NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY FRIDAY 5 AUGUST 1983

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T01094R000400010019-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 20, 2010
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: August 5, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
CCFAS/C 1C
Y 285.
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Top Sec
ret
National Intelligence Daily
Friday
5 August 1983
ovs
CPAS NID 1 X
5 August 1983 25X1
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Contents
Libya-Chad: Government's Position Deteriorating ................ 1
France-Chad: Intentions and Capabilities .............................. 2
India-Sri Lanka: New Delhi's Growing Unease ......................
Ell Salvador: Status of the Amnesty Program ........................
West Germany: Plans for Peace Movement Protests ............
Japan-Iran-Iraq: Foreign Minister Abe's Visits ......................
Upper Volta: Coup Reported ..................................................
Italy-US-Libya: Concern About Naval Maneuvers ..................
USSR-Central America: Warming Up to Contadora Effort
Special Analyses
Italy: New Government's Prospects ........................................ 11
Saudi Arabia-Syria: Concern About Syrian Intransigence .... 14
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5 August 1983
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LIBYA-CHAD: Government's Position Deteriorating
Libyan military involvement in Chad is steadily increasing, and the
The US Ambassador in N'Djamena believes that, without air
delivery of antiaircraft missiles and reinforcements, Faya-Largeau
could fall early today or tomorrow and that the loss of Abeche would
soon follow. Three of Chad's six air transports are not operational.
Government officials say the forces that withdrew from Oum
Chalouba yesterday have fallen back to Arada. Lightly armed Zairian
troops have moved to several towns north of N'Djamena.
Comment: Without French troops, the government probably
could not long survive the loss of Faya-Largeau and Abeche. The
capture of Oum Chalouba blocks the principal avenue of escape for
President Habre and his forces to the east and their potential
safehaven in Sudan. Government troops at Faya-Largeau are bracing
for a counterattack, and they cannot spare units for any effort to
recapture Oum Chalouba
The limited response by France to Libya's air attacks on Faya-
Largeau probably has led Libyan leader Qadhafi to conclude that he
can continue to support the dissidents without fear of significant
foreign intervention. At the same time, transportation problems and
Qadhafi's concerns about his military's attitude toward intervention
probably will continue to limit the size of the Libyan expeditionary
force and the rapidity with which it can be moved to the battlefront.
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5 August?1983
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FRANCE-CHAD: Intentions and Capabilities
The French Government is continuing to develop contingency
plans for expanding its involvement in Chad.
IOn
Wednesday the government repeated that it will not send French
combat troops to Chad.
If Paris decides to provide tactical air support in defense of
Faya-Largeau or to attack Libyan bases farther north, it probably will
deploy the fighters. The Mirages would join eight Jaguar fighter-
bombers currently based in Senegal and Gabon. French officials say
they would be reluctant to send Jaguars, which are primarily ground-
attack aircraft, into Chad without the protection of F-1s.
The Jaguars can refuel in midflight and normally operate with
KC-135 tankers. Without refueling, a Jaguar armed for a bombing
mission can attack out to about 400 nm and return to base. Faya-
Largeau is on the margin of that range-even if the Jaguars staged
from N'Djamena.
F-1s can fly fighter-protection missions out to about 350 nm
without refueling. They could reach Gabon or Senegal from France
within eight hours of a decision to send them.
The French also could operate aircraft from Bangui in the Central
African Republic. Refueling facilities are available there, but weapons
and rearming equipment would have to be brought in, possibly from
Senegal and Gabon.
France has no airborne-early-warning aircraft and is likely to ask
the US for AWACS support for a major operation. French pilots,
however, are well trained and aggressive and would be more than a
match for the Libyans.
Thus far, only a few French advisers and mercenaries are in Chad.
If Paris decides at some point to commit ground units, it can draw
from some 8,000 troops already in central Africa and from other
"Rapid Assistance Forces" in France.
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5 August 1983
NEW DELHI
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ISLANDS oa
(India)
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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INDIA-SRI LANKA: New Delhi's Growing Unease
Prime Minister Gandhi appears determined to thwart outside
intervention in Sri Lanka as Indian Tamils increase pressure for New
Delhi to become more actively involved.
The US Embassy in London reports that British officials believe
the Indians will block the proposed Commonwealth relief effort by
refusing the use of Madras as a staging site for an airlift of Tamil
refugees from Colombo to northern Sri Lanka. Meanwhile, Indian
officials have expressed concern about the possible movement of
foreign warships toward Sri Lanka in response to President
Jayewardene's reported request for help from several countries.
Indian opposition parties, particularly Tamil groups in southern
India, are continuing to chide Gandhi for her failure to alleviate the
plight of Sri Lanka's Tamils. The Prime Minister has responded by
offering limited support for local protest actions in Tamil Nadu State,
but she continues to avoid any moves implying intervention by India.
