SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE AND SPACE FLIGHT PROGRAMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP60-00321R000400090003-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 22, 2013
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: March 25, 1958
• Content Type: MISC

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25 March 1958
SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE AND SPACE FLIGHT PROGRAMS
Congressional Briefing for the
BOUSe Select Committee on
Astronautics and Space Exploration
1. Mt. Chairman, the purpose of this presentation is to furnish a
summary of Soviet space flight capabilities, intentions and :possible programs.
Inasmuch as your Committee is concerned with all vehicles moving through outer
space (above roughly 100.200 miles altitude), I will also briefly cover our
assessments of those Soviet long-range ballistic missiles Whose trajectories
pass through outer space. For example, an ICBM will reach altitudes of
500-1000 miles depending on its configuration and planned trajectory; and
an IRBM will reach 300 miles altitude - near the paanned orbit altitude of
some of our earth satellites.
2. We believe the Soviet ballistic missile program has contributed
directly to, and provided. the basis for, their earth satellite activities to
date. Consequently, I will cover the missile field first.
PART ONE-IME SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM
3. Background. Although the USSR 'had no known guided missile program
at the close of World War II, we have conclusive evidence of their great
postwar interest in guided missiles. immediately after World War II, they
thoroughly and systematically exploited the German guided. missile program,
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especially their ballistic missile, the V-2, which had. a range of about
200 miles and reacted altitudes of about 70 miles. From this exploitation,
the Soviets derived four general benefits: (1) operational and prototype
missiles, with range up to 200 miles in the ballistic missile field, research
and production facilities and equipment, and approx1mately-4w German missile
specialists; (2) complete reports on German missile developments up to the
warts end; (3) the familiarization of their personnel with German techniques
of research, development, testing, and production of missiles and components;
and (4) advanced technical studies and some development of hardware components,
which German scientists performed. in the Soviet Union to as late as about 2953.
4. As a result of this exploitation, the Soviet Union was able by 1948
to raise the level of its guided missile knowledge to that which existed in
Germany at the close of World. War II. We believe that 1948 marks the beginning
of a concerted and contiruing native Soviet missile research and development
program.
5. General Conclusions on the Soviet Guided Missile Pr
? :?
a. We estimate that the Soviet guided missile program is extensive
and enjoys a very high priority.
b. We believe that the USSR has the native scientific resources and
capabilities to develop advanced types of guided missile systems, and
the industrial base and related industrial experience to series produce
these guided missile systems.
0. We estimate that the USSR has the capability to develop and
produce the nuclear, chemical and/or high explosive warheads necessary
to effective missile systems.
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6. Surface to Surface Ballistic Missiles. Our best evidence on the
Soviet guided missile program is on their ballistic Missile flight test
activities. In 1947, the Soviets established, a guided missiles test range
at Kapustin Tar (SEE CHART) and, with German assistance, fired about 12
captured. V.2 missiles in the fall of that year. The test program has been
vigorous. Since mid-1953, about 350 ballistic missiles have been flight-tested
at Kapustin Tar. These flight tests have been to ranges of about 75, 150,
300, 650 and 950 nautical miles, with the majority-being divided about evenly
in the 150-, 300- and. 650- nautical mile categories. On 22 June 2957, the
Soviets fired their first missile to a 950-mile range. Between then and
29 August 1957, seven flight tests were conducted to the 950-nautical mile
distance. This extensive test program provides the USSR with an unequaled
experience factor in the ballistic missile field..
7. In our current estimates an the shorter-range ballistic missiles,
we estimmte that the USSR could now have available for operational use,
surface-to-surface ballistic missiles with mmximmm ranges of 75, 200,
350, 700 and 1000 nautical miles. We have, however, no firm evidence of the
operational deployment of any of these missiles.
