NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY MONDAY 28 NOVEMBER 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000500010022-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2010
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: November 28, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Director of TO
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Monday
28 November 1983
rap-secret-
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CPAS NID 83-277
28 November 1983
Copy 285
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Contents
Ell Salvador: Military Reorganization ......................................
Romania: Economic Problems ................................................
Philippines: Demonstrations Continue ..................................
USSR: Commitment To Improve Consumer Goods ................
China-US: Problems in Relations ............................................
Liberia: Coup Plot Developments ............................................
Chad: Efforts at Reconciliation ................................................
Romania-USSR: Discord on INF ..............................................
Jamaica: Seaga Calls Election ................................................
Malaysia: Prime Minister Challenges King's Authority .......... 9
Argentina: Drug Trafficker Released ...................................... 10
Special Analysis
PLO: Arafat's Political Prospects ............................................ 11
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Salvadoran Military Zones
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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EL SALVADOR: Military Reorganization
Defense Minister Vides has made sweeping changes in the
Salvadoran high command, including the appointment of a new chief
of staff.
Vides announced on Friday the appointment of Col. Adolfo
Blandon as chief of staff and Lt. Col. Miguel Mendez as head of
operations. Lt. Cola Domingo Monterrosa of the elite Atlacatl Battalion
was named to head the 3rd Brigade, and at least nine other major
field commands-including three of the four US-trained immediate
reaction battalions-received new commanders. In addition, the
Army's six military zones were realigned, placing the departments of
San Miguel, Morazan, and La Union under the command of the
3rd Brigade.
Comment: The Defense Minister had been under growing
pressure for over a month to make major command and institutional
changes to improve the Army's conduct of the war. The appointments
of Blandon and Mendez-both respected field commanders-almost
certainly presage a substantial increase in the command and control
authority exercised by the general staff. Monterrosa is considered the
Army's most effective field commander, and the reorganization of the
eastern departments under his leadership probably underscores the
government's concern about recent guerrilla successes in that region.
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ROMANIA: Economic Problems
Bucharest is taking steps that will cause living standards for
workers to become worse and could lead to widespread unrest during
the coming winter.
President Ceausescu announced Friday that the government has
approved measures to cut by 50 percent all domestic energy
consumption not directly tied to production.
Western press reports from Bucharest say the leadership has
urged consumers to stop using vacuum cleaners, washing machines,
and refrigerators in an energy-saving campaign unprecedented in
postwar Romania. In addition, the regime reportedly will close all
schools for the month of January.
The government also intends to impose-sector by sector during
the next several months-a complex wage system tying salaries more
closely to plan fulfillment.
Comment: Ceausescu is shifting the burden to consumers in an
attempt to protect Romania's shaky industrial sector and to repay
hard currency debt as quickly as possible. Consumers, however,
already are beleaguered by falling living standards, the worst food
shortages since World War II, and earlier energy cutbacks and price
hikes. The new energy measures will bring hardship to many
Romanians, and the new wage program could result in take-home pay
cuts for many as new groups of workers are added on the first of each
month through the winter.
The security forces have thus far been able to intimidate the
disgruntled populace. Nevertheless, the new measures-particularly
if they lead to severe dislocations-could provoke spontaneous
protests that might be difficult to control.
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Opposition leaders in the Philippines are planning a general strike
for today as a conclusion to the protest activities of the last week.
The "Justice for Aquino, Justice for All" alliance, which the US
Embassy reports has been heavily penetrated by Communists, is
calling for a day of rest-a euphemism for a general strike-and
urging everyone to remain at home. As many as 80,000 workers
participated yesterday in an antigovernment demonstration in Manila
commemoratin the birthday of murdered opposition leader Benigno
Aqulno.~ ?
The rally was sponsored by the May First Movement, a radical
labor organization previously believed to be on the fringe of the labor
movement. Demonstrations elsewhere were smaller than the one in
the capital, but they were more numerous than those that followed
Aquino's funeral in September.
Comment: The opposition's success in organizing large
demonstrations yesterday-more than three months after Aquino's
assassination-confirms that the breach between Marcos and the
people is deep and possibly irreversible. In addition, the apparent
ability of the May First Movement to stage a large rally suggests that
the economy has become a critical political issue. Extensive
participation in a general strike today would indicate that the
opposition might sustain momentum through National Assembly
elections in May.
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USSR: Commitment To Improve Consumer Goods
The leadership has shown increasing interest in strengthening the
sagging consumer goods sector with help from the West.
The Politburo in September approved the inclusion of the
consumer goods program in the Five-Year Plan for 1986-90. Soviet
media recently announced that a Politburo commission for
overseeing development of this program had met to discuss the
provision of goals and services in the consumer sector. The
commission stressed the need for more raw materials for consumer
goods production.
