THE GORBACHEV ERA: IMPLICATIONS FOR US STRATEGY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP99-00777R000302650001-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 25, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 16, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

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CURRENT STRATEGY FORUM
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
16 JUNE 1988
THE GORBACHEV ERA: IMPLICATIONS FOR US STRATEGY
BY ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
INTRODUCTION
THE SELECTION OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEV AS GENERAL SECRETARY IN
THE SPRING OF 1985 SIGNALED THE POLITBURO'S RECOGNITION THAT
THE SOVIET UNION WAS IN DEEP TROUBLE -- ESPECIALLY ECONOMICALLY
AND SPIRITUALLY -- TROUBLE THAT THEY RECOGNIZED WOULD SOON
BEGIN TO HAVE REAL EFFECT ON MILITARY POWER AND THEIR POSITION
IN THE WORLD. DESPITE ENORMOUS RAW ECONOMIC POWER AND
RESOURCES, INCLUDING A $2 TRILLION A YEAR GNP, THE SOVIET
LEADERSHIP BY THE MID-1980S CONFRONTED A STEADILY WIDENING GAP
WITH THE WEST AND JAPAN -- ECONOMICALLY, TECHNOLOGICALLY AND IN
VIRTUALLY ALL AREAS OF THE QUALITY OF LIFE.
AS A RESULT OF THESE TRENDS, THE POLITBURO RECOGNIZED THAT
THE SOVIET UNION COULD NO LONGER RISK THE SUSPENDED ANIMATION
OF THE BREZHNEV YEARS, AND COALESCED AROUND AN IMAGINATIVE AND
VIGOROUS LEADER WHOM THEY HOPED COULD REVITALIZE THE COUNTRY
WITHOUT ALTERING THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET STATE OR
COMMUNITY PARTY.
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STRENGTHENING THE LEADERSHIP AND HIS POSITION
THERE IS STRONG SUPPORT IN THE POLITBURO FOR MODERNIZATION
OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY. EVEN SO, NEARLY EVERY STEP GORBACHEV
SEEKS TO TAKE TOWARD STRUCTURAL ECONOMIC OR POLITICAL CHANGE IS
A STRUGGLE, AND SUPPORT IN THE POLITBURO FOR HIS INITIATIVES
SHIFTS CONSTANTLY. INCREASINGLY, AS GORBACHEV HAS ATTEMPTED TO
PUSH THE REFORM PROCESS FURTHER, OPINION IN THE POLITBURO HAS
BECOME POLARIZED; INDEED, AN OPEN SPLIT DEVELOPED LATE THIS
WINTER. PARTY SECRETARY LIGACHEV -- THE NUMBER TWO MAN --
BECAME MORE VOCAL IN HIS CRITICISM OF GORBACHEV'S AGENDA.
APPARENTLY BELIEVING GORBACHEV TO BE VULNERABLE FOLLOWING THE
DISTURBANCES IN ARMENIA, LIGACHEV REPORTEDLY AUTHORIZED
PUBLICATION OF A VENOMOUS ARTICLE DEFENDING STALIN AND
QUESTIONING GORBACHEV'S PROGRAM.
GORBACHEV COUNTERATTACKED IN MARCH, APPARENTLY TRUMPED
LIGACHEV IN A POLITBURO DEBATE ON THE ISSUE, AND HAS REDUCED
HIS ROLE. AND LIGACHEV NOW AT LEAST IS SOUNDING MORE
SUPPORTIVE.
THE POLITICAL WAR IS FAR FROM OVER, HOWEVER, AND THE STAKES
ARE HIGH; IN THE SHORT TERM, CONTROL OF THE PARTY CONFERENCE
DUE TO OPEN IN LESS THAN TWO WEEKS, AND WITH IT THE IMMEDIATE
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FATE OF THE REFORM AGENDA IS ON THE LINE. FOR THE LONGER TERM,
THERE WILL BE CONTINUING BATTLES OVER PACE AND SCOPE OF
MODERNIZATION AND WHO HOLDS POLITICAL POWER. EVEN GORBACHEV
ADMITS THE STRUGGLE WILL LAST A DECADE OR MORE; FOR HIM, THERE
WILL ALWAYS BE A LIGACHEV AND LEGIONS OF LITTLE STALINS.
THE STRUGGLE WITHIN THE POLITBURO IS ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT
TO GORBACHEV BECAUSE BELOW THE POLITBURO, SUPPORT FOR CHANGE --
AND.ESPECIALLY FAR-REACHING CHANGE -- IS EVEN SHAKIER.
