AT THE REQUEST OF THE DDI, THE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF "CHALLENGES TO THE WESTERN POSITION IN AND AROUND BERLIN" WAS SENT TO A SELECTED NUMBER OF SENIOR POLICYMAKERS.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89G01126R000100030014-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: February 7, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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Memorandum for: The Record
At the request of the DDI, the Executive
Summary of "Challenges to the Western
Position In and Around Berlin" was sent
to a selected number of senior policymakers.
EUR M 85-10025
lb / eLtMD
7 February ]985
E U R A
Office of European Analysis
Four notes signed by the DDI (notes attached)
Oriq - The Honorable Kenneth W. Dam
1 - The Honorable Michael Armacost
1 - The Honorable Fred C. Ikie
1 - VADM John M. Poindexter
Thirteen notes signed by D/EURA (note attached)
I - The Honorable Richard N. Perle
I - Donald Gregq
I - Ambassador Jack F. Matlock, Jr.
I - Colonel John R. Stanford
1 - Ronald S. Lander
1 - Wynfred Joshua
1 - Peter Rodman
I - Marten Akramowitz
I - Richard Burt
1 - Thomas Niles
1 - Richard Haass
1 - John Kornblum
1 - Peter Sommer
Internal Distribution
1 - DDI
I - DDI Registry
1 - OD/EURA
2 - Production file
4 - IMC/CB
I - Division file
1 - Branch file
I - Author
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NOTE TO: The Honorable Kenneth W. Dam
Deputy Secretary of State
Department of State
Attached is the Executive Summary of an
Intelligence Assessment that details Soviet and
East German infringements of Allied rights
during the last few years and presents our view
of the motivations behind them. It also
discusses prospects for restoring an air regime
compatible with Allied safety requirements, as
well as the possible merits and risks of
stronger Allied responses -- including
demonstration flights through disputed airsapce.
The full text of the assessment is in the
final stage of the publication process. It will
be available later this week, and we will send
copies to your staff. Please let me know if I
can be of further assistance.
Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Attachment:
As stated
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NOTE TO: The Honorable Michael M. Armacost
Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Department of State
Attached is the Executive Summary of an
Intelligence Assessment that details Soviet and
East German infringements of Allied rights
during the last few years and presents our view
of the motivations behind them. It also
discusses prospects for restoring an air regime
compatible with Allied safety requirements, as
well as the possible merits and risks of
stronger Allied responses -- including
demonstration flights through disputed airspace.
The full text of the assessment is in the
final stage of the publication process. It will
be available later this week, and we will send
copies to your staff. Please let me know if I
can be of further assistance.
Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Attachment:
As stated
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NOTE TO: The Honorable Fred C. Ikle
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
The Pentagon
Attached is the Executive Summary of an
Intelligence Assessment that details Soviet and
East German infringements of Allied rights
during the last few years and presents our view
of the motivations behind them. It also
discusses prospects for restoring an air regime
compatible with Allied safety requirements, as
well as the possible merits and risks of
stronger Allied responses -- including
demonstration flights through disputed airspace.
The full text of the assessment is in the
final stage of the publication process. It will
be available later this week, and we will send
copies to your staff. Please let me know if I
can be of further assistance.
Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Attachment:
As stated
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NOTE TO: VADM John M. Poindexter
Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Attached is the Executive Sumnary of an
Intelligence Assessment that details Soviet and
East German infringements of Allied rights
during the last few years and presents our view
of the motivations behind them. It also
discusses prospects for restoring an air regime
compatible with Allied safety requirements, as
well as the possible merits and risks of
stronger Allied responses -- including
demonstration flights through disputed airspace.
The full text of the assessment is in the
final stage of publication process. It will be
available later this week, and we will send
copies to your staff. Please let me know if I
can be of further assistance.
Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Attachment:
As stated
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Memorandum for: The Record
Attached is the Executive Summary of an
Intelligence Assessment that details Soviet and
East German infrinqements of Allied rights
during the last few years and presents our view
of the motivations behind them. It also
discusses prospects for restoring an air regime
compatible with Allied safety requirements, as
well as the possible merits and risks of
stronqer Allied responses -- includinq
demonstration flights through disputed airspace.
The full text of the assessment is in the
final stage of the publication process. It will
be available later this week, and we will send
copies to your staff. Please let me know if I
can be of further assistance.
