WESTERN MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-01617A002400060001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 8, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

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2iVssT 8 SE0.1950
CONTENTS
Page
HIGHLIGHTS - 1
WESTERN MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
European Rearmament Problems
NAT Conscripticin
UK-Egyptian Talks
Arabian Military Demands .
Chinese Nationalist Pressure
Tibetans Request Aid
CURRENT SOVIET TAC TICS
Malik's Stand
North Korean Reserves
Satellite Trade
? ? ?
. 7. . . .
3
3
4
5
, LOCAL DEVELOPMENTS .
Finnish Cabinet Threatened
French -Indochinese Armies
Korean War Review
? .South African Elections
8
9
10
11
11
West German Strikes 12
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HIGHLIGHTS
In a week devoid of any startling developments
affecting East-West relations, the Soviet Union gave every
indication of pursuing during September the same general
tactics in the United Nations, any variations being largely
the result of having lost those opportunities for procedural
obstructionism deriving from Malik's position as president
of the Security Council (see page page 7).
Meanwhile, any real progress toward the rearmament
of Western Europe appeared to hinge upon the resolution of
two crucial issues: the form and extent of US aid, and how far
the North Atlantic Treaty nations would move toward a truly
integrated European defensive effort (see page 2),
British-Egyptian defense negotiations once again
reached a stalemate (see page 4); and Chinese Nationalists
and the Government of Tibet both increased their pressure
for US military assistance (see pages 5 and 6),
In other sensitive areas of the world the most crucial
developments included the growing threat to the Finnish
Cabinet (see page 9) and continued French reservations re-
garding the creation of a strong native army in Indochina (see
page 10).
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WESTERN MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
Rearmament Problems Although the recent session of the
North Atlantic Treaty Deputies re-
vealed general agreement on the inaL;equacy of the presently
projected European rearmament effort and the need for its
acceleration, it became clear that the crucial issues confront-
ing the NAT countries are whether this rearmament is to be
a fully integrated effort and how it is to be financed. The
European Deputies clearly regarded the form and magnitude
of US aid as a key factor affecting the scope of the defense
effort Europe can sundertake. For instance, while recom-
mending an immediate high priority military production pro-
gram, the Europeans emphasized the extent to which such a
program would depend on US aid, particularly for financing
intra-country transfers of military equipment. Moreover, the
UK and France were particularly insistent that they must know
the total US aid available before they could implement over-all
rearmament plans.
A more comprehensive issue was raised by French
insistence of the need for a far more closely integrated NAT
effort, including a collective system of financing which would
fairly distribute the rearmament burden. A cleavage similar
to that over other European unification measures is apparently
developing over this issue: the UK, probably supported in
varying degrees by Canada, Norway, Denmark, and Portugal,
prefers a limited association of national efforts, while Belgium
and Italy tend to support the French. The European NAT mem-
bers*ill probably eventually agree on a compromise between
these two views because: (1) the French are likely to insist
on greater unity as a condition not only for expanding their own
rearmament 'program but for permitting any real remilitariza-
tion of Germany; and (2) the NAT members will eventually be
forced to the realization that an adequate rearmament program
is impossible without some degree of greater defense integration.
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NAT Conscription Meanwhile, the decisions by the Govern-
ments of the UK, France, and Belgium ?
subject to parliamentary approval-- to increase the respective
terms of national military service reflects the growing recogni-
tion in Western Europe of the urgen., need for greater defensive
forces in being. The British proposal to increase service from
18 months to two years would augment present British forces by
approximately 70,000 men in about a year's -time. British pres-
sure on the continental countries to join the UK in lengthening the
conscript period, combined with general US pressure for a
greater European military effort ,were partially responsible for
the French, and Belgian decisions. However, many of the con-
tinental countries, though willing to make some increase in the
term of military service, will be slow to follow the British lead
of requiring two full years because of their reluctance to in-
crease forces more rapidly than equipment becomes available.
-3
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UK-Egyptian Talks Once again British-Egyptian discussions
regarding defense arrangements appear
to have ground to a halt; the questions under consideration have
been referred back to the two governments for study. On the
central issue of the British garrison in the Suez Canal Zone; Egypt
has apparently felt unable to compromise: even though some
Egyptian officials secretly oppose complete British evacuation,
many Egyptian leaders have publicly demanded that the troops
leave and Foreign Minister Salaheddin seems to feel that con-
tinued delay may force the British to yield ground. As for the
UK, the so-called Gaza plan, which offered a possible com-
promise whereby the British troops in the Canal Zone would
be moved to the Gaza area, appeared impractical to many of
the British concerned, while the Korean outbreak has strengthened
the UK's interest in remaining in the Canal Zone, Nevertheless,
British Ambassador Stevenson as well as some British Foreign
Office officials doubt whether the UK can ignore Egypt's demands
until their present treaty expires in 1956. The fact that British
Foreign Secretary Bevin and Salaheddin will both be at the
General Assembly meeting in New York this fall offers a glimmer
of hope that agreement may be reached on a real basis for treaty
negotiations.