OPPOSITION FROM THE PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND PARTY APPARATUS
IS A CRITICAL PROBLEM FOR GORBACHEV. SENIOR LEVELS OF THE
ECONOMIC BUREAUCRACY STAND TO LOSE THE MOST IF GORBACHEV MOVES
TO DECENTRALIZE THE SYSTEM AND ARE IMPORTANT OBSTACLES TO
IMPLEMENTATION OF HIS PROGRAM. WHILE MANY SENIOR OFFICIALS OF
THE NATIONAL SECURITY BUREAUCRACIES UNDERSTAND THE CONNECTION
BETWEEN A STRONG DEFENSE AND A HEALTHY ECONOMY, THEY ALSO ARE
UNHAPPY WITH THE IDEA OF GREATER CONSTRAINTS ON DEFENSE
SPENDING AND SKEPTICAL OF PROMISED BENEFITS. OTHERS, FOR
EXAMPLE THE KGB, ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE POTENTIAL FOR
INSTABILITY AT HOME AND IN EASTERN EUROPE CREATED BY ANY
RELAXATION OF POLITICAL CONTROLS. THE SOVIET POPULATION SEEMS
TO BE PASSIVELY SUPPORTIVE, BUT THEY HAVE SEEN CAMPAIGNS FOR
CHANGE COME AND GO. THEY ARE SKEPTICAL THAT GORBACHEV'S
EFFORTS WILL PRODUCE LASTING RESULTS OR EVEN IMMEDIATE
PAYOFFS. THE INTELLIGENTSIA ARE PROBABLY THE ONLY GROUP THAT
COMES CLOSE TO GIVING WHOLE-HEARTED SUPPORT.
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IN SUM, GORBACHEV STILL VIGOROUSLY SUPPORTS RESTRUCTURING,
HAS MADE HEADWAY IN OBTAINING POLITBURO SUPPORT, BUT FACES A
LARGELY HOSTILE PARTY AND STATE BUREAUCRACY AND A CONSERVATIVE
AND APATHETIC POPULATION. EVERY RUSSIAN AND SOVIET LEADER FROM
PETER THE GREAT TO THE PRESENT SEEKING CHANGE OR MODERNIZATION
HAS FACED FORMIDABLE OPPOSITION. BUT, UNLIKE THEM, GORBACHEV
REALISTICALLY CANNOT RESORT TO WIDE-SCALE TERROR AND VIOLENCE
TO ELIMINATE THOSE WHO STAND IN HIS WAY. HE MUST RELY ON A
LONG TERM, LARGELY NON-VIOLENT PURGE OF PARTY AND BUREAUCRACY
AND PLACEMENT OF HIS SUPPORTERS IF HE IS TO REMAIN IN POWER AND
TO SUCCEED AT ALL. THE CENTRAL QUESTION IS WHETHER HE WILL GET
ENOUGH TIME.
MODERNIZATION OF THE ECONOMY
ALTHOUGH BY 1985 GORBACHEV HAD BEEN ON THE POLITBURO FOR
SIX YEARS AND A CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER FOR 14 YEARS, HE NOW
ADMITS THAT WHEN HE BECAME GENERAL SECRETARY HE UNDERESTIMATED
THE SEVERITY OF THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AFFLICTING THE SOVIET
UNION. ACCORDINGLY, HE SEEMS TO BE INCREASINGLY RECEPTIVE TO
MORE RADICAL PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE.
TAKEN AS A WHOLE, THE REFORM MEASURES PUT IN PLACE IN
GORBACHEV'S THREE YEAR TENURE ARE AN IMPRESSIVE PACKAGE.
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NEVERTHELESS, THE REFORMS DO NOT GO NEARLY FAR ENOUGH. THE
REFORM PACKAGE AS NOW CONSTITUTED IS A SET OF HALF MEASURES
THAT LEAVES IN PLACE THE PILLARS OF SOCIALIST CENTRAL
PLANNING.
BECAUSE OF INTERNAL CONTRADICTIONS AND THE RETENTION OF SO
MANY ELEMENTS OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM, EVEN IF FULLY IMPLEMENTED
BY 1991 AS INTENDED, THE REFORMS WILL NOT CREATE THE DYNAMIC
ECONOMIC MECHANISM THAT GORBACHEV SEEKS AS THE MEANS TO REDUCE
OR CLOSE THE TECHNOLOGICAL GAP WITH THE WEST. TO THE CONTRARY,
AGGRESSIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF REFORMS IS CAUSING SERIOUS
DISRUPTIONS AND TURBULENCE IN THE ECONOMY. SPECIFICALLY:
-- SOVIET GNP GROWTH FELL TO ABOUT .5% IN 1987, DOWN FROM
ALMOST 4% IN 1986.
-- GORBACHEV'S QUALITY CONTROL PROGRAM IS DISRUPTING
NEW INITIATIVES IN ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT ARE
CREATING CONFUSION AND APPREHENSION IN SOME QUARTERS,
AND BUREAUCRATIC FOOT-DRAGGING AND OUTRIGHT RESISTANCE
IN OTHERS.
-- DESPITE CONSIDERABLE RHETORIC, NONE OF THE PROPOSALS SO
FAR GREATLY CHANGES THE SYSTEM OF ECONOMIC. INCENTIVES
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THAT DISCOURAGE MANAGEMENT INNOVATION, TECHNOLOGICAL
-- A SHARP DECLINE IN SOVIET HARD CURRENCY EARNINGS (THE
? RESULT OF FALLING OIL PRICES AND THE DEPRECIATION OF
THE DOLLAR) WILL LIMIT MUCH NEEDED SPECIALIZED IMPORTS
FROM THE WEST.
