NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T01079R000200050001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 29, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 6, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Thursday
6 August 1987
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Top Secret
CPAS NID 87-182JX
6 August 1987
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Contents
To Secre
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Persian Gulf: Developments
Central America: Reactions to US Peace Plan
Mozambique: Status of Fighting
Eastern Europe-Israel: Improving Relations
USSR-Asia: Requests for Ship Repairs
Notes
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Norway: Possible Oil Find in Barents Sea
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In Brief
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Special Analyses
Panama: Opposition on the Offensive
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Too Secret
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Top Secret
Insurance Rates Up
060.1:4449f1 hip_?, insurers, citing heightened tension in the Gulf war zone,
t..r.
e Au ?ye3ter.day announced they were almost doubling minimum war risk
61,0 i
? insurance for ships sailing in the northern half of the Gulf. Because
war risk insurance remains only a small portion of overall
transportation costs, the hike will have no impact on the number of
tankers availablefto-transport-Gulf-oil
continued
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2 6 August 1987
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Positions Prior to the Summit
Costa Rica: Proposed plan in January with provisions intended to be acceptable to Managua
... vague on security issues... cease-fire and cutoff of external aid to regional insurgents
upon signature; democratization follows.., recently told US Embassy that it would amend
plan to halt aid and establish cease-fires 60 days after signature, permitting two-month period
to test Nicaragua's commitment to democracy.
Honduras: Proposed changes to Costa Rican plan last week... more explicit on
democratization... delays cutoff of aid to insurgents for six months after signature to ensure
Nicaraguan democratization and guarantee that arms talks will be successful.
El Salvador: Supports Honduran efforts to toughen Arias plan but believes long delay in
cutting aid to insurgents benefits Salvadoran rebels ... favors revision such as Costa Rica
now suggests but will insist on tangible proof of Nicaragua's commitment to democracy.
Guatemala: Had agreed with Salvadoran plan to focus summit discussion on obtaining
Sandinista commitment to immediate internal reforms... also wanted to give attention to
proposed regional parliament, which President Cerezo had championed.
Nicaragua: Avoided detailed commentary on Costa Rican plan ... accepts plan "in spirit" but
raised objections to democratization aspects in talks with Arias ... says Nicaragua already
has a democracy and insists it will not end state of emergency until "US aggression" ceases
... wants Contadora mediators to maintain high profile in talks.
Contadora Mediators: Proposed treaty draft in June 1986, which democracies found
unacceptable ... maintained low profile in recent months but?at the Central Americans'
request?provided new "synthesis" of proposals at joint Foreign Ministers meeting last week
... new proposal contains stronger provisions on democracy than any previous draft of the
mediators but provides for immediate end to external aid to the guerrillas.., arms talks take
place after signature and are open ended.
ugus
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CENTRAL
AMERICA:
Reactions to US Peace Plan
El Salvador's reaction to the US peace proposal suggests the
Central American democracies are confused about how to
proceed at the summit beginning today in Guatemala.
San Salvador has mixed reactions to the plan, which includes only
Nicaragua in its democratization provisions and involves Washington
directly in regional negotiations on security issues. According to the
US Embassy, President Duarte believes the proposal's major
advantage is its bipartisan support in the US
Nonetheless, Duarte feels the proposal is badly timed because it
undercuts the democracies' strategy for isolating Nicaragua at the
summit, according to the Embassy. He believes Nicaragua will claim
that the US plan proves the Central American problem is primarily a
US-Nicaragua issue. Duarte also fears the plan will spoil efforts to
ensnare the Salvadoran rebels into making a commitment to
democracy that is subject to international verification.
Nicaraguan President Ortega yesterday announced that Managua
was ready to begin immediately an "unconditional dialogue" with
Washington to discuss the plan and unspecified Nicaraguan
initiatives. Ortega offered no specific comments on the plan, however.