Comment: The consumer goods program-one of several long-
term plans under discussion since 1979-has received less emphasis
than the food and energy programs. The leadership has been
conspicuously vague in some of its statements, and it is not clear to
what extent the recent actions will be backed up by substantial
increases in investment or by an increased commitment in heavy
industry to produce more consumer goods. General Secretary
Andropov has hinted that consumers should not expect too much.
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Beijing has formally protested two recent moves by the US
Congress regarding Taiwan on the grounds that the violate earlier US
commitments to a one-China policy.
The Chinese Foreign Ministry called in the US Ambassador twice
in the past week to protest two congressional resolutions dealing with
Taiwan. The Chinese claim that the first, approved by the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee last week, supports an independent
Taiwan and is "deliberate interference in China's internal affairs." The
second protest complains that language attached to a funding
measure for regional development banks, which refers to Taiwan as
the "Republic of China," is an attempt to pursue a two-China policy.
After delivering the protest notes, Chinese officials suggested that
visits next year by Premier Zhao to the US and by President Reagan
to China had been jeopardized by the congressional moves. In the
second note, Beijing called for the US to take "immediate, concrete
measures."
Chinese media are replaying the protests along with critical
commentary. Beijing has also complained about remarks purportedly
made by President Reagan in Tokyo about US relations with the
"Republic of China," which the media said were in contravention of
various US-Chinese communiques.
Comment: Despite the protests, the Chinese are continuing
preparations for the exchange of top-level visits. The Chinese are
concerned, however, that Premier Zhao could be embarrassed if his
visit coincides with the introduction of the Taiwan resolution to the full
Senate. They appear to be seeking a high-level public reaffirmation of
the US commitment to a one-China policy.
The domestic political atmosphere in China, particularly the
campaign against Western cultural and intellectual influences, may be
affecting the tone of China's complaints. Even more than usual, no
one in the leadership can afford to be perceived as too compromising
on the question of Taiwan.
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LIBERIA: Coup Plot Developments
The government suspects former armed forces commander
Quiwonkpa of involvement in recent coup plotting and has given him
until today to surrender for questioning.
Security officials yesterday publicly called on Quiwonkpa to turn
himself in within 48 hours. Liberian troops have surrounded him and
some of his followers in a village in his tribal homeland.
The government is giving wide publicity to statements made by
seven alleged coup plotters it has in custody. All admit to being
colleagues of Quiwonkpa as well as members of his Gio or the related
Mano tribe. Some of the detainees claim that Quiwonkpa was directly
involved in the plot, in which Gio and Mano soldiers in Monrovia were
to rebel at the same time that other plotters mounted a small-scale
raid against a mining town in which some of Head of State Doe's
Krahn tribesmen were killed.
The US Embassy reports that many Liberians still are not
persuaded of Quiwonkpa's involvement. They suspect the charges
against him have been concocted to frame him for political reasons.
Meanwhile, the Soviets have expelled Liberia's Ambassador in
retaliation for the earlier ejection of the Soviet Ambassador in
Monrovia for alleged involvement in the plot. There is no sign,
however, that either government is considering breaking diplomatic
relations.
Comment: Events could easily degenerate into strife between the
Gio and Mano tribes and Doe's politically dominant Krahn if
Quiwonkpa comes to harm or if the former general is not seen as
receiving fair treatment in any future trial. Although it is doubtful that
the Gio and Mano are sufficient in number to bring down the regime,
dissidence on their part could slow progress toward a return to
civilian rule by 1985. Doe publicly maintains that internal tranquillity
and economic progress are preconditions for the military's return to
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Obstacles remain in the way of successful OAU-sponsored
reconciliation discussions tentatively set for late December in Addis
Ababa.
The US Embassy in Lagos says a Nigerian delegation that
recently returned from Tripoli following talks there on Chad reports
that Libya still objects to President Habre's continuing as chief of
state. Rebel leader Goukouni issued a statement in Tripoli last Friday
"welcoming" the OAU initiative and talks with Habre's "faction."
According to the US Embassy in N'Djamena, Habre's agreement to
participate is contingent on his treatment as Chad's legitimate head
of state.
Meanwhile, Habre reached a tentative agreement last week with a
group of southern dissidents-now numbering almost 1,000 men-
that plans to rally to the government. The US Embassy reports that
Habre has granted the ralliers freedom to circulate in their district and
has given them some limited administrative responsibilities. Chadian
officials indicate, however, that dissident activity continues unabated
elsewhere in the south.