TRYING TO RESHAPE THE ENTIRE STALINIST ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE GRADUALLY WHILE LEAVING KEY PROBLEMS OF PRICE
REFORM AND THE GOVERNMENT MONOPOLY OVER GOODS UNTIL
LAST IS LIKE A PHASED CHANGE FROM DRIVING ON THE RIGHT
HAND SIDE OF THE ROAD TO THE LEFT -- TRUCKS FIRST, CARS
LATER. THE RESULTS ARE LIKELY TO BE SIMILAR. TO
ILLUSTRATE JUST HOW TOTALLY OUT OF KILTER THE SOVIET
ECONOMY IS, CONSIDER THAT RENTS FOR HOUSING -- WHICH IS
GENERALLY AWFUL HAVE NOT BEEN RAISED SINCE 1928; THE
CURRENT PRICE OF BREAD WAS SET IN 1954; AND FOOD PRICES
OVERALL IN 1962. STATE SUBSIDIES ARE SO HUGE THAT IT
IS CHEAPER FOR A PEASANT TO FEED HIS PIGS BREAD THAN TO
GIVE THEM GRAIN. (AND THE SOVIET PEOPLE KNOW ANY PRICE
REFORM CAN ONLY HURT THEM.)
FINALLY, FOR A MODERNIZATION DRIVE THAT DEPENDS IN
SUBSTANTIAL MEASURE ON HARDER WORK, THERE ARE FEW
REWARDS FOR SUCH WORK. UNSATISFIED CONSUMER DEMAND IS
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REFLECTED IN CONTINUING LONG LINES IN STATE STORES AND
RISING PRICES IN THE COLLECTIVE FARM MARKETS. AND
GORBACHEV OFFERS LITTLE HOPE OF SIGNIFICANT CHANGE FOR
YEARS.
THUS, WHILE IMPORTANT BATTLES HAVE BEEN WON IN PRINCIPLE,
THE WAR TO CHANGE FUNDAMENTALLY THE MAIN PILLARS OF THE
STALINIST ECONOMIC SYSTEM REMAINS TO BE FOUGHT AND WON.
POLITICAL REFORM
GORBACHEV'S PLANS FOR THE POLITICAL SYSTEM REMAIN LESS
WELL-DEFINED THAN HIS ECONOMIC AGENDA. BUT HE AND HIS ALLIES
HAVE SHOWN A GROWING CONVICTION THAT THE REVITALIZATION OF
SOCIETY AND ECONOMY CAN SUCCEED ONLY IF THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT
CHANGES IN THE POLITICAL ARENA AS WELL. THE REGIME APPEARS TO
BE MOVING ON AT LEAST THREE FRONTS TO CREATE THE POLITICAL
CLIMATE IT SEEKS:
THE FIRST IS IDEOLOGY. GORBACHEV IS FRUSTRATED WITH
THE STRAITJACKET OF INHERITED DOCTRINE THAT OPPONENTS
OF CHANGE HAVE SOUGHT TO IMPOSE ON HIM. HE SEEKS TO
EXPAND HIS ROOM TO MANEUVER BY AN INCREASINGLY OPEN
ATTACK ON STAGNATION IN IDEOLOGY AND BY DEPICTING HIS
OWN PROPOSALS AS AN EFFORT TO RETURN TO LENIN'S
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ORIGINAL INTENT AND EXPAND THE BOUNDS OF WHAT IS
PERMISSABLE UNDER SOCIALISM.
-- THE SECOND FRONT IS DEMOCRATIZATION. GORBACHEV'S
CAMPAIGN FOR "DEMOCRATIZATION" IS DESIGNED TO
REVITALIZE THE COUNTRY'S POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS.
INITIALLY, THIS WAS MOSTLY RHETORIC. IN RECENT MONTHS,
HOWEVER, AS THE JUNE PARTY CONFERENCE HAS DRAWN CLOSER,
HIS PROPOSALS HAVE TAKEN ON NEW LIFE. THE SOVIET PRESS
HAS PUBLICIZED NUMEROUS PROPOSALS TO BE CONSIDERED AT
THE CONFERENCE, INCLUDING CALLS TO LIMIT THE TERMS OF
OFFICE FOR PARTY OFFICIALS, MANDATORY RETIREMENT, AND
USE OF SECRET BALLOTS IN ELECTIONS. GORBACHEV
APPARENTLY BELIEVES THAT WITHOUT SUCH REFORM, IT WILL
BE IMPOSSIBLE TO BREAK THE RESISTANCE WITHIN THE PARTY
TO HIS AGENDA.
-- THE THIRD FRONT IS GLASNOST, OR OPENNESS. TIGHT
CENTRAL CONTROLS OVER THE FLOW OF IDEAS AND INFORMATION
LIE AT THE HEART OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM. REMARKS BY
GORBACHEV AND HIS KEY ALLIES INDICATE THAT THE NEW
LEADERSHIP BELIEVES THAT THIS APPROACH IS INCOMPATIBLE
WITH AN INCREASINGLY WELL-EDUCATED SOCIETY, COMPLEX
ECONOMY AND THE POLITICAL NEEDS OF THE MOMENT. I SEE
OTHER MOTIVES AS WELL BEHIND GLASNOST, NOT LEAST OF
WHICH IS USE OF AN APPARENT LIBERALIZING FORCE TO
ACHIEVE SOME RATHER OLD-FASHIONED OBJECTIVES.