Comment: Gandhi's apparent stalling over relief efforts reflects
New Delhi's desire to prevent the intrusion of foreign influence into
Sri Lanka. She may suspect that Jayewardene intends external
assistance to be a first step toward introducing foreign security forces
into the island.
The Indians also may be concerned that the proposed airlift could
result in the partition of the island into a Sinhalese state in the south
and a Tamil state in the north, with the latter looking to New Delhi for
support. Jayewardene's continuing failure to offer conciliatory
gestures to Tamil demands and his decision to ban the Tamil political
party is likely to lead to more communal violence that will in turn
heighten tensions with India.
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4 5 August 1983
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EL SALVADOR: Status of the Amnesty Program
The amnesty program is making progress, but it may be hampered
by a lack of funds.
Government figures indicate that 254 guerrillas and sympathizers
accepted amnesty as of last month. Following the 30-day extension of
the law on 16 July, US Embassy officials report that increasing
numbers of insurgents and their followers are taking advantage of the
program.
Officials in San Salvador also report that 540 of the nation's 733
political prisoners were released by the middle of last month. Since
that time, more than 200 amnesty beneficiaries have been resettled in
Canada, Australia, and Belgium. Others have been relocated in
western El Salvador and have been given government subsidies.
Meanwhile, amnesty officials claim that funding for the extension
period was never appropriated and cite an immediate need for
$20,000 to $30,000 for publicity and pamphlets to be airdropped over
guerrilla areas. They also say that more financing is needed to
continue resettlement programs within the country. The officials
doubt that the current amnesty, which ends on 15 August, will be
extended again.
Comment: The total number of guerrillas who have requested
amnesty since the extension began is unclear. Fear of repression from
either the left or right will inhibit large numbers of insurgents from
accepting the amnesty. On the other hand, the government's
continuing military campaign has probably eroded guerrilla morale
and could make the amnesty increasingly appealing.
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5 5 August 1983
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BeIgiu
Boundary representation is
not necessarily oh-w,-
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5 August 1983
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Peace groups in West Germany are scheduling a number of
activities for this month while preparing more extensive protests this
fall.
Nationwide demonstrations are scheduled to begin tomorrow and
to end on Tuesday to commemorate the bombing of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, and others will be held on 1 September, which traditionally
has been Antiwar Day. On Sunday, local peace groups intend to
disrupt an air show at the US Air Force base at Ramstein and to try to
damage an aircraft with their bare hands.
The Pax Christi organizations in Wiesbaden and the Greens in
Mainz have planned peace marches later this month. From 2 to 4
September, prominent personalities, including authors Guenther
Grass and Heinrich Boell, will participate in a three-day blockade of a
US Army facility at Mutlangen.
Meanwhile, activists are conducting peace camps in various
locations to teach courses in nonviolent techniques of protest.
Comment: Sizable protest activities during the traditional
summer vacation period would portend more widespread and intense
activity in the fall. Although most groups advocate peaceful protests,
the "autonomous groups" and the terrorist fringe are likely to use
The demonstrations in Krefeld during Vice President Bush's visit
and the recent fire bombing of the Siemens industrial plant suggest
that protests in the fall probably will include street rioting and attacks
on military, industrial, and public service facilities. Such activities,
however, may alienate moderate members of the peace movement
and could strengthen public support for the government's decision to
deploy INF missiles.
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JAPAN-IRAN-IRAQ: Foreign Minister Abe's Visits
Japanese Foreign Minister Abe, whose trip to Iran and Iraq begins
tomorrow, hopes to use the visits to improve Tokyo's relations with
Tehran and Baghdad and to strengthen his own domestic political
standing.
Abe has eschewed any intent to mediate the war between Iran
and Iraq but will appeal for an early cease-fire. He also will indicate
that Japan stands ready to provide substantial quantities of economic
and technical assistance when hostilities end. Japan has extensive
trade and investments in both countries, and it is the only major
Western power with an ambassador in both capitals.
The chances of a successful trip to Iran have been improved by a
financial agreement between Mitsui and the Iranian Government on
the huge petrochemical project at Bandar-e Khomeyni. Work on the
project has been suspended since the outbreak of the war. In Iraq,
Abe reportedly will bow to Baghdad's insistence that the approaching
deadline on official credits to Iraq be extended.
Comment: The trip is an important step toward more active
Japanese diplomacy in the area. It could pave the way for a trip by
Prime Minister Nakasone to the region next year.
There is no prospect that Abe can achieve a cease-fire. Moreover,
if the war intensifies during his visits, the Foreign Minister will be
placed in a delicate diplomatic position. In that event, his hopes for
gaining favorable publicity at home also could be upset.