Comment: The Central American democracies are likely to postpone
decisions while seeking clarification of the dimensions of the US
proposal. They almost certainly will be critical of the lack of prior
coordination and may be defensive about the US initiative. Costa
Rican President Arias, who may regard the initiative as a direct attack
on his peace plan, is likely to have the most negative reaction
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The democracies' reservations about the US proposal, however,
might eventually lead to a consensus on modifying the Arias plan. By
proceeding with their own proposal, the democracies would hope to
undermine Managua's claims that they are US pawns
Nicaragua probably will raise the prospect that the US proposal is
aimed at sabotaging the summit. Ortega's announcement also may
be the first step by Nicaragua to characterize the plan as a ploy to
renew insurgent aid. Managua is likely to complain that the proposal
excludes the Contadora mediators and to insist that they retain their
central role in the peace talks.
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MOZAMBIQUE: Status of Fighting
Zimbabwean and Mozambican forces are continuing their efforts
to root out RENAMO insurgents from north-central Mozambique,
and the auerrilias anoe r to be increasing operations in the
south.
Zimbabwean troops in Tete and Zambezia Provinces have occupied a
number of deserted RENAMO camps in the past two months,
Mozambican preparations to
retake Milange, a major town in Zambezia Province still in RENAMO
hands, are being hampered by a shortage of ammunition and other
logistic problems
Comment: Neither side has made major military gains during the past
several weeks of fighting. Zimbabwean and Mozambican operations
in the north-central provinces may have spurred RENAMO to become
more active in the south.
Pretoria may have provided some new aid, believing that Maputo is
not doing enough to curb activity of the African National Congress in
Mozambique.
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EASTERN EUROPE- Improving Relations
ISRAEL:
Several East European regimes are improving relations with
1
Israel but are still movi1 g cautiously within limits Moscow has
set.
Poland has led the way among East European nations in fostering
relations with Israel. It opened reciprocal Interests'Sections last
October, which Warsaw called a first step toward full diplomatic
relations, according to US diplomats. As a goodwill gesture, Warsaw
also opened an institute to study Jewish contributions to Polish
history
Hungary, only slightly less active, is holding discussions with Israel on
the exchange of Interests Sections. Foreign Ministers Varkonyi and
Shamir met last September in New York to discuss the resumption of
relations, and Budapest recently erected a statue of Raoul
Wallenberg and hosted a World Jewish Congress meeting. A party
official stated in May, however, that Budapest would not establish full
relations before a similar Soviet move
Bulgaria hosted a visit by Shamir's wife last September but has done
little since then. Czechoslovak and East German relations with Israel
have shown almost no movement. Romania, the only East European
regime not to break relations with Israel after the 1967 war, has
maintained full diplomatic ties and the region's most liberal
emigration policy. Recent Israeli press reports indicate that Prime
Minister Shamir has accepted Romania's invitation?also pxtpnripri tn
Foreign Minister Peres?to visit Romania soon
Comment: The East Europeans see better relations with Israel as a
way to improve their chances for US economic support but are
constrained by Soviet Middle East policies and the need to maintain
access to a sizable Arab arms market. They will not establish full
diplomatic relations with Israel without Soviet approval or before
Moscow does. Although the Soviets have been gradually increasing
contact with Israel, they continue to demand that Tel Aviv allow them
to participate in an international conference on the Middle East and
insist that diplomatic ties can only be restored "in the context of the
Middle East peace process."
Poland and Hungary almost certainly will continue to gradually
increase economic and cultural contacts with Israel and to quietly
discuss establishing fuller diplomatic relations. Budapest probably
will also a ree to exchan in Interests Secti n 1- next two
years
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6 August 1987
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To Secret
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USSR-ASIA: Requests for Ship Repairs
Moscow is using attempts to secure repairs for Soviet ships to
obtain or improve access to Asian countries and possibly to
increase intelligence collection.