STAT
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Arabian Military Aid . King Ibn Saud has again demanded
that an immediate decision be made
regarding the proposed plan for US military aid to Saudi Arabia.
Seizing upon a request by: General O'Keefe that the US be per-
mitted to store bombs at the Dhahran Air Base, the King launched
into the now familiar theme that the US is anxious to defend the
air base but not Saudi Arabia. As is his custom, Ibn Saud ended
his speech with the threat that, failing to receive assurances of
aid from the US, he will turn elsewhere (by implication, to the
UK) for assistance. The King, however, is well aware that there
is little possibility of receiving substantial: aid from non-US
sources and he may be expected to acquiesce in additional defense
measures at Dhahran. Nevertheless, the protracted US delay in
reaching a decision on arms aid to Saudi Arabia has imposed an
increasingly severe strain on the King's patience and on US-Saudi
relations in general, a strain which may yet manifest itself to the
detriment of US interests in the area. .
Chinese Pressure In what may be another move aimed at
forcing the US to underwrite the security
of Taiwan, the Chinese Nationalist Government has formally
requested that in the event of a modification of the US 27 June
policy toward Taiwan there be "consultation and understanding
between the US and the Chinese.' The note also asked for in-
dications of what the US intended to do if the Chinese Com-
munists attacked after the withdrawal of the Seventh Fleet.
Reminiscent of Nationalist charges in 1947 and 1948 of US
responsibility for Communist military build-ups during the'
1946 to 1947 truce, the note alleged that since 27 June the
Chinese Communists have been able to prepare unmolested for
the invasion of Taiwan, thus placing the National Government
"under great military disadvantage." Further indication of
Nationalist anticipation that the US will not only underwrite the
security of Taiwan but will donate the necessary supplies for
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the island's defense is found in recent Nationalist Cancellations
of contracts for-essential-defense -materiel to be purchased .
abroad. The Nationalists have recently cancelled orders for
50 F-51 nixernft ns well as contxactslo.rsadar.azui other con
munications equipment (including technicians to install the
equipment) valued at $865,000.
Tibetan Request Tibet apparently has not yet given up hope
of obtaining:military aid with which to
oppose threatened Chinese Communist invasion and has dis;r
patched a note requesting specific quantities of arms from the
US for use by the extremely liniited Tibetan army. At the same
time, however, Lhasa is preparing to enter into negotiations with
Chinese Communist representatives in New Delhi. By attempting
to negotiate an adjustment of their claims to autonomy with the
Chinese Communists' demand .that Tibet recognize Communist
China's sovereignty, the Tibetan representatives may be stalling
for time in. order to take the, measure of possible Western support,
? They are probably well aware that any 'agreements to "autonomy
Within Communist China" will be the first step in the Communist
program to gain full control. Chinese Communist infiltration and
propaganda activities have already produced, considerable confusion
and disunity in Tibet and recognition of Communist sovereignty
would only hasten the process of assimilation.
6
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TOP SEC.RET
CURRENT SOVIET TACTICS
Malik and the UN Soviet tactics in the Security Council
during September will in general con-
form to the pattern developed during August; any variations
will be largely the result of having lost those opportunities
for procedural obstructionism deriving from Malik's position
as president of the SC. Nevertheless, in continuing his campaign
to use the Chinese Communist charges of US aggression on Taiwan
and US violations of Manchuria to pin the label of aggressor on the
US, Malik will still have considerable opportunity to obstruct, de-
lay and confuse the deliberations of the Security Council. This
campaign, however, designed primarily for Asian consumption,
may begin to backfire during September as reliance on the veto
rather than purely procedural maneuvers will dramatize Soviet
intransgence. Soviet propaganda efforts will be further deflated
by US willingness both tb permit UN investigations of the Taiwan
and Manchurian issues and to abide by majority UN decisions re-
garding their disposition.
