THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00472A001900050008-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 6, 2014
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: April 25, 1965
• Content Type: MEMO

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25 April 1965
HIGHLIGHTS
Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, in a recent conver-
sation with a US newsman on 22 Apriltasserted that
the proposed Cambodian conference was the "only pos-
sibility now available for any sort of talks." He
suggested that such a conference might provide the
opportunity for "corridor talks" about Vietnam. US
refusal to negotiate with the "Liberation Front" would
not cause difficulties at such .a conference, he sug-
gested, although it remains an obstacle to any set-
tlement Of the Vietnam situation. Dobrynin took ,a
hard line about US-Soviet relations, claiming that
American policy in Vietnam was now "killing the So-
viet peaceful coexistence policy," He professed not
to understand US foreign policy:? especially in Viet-
nam where the US "Could not. possibly win." He claimed
that since US actions ,had engaged Soviet prestige,
the USSR felt compelled to escalate Vietnam hostili-
ties when the US did. He stressed that the Soviets
--not the Chinese--were now "running the Vietnam show,"
since it was only the USSR which could provide the
military means that the North Vietnamese needed.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
Two US Marines were killed and four wounded early
today when Communist guerrillas attacked and over-
ran two marine outposts near Phu Bai Airfield. Sniper
fire was placed .on a US Marine patrol. near. Ba. Nang
air base, while to the south in tong An province,
a Regional; Forces - Popular Forces Outpost was' at-
tacked' and destroyed (Para. 1). Two major govern-
ment search-and-destroy operations, in Quang Tin
and Binh Dinh provinces respectively, have been.
favorably terminated (Paras. 2,and 3), A Viet Cong
ambush of government coastal and ground forces units
tn Kien Hoa Province on 23 April has resulted in
heavy friendly Casualties and weapons losses. (Para.
II. Political Developments inSouth Vietnam: For-
mal replacement of AdmiralCang as navy Chief and the
transfer of Saigon garrison commander General Dong to
a less sensitive command appear imminent. Both-have
been under suspension on charges of Corruption (Para. 1).
Lesser leaders of the abortive 19 February coup ,go on
trial Tuesday, but the two principal defendants remain
at lartze (Para. 2)."
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III. Military Developments in North Vietnam:
US aircraft destroyed the Xom Thai Xa highway bridge
and a vehicle ferry at Vinh Son on 24 April (Para. 1).
On 25 April, South Vietnamese aircraft heavily damaged
a vehicle ferry at Ron on Route 1, and approaches
to the Sal Duc mon road bridge have been cratered
by the USAF (Para. 3). No reactions have been re-
ported to several apparently hostile intrusions over
the Hanoi area on 25 April (Para. 6).
V. Communist Political Developments: The Soviet
ambassador to Peiping has told his Algerian colleague
that the North Vietnamese have adopted a more flexible
position on negotiations as a result of their recent
discussions with Soviet leaders in Moscow. The Soviet
ambassador claimed that Hanoi will forego stipulating
the evacuation of US forces as a precondition. (Para. 1).
Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, talking recently with a US
newsman in Washington, stated that the proposed Cam-
bodian conference was "the only possibility now avail-
able for any sort of talks." He said that "corridor
talks" on Vietnam might take place at such a con-
ference (Para. 2). Nforth_Vietnamese Premier Pham
Van Dong, outlining his position in negotiations, has
said that 'favorable conditions would be created if
the US "recognized" the application of the 1954 agree-
ments as a basis for a settlement (Para. 5). North
Vietnamese and Chinese Communist propaganda media
have been concentrating their fire in alleged US
intentions to escalate the Vietnam war (Para. 6).
VI. Other Major Aspects: Cambodian chief of
state Sihanouk, in his latest formulation concerning
a Geneva conference on Cambodia, has taken a Stand
against the participation of the Saigon government,
25 April 1965
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presumably out of skepticism that the Communist states
could be brought to a conference table which included
the South Vietnamese Government but excluded the
National Liberation Front (Paras. 1 and 2).
25 April 1965
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. The press reports that Viet Cong guerrillas
attacked and overran two US Marine outposts on the
security defense perimeter of Phu Bai Airfield, be-
tween Hue and Da Nang, early today, killing two US
Marines and wounding four others. Elsewhere, a
patrol of 150 US Marines encountered enemy sniper
fire 13 miles southwest of Da Nang. Two marines
received minor injuries. In Long An Province, an
unknown number of Viet Cong reportedly attacked and
overran a government outpost, killing 16 Popular
and Regional Forces soldiers and wounding 15 others..