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GLASNOST IS BEING USED TO CRITICIZE OFFICIALS
GORBACHEV SEES AS HOSTILE AND TO PRESSURE THEM TO
GET WITH THE PROGRAM.
IT IS BEING USED TO HIGHLIGHT PROBLEMS HE WANTS TO
ATTACK -- SUCH AS ALCOHOLISM AND DRUG ABUSE,
STALIN'S LEGACY, AND BUREAUCRATIC INERTIA -- IN
ORDER TO MOBILIZE SOCIETY BEHIND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
HE HOPES TO USE THE ATMOSPHERE OF GREATER OPENNESS
TO COOPT INTELLECTUALS AND PARTICULARLY ENGINEERS
AND SCIENTISTS TO BE FULL PARTNERS IN THE ATTEMPT
TO MODERNIZE THE ECONOMY -- TO OVERCOME THEIR
CYNICISM.
IT ENABLES THE REGIME TO COMPETE WITH FOREIGN AND
OTHER UNOFFICIAL SOURCES OF INFORMATION. SINCE THE
POPULATION WILL HEAR ABOUT RIOTING IN KAZAKHSTAN
AND ARMENIA AND THE DISASTER AT CHERNOBYL ANYWAY,
GORBACHEV BELIEVES IT IS BEST TO PRINT THE NEWS AND
PUT AN OFFICIAL SPIN ON IT.
FINALLY, HE INTENDS TO LEGITIMIZE BROADER
DISCUSSION OF PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS THAN
PERMITTED HERETOFORE IN ORDER TO BREAK THE BACK OF
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DOMESTIC RESISTANCE AND INCREASE HIS ROOM FOR
MANEUVER AT HOME. FURTHER, HE SEES THE EXPANSION
OF POLITICAL DEBATE AS A NECESSARY STEP TO ACHIEVE
HIS LONGER RANGE GOALS.
TO KEEP GLASNOST IN PERSPECTIVE, THERE HAS BEEN A
MORE OPEN AIRING OF PROBLEMS, BUT ONLY A VERY LIMITED
EXPANSION OF POLITICAL DEBATE. EVEN THIS HAS LED TO
CONTROVERSY OVER THE POLICY ITSELF AND OPEN CRITICISM
BY OTHERS IN THE POLITBURO THAT "OPENNESS" HAS GONE TOO
FAR. GORBACHEV HIMSELF HAS CAUTIONED MEDIA OFFICIALS
NOT TO GO TOO FAR LEST THEY UNDERMINE SOCIALIST VALUES
OR CREATE A CLIMATE OF DISRESPECT FOR PARTY OFFICIALS.
YET, GORBACHEV ALREADY HAS SET LOOSE FORCES THAT WILL
BE IMMENSELY DIFFICULT AND PAINFUL TO LEASH -- AS MUST
HAPPEN AT SOME POINT. THIS HAS BEEN ESPECIALLY EVIDENT
DURING THE CONTINUING DISTURBANCES IN ARMENIA AND
AZERBAIZHAN.
WHILE GORBACHEV'S BOLD POLITICAL MOVES AND RADICAL RHETORIC
HAVE SHAKEN THE SOVIET SYSTEM, HE HAS NOT YET REALLY CHANGED
IT. THE ULTIMATE FATE OF HIS VISION OF REFORM WILL DEPEND ON
HOW SUCCESSFUL HE IS IN PUSHING AHEAD WITH ITS IMPLEMENTATION
OVER THE NEXT DECADE IN THE FACE OF DESIGN FLAWS, ECONOMIC
DISRUPTION, TREMENDOUS OPPOSITION AND, WORSE, APATHY.
BUREAUCRATIC AS WELL AS POPULAR HOSTILITY IS LIKELY TO GROW AS
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DISRUPTION AND DISLOCATION BROUGHT ABOUT BY CHANGE RESULT IN
ECONOMIC SETBACKS AND, IN ALL LIKELIHOOD, A WORSENING SITUATION
FOR THE CONSUMER. WHAT GORBACHEV IS SUCCESSFULLY CHANGING IS
THE OFFICIALDOM OF THE PARTY AND STATE BUREAUCRACY. ONCE
AGAIN, THE PURGE HAS BECOME THE VEHICLE FOR CONSOLIDATING AND
ENHANCING PERSONAL POWER, AS WELL AS FOR IMPLEMENTING CHANGE.
IT IS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN -- I WOULD EVEN SAY IT IS
DOUBTFUL -- THAT HE CAN IN THE END PULL OFF REJUVENATION OF THE
SYSTEM, BUT HE HAS DEMONSTRATED A WILLINGNESS TO RISK HIS POWER
AND POSITION IN THE EFFORT. AS MUCH AS ANYTHING, THIS
INDICATES HOW DESPERATE HE BELIEVES THE SOVIET PREDICAMENT
REALLY IS.
IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREIGN POLICY AND FOR US STRATEGY
THERE SEEMS TO BE GENERAL AGREEMENT IN THE POLITBURO THAT,
FOR NOW, ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION REQUIRES A MORE PREDICTABLE, IF
NOT BENIGN, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT. THE ELEMENTS OF FOREIGN
POLICY THAT SPRING FROM DOMESTIC ECONOMIC WEAKNESS ARE A MIX OF
NEW INITIATIVES AND LONGSTANDING POLICIES. FIRST, GORBACHEV
WANTS TO ESTABLISH A NEW AND FAR-REACHING DETENTE FOR THE
FORESEEABLE FUTURE TO OBTAIN TECHNOLOGY, INVESTMENT, TRADE AND,
ABOVE ALL, TO AVOID MAJOR NEW MILITARY EXPENDITURES WHILE THE
SOVIET ECONOMY IS REVIVED. GORBACHEV MUST SLOW OR STOP
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AMERICAN MILITARY MODERNIZATION THAT THREATENS NOT ONLY SOVIET
STRATEGIC GAINS OF THE LAST GENERATION BUT WHICH ALSO, IF
CONTINUED, WILL FORCE THE USSR TO DEVOTE HUGE NEW RESOURCES TO
THE MILITARY IN A HIGH TECHNOLOGY COMPETITION FOR WHICH THEY
ARE ILL-EQUIPPED. THE SOVIETS KNOW THAT DETENTE IN THE EARLY
1970S CONTRIBUTED SIGNIFICANTLY TO DOWNWARD PRESSURE ON WESTERN
DEFENSE BUDGETS, SLOWED MILITARY MODERNIZATION, WEAKENED
RESOLVE TO COUNTER SOVIET ADVANCES IN THE THIRD WORLD, AND
OPENED TO THE USSR NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR WESTERN TECHNOLOGY AND
ECONOMIC RELATIONS.
SECOND, A LESS VISIBLE BUT ENDURING ELEMENT OF FOREIGN
POLICY -- EVEN UNDER GORBACHEV -- IS THE CONTINUING
EXTRAORDINARY SCOPE AND SWEEP OF SOVIET MILITARY MODERNIZATION
AND WEAPONS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. DESPITE SOVIET RHETORIC,
WE STILL SEE NO SLACKENING OF THEIR WEAPONS PRODUCTION OR
PROGRAMS. AND, FURTHER, SOVIET RESEARCH ON NEW, EXOTIC WEAPONS
SUCH AS LASERS AND THEIR OWN VERSION OF SDI CONTINUES APACE.
VIRTUALLY ALL OF THEIR PRINCIPAL STRATEGIC WEAPONS WILL BE
REPLACED WITH NEW, MORE SOPHISTICATED SYSTEMS BY THE MID-19905,
AND A NEW STRATEGIC BOMBER IS BEING ADDED TO THEIR ARSENAL FOR
THE FIRST TIME IN DECADES. THEIR DEFENSES AGAINST US WEAPONS
ARE BEING STEADILY IMPROVED, AS ARE THEIR CAPABILITIES FOR
WAR-FIGHTING. AS OUR DEFENSE BUDGET DECLINES AGAIN, THEIRS
CONTINUES TO GROW, ALBEIT SLOWLY.
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THE THIRD ELEMENT OF GORBACHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY IS
CONTINUED AGGRESSIVE PURSUIT OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES AND
PROTECTION OF SOVIET CLIENTS IN THE THIRD WORLD. UNDER
GORBACHEV, THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS ARE NOW PROVIDING MORE THAN A
BILLION DOLLARS A YEAR IN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO
NICARAGUA; MORE THAN A BILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF MILITARY
EQUIPMENT WAS SENT TO VIETNAM, LAOS AND CAMBODIA IN THE FIRST
SIX MONTHS OF LAST YEAR; MORE THAN FOUR BILLION DOLLARS IN
MILITARY EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN SENT TO ANGOLA SINCE 1984. AND, OF
COURSE, CUBA GETS ABOUT FIVE BILLION DOLLARS IN SOVIET SUPPORT
EACH YEAR. AT A TIME OF ECONOMIC STRESS AT HOME, THESE
COMMITMENTS SPEAK CLEARLY. ABOUT SOVIET PRIORITIES.
THE FOURTH ELEMENT OF GORBACHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY IS NEW AND
DYNAMIC DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES TO WEAKEN TIES BETWEEN THE US
AND ITS WESTERN ALLIES, CHINA, JAPAN, AND THE THIRD WORLD; TO
PORTRAY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AS COMMITTED TO ARMS CONTROL AND
PEACE; AND TO SUGGEST MOSCOW'S INTEREST IN DIPLOMATIC SOLUTIONS
TO THIRD WORLD PROBLEMS. THE FOREMOST EXAMPLE OF THIS IS THE
DECISION TO WITHDRAW FROM AFGHANISTAN. WE CAN AND SHOULD
EXPECT OTHER NEW AND BOLD INITIATIVES, PERHAPS INCLUDING
UNILATERAL CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS THAT WILL SEVERELY
TEST ALLIANCE COHESION. SIMILARLY, NEW INITIATIVES WITH CHINA
AND JAPAN SEEM LIKELY IN AN EFFORT, TO OVERCOME BILATERAL
OBSTACLES TO IMPROVED RELATIONS AND TO EXPLOIT PROBLEMS BETWEEN
THEM AND THE US. AND, IN THE THIRD WORLD, THEY WILL SEEK TO
TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ANY RELAXATION OF US VIGILANCE OR CONSTANCY.