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7 5 August 1983
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UPPER VOLTA: Coup Reported
Pro-Libyan former Prime Minister Thomas Sankara claimed in a
radiobroadcast from Ouagadougou yesterday to have overthrown the
nine-month-old pro-Western government of Army Major Jean
Baptiste Ouedraogo. Sankara was removed from his post three
months ago after receiving arms and promises of economic aid from
Libya. Details of the takeover are sketchy, and US Embassy reports of
continued firing in the capital suggest that the new regime is not in
complete control. The approximately 550 US citizens in Upper Volta
reportedly are safe.
Comment: Sankara will have difficulty consolidating power, and
he could face an early countercoup. If the new regime holds on,
however, it probably will move the country away from its traditionally
strong pro-Western stance and turn to Tripoli for assistance. Ivory
Coast, Niger, and Togo-Upper Volta's moderate, pro-Western
neighbors-will watch the situation closely for fear that the Libyans
will try to use the country as a springboard for regional subversion.
An official in the Italian Ministry of Defense has expressed
concern about US naval exercises in the Gulf of Sidra and complained
about the short notice provided of the maneuvers. The Ministry of
Foreign Affairs has followed up with a lower key note about the need
for advance notice of US operations in an area that falls within Italy's
"sphere of influence."
Comment: Italy shares US concerns about Libyan adventurism,
and it publicly defends the right of the US Navy to operate in the Gulf
of Sidra. The government, however, also wants to preserve
commercial relationships with Libya and protect the 15,000 Italian
citizens who live there. In addition, the military takes seriously Libyan
leader Qadhafi's periodic threats to retaliate against Italian and NATO
facilities in southern Italy. Defense officials plan to strengthen
inadequate air defense forces in the south-especially with the cruise
missile base at Comiso, Sicily, scheduled to become operational next
March-but these projects could be delayed by competing priorities.
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8 5 August 1983
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USSR-CENTRAL AMERICA: Warming Up to Contadora Effort
Soviet officials and media have begun to give cautious support to
the Contadora group-Venezuela, Mexico, Panama, and Colombia-
by saying it is trying to achieve "a just settlement of the conflict in the
region." In May Mexico had sought the USSR's endorsement of the
group's role and objectives, but Foreign Minister Gromyko said then
that Moscow's endorsement might cause an adverse US reaction. The
change follows Cuban and Nicaraguan endorsements of the
Contadora effort.
Comment: The Soviet attitude probably shifted as a result of
growing concern about US reactions to the Central American
situation. Moscow may see the effort as a way to check US activities
that it believes could threaten the Sandinista regime and increase
chances for a US-Cuban or US-Soviet confrontation in the region. The
USSR could be moving toward a more direct and authoritative
statement following talks in Nicaragua by Soviet Foreign Ministry
Secretary General Fokin and in Mexico and Costa Rica by roving
Ambassador Mendelevich.
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9 5 August 1983
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Special Analysis
ITALY: New Government's Prospects
The five-party government named by Socialist Prime Minister-
designate Craxi faces a difficult future. It probably is only a matter of
time before Craxi's coalition partners-the Christian Democrats,
Social Democrats, Republicans, and Liberals-begin to snipe at one
another again, especially over economic policy. By early next year,
Craxi may find it increasingly difficult to deal with his partners.
The Christian Democrats will control 15 of the 29 ministries in the
new government. They will hold the most important portfolios,
including the Foreign Affairs, Interior, Justice, Southern Affairs, and
Treasury Ministries.
Republican Party leader Spadolini will replace Minister of Defense
Lelio Lagorio, a Socialist. The Socialists will actually hold three fewer
posts this time than in the outgoing Fanfani government.
Foreign Policy Attitudes
The large size of the cabinet and the predominance of non-
Socialist ministers will ensure basic continuity in foreign policy, in
which Craxi has supported the US on cruise missile deployments and
other issues. Craxi almost certainly will continue to emphasize Italy's
close ties to NATO and the US.
At the same time, Craxi's record suggests that he will try to
persuade the public that he is "different" from his predecessors. He is
likely to try to underscore his "European" credentials.
Late last month a high-ranking Socialist Party official told the US
Embassy that Craxi hopes to travel to Paris, Bonn, and London early
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In addition, Craxi may be a more difficult ally on matters involving
the Middle East, North Africa, and the Third World. His views on these
areas frequently reflect his reliance on the French press and contacts
in the Socialist International for information on international affairs.
Christian Democratic Foreign Minister Andreotti, while sharing his
party's pro-Western attitudes, also has shown interest in Third World
causes.
Craxi probably hopes that, as prime minister, he will be able to
reassert his wavering authority in his party and to strengthen his
leverage over the Christian Democrats. To achieve these goals, he will
calculate that he has to persuade the public that he will govern better
than his predecessors.
