POSSIBLE SOVIET LONG RANGE BOMBER DEVELOPMENT, 1958-1962

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• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: March 4, 1958
• Content Type: SNIE

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cONFIDY TIM
SPECIAL
t
SNIE 1 1-5 8
4 March 1958
MAR 1 195E
N? 266
/-
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 11-58
POSSIBLE SOVIET LONG RANGE BOMBER
DEVELOPMENT, 1958-1962
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
on 4 March 1958. Concurring were The Director of Intelli-
gence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief
of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director
of Naval Intelligence; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelli-
gence, USAF; the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint
Staff; and the Atomic Energy Commission Representative to
the IAC. The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation, abstained, the subject being outside of his jurisdiction.
DOCUMENT O.
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IzR:etirEP
CONFIDENTIAL
POSSIBLE SOVIET LONG RANGE BOMBER DEVELOPMENT,
1958-19621
THE PROBLEM
To estimate what new long range bomber types the USSR may develop for opera-
tional use over the next five years.
CONCLUSIONS
1. The USSR will probably introduce im-
proved bombers into operational Long
Range Aviation units during 1958-4962.
Research and development toward im-
proved manned bomber weapon systems
is under way in the USSR, but the evi-
dence of specific new long range bomber
types is inconclusive. (Paras. 6, 7)
2. During the period of this estimate, the
USSR may introduce into operational
units one or more of the following:
a. Improved versions of the BISON jet
heavy bomber, having better range and
altitude capabilities; (Paras. 14, 15)
b. A new subsonic heavy bomber,
which could probably be available for
operational use in 1959-1960, having per-
formance characteristics somewhat bet-
ter than those achievable by improving
the BISON, especially with regard to
range; (Para. 16)
"The title of this estimate, when used separately
from the text, is classified CONFIDENTIAL.
c. A new medium bomber, which could
probably be available by 1960-1961, hav-
ing supersonic "dash" capabilities and a
range roughly equivalent to that achiev-
able in an improved BADGER. (Para. 17)
3. The USSR probably has a continuing
requirement for and is working toward
aircraft capable of both supersonic speeds
and two-way operations against all tar-
gets in the continental US. The achieve-
ment of both these characteristics would
require advanced airframe design as well
as high-energy chemical and/or nuclear
propulsion. Chemically-powered aircraft
with such characteristics will probably
not be available for operational use in the
USSR until after about 1962, although
prototypes having significant propaganda
impact may appear earlier. The attain-
ment of a nuclear propulsion system for
supersonic aircraft will require an exten-
sive development and test program, prob-
ably extending well beyond 1962. (Paras.
19, 20)
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4. With a high-priority program, a re-
actor suitable for nuclear propulsion of
subsonic aircraft could be available by
1962.2 (Paras. 21, 22)
5. We believe that the USSR has at-
tached high priority to a space-flight
program encompassing work on extreme-
ly high-altitude flight, manned earth
2
satellites and manned space vehicles. It
is probable that experimental manned
rocket aircraft for extremely high-alti-
tude research are now or soon will be fly-
ing in the USSR, but an operational
hypersonic (over Mach 5) glide vehicle
will probably not be achieved until some
years after 1962. (Para. 24)
DISCUSSION
General Considerations
6. As stated in NIE 11-4-57, we believe that
the USSR will retain a strong long range
bomber force, including both medium and
heavy bombers, at least until it has acquired
a substantial nuclear delivery capability with
more advanced weapon systems. Even there-
after, bombers, especially advanced types, will
almost certainly continue to play a consider-
able role, with emphasis on those functions
for which manned bombers are particularly
suited, such as attacks on small hardened
targets, damage assessment, and reconnais-
sance.
7. Thus we believe the Soviets have a con-
tinuing requirement for improved long range
bomber systems capable of penetrating US
defenses and of conducting two-way opera-
tions against all targets in the continental US.