8. ICBM. We have estimated for several years that an ICBM was probably
a top-priority aim of the Soviet Union. A summary of evidence bearing on
the ICBM question follows:
a. Soviet interest in the ICBM field. has been evident since 1947
when Stalin stated that be wanted.aweapon which could bombard. New York.
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b. In 1951, a large rocket engine of about 220,000 pounds thrust
was being fabricated. This engine could have been static tested in 1952
and ready for incorporation into a missile system in 1953. The thrust
rating of this engine could have been increased by now and the coupling of
two or more such engines is within Soviet capabilities, although we have
no evidence that either advancement has been accomplished.
co The existence of a new 3,500 nautical mile ballistic missile
test range has been firmly established. (SEE CHART) We believe that
three ICBM vehicles have been flight tested on this range and that both
Soviet satellites were launched from here. The official Soviet announce-
ment on 26 August of the successful test firing of an ICBM and.
Mt. KhrushehevIs statement to Mt. Daladier that be (Ehrudhchev) has
personally witnessed the successful trial of the second Soviet 'cam
on 7 September 1957 are further support of the 'am: vehicle flight tests.
9. With this brief review of our evidence and bearing in mind the
extensive Soviet ballistic missile experience factor mentioned earlier, I will.
now turn to our current estimate of Soviet ICBM capabilities. We believe the
USSR is concentrating on the development of an ICBM Which, when operational,
will probably be capable of carrying a high-yield nuclear warhead to a /092CiMUM
range of about 5,500 nautical miles, with a CEP of five nautical miles or less
at maximmn range, and. a system reliability of about 50 percent. Army
Intelligence believes that the initial Soviet Imm capability will be restricted
to a range of about 3,800-4,500 nautical miles and. that the longer range (5500 nm)
will only be achieved at a later date.
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10. The date at which the USSR will have a first operational capability
with the ICBM will depend on zany factors, apart from the over-all urgency of
the program. These factors include the extent of technical success in missile
testing and the availability of launching facilities, supporting equipment,
and trained personnel to operate the system. We estimate that some time
during the period mid-1958 to mid-1959, the USSR will probably have a first
operational capability with up to 10 prototype ICBM's, with characteristics
approximating those estimated above. I should like to emphasize, however,
that we have no firm evidence of the construction of bases for launching
ICBMts or of their deployment.
11. ICBM's could prObablyte produced, launching facilities completed,
and operational units trained at a rate sufficient to give the USSR an
operational capability with 100 ICBM's about one year after its first
operational capability date (mid-1959-60), and with 500 ICBM's about two
or at most three years (mid..194R/r63) after first operational capability date.
PART TWO-SOVIET SPACE FLIGHT PROGRAM
12. Now I will turn to the Soviet space flight program. My remarks
will be based on CIA's views of the Soviet space flight activities, particularly
their intentions, capabilities and possible programs.
13. Background. Evidence of Soviet interest in space flight dates
back to the publication in 1903 of a paper titled "Investigation of Universal
Space by Means of Rocket Flight" by the eminent Russian scientist, K. E.
Ttiolkovskiy. This was highly scientific treatise which, for the first
tine mathematically established the fundamentals of rocketry, and made a
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proposal for an artificial scientific earth satellite. The first significant,
coordinated and systematized rocket studies began in the USSR in 1929 when
the "Group for the Investigation of Reactive Mbtion" was organized. In
1934, Stalin personally took a hand in the organization of a government-
sponsored rocket research program.
14. In April 1955, the USSR officially &mounded the establishment
of the "Interagency Commission for Interplanetary Communications," stating
that "one of the first tasks would be to organize work on the creation
of an automatic laboratory for scientific research in cosmic space and
that this would be the first obtp in solving the problems of interplanetary
travel and allow Soviet scientists to probe more deeply into the secrets
of the Universe". This Commission is directly underr'the Academy of Sciences
and is composed of some of the leading Soviet scientists in the fields
associated with space research.