Comment: Although Libya appears to have agreed to send the
Chadian dissidents to the conference in Addis Ababa, Tripoli almost
certainly hopes to bargain for a compromise candidate to replace
Habre as Chad's president. Habre's agreement to go to the
negotiating table probably reflects increasing French pressure on his
regime after a cease-fire lasting almost four months, but it represents
little progress toward a settlement. A successful conclusion to talks
with southern dissidents would probably enhance Habre's image as
an effective leader and thereby strengthen his bargaining position in
Addis Ababa.
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Romania broke ranks with its Warsaw Pact allies Friday, calling
on both the US and the USSR to reconsider plans to deploy new
nuclear missiles in Europe and to return to the Geneva arms talks.
Criticizing both sides for taking unjustified measures that are pushing
the world toward nuclear war, Bucharest suggested that Washington
halt INF deployment and reduce the number of air- and sea-borne
missiles "oriented toward Europe" and that Moscow withdraw and
dismantle all medium-range missiles in the European USSR. Romania
also called for meetings this year between Secretary of State Shultz
and Foreign Minister Gromyko and early next year between President
Reagan and General Secretary Andropov. The statement further
advocated that a "consultative conference" of NATO and Warsaw
Pact states be held concurrently with the Geneva talks to discuss the
respective Soviet and US proposals.
Comment: While the statement contains little that is new, its
more evenhanded criticism of the US and the USSR will irritate the
Soviets and further damage already strained Soviet-Romanian
relations. It is unlikely, however, to have any impact on Moscow's
countermeasures strategy.
JAMAICA: Seaga Calls Election
Prime Minister Seaga, using the opportunity provided by an
opposition demand that he resign as minister of finance, has
announced a general election to be held on 15 December. The
opposition People's National Party had threatened to bring about a
constitutional crisis if an early election were called that required the
use of outdated voting lists. The demand for Seaga's resignation
came after he announced in the parliament last week a currency
devaluation, a new agreement with the IMF, and other economic
reform measures.
Comment: Opposition leader Manley's party committed a major
tactical blunder by enabling Seaga to call elections at a time when
events in Grenada have moved the ruling Jamaica Labor Party to a
7-percent lead in public opinion polls. Seaga is likely to receive a new
five-year mandate because his party faces an ill-prepared opposition
party that reportedly is divided over whether to contest the election.
Moreover, the Prime Minister's prospects will be helped by the private
sector's response to the devaluation, which thus far has been
positive.
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MALAYSIA: Prime Minister Challenges King's Authority
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Prime Minister Mahathir's effort to reduce the King's authority by
a constitutional amendment calling for an end to royal assent on
legislation is developing into a political crisis. The amendment is
opposed by the King and the nine state sultans, who are supported by
the ruling party's old guard, which believes Mahathir is ignoring its
interests. The US Embassy reports that rumors are circulating that
Mahathir has threatened to resign if the move to amend the
constitution fails.
Comment: Mahathir is unlikely to resign. He and his party
colleagues place great emphasis on maintaining Malay unity, and
neither the Prime Minister nor the sultans have ruled out a
compromise. Maneuvering on a possible compromise formula
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meeting of the ruling party's Supreme Council on 3 December.
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ARGENTINA: Drug Trafficker Released
the Argentine military junta has released former Bolivian Minister of
Interior and drug trafficker Luis Arce Gomez, who was in custody
pending resolution of a US extradition request. Arce ran his own
cocaine trafficking network in Bolivia from July 1980 to March 1981
and was the symbol of corruption in the Garcia Meza administration.
the junta detailed a contingent of military
and federal police to protect Arce until he leaves the country.
Comment: The junta had hoped to exchange Arce for a US
citizen who they believe was involved in the assassination in Argentina
of Chilean General Carlos Prats in 1974. When the Argentine
extradition request was denied by the US, Arce's detention
apparently was no longer considered necessary. Helping Arce get out
of the country, moreover, would remove a possibly embarrassing
problem for the civilian government scheduled to take office early
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Special Analysis
PLO: Arafat's Political Prospects
The assault on Yasir Arafat's forces in Tripoli has gained him
increased sympathy among Palestinian moderates. Even if Arafat
extricates himself from Tripoli, the military defeat he has suffered will
leave him with little leverage in Middle East politics. He probably will
try again for a role in the peace process, but under conditions that the
other participants will find difficult to accept. The PLO radicals and the
Syrians have the upper hand over Arafat and the moderate Arab
states, and are likely to remain the dominant Arab voices on the
Palestinian issue.
The successive political and military defeats Arafat has suffered
since the evacuation from Beirut have irreparably damaged his
authority. The split in Fatah and the bleak prospects of the forces that
remain loyal to him have deprived him of his base of power.