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IN THIS CONNECTION, I BELIEVE WE CAN ANTICIPATE FURTHER
SIGNIFICANT SOVIET INITIATIVES FOR ARMS CONTROL -- SOME OF THEM
AMBITIOUS AND UNREALISTIC, BUT VIRTUALLY ALL WITH ENORMOUS
GLOBAL POLITICAL APPEAL. GORBACHEV IS PREPARED TO EXPLORE --
AND, I THINK, REACH -- SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN WEAPONS, BUT
PAST SOVIET PRACTICE SUGGESTS HE WILL SEEK AGREEMENTS THAT
PROTECT EXISTING SOVIET ADVANTAGES, LEAVE OPEN ALTERNATIVE
AVENUES OF WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT, OFFER COMMENSURATE POLITICAL
GAIN, OR TAKE ADVANTAGE OF US UNILATERAL RESTRAINT OR
CONSTRAINTS (SUCH AS OUR UNWILLINGNESS IN THE 1970S TO BUILD A
PERMITTED LIMITED ABM).
IN MY JUDGMENT, THE BENEFITS OF ARMS CONTROL FOR GORBACHEV,
PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO STRATEGIC WEAPONS, ARE PRIMARILY
STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL, NOT ECONOMIC. HE DOES SEEK TO AVOID
NEW, UNANTICIPATED COSTS THAT DEVELOPMENTS SUCH AS SDI MIGHT
REQUIRE. THESE WOULD PROBABLY BE SUBSTANTIAL IN THE 1990S AND
COULD WREAK HAVOC ON HIS ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION AGENDA.
HOWEVER, IN TERMS OF POTENTIAL SAVINGS, STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
WEAPONS ACCOUNT FOR ONLY ABOUT 10 PERCENT OF THE SOVIET
BUDGET. FEW OF THE PRODUCTION OR RESOURCE CAPABILITIES ARE
TRANSFERABLE TO CIVILIAN PURPOSES AND THE SOVIETS ALREADY HAVE
MADE THE INVESTMENT NECESSARY FOR PRODUCTION OF THEIR STRATEGIC
WEAPONS FORCE THROUGH THE MID-1990S. ONLY THROUGH SIGNIFICANT
CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS COULD.GORBACHEV BEGIN TO REALIZE
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ANY MAJOR ECONOMIC BENEFIT AND, TO A GREAT EXTENT, THIS WOULD
THE POLITICAL BENEFITS OF ARMS CONTROL FOR GORBACHEV ARE
EVIDENT. AS I NOTED EARLIER, IT HAS THE POTENTIAL TO BRING
DOWNWARD PRESSURE ON WESTERN DEFENSE BUDGETS, SLOW WESTERN
MILITARY MODERNIZATION, WEAKEN RESOLVE TO COUNTER SOVIET
ADVANCES IN THE THIRD WORLD, AND OPEN TO THE USSR NEW
OPPORTUNITIES FOR WESTERN TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS.
ARMS CONTROL GIVES CREDENCE TO SOVIET CLAIMS OF THEIR BENIGN
INTENTIONS AND MAKES THEM APPEAR TO BE A FAR MORE ATTRACTIVE
PARTNER TO OTHER COUNTRIES IN POLITICAL, CULTURAL, AND ECONOMIC
ARENAS.
ARMS CONTROL IS AN ATTRACTIVE PROPOSITION FROM GORBACHEV'S
POINT OF VIEW FOR ITS STRATEGIC IMPACT AS WELL -- AS LONG AS
ANY AGREEMENT REFLECTS BASIC SOVIET POSITIONS: PERMITTING
CONTINUED MODERNIZATION OF HEAVY ICBMS AND DEPLOYMENT OF MOBILE
ICBMS, PREVENTS THE UNITED STATES FROM DEPLOYING AN EFFECTIVE
SPACE-BASED MISSILE DEFENSE, AND PLACES CONSTRAINTS ON AIR AND
SEA LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES. FROM THE SOVIET PERSPECTIVE,
DEEP CUTS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WITH THESE CONSTRAINTS,
OFFER THE MEANS TO LIMIT THE GROWING NUMBER OF HARD-TARGET
WEAPONS IN THE US ARSENAL AND TO CONSTRAIN US PROGRESS IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF ADVANCED STRATEGIC DEFENSES. WHILE START WOULD
ALSO OBVIOUSLY LIMIT SOVIET WEAPONS PROGRAMS, THEY PRESUMABLY
BELIEVE THAT AN AGREEMENT THAT ENCOMPASSED THEIR BOTTOM-LINE
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POSITIONS WOULD, AT MINIMUM, NOT DEGRADE THEIR RELATIVE
STRATEGIC POSTURE.
