DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00777R000302700002-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 25, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 6, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECURITY AFFAIRS SUPPORT ASSOCIATION
FALL '88 SYMPOSIUM
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION:
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. INTELLIGENCE
6 OCTOBER 1988
ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AS YOU HEARD THIS MORNING, CHANGES IN PERSONNEL AND POLICY
IN THE SOVIET UNION ARE TAKING PLACE FAR FASTER THAN
IMPLEMENTATION OF THOSE POLICIES AND REAL CHANGE IN THE
SYSTEM. EVEN SO, WHILE ACTUAL STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN SOVIET
UNION HAVE SO FAR BEEN MODEST, WHAT GORBACHEV ALREADY HAS SET
IN MOTION REPRESENTS A POLITICAL EARTHQUAKE. HE IS PULLING ALL
THE LEVERS OF CHANGE IN A SOCIETY AND CULTURE THAT HISTORICALLY
HAS RESISTED CHANGE -- AND WHERE CHANGE USUALLY HAS BEEN
VIOLENT AND WRENCHING. THE FORCES HE HAS UNLEASHED ARE
POWERFUL, BUT SO ARE THE PEOPLE AND INSITUTIONS HE HAS
ANTAGONIZED -- THUS SETTING IN MOTION A TREMENDOUS POWER
STRUGGLE AND PURGE NO LESS DRAMATIC FOR THE ABSENCE OF.SHOW
TRIALS AND TERROR.
INDEED, AFTER ALL OF THE TALK OF GLASNOST AND
DEMOCRATIZATION, STALIN WOULD HAVE BEEN PROUD OF THE SMOOTHLY
ORCHESTRATED 44-MINUTE SUPREME SOVIET SESSION IN WHICH PEOPLE
WERE FIRED, RETIRED AND HIRED WITH NO DISSENTING VOTES AND 1500
DELEGATES VOTING AS ONE. THE SESSION WAS A POWER PLAY IN THE
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GRAND AND TRADITIONAL SOVIET MANNER. WHILE IT IS TESTIMONY TO
GORBACHEV'S POWER, THE NEED FOR IT ALSO IS A MARK OF HIS
VULNERABILITY, HIS FRUSTRATION AT THE LACK OF PROGRESS,
BUREAUCRATIC OBSTRUCTIONISM AND OPPOSITION IN THE PARTY TO HIS
PROGRAMS AND POLICIES -- AND OF THE DESPERATE SITUATION FACING
THE SOVIET UNION.
WE ARE IN AN EXTRAORDINARY PERIOD IN HISTORY. THE TUMBRELS
ARE ROLLING IN MOSCOW; POLICIES A HALF-CENTURY OLD ARE BEING
OVERTURNED; UNREST STALKS THE CAUCASUS, A REVOLUTION FROM ABOVE
HAS BEEN LAUNCHED WITH NO ASSURANCE IT WILL SUCCEED.
MEANWHILE, ONE READS IN THE NEWSPAPERS OF PEACE BREAKING OUT
ALL OVER. AND, TO BE SURE, WE HAVE SEEN A REMARKABLE CHANGE IN
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION
OVER THE PAST YEAR'OR SO, CULMINATING IN THE SIGNING OF THE
TREATY ON INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES AND CONTINUED
NEGOTIATIONS IN A VARIETY OF OTHER FORUMS. WE ARE SEEING A
SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION
AND CHINA. WE SEE THE SOVIETS WITHDRAWING FROM AFGHANISTAN,
AND WE BELIEVE THAT THAT WITHDRAWAL WILL CONTINUE. WE HAVE
SEEN THE SOVIETS APPEARING TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN
NEGOTIATIONS WITH RESPECT TO CAMBODIA AND ANGOLA. WHAT ARE WE
TO MAKE OF IT ALL?
IT IS A FACT, AS ANY POLICYMAKER WILL TELL YOU, THAT
INTELLIGENCE LOOKS AT THE WORLD THROUGH A UNIQUE AND GLOOMY
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PRISM. INDEED, IT HAS BEEN SAID THAT WHEN AN INTELLIGENCE
OFFICER SMELLS FLOWERS, HE LOOKS AROUND FOR A COFFIN. .BUT ALSO
IT HAS BEEN OUR EXPERIENCE THAT, MORE OFTEN THAN NOT, AMBROSE
BIERCE WAS ACCURATE -- IF CYNICAL -- WHEN HE DEFINED PEACE AS A
PERIOD OF CHEATING BETWEEN TWO PERIODS OF FIGHTING. SOME
TWENTY YEARS AGO THE HISTORIAN WILL DURANT WROTE THAT IN THE
PREVIOUS 3,421 YEARS OF HUMAN HISTORY, ONLY 268 HAD SEEN NO
WAR.