2. According to MACV, the government's large-
scale search-and-destroy operation with airborne
support initiated on 18 April against the estimated
concentration of 3,000 Viet Cong in the Viet An area
of Quang Tin Province, was terminated on 23 April.
Enemy losses were placed at 350 killed (the great?
majority by air strikes), while ARVN units sustained
losses of 26 killed, 86 wounded and 28 missing.
Two UH-1B helicopters and two armored cars were
damaged, and 32 weapons captured, including one
57-mm. recoilless rifle, three 60-mm. mortars, one
.50-caliber machine gun, and three light machine
guns.
3. Final results have also been received on
the government's large-scale heliborne operation
conducted in Binh Dinh Province during 19-22 April
against the 50th main force Viet Cong battalion
and one local force Viet Cong company. Seventy-
three COmmunist guerrillas were killed, 23 captured,
and 16 weapons seized, while friendly losses were
placed at 15 killed (ten US), 19 wounded (one US),,
and two armed UH-1B helicopters destroyed.
4. MACV's military report for 22 and 23 April
shows a combined total of 131 Communist-initiated
incidents, nine of which occurred during the re-
porting periods. The most significant action was
reported in Kien Hoa Province on 23 April, where
25 April 1965
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elements of two Vietnamese junk divisions and a
Popular Forces platoon on a ground combat patrol
mission were ambushed by an estimated 100 Viet
Cong supported by 81-mm. mortar fire. Friendly
losses were placed at 32 killed, five wounded,
four missing, and 36 weapons, including three
automatic rifles and nine submachine guns. Enemy
losses are unknown. Forty government troops es-
caped the Viet Cong encirclement and returned
safely to base.
5. Additionally, during 22-23 April, guer-
rilla-directed 60- and 81-mm. mortar fire was
placed:on an ARVN base area in Phuoc'Thanh Province,
and on government outposts in Long An and Phu Yen
provinces. An unescorted train was mined-in guang
Nam Province, derailing four cars and damaging one
rail. Small arms harassing fire was directed a-
gainst new life hamlets in Kontut and Phuo-c Thy
provinces, a government post in Bien Boa Province,
and a Watchtower in Bac' Lieu Province.
6. During the two-day period 22-23 April,
13 government ground operations of battalion
strength or larger were initiated and 13 terminated,
leaving 22 in progress on 23 April. Twenty-five
Viet Cong were captured and eight suspects detained
during an ARVN search-and-destroy operation con-
ducted in Dinh Tuong Province on 22 April.
7. Company size or smaller operations con-
ducted during 22-23 April numbered 4,534. Twenty-
six contacts were made with the Viet Cong, with
enemy, losses listed as 49 killed, six wounded, 17
captured, and 18 weapons seized. Government forces
sustained losses of 17 killed, 21 wounded, and three
missing. Sixteen weapons were captured.
8. The level of over-all USAF activity generally
increased during the reporting periods, while VNAF
activity reflected a slight decline. Pilot reports
from combat air operations conducted throughout South
Vietnam during 22-23 April estimate 117 Viet Cong
killed and 421 structures and 17 saipans destroyed.
25 April 1965
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9. The total number of reported infiltrees
from North to South Vietnam since 1959 has now
risen to 39,517, up some 2,000 over the February
total, according to a report from USMACV. Some
1,200 are reported as having infiltrated in 1965.
Of the total estimate of 39,517, 20,878 are re-
garded as confirmed as compared to some 19,678
reported in this category in February.
10. The 1,200 infiltrees reported in 1965
are considered to be members of the North Vietnam-
ese 101st Regiment, 325th Division. One battalion
of 400 men is considered confirmed by MACV, with
two more battalions totaling some 800 men reported
in South Vietnam but not, as yet confirmed.
25 April 1985,
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II, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. General "Little" Minh, ?the armed forces
commander, has indicated that he has cleared with
Premier Quat the transfer of General Pham Van Dong
from command of the Saigon military district to com-
mand of the NCO school in Nha Trang, and the replace-
ment of Admiral Cang as navy chief by the inpumbent
navy chief of staff. Both Dong and Cang have been
under suspension for the past two weeks, ostensi-
bly pending investigation into charges of corrup-
tion. To date no hearings on their cases are known
to have been conducted, and it is possible that the
charges may be quietly dropped, particularly in the
case of Dong, who is believed to be more the victim
of Buddhist pressures than actually guilty of seri-
ous malfeasance.