The Prime Minister-designate hopes to concentrate his efforts on
strengthening government institutions and making them more
efficient. He may compensate for the unwieldy size of his cabinet by
forming a small inner cabinet drawn from the more important
ministries and reducing the number of cabinet undersecretaries.
Craxi's attention will be directed toward reforms designed to
strengthen the office of prime minister, including limits on the use of
the secret ballot in parliamentary voting, and to streamline legislative
procedure. Over the longer term, he would like to institute changes in
the proportional representation voting system and install a German-
style constructive vote of no-confidence.
All of these proposals will be contentious. As a-result, Craxi's
prospects for success are uncertain.
Economic Program
Problems also are likely to arise among the coalition partners on
economic policy. The new cabinet's economic proposals call for
reducing inflation and for laying the groundwork for economic
recovery.
Press and US Embassy reporting indicate that his program
probably.will entail:
- Creating new jobs over the next three years in the public
sector and in the depressed south.
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- Reducing the inflation rate next year from 16 percent to
10 percent through such measures as an incomes policy
and limiting increases in administered prices.
- Keeping the budget deficit under $51 billion this year-
about 17 percent of GDP-in part by limiting transfers to
local governments and by reforming the social security
and health care systems.
The program gives ground to the austerity-minded Christian
Democrats and Republicans while preserving a key Socialist objective
of creating more jobs. The government's success in hitting the
inflation target will depend on keeping the budget deficit in line and
slowing down wage costs. The Socialists hope to finance the jobs
program largely by shifting expenditures from other programs.
Despite Craxi's interests in other areas, the economy probably
will be the first and most difficult subject on the new government's
agenda. Debate in the coalition probably will be acrimonious, and
further modifications in the government's program are likely.
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Special Analysis
SAUDI ARABIA-SYRIA: Concern About Syrian Intransigence
The visit to Damascus last weekend by Prince Bandar, King
Fahd's close adviser and his new Ambassador to the US, reflects
Riyadh's concern that Syria's positions on Lebanon, the PLO, and the
war between Iran and Iraq are jeopardizing key Saudi policy
objectives. The Saudis, however, have little leverage with Damascus
on these issues. On Lebanon, Fahd increasingly will look to the US to
extract concessions from Israel that could reduce Syrian
intransigence.
Bandar's trip follows several weeks of high-level exchanges
between Riyadh and Damascus. Fahd also has been in close contact
with PLO chief Arafat, who held lengthy discussions with the King last
Continued Syrian support for Iran remains another point of
friction between Riyadh and Damascus, especially now, when
tensions between the Saudis and Iranians are increasing over the
coming pilgrimage to Mecca. The Saudis believe that Syria's support
for Iran-particularly its closure of Iraq's oil pipeline-has
encouraged Tehran to conclude it can win the war and has saddled
Saudi Arabia with the burden of major economic aid to Baghdad.
Fahd probably also is looking ahead to the next Arab summit,
which will be held in Riyadh in November. As the summit approaches,
the King is likely to increase his efforts to reduce differences between
conservative Arab governments and the radical states led by Libya
and Syria. His eagerness to avoid embarrassing disruptions of the
summit will give radicals increased leverage in their dealings with the
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Fahd's Concerns
The King views the Syrian-backed rebellion within Fatah as a
threat to continued moderate control of the PLO and, consequently,
to the moderate Arab consensus he has worked to build. Moreover,
he and other Saudi leaders worry that Arafat's inability to regain
control of the PLO will lead to a resumption of Palestinian terrorism,
which this time they fear will be aimed at Saudi Arabia and other
conservative Arab regimes. Fahd also believes that continued friction
between Arafat and Assad complicates efforts to bring about a
withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon, thereby facilitating the
partition of Lebanon and blocking progress in the Middle East peace
process
Syria's intransigence has helped prevent Fahd from obtaining a
major success in foreign affairs, with which he has been preoccupied
since he became King. He needs such a success to counter his
domestic critics, who assert that his cooperation with US regional
initiatives is unjustified in the face of continued US support for Israel
Outlook
Syria will continue to rebuff Saudi Arabia's petitions to end its
support for Iran and the Fatah rebellion and moderate its position on
a troop withdrawal from Lebanon. Fahd will not cut off financial aid to
Syria-his only leverage with Assad-for fear of driving Damascus
closer to Moscow and provoking Syrian-sponsored terrorism against
In the absence of Syrian movement, the King increasingly will look
to other countries that might exert a moderating influence on
Damascus. Riyadh might even discreetly approach the Soviets to urge
increased Syrian flexibility. At the same time, Fahd will increase his
appeals to the US to extract concessions from Israel that could
reduce Syrian intransigence in Lebanon
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