To assist in the penetration of defenses, the
USSR will require that operational bomber
designs be capable of employing ECM, decoys,
air-to-surface missiles, and other specialized
equipment. For the same reason, the desired
2 The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF
believes that this conclusion does not give due
consideration to the possibility of accelerated
Soviet developments in nuclear propulsion be-
tween now and 1962. In doing so, it does not
give enough weight to a factor of particular con-
cern to US security ? that the USSR, through
determined efforts and concentration of re-
sources, has proved that it is capable of unusual
technological accomplishments. He believes,
therefore, the paragraph should read as follows:
"With a high priority program the Soviets may
achieve a nuclear powered subsonic aircraft ap-
preciably before 1962."
performance characteristics of improved So-
viet long range bombers will include increased
speeds, as well as capabilities for very high or
very low altitude penetration. For two-way
intercontinental operations, Soviet opera-
tional forces will require either aircraft with
very long unrefueled combat radii or an in-
flight refueling capability, with compatible
tankers.
8. The continued slow rate of production of
the BISON jet heavy bomber, together with
an even lower rate of production of the BEAR
turboprop heavy bomber, suggest that Soviet
planners may not be satisfied with present
versions of these bombers. The BISON and
BEAR, which went into series production in
1955, represent the level of Soviet airframe
and propulsion technology as of the early
1950's. We now believe that the performance
characteristics of the BISON are somewhat be-
low our original estimates. They may not
measure up to Soviet expectation.8
9. Despite the lagging Soviet heavy bomber
program, the USSR has continued to expand
certain facilities associated with large mili-
tary aircraft. Major new construction has
been reported at most Soviet airframe plants
Our current estimates of the performance char-
acteristics of operational Soviet long range
bombers are presented in detail in revised Table
6 of the ANNEX to NIE 11-4-57: MAIN TRENDS
IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND POLICIES,
1957-1962. A simplified table of performance
characteristics, for purposes of comparison
among present and alternative future Soviet long
range bombers for operational use by 1962, is
presented as an ANNEX to this paper.
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over the past four years. Construction at
bomber plants has been characterized by
large, high-bay buildings; estimated comple-
tion dates at various plants range from 1956
to 1959. Some of this added capacity is be-
lieved to be for the production of the large
transports developed over the past few years.
During the same period, the USSR has under-
taken the construction or expansion of a
number of military airfields. Runways of
well over 10,000 feet in length have been pro-
vided in several areas, including a few of the
potential bomber staging bases in the Arctic.
10. The USSR has adequate research and de-
velopment capacity for more advanced long
range bombers. We estimate that Soviet
capabilities in aerodynamics and structures
through 1962 will permit the design and con-
struction of airframes capable of supersonic
and hypersonic (above Mach 5) flight. So-
viet propulsion capabilities during the period
will probably support bomber development in
the subsonic and supersonic regions up to
about Mach 2.5. We also believe that the
USSR is now actively developing high energy
chemical fuels and nuclear propulsion sys-
tems for aircraft. ? Experiments are being
conducted on structural techniques that per-
mit more advanced and efficient airframes.
Nevertheless, we believe that the USSR will
probably not be able to develop for operational
use during the period of this estimate a
bomber capable of both supersonic speed and
unrefueled two-way intercontinental opera-
tions.4
Evidence of New or Improved
Long Range Bombers
11. The Soviets have made efforts to improve
existing models of long range bombers, to
adapt them to inflight refueling and better
bombing navigation equipment, and to mod-
ify them for transport use. Some of the de-
lay in BISON production, at least until about
mid-1956, was probably accounted for by tech-
nical difficulties necessitating extensive modi-
fication of the airframe. Engine improve-
ments noted in the CAMEL transport in 1957
'See the characteristics of the 1960-1961 medium
bomber in the ANNEX.
3
presumably reflect similar work on the BISON
and BADGER, which employ the same basic
engine.
12. Since mid-1957, we have received some
fragmentary information which could be re-
lated to new Soviet bombers. Among these
items are the following: several observers in
the Kola Peninsula area in October reported
seeing large, high-speed aircraft of delta-
wing configuration; an enigmatic Red Star
article in December described the test flight in
"high latitudes" of a "colossal" jet heavy
bomber, which allegedly covered an unre-
fueled distance exceeded only by one other
type of Soviet bomber. An analysis of the
October sightings does not establish whether
the observers saw known Soviet aircraft or a
new type. The Red Star article was studi-
ously vague as to just how new the air-
craft was and when the flight occurred.