2. The government has announced meanwhile that
leaders of the abortive coup attempt on 19 February
will go on trial Tuesday. The principal leaders, Gen-
eral Lam Van Phat and Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao, have thus
far managed to evade arrest. Thao is continuing ef-
forts to stimulate another coup attempt, operating
from various hiding places in the Saigon area. Ameri-
can officials in Saigon are inclined to doubt Thao's
ability to launch a coup at this time. Nevertheless,
there continue to be signs of restiveness among mili-
tant Catholic elements, who will watch the forthcom-
ing trials for confirmation of their belief that the
Quat government is engaged in a Buddhist-inspired
vendetta against them.
3. The Buddhist hierarchy has issued a state-
ment calling on priests, pagoda heads, and school
directors to prevent any more monks or nuns from
sacrificing themselves by self-immolation. The
statement denounced as "deplorable" the suicide last
week of a young novice and an unsuccessful attempt
by a Buddhist nun. Both handwritten letters pro-
tested the peoples' suffering and calling for peace.
The press reports that yet another monk burned him-
self to death after issuance of the appeal, although
his reasons for doing so are not cited.
25 April 1965
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NORTH
VIETNA
GULF
OF
TONKIN
THAI XA Br.
A TINH Hwy. Br.
ON Fy.
STRIKE TARGETS
24-25 ,APRIL 1965
1:1 US STRIKE
A VN STRIKE
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-III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
1, On 24 April, USAF aircraft destroyed Xom
Thai Xa highway bridge and .a vehicle ferry at Vinh
Son. The approaches on another road bridge at Ha
Tinh were also damaged by USAF aircraft.
3. VNAF aircraft heavily damaged a vehicle ferry
at Ron on Route 1 on 25 April. The approaches to the
Bai Due Thon road bridge were cratered by the USAF,
but the superstructure apparently remains in tact. US
Navy aircraft caused moderate damage to about 50 rail-
road boxcars on the line north of Vinh.
4. As of 1600 EST 25 April, there were no re-
ported losses of US or Vietnamese aircraft is a re-
sult of the week-end strikes.
25 April 1965
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25, April 1965
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
2, ?Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, in a recent
conversation in Washington with a US newsman, stated
that the proposed Cambodian conference was:tthe
only possibilitynow available for any sort of
talks." Dobrynin said that the US would just have
to risk the possibility of a "propaganda pounding"
at such a conference. He added that he could not
say whether there would be "corridor talks" about
Vietnam at such a conference, but claimed that
"there may be."
3. Dobrynin suggested that the question of
"Liberation Front" representation would not be a
problem at a Cambodia conference, but that US re-
fusal to recognize the Front posed a real obstacle
in the way of a Vietnam settlement. He maintained
that US refusal to recognize the,"Liberation Front"
and its insistence that Hanoi mustaccept responsi-
bility for Viet Cong actions were really "precondi-
tions" for negotiations.
4. Taking a hard line on US-Soviet relations,
Dobrynin said that American policy was now "killing
-the Soviet peaceful coexistence policy." He pror
fessed his inability to understand US foreign policy,
25 April 1965
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especially in Vietnam, where the US "could not pos-
sibly win." Dobrynin implied that the USSR had mis-
calculated US policy toward Vietnam. He claimed
that the Soviets thought "they were dealing with
a Franklin D. Roosevelt, but they now know that they
are not." US actions tad engaged Soviet prestige,
he charged, and the Soviet Union felt compelled to
escalate when the US did. He stressed that the
Soviets-,-rather :than'theChitese4.7were,.- now:
"running the Vietnam show," since was t:nly the
USSR which could provide the military means that
the North Vietnamese needed.
5. Hanoi's position on negotiations, as stated
by Premier Pham Van Dong in a report to the National
Assembly published on 12 April, is that favorable
conditions would be created for a conference if the
US "recognized" as a basis for a settlement of the
situation the application of the 1954 agreements.
This would include cessation of attacks on the north,
withdrawal of US forces from the south, settling of
South Vietnamese problems in accordance with the
program of the Liberation Front, and the peaceful
reunification of Vietnam by the Vietnamese without
foreign interference.
6. North Vietnamese and Chinese Communist prop-
aganda media over the week end concentrated their
fire on alleged US intentions to escalate the war
in Vietnam. Hanoi radio on 24 April, quoting a
party press commentary, lashed out at "new measures"
which it claimed were decided upon at the Honolulu
conference to "intensify and expand" the war in both
North and South Vietnam. Despite these "new ad-
ventures" being prepared by the US, the final result
will be "total and ignominious defeat" for the US
"aggressors."