IT IS OUR JOB IN INTELLIGENCE TO LOOK BEHIND THE FACADE --
THE HEADLINES -- AND TO TRY TO DISCERN REALITY. MOVEMENT
TOWARD NEGOTIATED SOLUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS AND HOT
SPOTS SURELY IS WELCOME, JUST AS ARE INITIATIVES IN THE SOVIET
UNION THAT WE HOPE MIGHT ULTIMATELY POINT IN THE DIRECTION OF
GREATER OPENNESS, PLURALISM, STRATEGIC STABILITY AND
INTERNATIONAL TRANQUILITY. BUT THESE TRENDS, AND PARTICULARLY
THE PUBLICITY AND ATMOSPHERICS ATTENDANT TO THEM, MUST NOT
BLIND US TO REALITY. I WANT TO SPEAK BRIEFLY TO YOU ABOUT
THESE REALITIES AS WE LOOK AT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION
AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS.
THE MILITARY
THE FIRST REALITY IS THE CONTINUING EXTRAORDINARY SCOPE AND
SWEEP OF SOVIET MILITARY MODERNIZATION AND WEAPONS RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT. DESPITE SOVIET RHETORIC, WE STILL SEE NO
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SLACKENING OF THEIR WEAPONS PRODUCTION OR PROGRAMS, AND SOVIET
RESEARCH ON NEW WEAPONS CONTINUES APACE. AS THE RATE OF GROWTH
OF OUR DEFENSE BUDGET DECLINES, THEIRS CONTINUES TO GROW,
ALBEIT SLOWLY. WE SEE A RAPID PACE OF SCIENTIFIC AND
TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT ON NEW AND EXOTIC SOVIET WEAPONS,
MANY OF THEM BASED ON NEW PHYSICAL PRINCIPLES. I INCLUDE AMONG
THESE NEW HIGH EXPLOSIVES (IN WHICH THE SOVIETS HAVE A CLEAR
LEAD), RANGING FROM ENHANCED BLAST MUNITIONS. TO REACTIVE
SURROUND WARHEADS TO FUEL AIR EXPLOSIVES. THESE WEAPONS, WITH
ENORMOUSLY ENHANCED POWER AND HIGH ACCURACY, CAN HAVE THE ROUGH
EQUIVALENT OF LOW YIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AS FORESHADOWED BY
MARSHAL OGARKOV. WE ARE SEEING ADVANCES IN SOVIET WORK ON
PRECISION GUIDED MUNITIONS, AND CAN SEE THE DAY IN WHICH
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENTS IN VERY HIGH SPEED INTEGRATED CIRCUITS,
MICRO-ELECTRONICS, ADVANCE IMAGE PROCESSING, FOCAL PLANE ARRAYS
AND SPECIAL COMPOSITE MATERIALS CAN LEAD TO "BRILLIANT"
PRECISION GUIDED MUNITIONS WITH NEAR ZERO CEP AND HIGH
RELIABILITY. THE SOVIETS LEAD THE U.S. IN THE DEVELOPMENT IN
MANY AREAS OF HYPERVELOCITY IMPACT WEAPONS, AS WELL IN CERTAIN
AERODYNAMIC AND NAVAL ADVANCED PROPULSION TECHNOLOGIES.
UNDERSTANDING THESE DEVELOPMENTS IS CRUCIAL TO U.S.
INTERESTS. IN THESE AND OTHER NEW TECHNOLOGIES, COLLECTION AND
ANALYSIS REQUIREMENTS WILL POSE ENORMOUS CHALLENGES TO US. LET
ME GIVE YOU FIVE EXAMPLES:
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS, FOR BOTH
TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC USE, EITHER ON THE GROUND OR IN
SPACE, REQUIRES THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW COLLECTION
SYSTEM CAPABILITIES. THESE WEAPONS HAVE VERY HIGH PEAK
POWER, BUT ARE ON THE AIR FOR ONLY A VERY SHORT TIME.
EACH EVENT OCCURS WITH LITTLE WARNING AND IS
EXCEEDINGLY RARE BUT EXTREMELY SIGNIFICANT. COLLECTION
SYSTEMS MUST PROVIDE CONTINUOUS COVERAGE OF LARGE AREAS
OF LAND AND SPACE, COVER A WIDE SPECTRAL REGIME AND
FIND, MONITOR AND REPORT IN REAL TIME ON THE STATUS OF
DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS SYSTEMS.
