MINUTES SEVENTEENTH MEETING OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY PANEL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93B01137R000400020039-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 29, 2012
• Sequence Number: 39
• Publication Date: June 26, 1980
• Content Type: REPORT

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l;_INOTES
SEVENTEENTH MEETING
OF
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE SCIENCE
AND TEC1NOLOGY ADVISCRY PANEI
;Approved Iy STAR on
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CIA AGENCY-WIDE LCNG-RANGE PLANNING-
to the DCI
C
in planning, improvements are in order.
Special Assistant 25X1
The Agency long-range Flan is still evolving. Last July ;19711) in
response to STAP recommendations, the Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence sent a memorandum to the Executive Committee ;F.xCom)
asking that.a study of the Agency lcng-range planning process he
undertaken by the ExCom.Staff. A long-range issues planning paper-was
produced. The paper concluded that although the Agency is doing well
nine-year plan.
The current plan is tc evaluate the present planning and
management issues, recommend areas for improvement, and identify
long-range planning issues. This shculd be completed by NovAmher.
Weekly meetings of Agency planners are being held. They raves
discovered that a number of planning programs already exist. For
example, Data Processing already has an Agency-wide icng-range plan;
N.FAC has a five-year plan; and the Cffice of Communications has a
The next step will be to identify major foreign policy and
management issues. This raises a number of questions. Should, or can,
the two lists be linked and interrelated? Should they he tied t_)
resources? If so, how will the Agency ccmptrcller fit into the plan?
How much detail should.be included? It is hoped that this first cut
will be completed by November 1980.
In the discussion that followed, STAP felt that it was good that
the Agency was facing up to the issues in planning and that thr
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planning is being tied to resources. The process is considered the
most important benefit of long-range planning, not the production cf a
formal planning document; it must to a continuous process that
actively involves top management. Constant support is important and is
necessary for R&D plannig. Some concern was expressed that the
planning process described was not for the entire Intelligence
Community, but only CIA. Exemplary projects,
should be publicized as examples of
O
involved in scientific and technical areas.
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that have gone well. There was concern that the planning period as
only five years, a period too short when lead-times of 10-20 years are.
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STAP believes that the real value of the planning exercise is.
that it forces the players to gc through the Flanniing process, not t:)
produce a report or product.
Resources Staff, DDS&T
Chief, Planning an-1 25X1
The principal goals of the R&D Plan were identified as: 1)
support for the Operations Directorate; 2) enhancement of the Foreign
Broadcast Information Service; 3) complete and timely exploitation of
new types of imagery; 4) CIA support for the, SIGINT Program
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5) continued support to Naticnal Intelligence Programs; 6) 25X1
planning and execution of an Agency-wide RDEE program. responsive.ta
and consistent with the other goals, as well as the requirements of
the Administration Directorate and the Naticnal Foreign Assessment
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Center.
The two major requirements of the plan are to enhance
productivity throughout the Agency and to respond tc world tren.1s
and/or increasingly hostile environments. Because of that., the hi.gh,st
quality equipment must be used everywhere. In days past, there wera
relatively few areas of the world th
t
a
required the test equipment.
A number of problems result.
R&D planning is a year-lcng process. Each directorate develops
its long-term requirements, reviews RBEE proposals and then ranks th-
reiuirements and proposals. The. DDSET develops the proposals an!
structures a comprehensive program consistent with on-gcirl(-
-activities, new initiatives, and funding constraints.
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Operations support gets the largest single share of the RD&E
C
budget priuarily because the hostile threat is increasing.
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n r v q
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Because resources are not keeping pace with requirements,
productivity must be enhanced.
Future improvements appear to be limited by the growth of
available funds. The RD&E program funds will grow in excess of 5% rcal
growth per year. Most of this will go to upgrading NPIC. Grows.!- o`
this size will allow only modest endeavors to be undertaken and it
will not allow more than one significant program simultaneously. The
RD.E costs may tend to be overshadowed by the high costs associated
with producing many copies of multi purpose devices. Production casts
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- av a u~. a a. ~i
which are too high are becoming an increasing problem, especially in
DDO support.. Some development has been cancelled because of this. F
with clear goals and requirements.