ARMS CONTROL AND OTHER NEW INITIATIVES ALSO ARE INTENDED TO
BREAK SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY OUT OF LONGSTANDING TACTICAL
DEADENDS AND TO MAKE THE SOVIET UNION A MORE EFFECTIVE,
FLEXIBLE AND VIGOROUS PLAYER THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. THE RESULT
IS LIKELY TO BE A SOVIET POLITICAL CHALLENGE TO THE US ABROAD
THAT COULD POSE GREATER PROBLEMS FOR OUR INTERNATIONAL
POSITION, ALLIANCES AND.RELATIONSHIPS IN THE FUTURE THAN THE
HERETOFORE ONE DIMENSIONAL SOVIET MILITARY CHALLENGE. WE MUST
BE PREPARED FOR GREATER SOVIET FLEXIBILITY -- A NEW AND
DISCONCERTING WILLINGNESS TO SAY YES TO SOME OLD AND NOT WELL
EXAMINED US AND WESTERN PROPOSALS. CONSIDERABLE NEW THINKING,
FLEXIBILITY AND POLITICAL AGILITY WILL BE NEEDED ON OUR OWN
PART TO ANTICIPATE AND COUNTER SOVIET INITIATIVES AND TO AVOID
BEING OUTMANEUVERED AND PLACED CONSISTENTLY ON THE DEFENSIVE.
CONCLUSIONS
WHILE ACTUAL CHANGES IN THE ECONOMY OR POLITICAL LIFE OF
THE SOVIET UNION SO FAR HAVE BEEN MODEST, WHAT GORBACHEV
ALREADY HAS SET IN MOTION REPRESENTS A POLITICAL EARTHQUAKE.
HE IS PULLING ALL OF THE LEVERS OF CHANGE IN A SOCIETY AND
CULTURE THAT HISTORICALLY HAS RESISTED CHANGE -- AND WHERE
CHANGE USUALLY HAS BEEN VIOLENT AND WRENCHING. THE FORCES HE
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HAS UNLEASHED ARE POWERFUL BUT SO ARE THE PEOPLE AND
INSTITUTIONS HE HAS ANTAGONIZED -- THUS SETTING IN MOTION A
TREMENDOUS POWER STRUGGLE AND PURGE NO LESS DRAMATIC FOR THE
ABSENCE OF SHOW TRIALS AND TERROR.
THE STRUGGLE IS ESSENTIALLY BETWEEN THOSE SEEKING TO
PRESERVE THE STATUS QUO -- AND THEIR POWER IN IT -- AND
GORBACHEV AND HIS ALLIES WHO SEEK TO REPLACE THOSE NOW IN POWER
AND, IRONICALLY, TO TURN THE CLOCK BACK, BACK BEFORE STALINISM
TO LENINISM. GORBACHEV SEEKS TO RESTORE IN THE USSR A SYSTEM
IN WHICH SOME -- THOUGH CERTAINLY NOT ALL -- ELEMENTS OF THE
STALINIST ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND BUREAUCRACY ARE ELIMINATED
THUS OPENING THE WAY TO GREATER FLEXIBILITY AND INNOVATION AND
THEREBY TO MODERNIZATION AND IMPROVED PERFORMANCE.
IN THE POLITICAL ARENA, GORBACHEV'S LENINISM MEANS THE
CONTINUED POLITICAL MONOPOLY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, ITS ROLE
AS SOLE ARBITER OF THE NATIONAL AGENDA, ITS CONTROL OF ALL THE
LEVERS OF POWER, AND ITS ULTIMATE AUTHORITY OVER ALL ASPECTS OF
NATIONAL LIFE -- INCLUDING THE LAW. IT ALSO MEANS A MASSIVE
PURGE OF THE PARTY AND GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY, NOW UNDERWAY.
GORBACHEV'S OWN BOOK MAKES CLEAR THAT "DEMOCRATIZATION"
SOVIET-STYLE DOES NOT MEAN MOVING THE USSR AWAY FROM
MARXISM-LENINISM AND ITS ESSENTIALLY TOTALITARIAN STRUCTURE.
HIS RECENT ACTIONS IN SUPPRESSING THE DEMOCRATIC UNION AND
OTHER SUCH EMBRYONIC OPPOSITION PARTIES PROVE THE POINT. THE
DICTATORSHIP OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY REMAINS UNTOUCHED AND
UNTOUCHABLE.
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WESTERNERS FOR CENTURIES HAVE HOPED REPEATEDLY THAT RUSSIAN
ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION AND POLITICAL REFORM -- EVEN REVOLUTION
-- SIGNALED AN END TO DESPOTISM. REPEATEDLY SINCE 1917, THE
WEST HAS HOPED THAT DOMESTIC CHANGES IN THE USSR WOULD LEAD TO
CHANGES IN COMMUNIST COERCIVE RULE AT HOME AND AGGRESSIVENESS
ABROAD. THESE HOPES, DASHED TIME AND AGAIN, HAVE BEEN REVIVED
BY GORBACHEV'S AMBITIOUS DOMESTIC AGENDA, INNOVATIVE FOREIGN
POLICY AND PERSONAL STYLE.
THERE IS A CHANCE -- A VERY SMALL ONE IN MY VIEW -- THAT
GORBACHEV IS SETTING LOOSE FORCES THAT NEITHER HE NOR THE PARTY
WILL BE ABLE TO CONTROL AND THAT, CONTRARY TO THEIR INTENTIONS
AND EXPECTATIONS, ULTIMATELY MAY BRING A FUNDAMENTAL AND
WELCOME TRANSFORMATION OF THE SOVIET UNION AT HOME AND ABROAD.