-- IN THE REALM OF ADVANCED TELECOMMUNICATIONS, HIGH BAND
WIDTH COMMUNICATIONS LINKS ARE DIFFICULT TO MONITOR AND
RESISTANT TO ATTEMPTS TO EXTRACT INTELLIGENCE FROM
THEM. FIBER-OPTIC SYSTEMS ARE BECOMING MORE COMMON AND
REQUIRE THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW MONITORING TECHNOLOGY.
-- DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AREA OF HIGHLY ACCURATE NAVIGATION
TYPIFIED BY THE GLONASS SPACE BASED NAVIGATION SYSTEM
IN THE SOVIET UNION ARE-MAKING INCREASINGLY ACCURATE
AND RELIABLE MOBILE WEAPONS SYSTEMS POSSIBLE. AS THESE
TECHNOLOGIES ADVANCE-AND MOBILE SYSTEMS REACH THE
PERFORMANCE LEVELS OF SILO-BASED SYSTEMS, COLLECTION
SYSTEMS MUST DEAL WITH STRATEGIC TARGETS WHICH ARE MORE
DIFFICULT TO LOCATE AND IDENTIFY AND ARE DEPLOYED ON A
VARIETY OF BROADLY DISTRIBUTED PLATFORMS.
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CURRENT COLLECTION SYSTEMS ARE NOT ADEQUATE FOR THE
DETECTION OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
ACTIVITIES, NOT JUST IN THE USSR BUT TO HELP COPE WITH
THE WORLDWIDE PROLIFERATION OF THESE WEAPONS. NEW
TECHNIQUES FOR THE PRODUCTION AND DESIGN OF CBW AGENTS
ONLY ADD TO THE PROBLEM BY ALLOWING RAPID CHANGES IN
THE AGENTS IN ROUTE AND REDUCING REACTION TIMES. NEW
TECHNIQUES FOR DETECTING GENETICALLY ALTERED SUBSTANCES
AND TRACING THEM TO THEIR SOURCE WILL BE NEEDED.
FINALLY, REDUCED OBSERVABILITY OBVIOUSLY MAKES
COLLECTION MORE DIFFICULT. IN A RELATED AREA,
COLLECTION AGAINST COUNTER LOW OBSERVABLE SYSTEMS
REQUIRES PRECISION AND DETAIL IF EFFECTIVE COUNTERS ARE
TO BE DEVELOPED. OUR ASSESSMENT.OF SOVIET LOW
OBSERVABLE SYSTEMS AND ABILITY TO ACCURATELY
CHARACTERIZE THE THREAT TO OUR OWN SYSTEMS DEPEND UPON
OUR ABILITY TO IMPROVE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS
CAPABILITIES.
MORE BROADLY, THE RAPID GROWTH OF TECHNOLOGY AROUND THE
WORLD STRAINS OUR RESOURCES TO TRANSLATE OUR PRINCIPAL DATA
SOUCE ON TECHNOLOGY, THE TECHNICAL LITERATURE, INTO ELECTRONIC
MEDIA THAT CAN BE EASILY SEARCHED. WE CANNOT KNOW IN A TIME OF
RAPID CHANGE AND INNOVATION WHICH ARTICLES NEED TRANSLATION.
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WE NEED MEANS FOR FAST, ACCURATE., AND COLLOQUIAL TRANSLATION
BECAUSE WE CANNOT HIRE ENOUGH ANALYSTS TO COVER THE RANGE OF
TECHNICAL DISCIPLINES THAT SHOULD BE MONITORED. WE NEED TO
DEVELOP BETTER COMPUTER ASSISTED TOOLS TO ASSIST THE ANALYST.
ARMS CONTROL
BEYOND THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW SOVIET WEAPONS CAPABILITIES
AND RELATED TECHNOLOGIES, WE WILL FACE A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON
INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS AS A RESULT OF TREATY MONITORING
RESPONSIBILITIES. DURING THE NEXT FIVE YEARS, ARMS CONTROL
TREATIES COULD BE COMPLETED OR UPDATED ON STRATEGIC WEAPONS, A
THRESHHOLD TEST BAN, PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS, DEFENSE AND
SPACE, CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND CONVENTIONAL ARMS. EACH OF THESE
WILL PRESENT SPECIAL MONITORING CHALLENGES TO THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE SOVIETS AND ARE COMPLYING
WITH PROVISIONS OF THE TREATIES. IN ADDITION TO THE
CONSTELLATION OF NATIONAL TECHNICAL MONITORING TOOLS WE HAVE
TODAY, WE WILL HAVE MORE ADVANCED SYSTEMS, AND THESE WILL BE
AUGMENTED BY ON SITE AND TECHNICAL INSPECTION TECHNIQUES.