7. Also on 24 April, Hanoi radio once again
took up the cudgel against President Johnson's
proposals for unconditional dicussions. The broad-
cast quoted an article in the DRV fortnightly journal,
"Vietnam Courier," which characterized the President's
proposals as a "booby trap." In terms similar to
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those used earlier by the Chinese Communists, the
article asserted that the 7 April speech actually
demanded that the Communists agree to the division
of Vietnam into two zones "indefinitely," that the
South Vietnamese people should accept "any, Diem,
Khanh, or Quat" Washington sees fit to appoint,
that the South Vietnamese sliould stop fighting a-
gainst the "bloodthirsty puppet regime in Saigon,"
and that US troops and bases in South Vietnam should
be allowed to "remain there forever."
8. The article commented that "some people
advise the Vietnamese people not to put forward any
preconditions to negotiation,." 1e article asserted
that the Vietnamese "people" are not fighting for
"preconditions" but for their. "independence, freedom,
the unity of their fatherland," and "all those funda-
mental and inalienable rights indelibly inscribed
in the Geneva agreements and constituting the essence
of these accords."
9. Comparing the US proposals to those made
by France in the Algerian War, the article claimed
that Washington wants the Viet Cong to lay down their
arms, to leave US troops in South Vietnam undisturbed,
and to bow their heads before the "Saigon puppets,"
and then "peace would come." To this the article
replied, "no, nothing doing." The article concluded
by asserting that the "Vietnamese people are not
frightened by your stick and will not stoop to beg
for your carrot."
10. The Chinese Communists also attacked the
Honolulu conference, terming it another of a series
of "calculated steps for a gradual expansion of the
war." A People's Daily editorial on 24 April claimed
that the Honolulu meeting was called after the "US
war blackmail and peace fraud" had "gone to the dogs."
The editorial alleged that what it called "the theory
of escalation" is now popular in US "ruling circles"
and compared it with the tactics of Hitler "just be-
fore the outbreak of World War II." The path of
"escalation," according to the editorial, is a path
leading the US "to the grave."
25 April 1965
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11. Unity between North Vietnam, Communist
China, and the Laotian Communists was the theme of
a Chinese Communitt,banquet in 'Kunming staged for
North Vietnamese Premier Pham-Van Dong during his
two-,day stopover on his way home from the Bandung
anniversary celebrations in Djakarta last week.
Chinese Communist leader Chu Te, one of Mao's old
"comrades in arms" and Chairman of the National
Peoples Congress Standing Committee, went to Kunming
to greet Dong. Chu Te-, in his remarks at the 24 ?
April banquet, called upon the Chinese, Vietnamese,
and Laotian people to "consolidate their unity" and
to "fight to the end" against "US imperialism." .
Pathet Lao leader Prince Souphannouvong was also
present, having returned from the Indonesian cele-
brations with Pham Van Dong.
25 April 1965
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VI. OTHER MAJOR ASPECTS
1. Prince Sihanouk, in a speech given on 24
April, stated that any Genevaconference on Cambodia
would be restricted to the signatories of the 1954
Geneva Accords, which if adhered to literally would
exclude South Vietnam and the US, neither of which
signed the agreements. The Cambodian chief' of state
added that participation of the Saigon government
would in particular cause difficulties, since it is
not recognized by "certain of the Socialist powers."
Sihanouk's latest stand on a conference seems to re-
flect his skepticism that the Communist states would
attend if a conference would include the South Viet-
namese Government but would exclude the National Lib-
eration Front.
3. The Japanese Government is considering taking
the initiative to help restore peace in Southeast
Asia. Prime Minister Sato-has,handed Ambassador
Reischauer a Foreign Ministry outline of a draft pro-
posal to the USSR. It asks Moscow to persuade North
Vietnam to drop its demand for the withdrawal of US
forces as a precondition, in return for which Japan
would encourage the US to consider an early opening
of negotiations. In addition, independent of the above
approach, the, Japanese Foreign Ministry proposes talks
with the US in regard to a preliminary suspension of
the bombings and some form of Viet Cong participation
in a cease-fire agreement.
50X1
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/06: CIA-RDP79T00472A001900050008-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized CopyApproved for Release 2014/02/06 : CIA-RDP79T00472A001900050008-9
? Iur 3.UK.t, I ?
TOP SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/02/06: CIA-RDP79T00472A001900050008-9