AS WE HOPE THAT THIS REMOTE POSSIBILITY SOMEDAY COMES TO PASS,
I WOULD ADVISE, IN OLIVER CROMWELL'S FAMOUS WORDS, THAT WE
"TRUST IN GOD, BUT KEEP YOUR POWDER DRY."
ENDURING CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET GOVERNANCE AT HOME AND
POLICY ABROAD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT -- WHILE THE CHANGES UNDERWAY
OFFER OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE UNITED STATES AND FOR A RELAXATION
OF TENSIONS -- GORBACHEV INTENDS IMPROVED SOVIET ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE, GREATER POLITICAL VITALITY AT HOME, AND MORE
DYNAMIC DIPLOMACY TO MAKE THE USSR A MORE COMPETITIVE AND
STRONGER ADVERSARY IN THE YEARS AHEAD. WE MUST NOT MISLEAD
OURSELVES OR ALLOW OURSELVES TO BE MISLED INTO BELIEVING
OTHERWISE.
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IN CONCLUSION, THE QUESTION I AM MOST FREQUENTLY ASKED IS
WHETHER IT IS IN OUR INTEREST FOR GORBACHEV TO SUCCEED OR
FAIL. THE FIRST THING WE MUST ADMIT IS THAT THERE IS VERY
LITTLE THAT THE UNITED STATES CAN DO TO INFLUENCE THE OUTCOME
OF THE STRUGGLE GOING ON INSIDE THE SOVIET UNION. THAT SAID,
WE SHOULD ASK OURSELVES IF WE WANT THE POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC REVITALIZATION OF THE HISTORICAL AND CURRENT SOVIET
SYSTEM. I THINK NOT.
WHAT WE DO SEEK IS A SOVIET UNION THAT IS PLURALISTIC
INTERNALLY, NON-INTERVENTIONIST EXTERNALLY, OBSERVES BASIC
HUMAN RIGHTS, CONTRIBUTES TO INTERNATIONAL STABILITY, AND A
SOVIET UNION WHERE THESE CHANGES ARE MORE THAN A TEMPORARY
EDICT FROM THE TOP AND ARE INDEPENDENT OF THE VIEWS, POWER AND
DURABILITY OF A SINGLE INDIVIDUAL. WE CAN HOPE FOR SUCH CHANGE
BUT ALL OF RUSSIAN AND SOVIET HISTORY CAUTIONS US TO BE DEEPLY
SKEPTICAL.
WHILE WE CANNOT SIMPLY CLOSE OUR EYES TO MOMENTOUS
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE USSR, WE SHOULD WATCH, WAIT, AND EVALUATE.
AS GENERAL BILL ODOM HAS SAID, WE SHOULD APPLAUD PERESTROIKA
BUT NOT FINANCE IT. WE SHOULD NOT MAKE CONCESSIONS BASED ON
HOPE AND POPULAR ENTHUSIASMS HERE OR PLEASING PERSONALITIES AND
ATMOSPHERIC OR SUPERFICIAL CHANGES THERE. WE SHOULD, HOWEVER,
TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OPPORTUNITIES WHERE THE TERMS ARE FAVORABLE
TO US OR WHERE WE CAN BRING ABOUT DESIRABLE CHANGES IN SOVIET
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POLICIES -- WHETHER TO ADVANCE HUMAN RIGHTS, FREER EMIGRATION,
STRATEGIC STABILITY, SOLUTIONS TO SOVIET GENERATED PROBLEMS
SUCH AS AFGHANISTAN, OR EVEN EXPANDED BUSINESS TIES (IF THERE
IS NO TRANSFER OF SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY). ABOVE ALL, WE MUST
ESTABLISH REALISTIC CRITERIA BY WHICH WE CAN JUDGE IN THE
COMING MONTHS AND YEARS WHETHER POLITICAL OR ECONOMIC CHANGE IN
THE SOVIET UNION GENUINELY IS RESHAPING THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE
SYSTEM -- OR WHETHER THE TOTALITARIAN STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET
UNION, INCLUDING THE INSTRUMENTS OF CENTRAL CONTROL AND
REPRESSION, ENDURES DISCREETLY IN THE SHADOWS, AVAILABLE AT THE
BECKON OF GORBACHEV'S SUCCESSOR, OR EVEN FOR GORBACHEV.
THERE ARE MANY UNCERTAINTIES SURROUNDING THE SOVIET UNION
TODAY, BUT ONE FACT IS CLEAR: WHETHER GORBACHEV SUCCEEDS,
FAILS, OR JUST SURVIVES, A STILL LONG COMPETITION AND STRUGGLE
WITH THE SOVIET UNION LIE BEFORE US. SEEING THIS REALITY
CLEARLY -- THE OPPORTUNITIES AS WELL AS THE DANGERS -- WILL BE
AN EXTRAORDINARY CHALLENGE FOR THE UNITED STATES AND THE
WESTERN DEMOCRACIES IN THE YEARS AHEAD.
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