The article could relate either to a completely
new subsonic bomber or to one of the USSR's
existing heavy bomber types, possibly modi-
fied (see paras. 14 and 16). Other fragmen-
tary data suggest that a large new Soviet air-
craft or a modified existing bomber has been
undergoing flight tests since early 1957. In
sum, the above evidence could indicate that
new types of long range bombers are now fly-
ing in the USSR, but it is insufficient to justify
a firm conclusion that this is the case and
it is inconclusive as to what specific types are
under development. We therefore remain
largely dependent upon estimated Soviet
capabilities and requirements in assessing So-
viet long range bomber development.
Bomber Development for Operational
Use by 1962
13. The USSR will probably introduce im-
proved bombers into operational Long Range
Aviation units during 1958-1962. Since the
evidence of specific new long range bomber
types is inconclusive, we remain largely de-
pendent upon estimated Soviet capabilities
and requirements in assessing the USSR's
bomber development programs. Soviet re-
search and development establishments are
probably working on various alternative ap-
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proaches to interim manned bomber systems,
and past experience has indicated that the
USSR may display experimental or prototype
aircraft which will not be developed further
into series production models.
14. Improvement of Present Types. The
USSR could still elect to improve the BISON
by normal refinements, especially in propul-
sion. Soviet planners probably are not satis-
fied with the range of this aircraft, whose two-
way capabilities against the continental US
now appear to be marginal, even with refuel-
ing and staging from advanced bases in the
Arctic. The BISON's combat radius could
probably be improved by 1960 to about 4,450
n.m., with inflight refueling and a reduced
payload commensurate with probable Soviet
improvement in nuclear weapons technology.
This combat radius would give it greater tacti-
cal flexibility but probably still not an opti-
mum two-way intercontinental capability.
Target speeds of 460 knots and target alti-
tudes of about 44,000 feet could probably be
achieved. Increased capabilities to penetrate
to target areas could be achieved through the
use of ECM, decoys, defensive armament and
air-to-surface missiles.
15. Improvement of the Bison would be con-
sistent with the effort the Soviets devoted to
getting the BISON into series production in a
relatively short time, and with their frequent
practice of settling on a weapon system and
producing it in large quantities. It would
permit the most efficient buildup of heavy
bomber production and would impose rela-
tively little drain on Soviet aviation research
and development resources, which could thus
be concentrated on more advanced aircraft.
The same relatively modest development ef-
forts could somewhat improve the perform-
ance characteristics of the BADGER.
16. New Subsonic Heavy Bomber. On the
other hand, if the USSR had an entirely new
subsonic heavy bomber in advanced flight-test
status by the fall of 1957, a preliminary de-
sign would probably have been started in
about 1954 and the aircraft could probably be
ready for operational use by 1959 or 1960.
Considering the estimated state of the art in
the USSR during this time period, in conjunc-
tion with a requirement of about 5,000 n.m.
refueled combat radius for adequate coverage
of the continental US, we believe that such
an aircraft, employing improved turbo-jet en-
gines, could probably achieve target speeds
of 480-490 knots at 46,000-48,000 feet. The
use of turbo-fan engines would result in
slightly greater range capabilities, at some
sacrifice in speed and altitude performance.
A heavy bomber of the type described would
possess generally the same advantages and
disadvantages as the BISON relative to West-
ern defensive capabilities during this time
period, but its greater combat radius would
permit much more flexibility in interconti-
nental operations. A Soviet decision to press
ahead with such a bomber would imply dis-
satisfaction with the growth potential of
BISON and BEAR.