15. Since early 1955 there have been close to 500 articles on space
research, earth satellites and manned space flight, many by ugh calibre
Soviet scientists. Most of these articles deal with the theoretical principles
of space flight. Although they do indicate the general level of Soviet knowledge,
very few provide any indication of Soviet intentions and programs. All
of these articles are reviewed and. over 100 have been completely translated
in C/A for the benefit of the intelligence community and for other interested
government and non-government institutes and scientists.
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16. We continually evaluate( all of these articles for indications
of their level of knowledge, intentions, capabilities and probable programs.
From these assessments and related intelligence information, we have concluded
that the USSR has a very great interest in space flight and is probably
pursuing a vigorous research and development program with the ultimate
goal being manned space flight.
17. Capabilities and. Intentions. Available evidence bearing on
Soviet activities and. accomplishments in related areas of science and.
technology indicates that the USSR has the potential, and. is currently
in the midst of a large-scale effort to acquire the capabilities essential
to successful umnanned and manned space flight.
18. Soviet capabilities in the development and effective utilization
of high powered rocket devices were strikingly demonstrated in the successful
launching of the world's first two artificial earth satellites on It October
and 3 November 1957, reportedly weighing about 184 and 1120 pounds respectively.
At present, we do not doubt the reported. weights or that a dog is carried in
SPUTNIK II. Our detailed. calculations on what would. be required. instrument
and weight vise,to accomplish the experiments claimed in SPUTNIK II show
that the purported weight of 1120 pounds is probably accurate.
19. Heavier and more sophisticated satellites are expected to follow
as a logical part of their space num research program. Many of these
will require very large booster engines. We have good. evidence that the
USSR ha. large rocket engines capable of producing about 220,000 pounds thrust.
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These are the engines I mentioned. earlier under their ICBM program.
Utilization of these engines in clusters could provide the greater thrusts
(up to about 1.5 million pounds) required for manned lunar and, other outer
space explorations. Soviet emphasis on large rocket engines is well known,
and. it is likely that they are currently working on even larger engines,
perhaps with thrust in the order of one-half million pounds each.
20. It is believed. that current Soviet propulsion systems for launching
satellites and space craft are based, on chemical systems featuring pairs of
liquid propeLlants. SPUTNIKS I and. II could have been launched using con-
ventional liquid fuels, such as kerosene and. liquid oxygen. However, higher
energy producing fuel combinations will be needed. for the latmching of larger
payloads. We have evidence of Soviet research in this field, but no firm
evidence of their application of high energy fuels to their earth satellite
program.
21. Solid propellants are also important to a space research program
in that they provide reliable propulsion units capable of ignition at high
altitudes. Such units are needed. for the third and fourth stages of space
vehicles. We have very little evidence of Soviet work on solid. propellant
suitable for space flight programs. However, based. on the high calibre
of their small-grain solid. propellant work during and. after World War II,
we believe their knowledge of solid propellant technology to be generally
equ.al to that of the West.
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22. Nuclear propulsion systems offer a much greater potential as
far as space vehicle weights and flight duration times are concerned.
However, such systems involve very high temperatures (about 3.50000C)
requiring the development of structural materials which can accommodate
these temperatures without melting. We believe that the USSR maybe able
to solve these problems and achieve a nuclear rocket propulsion system
in about 1965.
23. Turning now to the field of guiding an earth satellite or space
vehicle; the Soviets are currently considered capable of controlling unmanned
space vehicles in orbital or directionall,y programmed space flight trajectories
with accuracies sufficient to achieve near circular orbits of the earth,
lunar Impacts and lunar probes. The specific guidance system or combination
of systems used in the Soviet Space Flight Program is not known. The open
Soviet literature contains ample evidence of native competence in the basic
aspects of guidance of space vehicles. Soviet capabilities in the various
other electronics areas supporting an extensive space research program are
believed to be generally comparable with those of the Vest.
fr-cti.-641
24. Soviet research in space medicine leads; that of the West,
particularly in rocket flight physiology, space flight equipment and. pre.
conditioning for gravitational stress. It is this area of Soviet research
which provides definite indications of their intent to put man into space.