5 February 1985
Director, =
E U R A
c'
Office of European Analysis
Directorate of Intelligence
STAT
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Central Intelligence Agency
5 February 1985
MEMORANDUM
Challenges to the Western Position In and Around Berlin
Executive Summary
During 1984, the Soviets and East Germans took a series of actions in and
around Berlin that further eroded Western rights based on four power
agreements and/or longstanding practice. As a result, the Western position in
and around Berlin is not as good as it was a year ago.
Recent Soviet actions primarily reflect Moscow's long-term goal to change
the status quo to its advantage whenever opportunities arise to do so without
provoking a crisis. The Soviets apparently view an incremental approach to
change in quadripartite arrangements as the best means of gaining Western
acquiescence in their intepretation of the rules governing access to Berlin.
Similarly, they remain motivated by a desire to enhance the sovereignty and
legitimacy of the East German regime, especially when they estimate the risks
of Allied counterreaction are small. And the Soviets and East Germans are
always watchful to stymie any perceived West German efforts to strengthen
political ties between the Federal Republic and West Berlin. But the Allies,
not the West Germans, appear to have been the primary target of Soviet actions
in 1984.
The Soviets took steps in early December apparently designed to defuse
Western protests over its actions last year and to avoid the appearance of an
East-West confrontation over Berlin. This seeming flexibility may have been
timed to influence Allied discussions of Berlin issues at the December NATO
ministerial meeting. It also may have reflected increasing Soviet interest in
smoothing over secondary disputes with the United States in anticipation of
the meeting between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko in early
January.
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Soviet and East German Actions in 1984
The adverse actions taken during 1984 involved technical matters and have
antecedents in earlier disputes. In addition to pursuing the Soviets' long-
term quest for advantage, the steps could also be interpreted as an effort to
remind the West of its vulnerability in Berlin at a time of heightened East-
West tension:
-- On 15 November, the East Germans closed the Glienicker Bridge, the
military liaison missions' primary transit point between West Berlin
and their headquarters in Potsdam. Although reopened on the same
day, the East Germans indicated that the bridge would be closed again
if the West Berlin Senat (government) did not agree to its terms for
financing repairs to and maintenance of the bridge.
As a result of seeming new Soviet and East German flexibility in
December, some progress toward ameliorating differences has been made on two
of these issues. Soviet officials in West Berlin "notified" several
reservations for less than the full length of the corridors and indicated that
most future reservations will include similar geographic limits. In addition,
the East Germans and the Senat reached an agreement on the Glienicker Bridge
in which the East Germans backed away from their insistence that West Berlin
pay for maintenance of the bridge. Because the East Germans had no apparent
direct interest in coming to a quick agreement to keep the bridge open, we
believe their retreat probably was at the behest of the Soviets. But despite
their recent readiness to seek compromises, the Soviets still are asserting
the right to make unilateral adjustments in the air corridor regime, contrary
to the Allied position that the corridors remain a four-power
responsibility.
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We believe that Soviet frustration over failing to block INF deployments
contributed to last year's troubling actions on Berlin issues. Soviet
restrictions on the air corridors and military liaison mission travel have an
inherent military rationale suggesting that recommendations by Soviet military
commanders in East Germany -- whose military requirements now differ
considerably from those that existed when the access understandings were
established -- may have weighed heavily in Kremlin deliberations. Soviet
political authorities may have approved such recommendations as a convenient
way to signal to the West the costs of increased East-West tensions. Soviet
decisionmaking regarding Berlin may also have been affected by leadership
changes in Moscow. The air corridor and military liaison mission travel
decisions were implemented at a time when the top level leadership picture was
in considerable flux after the accession to power of General Secretary
Chernenko and may reflect increased influence on the part of Gromyko.
The degree of Soviet and East German harassment to date almost certainly
does not itself endanger the Western presence in Berlin; Western access has
been inconvenienced but not reduced or explicitly threatened. Indeed, a
consensus appears to exist among US experts on Berlin that the West does not
face an imminent crisis in Berlin and that the situation remains relatively
calm, especially when compared to periods in the past and to the high level of
East-West tension in recent years.
Options for Responding to Eastern Encroachments
The West nonetheless faces a difficult task in responding to Soviet and
East German encroachments. The three Western powers sometimes are not in
agreement on how to respond. Moreover, there would be little public sympathy
in Western Europe for any Allied effort to escalate issues that almost
certainly would be perceived as minor -- such as the extent of corridor
reservations -- into a major East-West confrontation.