17. New Supersonic "Dash" Medium Bomber.
The USSR has been working on military air-
craft capable of supersonic speeds for a num-
ber of years. Considerable progress in delta-
configuration supersonic fighters and super-
sonic "dash" light bombers was apparent in
the display of prototypes in 1956 and 1957;
delta-configuration fighters are probably now
in production. There are also fairly reliable
indications of Soviet development of jet en-
gines with thrusts well beyond those of cur-
rent engines. A logical next step would be a
medium bomber capable of supersonic "dash"
at speeds up to about Mach 1.5. We believe
that such a project may have been started
by early 1955. If so, a prototype could prob-
ably be flown in 1958 and the first operational
aircraft be available in 1961.5 An aircraft of
this type might have been the subject of the
October 1957 sightings in the Kola Peninsula,
in which case the project might be sufficiently
far along to permit first operational availa-
bility as early as 1960. The speed and alti-
tude capabilities of this type aircraft would
provide it great advantages over present So-
viet long range bombers in its ability to pene-
trate to target areas. Its range would be
roughly equivalent to that achievable by an
This aircraft is designated "MB-61" in NIE
11-4-57.
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improved BADGER, i.e., with one inflight re-
fueling and staging from the Chukotski Pen-
insula, it could probably conduct two-way
operations against a few targets in north-
western US and one-way operations against
all US targets.
13. The USSR may introduce one or more of
the above types into operational units as in-
terim manned bomber systems. In the sub-
sonic heavy bomber field, either an improved
BISON or a new jet heavy bomber would help
the USSR cope with the geographic disad-
vantages it faces in the application of strate-
gic air power against the continental US. The
supersonic "dash" medium bomber would
probably be considered by Soviet planners pri-
marily as a replacement for or supplement to
the BADGER. On the other hand, consider-
ing that neither a new subsonic bomber nor a
supersonic "dash" medium bomber would add
substantially to Soviet capabilities for inter-
continental attack, the USSR may have
elected not to develop either or both these
types to the point of operational use, but may
be proceeding directly to the more advanced
types discussed in the following paragraphs.
Development for Operational
Use Beyond 1962
19. Soviet aviation research and development
establishments are probably already working
toward considerably advanced manned air-
craft, the development of which will require
solutions to a wide range of technical prob-
lems. These include aerodynamic heating
and other problems associated with continu-
ous flights at extremely high speeds, the devel-
opment and production of practical, high-en-
ergy chemical fuels, and/or the development
of nuclear reactors suitable for aircraft pro-
pulsion. At present, three avenues of research
and development toward advanced manned
aircraft seem open to the USSR. Soviet pur-
suit of any or all these avenues may become
evident during the period of this estimate.
20. Supersonic Chemical Bomber. The So-
viets have probably undertaken preliminary
design studies of a fully supersonic, chemical-
powered heavy bomber. If this project were
actively pursued, a prototype could probably
be flight-tested, using conventional fuels, late
in 1960-1962. Among the critical problems
the USSR will encounter are those of high-
energy chemical fuels, as well as inflight re-
fueling of this type of aircraft. Soviet state-
ments show that the USSR has considered
liquid hydrogen as a propellant but has found
it unsuitable at present for practical applica-
tion. Since 1949, Soviet scientists have syn-
thesized and studied boron compounds in an
extensive research program, and have prob-
ably achieved pilot plant production of di-
borane, an intermediate step in the produc-
tion of more desirable boron fuels. While we
have no evidence of the testing of boron in
turbojets, ramjets, or afterburners, the Soviet
need for a high-energy fuel to permit the
achievement of both supersonic speeds and in-
tercontinental ranges leads us to estimate a
Soviet program in boron fuel development,
which could probably make it available for
limited operational use in about 1962. How-
ever, its first use is likely to be restricted to
afterburners or ramjets, because of limited
availability of fuel and problems of toxicity,
engine design, and combustion product re-
moval.
21. Nuclear-propelled Aircraft. We believe
that the USSR also has an active nuclear air-
craft propulsion program, judging from state-
ments by leading Soviet scientists and offi-
cials, the continuing appearance of semi-
technical popular articles on this subject, and
a few technical articles on subjects directly
related to nuclear aircraft propulsion activi-
ties. We have not identified any specific So-
viet program, but the USSR's capabilities in
reactor and shielding technology, high tem-
perature materials, and engine and airframe
technology are sufficient for the conduct of an
advanced program in this field.
