the Cambodian resistance coalition and
ASEAN would see acceptance of the proposal as implying a loss of
status for Sihanouk and would be a retreat from their insistence that
Vietnam participate in talks from the outset.
Sihanouk's initial reaction, however, suggests that he believes this
cocktail-party formula concedes too much and, in articular does not
accord him respect due as senior Khmer leader
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China and the Khmer Rouge probably oppose the plan but do not
want to appear inflexible before the UN General Assembly. Chinese
media played down the Thach-Mochtar meetings and have
emphasized Beijing's support for the resistance's Eight-Point Peace
Top Secret
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Toa Secret
Proposal, which links talks among the Cambodian parties with
agreement between the resistance and Hanoi on the withdrawal of
Vietnamese forces. The Khmer Rouge radio indirectly attacked the
proposal as a Vietnamese trick.
Hanoi is portraying the proposal as another favorable development
toward a regional dialogue on Cambodia. PRK Communist Party
General Secretary Heng Samrin is cautious, repeating only his
longstanding position that the PRK will talk with opposing individuals
or groups except the Khmer Rouge's Pol Pot and his associates. His
stance allows Hanoi to appear to be the more flexible party. Moscow
continues to stress that the time is right for diplomatic progress but
has not specifically endorsed the cocktail-party plan.
The Next Steps
The ASEAN Foreign Ministers this weekend probably will call for
further efforts to refine the proposal and to dissuade Sihanouk from a
meeting with Hun Sen outside of ASEAN's control. Sihanouk may
clarify his position in his talks with Siddhi and at the 28 August
meeting in Beijing of the leaders of the three resistance groups.
Unless the impulsive Prince suddenly accepts the current offer, the
prospects are dim for early discussions among the Cambodian
parties.
Too Secret
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