OUR EXPERIENCE WITH MONITORING OF PREVIOUS AGREEMENTS, BOTH
RATIFIED AND UNRATIFIED, AND OUR RECENT EXPERIENCE WITH ONSITE
MONITORING OF THE INF TREATY AND THE JOINT VERIFICATION
EXPERIMENT, LEAD US TO CONCLUDE THAT ONLY THROUGH SYNERGISTIC
USE OF ALL OF OUR TECHNIQUES WILL WE BE ABLE TO MEET OUR
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MONITORING OBLIGATIONS. THE MONETARY COST OF ARMS CONTROL IS,
AND WILL BE, SIGNIFICANT. HIGH TECHNOLOGY AND SPACE BASED
SYSTEMS ARE EXTREMELY EXPENSIVE, BUT WILL BE ABSOLUTELY
NECESSARY IN AN ARMS CONTROL WORLD WHERE MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT
CHEATING COULD GAIN THE EDGE FOR AN ADVERSARY IN NUCLEAR,
CHEMICAL OR CONVENTIONAL ARMS. MOREOVER, THESE RESOURCES ARE
ONLY INDEPENDENT MEANS FOR ASSESSING COMPLIANCE WITH TREATY
PROVISIONS.
ON SITE INSPECTION AND OTHER COOPERATIVE MEASURES WILL ADD
SUBSTANTIALLY TO THE NATION'S MONITORING AND VERIFICATION
CAPABILITIES. THESE HAVE THEIR COSTS AND LIMITATIONS,
HOWEVER. THEY REQUIRE THE COOPERATION OF THE SIGNATORIES AND
THEREFORE CAN BE CUT OFF OR INTERFERED WITH AT ANY TIME.
FURTHERMORE,WE MUST BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE SAME
INTRUSIVENESS WE EXPECT THE OTHER SIDE TO ACCEPT. IN THE ON
SITE WORLD, WE MUST BE PREPARED TO RISK EXPOSURE OF OUR MOST
SENSITIVE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE TECHNOLOGIES IF WE WANT SIMILAR
ACCESS ELSEWHERE. THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE RISKS OF SOVIET
INSPECTORS IN THE U.S. CANNOT BE OVERLOOKED. WE MUST ALSO BE
PREPARED TO BEAR HEAVY MONETARY BURDENS ASSOCIATED WITH
HOUSING, TRANSPORT, ESCORT, PORTAL PERIMETER MONITORING, AND
LOST TIME BROUGHT ABOUT BY INSPECTIONS.
LET ME SAY A WORD ABOUT SPECIFIC MONITORING TASKS.
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WITH RESPECT TO START, NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS WILL
REMAIN OUR PRIMARY MONITORING TOOL, ALTHOUGH
SUPPLEMENTED WITH ON SITE INSPECTION. ON SITE
INSPECTION WILL PROVIDE A COUNTER CHECK AND MORE DIRECT
ACCESS TO AFFIRM OUR TECHNICAL ESTIMATES AND FORCE
ASSESSMENTS. MOBILE MISSILES ARE PARTICULARLY
DIFFICULT FOR US TO MONITOR. IT WILL TAKE A
COMBINATION OF NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS AND ON SITE
INSPECTIONS, AND OTHER COOPERATIVE MEASURES, TO DEAL
WITH THIS AND, EVEN THEN, THERE WILL BE PROBLEMS. AS
STRATEGIC SYSTEMS GET SMALLER, AS IN THE CASE OF CRUISE
MISSILES, OUR CHALLENGE WILL BECOME EVEN GREATER.
START WOULD ALSO REQUIRE US TO MONITOR A PRODIGIOUS
ARRAY OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND FACILITIES. THE INF
TREATY GIVES THE UNITED STATES THE RIGHT TO CONDUCT
INSPECTIONS AT 117 SOVIET FACILITIES, BUT START COULD
INVOLVE AS MANY AS 2500. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES,
THE STRAIN ON EXISTING U.S. NATIONAL TECHNICAL
COLLECTION RESOURCES WILL BE STAGGERING. ACCORDINGLY,
WE MUST ANTICIPATE THE NEED FOR NEW AND IMPROVED
TECHNICAL COLLECTION CAPABILITIES TO MEET THE DEMANDS
OF ARMS CONTROL AND STRATEGIC FORCE MONITORING WITH
INCREASED RELIANCE ON AUTOMATED SYSTEMS FOR TASKING AND
EXPLOITING THESE ASSETS. IN THIS ENVIRONMENT, HUMAN
AGENTS WILL BE EVEN MORE CRITICAL IN THE FUTURE THAN
TODAY.