North Korean Reserves ? The numerous reports of a readily
available strategic manpower re-
serve in Manchuria composed of Korean veterans (who had
served with Chinese Communist forces in the Manchurian
campaign of 1946-48) tend to be discounted by the non-appear-
ance of such troops in the combat area. It is logical to assume
that if such a reserve had been in existence on 25 June, it
would have been cotnmitted shortly after UN forces had been
committed and when its use might have proved decisive. More-
over, since mid-July the North Korean Army has been using
recruits with as little as two weeks' training. In addition, even
if not immediately available in concentration areas on 21 June, there
has been ample time since that date to organize and equip any,
Korean veterans in Manchuria who would have been far more
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useful in combat than the inexperienced reinforcements
being used. Thus, it is likely that the North Koreans will
have to depend for further replacements on: (1) non-
veteran Koreans recruited in Manchuria and that part of
Korea now in Communist hands; (2) untrained Chinese
Communist or Soviet manpower resources;py (3) Chinese
Communist or SoViet military units, if it is decided to
commit such forces in order either to defend the 38th parallel
or to drive UN forces out of Korea.
Satellite Trade The continuing Soviet campaign to integrate
the economies of the Satellites has resulted
in the almost complete absence of formal commercial and.
financial agreements between Rumania and Bulgaria with the
countries outside the Soviet orbit. These two countries thus
resort to spot purchases of strategic items from the West,
a procedure which is proving more successful in evading
Western export controls than would be possible if formal
commercial agreements were in effect. Rumania has been
obtaining many types of petroleum equipment, bearings vehicles
other and goods on the prohibited lists. Bulgaria is obtaining
from the West similarly banned goods, especially transport
equipment, .required for its industrialization program. More-
over, both countries are making direct and clahdestine purchases
of military goods from Western sources. The USSR is apparently
supplying Bulgaria and Rumania with the hard currency for these
spot purchases which, because they can be concluded rapidly and
are small in volume, often go unnoticed by Western officials.
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LOCAL DEVELOPMENTS
FINLAND
Cabinet Threatened The current Social Democratic wage
? offensive, which stems partly from
Finland's growing wage-price difficulties, may lead to the
? eventual downfall of the Kekkennon Government (which is
already under considerable pressure for wage adjustments
in numerous strategic industries). The Social Democrats
'are apparently determined to prove they are indispensible
to a stable government. Labor sentiment and economic
conditions will make it relatively easy for the Social Demo-
crats to focus publid -opinion on Kekkermon and force him
either to request Social Democratic participation in the
present government or resign and attempt to form a new
government including the Social Democrats. The metals
industry is already shut down; a strike is scheduled in the
wood producing industry which provides 90% of Finland's
exports; and work stoppages are threatened in various other
industries and government services. If the growing economic
and political pressures bring about Kekermon s downfall, there
will be a prolonged period of negotiations between the various
parties before another coalition can be formed. These negotia-
tions :will be dOmplickted by the perennial question of including
Communists in the Government. Kekennon would probably
favor including the Communists and the Kremlin would probe
abl3i exert its familiar pressures to support him. The Social
Democrats, as well as the other parties, would steadfastly
oppose inclusion of a Communist in the Government. In such a
situation, the most likely possibility would be the formation of an
Agrarian-Social Democrat coalition which would exclude Communists.
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INDOCHINA
French Military Views Although the French have agreed
in principle to the formation of a
strong native army in Vietnam, their still strong reserva-
tions about implementing the program may considerably
reduce its effectiveness. For example the French have made
it plain that they will be financially unable to realize their
target of a 120,000 -man Vietnam Army by July 1951 and
that the Vietnam Government will be unable to defray the re-
quisite costs. In addition, the French continue to discourage
the development of native armed forces which are not firmly
controlled by the French High Command and have rejected
the US suggestion that Vietnamese serving with the French
regular army be placed under the flag of the State of Vietnam.
Notwithstanding their protestations of their eagerness to
build an effective native force, the French are opposed to
conscription (claiming that manpower is not a great problem),
have activated only four all-Vietnamese battalions since 1945,
now oppose the creation of a Vietnam Army made up entirely
of regular (i.e., battalion) formations as compared with local
militia, and are even reluctant to permit a substantial in-
crease of Vietnamese militia. Finally, the French recognize
the critical shortage of military instructors, but ar'e opposed
' to the assumption of training responsibilities by the US MAAG
and have insisted that US technicians not be attached directly
to the Vietnam Government. It appears, therefore, that the
French are still basically opposed to the development of a
military organization of a type which has proved its ability to
fight without French cadres. Moreover, the absence of any
indication that the expansion of native armed forces in Vietnam
will be accompanied by French political concessions will un- .
doubtedly incline many Vietnamese to believe that their country
is merely contributing more manpower without anything in
addition to show for it.