Arafat's chief political asset is his continuing popularity among
most Palestinians. Moderates usually critical of his vague and shifting
diplomacy and leftists long hostile to his pursuit of a political
compromise with Israel have rallied behind him.
The PLO chief's only hope for political survival is to create a new
organization around the moderate Palestinian supporters. He will
have difficulty, however, translating his popular support into political
power. Most Palestinians are far removed from the main arena of
conflict with Israel, and they lack political organization.
Arafat's backers in the West Bank are politically cautious. They
also are divided by local and ideological rivalries and recognize that
their future depends as much on decisions made in Israel as on their
support for Arafat. Many have serious reservations, moreover, about
some of Arafat's specific policies and his capacity for creative
leadership.
If Arafat can get out of Tripoli, he probably will consider reviving
his efforts to work with Jordan's King Hussein toward expanding the
Middle East peace talks. Despite a need to show some quick results,
he is likely to move cautiously. Arafat probably would demand that
negotiations have to lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state,
or that the talks at least not rule out such an outcome.
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At a minimum, Arafat is likely to insist that any endorsement given
to Jordan to negotiate Palestinian issues with Israel be contingent on
Tel Aviv's halting settlement activity in the West Bank. He will seek
assurances that the US will press Israel for concessions in the West
Bank and Gaza. He also might insist that, if he renounces terrorism
and armed struggle, Israel accept him as a direct participant in any
negotiations.
Even if Arafat achieves some early success, however, PLO
radicals and the Syrians have at least an even chance of blocking his
initiatives. They are prepared to use terror to intimidate his
Palestinian and Arab supporters.
The radicals also will bid for Palestinian support by claiming that
Arafat is pursuing the same bankrupt policies that undermined his
support in the PLO. They will claim that he is now much weaker
politically and that he thus is less able to secure a settlement
favorable to the Palestinians.
Supporters of the Fatah rebels are already working to win
adherents in the West Bank. Some moderates there believe time is on
the dissidents' side, especially if Arafat fails to make political
progress. The rebels' call for armed struggle against the Israeli
occupation appeals to many West Bank hardliners, especially the
volatile students, no matter how self-defeating such action might be.
The Legitimacy Issue
The dissidents' immediate goal is to gain recognition as the
legitimate leaders of the PLO and assume the Arab League's
mandate to act as the sole representative of the Palestinians. They
would prefer to remove Arafat and his loyalists through nominally
legal methods.
With Syrian support, the rebels probably will convene a Fatah
general congress and manipulate it to replace Arafat. It will be more
difficult, however, to remove him as PLO chairman.
Arafat's supporters apparently still command a majority on the
380-member Palestine National Council, which elects the PLO's
15-member Executive Committee. Its members are scattered
throughout the Arab world, and the dissidents currently would be
hard pressed to convene a quorum without Arafat's approval.
Arafat also is aided somewhat by the continued support he
receives for his legitimacy as PLO leader from the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine and the Democratic Front for the
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Liberation of Palestine, which, after Fatah, are the two most important
PLO groups. Syria's moves against Arafat have seriously strained its
relations with these two Marxist groups. Their leaders have no
alternative to maintaining a presence in Syria, however, and they thus
are forced to accept domination by Damascus.
Over time, Arafat's majority on the National Council is likely to
erode unless he achieves some political breakthrough for the
Palestinian cause. The National Council will become irrelevant to the
Palestinian cause, moreover, if, its only function is to keep a politically
weak Arafat formally in power.
King Hussein will be disinclined to revive his talks with Arafat as
long as the issue of PLO legitimacy remains unresolved. Even if Arafat
manages to stay on as PLO chairman-and the odds are against
him-Hussein will want assurances that Arafat will not back out again
and that Saudi Arabia and the moderate Arab states will firmly back
In the moderates' view, talks between Hussein and Arafat are
unlikely to succeed until the US forces Israel to cease settlement
activity or to make some other gesture of flexibility. If the Arab states
are dissatisfied with the US and Israeli response, they would be
reluctant to support talks between Arafat and Hussein.
Outlook
If Arafat leaves Tripoli, he will be able to join Hussein in support of
the Middle East peace process only if he demonstrates quickly that
the political option can achieve results favorable to the Palestinians.
He is unlikely to succeed. His minimum demands probably will
continue to exceed the maximum concessions that Israel will offer.
PLO radicals will not for some time, if ever, acquire the breadth of
support enjoyed by Arafat. Nonetheless, they probably will be able to
veto any move by more moderate Palestinians to reach a settlement
with Israel that the radicals and Syria oppose. The Jordanians and the
Israelis, meanwhile, will be wary of accepting Arafat as a partner in
negotiations while the Palestinians are divided into warring camps
and can no longer claim to represent a Palestinian consensus.
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