The Soviets have emphasized research related to extrmnely high altitudes and
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have developed, basic research techniques applicable to aeromedicine. This
research includes significant work in acceleration, weightlessness, bio-
engineering, forced. breathing, "sealed. cabins" and. many other medical aspects
directly and solely related. to the launching of manned satellites or space
vehicles.
25. The successf111 orbiting of SPUTNIK II as a biological experiment,
preceded by many high altitudes (30-120 mile) rocket experiments, has greatly
advanced Soviet knowledge and. capabilities in aeronedical research; they
are able to apply aeromedical research to actual conditions. A careful
assessment of our evidence indicates that there is no aeromedical obstacle
which prevents the Soviets front orbiting a human being for a period. from
hours to days within the next year.
26. Soviet research activity in the complicated. field of celestial
mechanics is also very high. Celestial mechanics is that field. of astro-
nomical research Which deals with the motions of two or more bodies in space
under the influence of their mutual gravitational attractions. Our evidence
indicates that they are in a position to make substantial advances in the
"state of the art." The Soviet Institute of Theoretical Astronomy, founded.
in 1923, is the largest of its kind in the 'world. devoted. almost exclusively
to celestial mechan.ics research. There is no specialized facility in the
West to compare with this establishment. A recent disclosure in connection
with Soviet Space Flight activities is a paper summarizing the results of
a systematic investigation, undertaken from 1953 to 1955, to find. solutions
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for the fUndamental problems posed by a flight to the moon. More than 600
trajectories involving various types of lunar flights were calculate. in
this study.
27. Space vehicles require an internal power source to operate the
various equipment carried therein. Without an adequate internal power
supply most scientific experiments and any manned flights would be impossible.
These power sources are separate from and in addition to the propulsive
power needed to place the vehicle into space. Internal power supply sources
involving nuclear-electric plants are within Soviet developmental capabilities,
but their considerable weight would permit their use only in very large space
craft. We believe it milikely that the MR would utilize such power sources
within the next 5 to 7 years. In other forms of power sources such as
chemical, solar and atomic the Soviets are considered to have a competence
equal to that of the West.
28. Hy remarks so far have dealt primarily with ballistic configurations.
There is another technique for getting man into space which I want to mention
before going into our estimates. This involves the use of rocket-powered,
winged. aircraft, such as the US L.15 project. Soviet activity in this field
should therefore be mentioned. Since the flight of their first rocket-
powered aircraft in 1940, the Soviets have displayed strong interest in
this type of aircraft, ani are known to have had. an organized program for
the investigation of a rocket-propelledl skip-type, intercontinental
bother as early as 1946-47. In recent months, the Soviets have stated on
a number of occasions that a manned space vehicle is feasible in the near
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future and is one of their prime objectives. It is possible that they
recognize in the winged, rocket-powered vehicle, similar to the US X-15,
a practical method. for the safe return of a man from an initial, Limited
test flight in outer space. Although direct supporting evidence is lacking,
it is believed that the Soviet Union has in being an active and continuous
research program involving these type.,vehicles, and. that research prototypes
are now or soon will be flying in the USSR.
29. Specific Soviet Space Flight Capabilities and. Possible Programs.
Based. on demonstrated. and. estimated Soviet capabilities in the ballistic
missile field, their acknowledged interest and. intent in the space flight
field, and their performance to date, we in CIA have prepared a tentative
estimate of Soviet Space Flight capabilities and possible programs. We
believe they can pursue this program without seriously interfering with
their high priority ICBM program. In fact, zany of these early earth
satellite firings will provide valuable test data to their ICBM program.