The prospects for a settlement that restores a greater measure of
quadripartite management of the air corridors or leads to geographic limits on
reservations more acceptable to the Allies probably would increase if an East-
West thaw leads Soviet authorities to decide that Berlin issues are not worth
the potential damage to improved relations. A more cooperative Soviet
attitude also may come about if President Reagan decides to visit West Berlin
in May: The Soviets, anxious to maintain the perception that they were not
doing anything to disrupt the calm in Berlin, became unusually cooperative on
several issues before the President's last visit in 1982.
Stronger Actions. The Soviets might also move to satisfy Allied demands
if the West, despite possible problems with Western public opinion, escalates
its response to unilateral actions beyond verbal protests. This would
appreciably boost the potential costs to Moscow of its piecemeal efforts to
erode Allied access. But such Allied reactions are risky since we cannot be
certain how the Soviets will respond. The Soviet response to a specific
Allied action would depend on the nature and timing of the action, the local
circumstances leading up to it, the state of East-West relations at the time,
and other factors such as leadership politics in Moscow.
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Given the West's vulnerability in Berlin, the Allies have few options in
responding to Soviet behavior, while Moscow has many options for
counterreactions. The Allies could take actions against Soviet interests in
and around Berlin, but these would be largely limited to harassment of Soviet
personnel. Another option would be to take action on a non-Berlin issue of
importance to Moscow, clearly linking such a move to the Soviet position on
Allied rights in Berlin. For example, the United States could tie continued
refusal to reinstate US landing rights for Aeroflot to the air corridor
issue. The Allies could also make further high-level demarches, perhaps
accompanied by a stated readiness to send demonstration flights through
disputed airspace at the eastern ends of the corridors. These options would
not carry the risk of a military incident in Berlin, but could nevertheless
provoke Soviet counterreactions, including increased harassment of Allied
personnel in and around Berlin.
Demonstration Flights. Actual demonstration flights through disputed
airspace would be the riskiest option since they could result in the shooting
down of an Allied aircraft. Even if the Allies were to limit their
penetration of reserved airspace to the disputed miles at the ends of the
corridors, the Soviets could increase military air activity in the area to
enhance the risk for the Allies of mid-air collisions.
Although risks always will exist, we believe there are conditions and
times when strong Allied responses -- including demonstration flights -- have
a greater likelihood of successfully deterring the Soviets from abridging
Allied rights, or of forcing the Soviets to acknowledge Western positions.
Ironically, we believe a strong response is more likely to achieve Western
objectives when Moscow has a solidly perceived interest in improved relations
with the West. In such an environment, Soviet leaders probably would be more
reluctant than they are now to permit Berlin issues to pose an unnecessary
burden on overall East-West relations. We also believe the effectiveness of
stronger Allied actions would be greater -- and the risks probably less -- if
they were taken in the early stages of a dispute.
In the case of the air corridors, a strong response shortly after 20
February 1984 would have demonstrated to the Soviets how seriously the Allies
viewed the situation. Indeed, available evidence shows that the Soviets did
not initially use the disputed airspace, suggesting they probably were waiting
to see how the Allies would respond. We believe that now, however, the risks
are fairly high that stronger actions would undercut -- rather than reenforce
-- the apparent recent Soviet willingness to compromise on Berlin issues. The
leadership situation in Moscow and the course of East-West relations remain
uncertain, and statements by Soviet officials in Berlin indicate they believe
they already are taking steps to assuage Allied concerns on Berlin issues. At
some point in the future, especially if US-Soviet relations improve and the
Soviets continue to impinge on Allied rights, stronger actions may stand a
greater chance of success at lower risk.
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More Serious Challenges Possible
More serious Soviet challenges to the West in and around Berlin cannot be
ruled out. On the one hand, West German efforts to increase the Federal
Republic's ties to West Berlin could provoke Soviet retaliation. At the
moment, West Germany is a special target for Soviet hostility, albeit for its
alleged drift toward "revanchism" and not specifically for any activities it
is undertaking in Berlin. A perceived Allied failure in the future to contain
assertive West German behavior in Berlin, therefore, could provide Moscow the
pretext for seeking further changes in the status quo in Berlin. And West
German actions aside, Berlin will remain an arena in which Moscow can bring
pressure to bear on the Western Allies, specifically the United States. In
the event that East-West relations do not develop favorably from Moscow's
point of view or that US actions are perceived as dangerous to important
Soviet interests in regions less accessible to Soviet military power, Moscow
might be tempted to exploit its inherent leverage over Western access to
Berlin in more direct and threatening ways.
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