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IN THE NUCLEAR TESTING ARENA, OUR WELL-ESTABLISHED
NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS WHICH DEPEND ON SEISMIC DATA,
WILL BE AUGMENTED BY CORRTEX, THE U.S. METHOD FOR
HYDRODYNAMIC MEASUREMENT OF NUCLEAR TEST YIELDS.
CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRESENT AN ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE
MONITORING CHALLENGE FOR US. NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS
CAN ONLY DO SO MUCH. THERE ARE FEW SIGNATURES FOR
PRODUCTION AND STORAGE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, AND LITTLE
ON THE HORIZON THAT WILL HELP US SUBSTANTIALLY IN THIS
AREA. ONLY THROUGH EXTENSIVE AND INTENSIVE EFFORTS CAN
WE ATTEMPT TO IDENTIFY THE EXISTENCE OF CHEMICAL
WEAPONS PROGRAMS AND ESTIMATE THEIR STATUS. EVEN SO,
BECAUSE OF RECENT PROLIFERATION AND USE OF SUCH
WEAPONS, WE RECOGNIZE THE IMPORTANCE AND DESIRABILITY
OF FINDING SOME WAY TO ELIMINATE CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND
SOME MEANS OF MONITORING THIS.
CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL ALSO WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY BE
ON THE AGENDA IN THE NEXT.US ADMINISTRATION. WE EXPECT
THE NEXT FIVE YEARS TO BE A PERIOD OF DYNAMIC CHANGE IN
SOVIET THEATRE FORCES. THE SOVIETS SEE A NEED TO
RESPOND WITH NEW SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES TO
A REVOLUTION IN MILITARY TECHNOLOGY THAT THREATENS
THEIR ADVANTAGE IN GROUND FORCES. AT THE SAME TIME,
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THE LEADERSHIP HAS CALLED FOR POLITICAL SOLUTIONS TO
SECURITY PROBLEMS THAT RESULT IN THE NEED FOR SOVIET
FORCES TO APPEAR LESS THREATENING BUT NO LESS CAPABLE.
AT THE SAME TIME, THE LEADERSHIP WILL BE LOOKING FOR
WAYS TO REDUCE THE WEIGHT OF THE DEFENSE BURDEN. SUCH
DEVELOPMENTS IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES WILL PRESENT US
WITH NEW CHALLENGES FOR COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS:
WE MUST DETERMINE THE EXTENT AND THE PACE OF
RESTRUCTURING IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND ATTEMPT TO
DISTINGUISH CHANGES RESPONDING TO NEW TECHNOLOGIES
FROM THOSE THAT MIGHT RESULT FROM ANY CHANGE IN
DOCTRINE OR ECONOMIC PRIORITIES.
BECAUSE THE GEOGRAPHIC AREA TO BE COVERED IN THE
NEW ARMS CONTROL TALKS IS SO LARGE, ALL OF EUROPE
FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS, WE MUST INCREASE
OUR DETAILED ANALYTIC EFFORT ON THE SOVIET FORCES
OUTSIDE OF CENTRAL EUROPE, WHICH WAS THE MORE
LIMITED FOCUS OF THE MBFR TALKS.
- AND IF AN AGREEMENT ON REDUCTION OF CONVENTIONAL
FORCES IS ACHIEVED, IT WILL REQUIRE SUBSTANTIALLY
INCREASED COLLECTION AND ANALYTICAL RESOURCES TO
SUPPORT MONITORING AND ON-SITE INSPECTION OF
HUNDREDS OF INSTALLATIONS.
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POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS
BEYOND WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT, PROCUREMENT, AND DEPLOYMENT
PROBLEMS, BEYOND ARMS CONTROL, IS THE CHALLENGE OF
UNDERSTANDING AND RESPONDING TO NEW REQUIREMENTS IN THE
TURBULENT SOVIET INTERNAL AND FOREIGN POLICY ARENAS. THE
SOVIET UNION IS IN THE MIDST OF ITS GREATEST UPHEAVAL AND
PERIOD OF CHANGE IN OVER HALF.A CENTURY. GORBACHEV SEEKS TO
ALTER DRAMATICALLY THE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL FACE OF
THE SOVIET UNION. THIS IS TO BE DONE WHILE OUTMANEUVERING HIS
POLITICAL RIVALS, CONTAINING DOMESTIC UNREST, INCREASING THE
REGIME'S LEGITIMACY, MAINTAINING ECONOMIC AND MILITARY
STRENGTH, AND PRESERVING MOSCOW'S SUPERPOWER STATUS.