30. The official Soviet News Agency TABS, announced on 20 March
that SPUTNIK II was nearing the earth's atmosphere and. was expected to
"end. its existence" between 5 and. 15 April. Calculations made by US
scientists at the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory indicate that the
end. of SPUTNIK II will occur about lie. April. As you remember, SPUTNIK I
made its final orbit on 1 December 3957 and its carrier rock et on Ii. January 1958,
leaving only SFR= II "representing" the USSR in outer space. Soviet
recognition of this fact, together with their predicted. "death"
of SPUTNIK II
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and their awareness of the tremendous psychological effects of their satellite
venture, could be a very disturbing factor to their claims of Soviet superiority
in this space era.
31. Although we have no evidence indicating the exact date when
SPUTNIK III will in fact be placed into orbit, we are expecting an attempt
most any day now, and. probably before the death of SPUTNIK II in mid-April.
We are also expecting something unusual or spectacular. Soviet articles
and. announcements indicate an interest in many different type of space
research programs. Although ire can not predict precisely what theymaytry,
we believe they are currently capable of accomplidhing one or more of
the Yellowing type earth satellites - we doubt they will successfully
accomplish all of them this year. of these steps are based on use of
the proyulsion units of their 'Mae the launching vehicle.
(1) Orbiting an earth satellite weighing 4000 to 5000 pounds.
(2) Impacting an object of up to 500 pounds weight on the moon
with suitable dye markers or other discernible features to assure that
the world will be aware of the event.
(3) Placing another animal bearing satellite into orbit and
attempting recovery thereof.
(4) Orbiting an optical reconnaissance satellite with a limited
resolution possibly capable of detecting fleet movements, large airfields
and other large installations, and. making weather observations.
(5) Veking a solar probe (shooting an instrumented satellite
towards the sun), or creating an artificial asteriod (minor planet
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similar to the thousands of small worlds revolving araund the sun,
mainly between the orbits of Mars and. Jupiter).
32. Looking forward into the near fUture,(i;year or so from now
we have estimated additional space flight adhievements which the Soviets
have shown an interest in and. are believed to be within their capabilities
still using their basic ICBM propulsion units in vehicle.
(1) Making a soft landing on the moon with pp to 150 pounds
of instrumentation.
(2) Placing an instrumented, satellite into orbit around the moon.
(3) Orbiting and. recovering a nanned satellite; we would expect
this event to be preceded by recovery of several animals from satellites.
The date the Soviets choose to attempt this feat will depend largely on
how certain of success they feel they have to be.
(4) Probing our neighboring planets, Mars and. Venus. This night
be tried on or about the respective confluence dates (dates at which
the planet is in the most favorable position for a space flight to
leave the earth). Mars - 20 August 1958 and 15 October 1960; Venus -
June 1959 and jarnuay 1961.
33. As your committee nay have to look far into the future, we have
also looked. farther ahead. Any estimates of Soviet apace flight capabilities
in this period. must be considered as highly speculative. We have readhed
some very tentative guesses which you maybe interested in.
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TOP SECRET
34. If the Soviets are to actively pursue manned interplanetary
space flight as they have indicatedl the following steps are considered
possible courses of action 'within their capabilities:
(1) If development of the new larger booster mentioned earlier
is successful, the USSR could orbit an earth satellite weighing
up to 25,000 pounds in 1960. Such a satellite could. provide the
basic vehicle for further space ventures.
(2) A recoverable manned circumlunar flight in 1961.
(3) Using these large satellites to construct a space platform
weighing up to 300,000 pounds .in 1963.65.
(4) By 1965.70 3Anding a man on the noon with a reasonable
Chance that he naiad return.
35. Gentlemen, I would like to close my presentation. With a few
sobering remarks. The USSR is engaged in extensive high priority ICBM
and spaceflight programs. They have demonstrated. to the world the highest
competence in these fields Endr-TrAatbt-thatliteril;rverny-rierriuiP'sh
thisvmsbbia5-
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