22. We therefore estimate that the Soviets are
probably now engaged in development and
testing of reactor components and sub-sys-
tems. This effort, if given a high priority,
could result in the development of a reactor
suitable for nuclear propulsion of subsonic
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aircraft by 1962.6 The ability of such an air-
craft to fly extremely long distances at very
low altitudes would make it a useful vehicle
for some military missions. The attainment
of a nuclear propulsion system for a super-
sonic aircraft will require an extensive devel-
opment and test program, probably extending
well beyond 1962.
23. The Soviets, for propaganda and research
reasons, may have undertaken on a "crash"
basis to develop a nuclear power plant which
could be carried in an aircraft. If this is the
case, we believe they could have a flying test-
bed airborne appreciably before 1962. Such
a vehicle could have at least one nuclear
power unit providing useful thrust during
some phase of the flight.
'The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF
believes that this effort, if given a high priority,
could result in a subsonic nuclear propelled air-
craft reaching test flight stage appreciably be-
fore 1962. (See footnote to paragraph 4, Con-
clusions.)
24. Hypersonic Aircraft. We believe that the
USSR has attached high priority to a space-
flight program encompassing work on ex-
tremely high-altitude flight, manned earth
satellites, and manned space vehicles. It is
probable that experimental manned rocket
aircraft for limited exploration of extremely
high altitude flight problems are now or soon
will be flying in the USSR. One outgrowth
of such a program may be a hypersonic glide
vehicle capable of reconnaissance and possibly
weapons delivery. A vehicle of this type would
receive an initial rocket boost to a sufficient
altitude and velocity to enable it to glide
through the upper atmosphere to its target.
In advanced stages of development it could
return to its base by encircling the globe.
Initial flight-tests of the manned stage of such
a Soviet vehicle could take place by about
1962, but an operational vehicle could prob-
ably not be achieved until some years there-
after.
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ANNEX
SIMPLIFIED PERFORMANCE
COMPARISON
Current and Alternative Future
Soviet Long Range Bombers
to 1962
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OPTIMUM MISSION PROFILE
(Calculated in accordance with US Mil-C-5011A Spec except that fuel reserves are
reduced to permit a maximum of 30 minutes loiter at sea level, and aircraft
operate at altitudes permitting maximum radius/range)
CURRENT MODELS
BADGER BISON
1957 1957
BEAR
1957
ALTERNATIVE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT
Heavy Medium
BISON Bomber Bomber
1960 1959-1960 8 1960-1961
Take-off weight (lbs.)
160,000
395,000
300,000
395,000
425,000-475,000
190,000
Radius (n.m.)
1,800
2,950
4,400
3,300
3,600-3,800
1,950 '
3,300 lb. payload
one refuel'
2,450
3,950
6,100
4,450
4,850-5,150
2,650 '
Range (n.m.)
3,600
5,800
8,700
6,600
7,000-7,400
3,800'
3,300 lb. payload
one refuel'
4,800
7,800
8,900
9,450-10,000
5,100
Target Speed (knots)
475
460
410
460
480-490
865
Target Altitude (ft.)
41,400
41,300
42,500
43,700
46,000-48,000
47,000
Optimum mission profiles and 3,300 lb. payloads have been selected for comparison on this simplified
chart in order to show the reasonable maximum performance to be expected from Soviet long range
bombers during this time period. The use of standard US mission profiles, increased bombloads, or large
air-to-surface missiles would reduce performance characteristics, particularly in radius/range capa-
bilities. Table 6 of the ANNEX to NIE 11-4-57 contains full performance characteristics for these air-
craft, with the exception of the 1959-1960 Heavy Bomber for which no details are available.
'Refueling estimates based upon use of compatible tankers which provide approximately 35 percent in-
crease in radius/range.
Performance estimated on the basis of improved turbo-jet engines. The use of turbo-fan engines would
result in slightly greater range capabilities, at some sacrifice in speed and altitude capabilities.
'Radius/range figures include 500 n.m. supersonic "dash." Maximum "dash" speed is estimated at 1,085
knots at 35,000 ft. altitude.
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