In the last six months, the USSR has renewed proposals to South
Korean, Philippine, and Hong Kong shipyards to have Soviet
commercial ships repaired, In
addition, China publicly agreed in June to resume repair of Soviet
ships, suspended for more than 20 years
Moscow has put special emphasis on the recent proposals to the
Philippines and Hong Kong. According to press reports, the USSR
has suggested ship repair as a possible form of countertrade payment
for proposed Soviet assistance in the construction of a Philippine
power plant. The Soviets have insisted on access to Philseco
shipyard located iust outside the US naval facilities at Subic Bay.
Probably because of Hong Kong's objections to an onshore Soviet
presence, the USSR reportedly has dropped its insistence on the
presence of a Soviet marine superintendent. The Soviets have put
discussions with the South Koreans on hold for the past three
months, however, probably because of the unsettled political
situation in Seoul and a reluctance to irritate the North Koreans.
Earlier this year, South Korea considered permitting the repair of
Soviet ships in exchange for a fishing treaty permitting South Korean
fishing boats to enter Soviet waters and ports accordirm to the US
Embassy in Seoul.
Comment: Although the Soviets, whose domestic shipyards have
long been overtaxed, would benefit from access to relatively
inexpensive ship repair, Moscow may be using these proposals as a
nonthreatening way of approaching governments suspicious of direct
political overtures, as they have done with fishing deals in the South
Pacific. All three governments are wary of permitting a Soviet
presence in the countries for reasons of internal security. In the
Philippines, the only one of the three with a Soviet diplomatic
presence, the government is sensitive to US anxiety over Soviet
proximity to Subic Bay. Despite their concerns, however, the three
governments may be influenced?among other factors?by the need
to bring business to local shipyards, many of which are suffering. The
South Koreans, however, currently consider the Soviet request dead.
7
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Top Secret
8 6 August 1987
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Greenland
Limit of
Norwegian
Norwegian
Nordkapp
(North Cape)
219
Ostrov Kolguyev
(Kolguyev Island)
Finland
Kola
Peninsula
White
Sea
Arctic
Top Secret
200 Kilometers
? 200 Miles1
710944 (A05818) 8-87
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NORWAY: Possible Oil Find in Barents Sea
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Norway reportedly has found promising oil-bearing strata southeast
of Bear Island in the Barents Sea and is drilling a well west of the
region that is involved in a boundary dispute between Norway and the
USSR. a major discovery could be 25X1
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Comment: The Barents Sea is a potential new source of oil for the
USSR and Norway. Potentially recoverable oil reserves in the Soviet
portion of the Barents Sea are estimated as being in the range of
25-30 billion barrels?roughly the same as in the North Sea. An
additional 8 billion barrels may be in the disputed area. Geological
conditions like those in the North Sea oilfields are believed to exist in
the drilling area, a condition that increases the likelihood of a large oil
discovery.
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Tnn Carrot
9 6 August 1987
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To ? Secret
In Brief
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South Asia
Middle East
Africa
East Asia
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in USSR ... sometimes euphemism for vacation... Moscow
unhappy with Najib's failed peace initiatives but no firm evidence
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Assassination attempt against Bangladesh President Ershad on
28 July reportedly foiled without bloodshed ... led by enlisted
men, civilians.., noncommissioned officers
unhappy with Ershad's corruption, philandering
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Islamic fundamentalists in Tunisia planning more demonstrations,
perhaps on Friday, 25X1
government intends to deal harshly with fundamentalists ... could
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Israeli authorities lifted curfew in Gaza Strip yesterday, according
to press ... residents permitted to enter Israel while security
forces continue search for assailants of murdered militar officer
... numerous Palestinians detained but no arrests yet. 25X1
High-level Mozambican delegation arriving in South Africa
for security talks, according to press... Maputo probably hopes
to diffuse tensions following bombing by African National
Congress in Johannesburg.