A KEY REQUIREMENT FOR US IS TO ESTABLISH REALISTIC CRITERIA
BY WHICH WE CAN JUDGE IN THE COMING MONTHS AND YEARS WHETHER
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION IS GENUINELY
RESHAPING THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE SYSTEM -.OR WHETHER THE
TOTALITARIAN STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET UNION, INCLUDING THE
INSTRUMENTS OF CENTRAL CONTROL AND REPRESSION, ENDURES
DISCREETLY IN THE SHADOWS, AVAILABLE AT THE BECKON OF
GORBACHEV'S SUCCESSOR, OR EVEN FOR GORBACHEV.
BEYOND THIS NEED TO KEEP OUR PLACE, OUR PERSPECTIVE, ARE
OTHER CHALLENGES.: GLASNOST AND THE SHEER . VOLUME. OF INTERNAL
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CHANGE HAS RESULTED IN AN INFORMATION OVERLOAD THAT REQUIRES
GREATER RESOURCES TO SIFT THROUGH AND PICK OUT THE MOST SALIENT
ITEMS. THE INCREASING AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION TO THE PRESS
PROVIDES US WITH A CHALLENGE TO SORT OUT WHAT IS ACCURATE, AS
WELL AS TO COME UP WITH UNIQUE SOURCES OF INFORMATION THAT GIVE
US A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE DYNAMICS AT WORK.
IN FOREIGN POLICY, THE CONTINUED AGGRESSIVE PURSUIT OF
SOVIET OBJECTIVES AND PROTECTION OF SOVIET CLIENTS IN THE THIRD
WORLD WILL REMAIN CENTRAL. UNDER GORBACHEV, THE SOVIETS AND
CUBANS ARE NOW PROVIDING MORE THAN A BILLION DOLLARS A YEAR IN
ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO NICARAGUA; MORE THAN A
BILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT WAS SENT TO
VIETNAM, LAOS AND CAMBODIA IN THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF LAST
YEAR; MORE THAN FOUR BILLION DOLLARS IN MILITARY EQUIPMENT HAS
BEEN SENT TO ANGOLA SINCE 1984. AND, OF COURSE, CUBA GETS
ABOUT SEVEN BILLION DOLLARS IN SOVIET SUPPORT EACH YEAR. AT A
TIME OF ECONOMIC STRESS AT HOME, THESE COMMITMENTS SPEAK
CLEARLY ABOUT SOVIET PRIORITIES. HOWEVER, WE MUST ALSO
ANTICIPATE SOVIET PRESSURE ON CLIENTS TO USE THIS HELP MORE
EFFICIENTLY, TO REDUCE OR AT LEAST CONSTRAIN FURTHER GROWTH IN
SOVIET ASSISTANCE. OUR ABILITY TO TRACK THIS MILITARY AND
ECONOMIC HELP AND THE POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS WILL CONTINUE TO
BE A DIFFICULT PROBLEM.
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ANOTHER ELEMENT OF GORBACHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY IS NEW AND
DYNAMIC DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES TO WEAKEN TIES BETWEEN THE US
AND ITS WESTERN ALLIES, CHINA, JAPAN, AND THE THIRD WORLD; TO
PORTRAY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AS COMMITTED TO ARMS CONTROL AND
PEACE; AND TO SUGGEST MOSCOW'S INTEREST IN DIPLOMATIC SOLUTIONS
TO THIRD WORLD PROBLEMS. WE CAN AND SHOULD EXPECT OTHER NEW
AND BOLD INITIATIVES, PERHAPS INCLUDING UNILATERAL CONVENTIONAL
FORCE REDUCTIONS THAT WILL SEVERELY TEST ALLIANCE COHESION.
SIMILARLY, NEW INITIATIVES WITH CHINA AND JAPAN SEEM LIKELY IN
AN EFFORT, TO OVERCOME BILATERAL OBSTACLES TO IMPROVED
RELATIONS AND TO EXPLOIT PROBLEMS BETWEEN THEM AND THE US.