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KOREA
Military Situation Although the main force of the recent meek-
long North Korean offensive appears to have
been broken by stiff UN air and ground resistance, reports
indicate a considerable movement of supplies and replace- -
ments southward in North Korea and another large-scale
North Korean effort will probably develop in the near future.
Initially, the greatest enemy pressure was exerted in the
south, against the US 25th and 2nd Divisions. After losing
some ground in this area, UN forces counter-attacked and
have now taken up defensive positions along or close to the
line originally held before the North Korean attack. In the
meantime, however, North Korean forces, assisted by a
large concentration of infiltrated guerrillas, broke through
on the northern sector, drove UN forces out of Pohang and
threatened to capture both Kyongju and Yongchon, key points
on the alternate- Pusan-Taegu-supply route. This attack has,
been temporarily contained but the North Koreans continue
to threaten the Kyongju-Yongchon road and are exerting heavy
pressure along the entire front.
SOUTH AFRICA
Election Results The Nationalist Party's sweep of all six
South-West African seats to the Union's
House of Assembly in the 30 August elections constitutes
a severe set-back not only for the United Party but also for
the moderate elements within the Malan Government. With
the coalition's margin of seats increased to thirteen, the
restraining influence of Finance Minister Havenga and his
small Afrikaner Party will be greatly reduced. Consequently,
the Nationalists are now in a position to eliminate the colored
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SOUTH AFRICA
franchise and thereby reduce the future United Party vote.
Another result of the election will be to strengthen the
Nationalists' determination to absoro South-West Africa
regardless of UN criticism and the advisory opinion of
the International Court.
GERMANY
Strike Increase The West German Government is seriously
concerned over the increase in strikes
which began in the Frankfurt building trades on 29 August and
are rapidly spreading to other cities. Rising prices have led
the building worker's union, comprising nearly half a million
workers, and public-service workers to demand substantial
wage increases. Federal Minister of Labor Storch has set
up an arbitration committee in an effort to mediate the strike,
and has warned the workers that granting their demands would
cause serioas inflation. Moreover, any substantial increase in
wages would have serious effects on the program, which in
turn would cause a serious decline in West Germany's export
trade. Meanwhile, the Communists are exploiting the strike
situation through their "national resistance" movement which
is aimed at disrupting the German economy and preventing
German cooperation with Western defense plans. Chancellor
Adenauer doubts that the West German Laender police have
the ability to control serious labor disturbances; and is press-
ing the High Commission for immediate permission to establish
and expand an effective federal force.
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DISTRIBUTION ss.. C:3ANGED 11(); n
DDA Memo, 4 Apr 7?
1 The President Auth- af REG. 1 OH
?
2,3,4,5: ; . Secretary of State Date: ),Ci / 4 By; p2.33
6,7,8 ? Secretary of Defense
Secretary of the Army
10 Secretary of the Navy
11 Secretary of the Air Force
?
12. . .. .. Special Assistant to the President, W. A. Harriman ?
13,14,15. . Chairman, National Security Resources Board
16,17. . . Executive Secretary to the National Security Council
18; . Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air
19 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
20.. Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff
21,22 Chief of Staff, US Army
23,24,25. . . . Chief of Natal Operations .
26,27,28 Chief of Staff, US Air Force
29 Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Operations, US Army
30. ...... Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations), It? Air Force
Deputy Chief of Natal Operations (Operations)
32. Director of Plans and Operations, US Air !Force
33,34 . ,35. . . Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State
36,37,38,39,40141,
42,43,44,45 Assistant Chief of Staff, 0-2., Intelligence, US Army
46,47,48,49,50,51,
52,53,54,55,56, .
57,58,59,60 Director of Naval Intelligence
.61162,63,64,65,66,
67,68,6Q . . Director of Intelligence, Headquaters, US Alt .Force
70. . . . Director of Intelligence, Atothic Energy Conimission
71. . . . . . . . Executive Secretary, Military Liaison Committee,
Atomic Energy Commission
72,73,74,75,76,77,
78,79,80,81,82,
83,84,85, . . Chief, Acquisition and Distribution Div. OCD, State
86.. . Chief, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
87. . . US Air Force Representative on Joint Strategic Survey
Committee
88 Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
89 ? Administrator, Economic Cooperations Administration
90 Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
91,92 ..... ? Secretary, Joint Intelligence Group, Joint Staff
93,94,95 Director, Armed Forces Security Agency
*0 iv, re TO
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