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STAP feels that the Agency-R&D Plan appears to be well developel
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l~r ~c~.nr r PAGE 8
CI
SOVIET SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURING-H ICER
equipment has been critical to their expansion.
The Soviets started late in manufacturing semiconductors ccmparel
to other producers. In 1969 they were producing only about 100,000
units compared.to 30,000,000 in the United States. In 1973 they
launched a major effort to acquire foreign technology to build plants.
Most, of their acquisitions have been covert. Equipment som?times
passes through three or four countries before arriving in the USSR.
Soviet current output is 300-400,000,000 units per year. Western
behind the West that they cannct catch up.
Soviet semiconductor technology primarily uses bipolar logic with
digital circuits. Although most Scviet production is based on Western
design, the CMOS processor appears to be of indigenous Soviet design.
This may be an indicator that they realize that they cannot copy
indefinitely or they will be hurt. Still, they may already he so far
resistors and packing materials, both silicon and silicone.
The Soviets continue to import large quantities cf semiconductor
items. Besides the equipment mentioned above, they are importing photo
In the discussion, SIAP expressed concern about the flcw
equipment and raw materials to the Soviet Union. Although sore
o iers appear indifferent.
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extremely difficult to stem the
flow entirely because there are so many sources for technclcqy.
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1 1 Cnvc. 4
FUTURE COMMUNICATIONS?
Director of Communications
The Office of Communicaticns dates back tc the OSS. Initially all.
communication was by HF radio, serving basically two customers--the
DDO and the Department of State. There has been a continual growth in
volume of traffic and numbers of custcmer: with no signs of abatement.
Most of the equipment in use today is extremely old. Although it is
still working, it cannot handle the volume, which puts a tremendous
load on the people operating the systems..
Like other areas of the Agency, inflaticn is causing problems in
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replacing aging equipment. In constant dcilars, the budget is
decreasing slightly while the cost cf eguipment is rising. In
addition, they are losing experienced personnel, putting a heavier
burden on those who are left.
The Office of Communications is currently ccnfronting the
following issues:
+ Demography-changes in the population: people have
different interests; sore wcmen in. work force; zero population
growth.
+ Investment Strategy--meeting the new high-technology needs
with available resources. 25X1
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STAP. thinks that communication is clearly an important
function and that maximum efforts should be made to keep the
Agency current with the technology. In line with this,efforts
should be made to join communications with data processing. 25X1
The discussions with truce Clarke and Evan Hineman centered on
three major topics: How can STAP help NFAC?; Evaluation of FLINT
Satellite Collection; and the Senicr Review Panel review of NFAC
Production..
On _the topic of STAP helping NFAC, the problem of what to present
to the new administration after the elections in November. In the
discussions that followed SAP suggested that the Agency's view cf the
world not be presented; in all probability, the new President will
already have his own world view. Instead the briefings shoul?'
concentrate on US capabilities in intelligence and problem areas.
Among the problem areas are the vulnerability of satellites, the noel
to get more deeply into ncn-military intelligence. such as economic
warfare and food as a weapon.
Anothcr suggestion-was to give the new administration a sense of
thetrends in the world tcda. These would include such areas as
Q Intelligence collection
arms control, verification, and the overall
strategic situation, to name a few.
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possible to help them meet those problems.
Finally, it was suggested that a briefing on the most important
problems that the new adm:inistraticnwculd immediately face. Then
present a sort of "intelligence Berlitz course" to help the new
administration members assimilate as much infcrmation as quickly as
Evan Rifleman then raised the question of FLINT collection and the
balance between strategic and tactical. He felt that perhaps too
muchemphasis is being placec on the collection of tactical ELINT and
asked that STAP review this situaticn. His fear is that not enough
"strategic ELI.NT" is available which results in many analysts having
"blinders on" in this area..
Mr. Hineman suggested that STAP: 1) establish a
baseline--discover what the NFO is doing currently and what are its
plans; and 2) interview technical analysts to determine what they need
to do their work and what information they feel that they are lacking.
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Mr. Clarke briefed the.STAP on a recuest that the Agency's Senior
Review Panel (SRP) review NFAC production. for a one-year period. This
effort will be in two phases. The first will he to establish the facts
on what NFAC does or does nct do. The second will be to judge how well
or how poorly we're doing. 25X1
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