IN THE THIRD WORLD, THEY WILL SEEK TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ANY
RELAXATION OF US VIGILANCE OR CONSTANCY. THE INCREASED
PRESENCE OF SOPHISTICATED,.TALENTED, LINGUISTICALLY QUALIFIED
SOVIETS IN THE THIRD WORLD WILL OFFER THEM INCREASED
OPPORTUNITIES TO APPROACH LOCAL POLITICIANS AND GROUPS AND WILL
REQUIRE REDIRECTED AND POSSIBLY ADDITIONAL COLLECTION
RESOURCES. AS THE SOVIET OVERT POLICY IN THE.THIRD WORLD
BECOMES MORE SOPHISTICATED, SO TOO WILL THEIR COVERT
ACTIVITIES. WE WILL NEED TO DEVOTE MORE ATTENTION AND EFFORT
TO SOVIET ACTIVITIES TO CLANDESTINELY INFLUENCE POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENTS IN A WIDE RANGE OF COUNTRIES FRIENDLY AND/OR
IMPORTANT TO THE UNITED STATES.
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ARMS CONTROL AND OTHER NEW INITIATIVES ALSO ARE INTENDED TO
BREAK SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY OUT OF LONGSTANDING TACTICAL
DEADENDS AND TO MAKE THE SOVIET UNION A MORE EFFECTIVE,
FLEXIBLE AND VIGOROUS PLAYER THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. THE
FOREMOST EXAMPLES OF THIS ARE THE CHANGES IN THE SOVIET
POSITION ON INF AND THEIR DECISION TO WITHDRAW FROM
AFGHANISTAN. THE RESULT IS LIKELY TO BE A SOVIET POLITICAL
CHALLENGE TO THE US ABROAD THAT COULD POSE GREATER PROBLEMS FOR
,OUR INTERNATIONAL POSITION, ALLIANCES AND RELATIONSHIPS IN THE
FUTURE THAN THE HERETOFORE ONE DIMENSIONAL SOVIET MILITARY
CHALLENGE. WE MUST BE PREPARED FOR GREATER SOVIET FLEXIBILITY
-- A NEW AND DISCONCERTING WILLINGNESS TO SAY YES TO SOME OLD
AND NOT WELL EXAMINED US AND WESTERN PROPOSALS. CONSIDERABLE
NEW THINKING AND AGILITY WILL BE NEEDED ON OUR OWN PART TO
ANTICIPATE AND UNDERSTAND SOVIET INITIATIVES.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
THE LAST AREA OF NEW REQUIREMENTS I WANT TO MENTION TODAY
IS COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. DESPITE RECENT ENCOURAGING
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE USSR AND IMPROVED US-SOVIET RELATIONS, AN
EFFECTIVE AND COMPREHENSIVE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM HAS
NEVER BEEN MORE IMPORTANT TO OUR NATION. SINCE GORBACHEV'S
ACCESSION TO POWER, THE HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE THREAT AGAINST US
HAS GROWN. THE NUMBER OF OPERATIONS AGAINST US HAS CERTAINLY
INCREASED. OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS, WE HAVE DISCOVERED MORE
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PENETRATIONS OF THE U.S. DEFENSE AND INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITIES
THAN AT ANY TIME IN OUR HISTORY. THE COST OF THESE COMPROMISES
ARE ESTIMATED IN THE BILLIONS OF DOLLARS. ALTHOUGH MANY
COUNTRIES ENGAGE IN INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE UNITED
STATES, THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, THE KGB AND GRU,
REPRESENT BY FAR THE MOST SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE THREAT IN
TERMS OF SIZE, ABILITY AND INTENT TO ACT AGAINST U.S.
INTERESTS, BOTH AT HOME AND ABROAD. AND DESPITE SOVIET
GLASNOST AND PERESTROIKA, WE ACTUALLY HAVE SEEN AN INCREASE
THIS YEAR OF SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO RECRUIT U.S. SOURCES.
AN EFFECTIVE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM REQUIRES VIGILANCE
ON BOTH THE DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE FRONTS. FIRST, WE MUST
PROTECT SENSITIVE INFORMATION, TECHNOLOGY, EQUIPMENT AND
PERSONNEL. SECOND, WE MUST DETECT, MONITOR AND COUNTER THE
ACTIONS OF HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES. AS THE SOVIET BLOC
INTELLIGENCE SERVICES BECOME MORE SOPHISTICATED, OUR
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MEASURES MUST GROW CORRESPONDINGLY
STRONGER. RECENT CASES ALSO POINT TO THE IMPORTANCE OF
TENACITY AND OF CLOSE COOPERATION AMONG THE VARIOUS AGENCIES
WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. I BELIEVE IN THIS REGARD
THAT THE CHOICE OF VLADIMIR KRYUCHKOV AS CHAIRMAN OF THE KGB
LIKELY WILL MEAN A REDOUBLING OF SOVIET INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS
AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES. COUNTERING THIS
CHALLENGE WILL BE ONE OF OUR MOST DIFFICULT REQUIREMENTS IN THE
FUTURE.