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Z:IA I
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South Korea's ruling party elected Roh Tae Woo as
party president... Roh pledged constitutional compromise and X
fair presidential election... President Chun named honorary party
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Papua New Guinea Prime Minister Wingti narrowly reelected_
.yesIerday- . . . likely to continue gloslerate-apiafeaeti to -USslaip
/446146-, relations with Soviets ... fragile government vulnerable to
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Too Secret
10 6 August 1987
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National Civil Crusade
This group was formed on 9 June after former Defense Forces Chief of Staff, Colonel Roberto
Diaz, publicly accused Noriega of political murder, electoral fraud, and corruption. Initially a
loose, ad hoc coalition of 28 civic, professional, educational, and religious groups, the
Crusade now includes more than 100 organizations representing Panamanians of all races
and social classes. Branches exist in every provincial capital, according to the US Embassy,
but are not directly connected to the Panama City organization. Aurelio Barria, President of
the prestigious Panamanian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, has emerged as the
Crusade's most widely known spokesman. Its members describe the Crusade as a moral,
rather than political, organization.
Political Parties
The traditional opposition parties?Authentic Panamenistas, Christian Democrats, and the
Nationalist Republican Liberal Movement?have maintained an uneasy alliance since the
1984 electoral campaign and recently worked out an agreement to share power in a new
government if the current regime falls. Ricardo Arias Calderon and his Christian Democratic
Party have emerged as the most visible opposition political party following the failure of
Arnulfo Arias to exert leadership. Arias Calderon, however, lacks the elder Arias's charismatic
appeal, and his party is narrowly based in the middle- and upper-class white minority.
Students
Leftwing university and secondary school students, who have clashed violently with police, are
operating independently of the opposition. Their main concern before Diaz made his
allegations was opposition to the government's proposed education and fiscal austerity
reforms.
The Catholic Church
The Church, under Archbishop Marcos McGrath, has criticized government corruption and
human rights abuses and seconded the Crusade's call for Noriega to step down. Despite its
sympathy for the opposition, however, the Church?generally conservative and lacking a -
strong populist element?is not likely to assume a leadership role. The Church's more
moderate rhetoric in recent days indicates it hopes to act as a mediator between the regime
and the opposition.
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Special Analysis
PANAMA: Opposition on the Offensive
Panama's diverse opposition, emboldened by the success of its
recent general strike and despite its vulnerability to reprisals by
the military, remains largely unwilling to compromise in its
campaign to oust strongman General Noriega. Led by the
business-based National Civil Crusade, which organized the
antigovernment rallyteyAthe opposition movement poses the
greatest challenge yet to filim militarv-rin7inated regime.
loose -knit alciet itli-fte-Feeegfrizeri
rirr". - 6
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The Crusad s bridging the gap between the traditional middle- and
upper-class olitical opposition and the low-income, working-class
groups that have been the backbone of the regime's support.
Participation in such Crusade activities as car caravans,
demonstrations, nonviolent mass rallies, and business strikes has
broadened to include all sectors of Panamanian societyAeeefel-iRg-to-
-the-tra-Em1,essy7- 25X1
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Seizing the Initiative
The Crusade has demonstrated considerable inaenuitv in its
campaign against NoriegaL
leacled_s_publish a daily undergro_un
-i-ndicalf_)s Crusade leaders outmaneuvered government officials in the
competition for the support of businesses in tile two-day general
strike last week.
Increasingly frustrated, the regime has threatened Crusade members
with arrest, subjected them to legal and economic harassment, and
shut down opposition media. On Teesday, the military raided Crusade
headquarters and seized anti-Noriega literature and yesterday issued
arrest warrants for several Crusade members.Y_ferieeje+as-effered,
cPacessions_ancllast-weekend-p re misecl.ta4esign-after-t-h e-49 89
eleetivirbot-4,14e-ejapesitien-Fejeated-any-deaf-and-cortinue-d-te-ifisist-
he-step