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CONCLUSION
AS YOU CAN SEE,. THE CHANGES THAT ARE UNDERWAY IN THE SOVIET
UNION, BOTH IN ITS INTERNAL POLICIES AND IN ITS FOREIGN AND
NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES, POSE FORMIDABLE NEW REQUIREMENTS
FOR AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE. FROM WEAPONS RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT, MILITARY PROGRAMS, ARMS CONTROL MONITORING
RESPONSIBILITIES, TO TRACKING AND FORECASTING INTERNAL
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND FOREIGN POLICY
INITIATIVES, OUR WORK IS BECOMING MORE COMPLEX AND MORE
CHALLENGING. IT WILL ALSO COST MORE. IN AN ERA OF AGAIN
CONSTRAINED SPENDING FOR DEFENSE AND INTELLIGENCE,FINDING THE
RESOURCES TO MEET THE RESPONSIBILITIES IMPOSED UPON US BY THE
NEEDS OF. THE NATION AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF ITS LEADERS IS
DAUNTING. AND, WHILE THE SOVIET UNION REMAINS OUR PRINCIPAL
ADVERSARY, WE CANNOT NEGLECT SUCH MAJOR PROBLEMS AS CHEMICAL
AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION AMONG MANY OTHER COUNTRIES
OF THE WORLD, THE PROLIFERATION OF MISSILE TECHNOLOGIES, OUR
RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONTINUING AND IMPROVING OUR EFFORTS TO HELP
THE NATION'S COUNTERNARCOTICS PROGRAM, COPING WITH TERRORISM,
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE THIRD WORLD, AND A HOST OF OTHER PROBLEMS.
WHERE WILL THE MONEY COME FROM? PEOPLE POINT TO THE
INCREASE IN'RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO US IN RECENT YEARS. A
SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF THOSE RESOURCES WERE REQUIRED SIMPLY TO
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RECOVER FROM THE DRAWDOWNS IN OUR CAPABILTIES IN THE 1970S, A
TIME WHEN U.S. INTELLIGENCE LOST SOME FIFTY PERCENT OF ITS
PEOPLE AND FORTY PERCENT OF ITS SPENDING POWER. WE HAVE
REBUILT SUBSTANTIAL CAPABILITIES, BUT THE REQUIREMENTS ON US
HAVE GROWN EXPLOSIVELY..
THERE ARE NEW INITIATIVES UNDERWAY TO EXPAND OUR
CAPABILITIES, BUT THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES MUST
WORK TOGETHER TO ENSURE THAT WE ARE SIMPLY NOT PLUGGING HOLES
IN THE DIKE OR DEALING WITH TODAY'S PROBLEMS BUT THAT WE ARE
LOOKING AND PLANNING AHEAD FIVE, TEN, EVEN FIFTEEN YEARS TO
ENSURE THAT THE RESOURCES AND CAPABILITIES WE WILL NEED TO
RESPOND TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE LATE 1990S ARE AVAILABLE
WHEN WE NEED THEM.
IN RECOUNTING THE INTELLIGENCE PROBLEMS AND DANGERS OF THE
REAL WORLD, I HAVE NOT INTENDED TO COST YOU A NIGHT'S SLEEP BY
WARNING OF GHOULIES AND GHOSTIES AND LONG-LEGGITY BEASTIES AND
THINGS THAT GO BUMP IN THE NIGHT. RATHER, MY PURPOSE HAS BEEN
TO REMIND YOU THAT BEHIND THE HEADLINES ARE BOTH ENDURING
CHALLENGES. AND A WHOLE RANGE OF NEW ONES THAT WE MUST RECOGNIZE
AND DEAL WITH. THE WORLD IS NOT A STATIC PLACE. PERMANENT
PEACE AND SECURITY ARE DREAMS. REAL PEACE, STABILITY, AND OUR
NATIONAL WELL-BEING CAN BE ACHIEVED AND PRESERVED ONLY BY
REALISTIC AWARENESS OF DEVELOPMENTS AROUND US AND BY THE
CAPABILITY AND WILL TO OUTTHINK AND OUTPLAN OUR ADVERSARIES AND
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TO ANTICIPATE GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS. OUR NATIONAL ABILITY TO DO
THIS WILL DEPEND UPON FIRST OF ALL ON FAR SIGHTED RECOGNITION
OF NEW CHALLENGES BY OUR INTELLIGENCE SERVICES AND THE WISDOM
AND RESOURCES TO ANTICIPATE THE FUTURE INTELLIGENCE NEEDS OF
THE NATION AND ITS GOVERNMENT.
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