SOVIET INTEREST IN ELV COMMERCIALIZATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92B00181R001701600008-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 29, 2011
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: September 7, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 : CIA-RDP92B00181 R001701600008-8
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Jim Chamberlin ACDA
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SO$140: 41 (Aw. 77i)
GPO : 1982 0 - 361-529 (220) C~Ip .;ILM
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JNF1OENTIAL
UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
September 7, 19 3
CONFIDENTIAL
with SECRET Attachment)
MEMORANDUM
TO: SIG (Space) ELV Working Group
FROM: ACDA - Jim Chamberlin
. , , , A Ov
4,k -S4
SUBJECT: Soviet Interest in ELV Commercialization
The Soviet Union made a demarche on July 7 regarding ELV
commercialization. The US replied on August 24 (see attached
cables).
The Soviet Union also apparently has factored concerns
about ELV commercialization into their "Draft Treaty Banning
the Use of Force in Space" submitted for the upcoming UN
session (attached).
Article 3 of the draft treaty states that parties to
the treaty shall not "help, encourage, or incite ... physical
or legal persons to engage in activity prohibited by this
treaty." The reference to "legal persons" appears to be a
reference to corporations engaged in space launch activities.
Article 6 calls for the parties to take necessary internal
measures to insure compliance. This article also appears to be
aimed at US commercialization of ELVs. No similar provision
appeared in the Soviets' 1981 draft treaty on outer space.
If the Soviets should make an issue of private ELV
operators at the UN (e.g., by explaining why they added
article 6 to their draft), we should be prepared to explain
and defend our procedures.
OFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
with 8~ Attachment
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UUItUIItiU
CONFIDENTIAL ,
PAGE 0 Department o State
1 STATE 239933 919
INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 EB-09
BODE-00 NSC-01 NSAE-00 COME-00 NASA-01 L`~ DOE-18
PM-08 PA-O1 STR-14 DES-09 ACA-1 USIE-00 SP-02
PRS-91 /103 R
DRAFTED BY EUR/SOV:SMANN
APPROVED BY EUR:MPALIIER
EUR/SOV:LPASCOE
EUR/SOV:AVERSHBOW
--~------------=-134529 2404592 /23
P 24012OZ AUG 83
FM SECSTATE WASHOC
TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
E.O. 12356: DECI: OAOR
TAGS: TSPA, UR, US
SUBJECT: REPLY TO SOVIET DEMARCHE ON PRIVATE SECTOR
LAUNCH ACTIVITIES
2. DAS PALMER CALLED IN SOVIET CHARGE SOKOLOV TODAY
AND DELIVERED US REPLY TO JULY 7 SOVIET DEMARCHE ON
COMMERCIALIZATION OF LAUNCH ACTIVITIES. TEXT OF
NONPAPER FOLLOWS IN PARA 3.
3. BEGIN TEXT. THE UNITED STATES REFERS TO THE JULY 7
REMARKS OF CHARGE SOKOLOV TO DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
?ALfltK ANU W1SNt4 IU AUuRt I.LKIAIN YUINIS KAIStU tlT
THE SOVIET UNION CONCERNING PRIVATE SECTOR SPACE
ACTIVITIES.
THE 1967 OUTER SPACE TREATY EXPLICITLY RECOGNIZES THAT
NONGOVERNMENTAL SPACE ACTIVITIES MAY OCCUR. ARTICLE VI
PROVIDES THAT STATES PARTY TO THE TREATY BEAR
'INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUCH ACTIVITIES AND
THAT SUCH ACTIVITIES REQUIRE AUTHORIZATION AND
CONTINUING SUPERVISION BY THE STATE CONCERNED. THE
UNITED STATES IS FULLY COGNIZANT OF ITS INTERNATIONAL
OBLIGATIONS AND WILL CONTINUE TO CARRY THEM OUT.
ALL COMMERCIAL LAUNCH ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES
PRIVATE SECTOR WILL BE CARRIED OUT UNDER CLOSE
GOVERNMENT SUPERVISION, TO ASSURE THAT THESE ACTIVITIES
COMPLY WITH UNITED STATES LAWS AND REGULATIONS AND WITH
ALL INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE UNITED
STATES. THE GOVERNMENT'S LEGAL CONTROL OVER ACCESS TO
TECHNOLOGY WILL NOT BE AFFECTED BY THE DECISION TO
ALLOW COMMERCIALIZATION OF EXPENDABLE LAUNCH VEHICLES.
REGARDING SPECIFIC POINTS, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
REQUIRES PRIVATE SPACE L;UNCH OPERATORS TO OBTAIN PRIOR
APPROVAL FOR ALL PROPOSED LAUNCHES. THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT CAREFULLY REVIEWS ALL SUCH PROPOSALS TO
ENSURE THEIR COMPATIBILITY-WITH DOMESTIC GUIDELINES AS
WELL AS WITH INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS. MOREOVER, THE
UNITED STATES REQUIRES THAT ALL PRIVATE SECTOR LAUNCH
OPERATORS MEET VEHICLE AND LAUNCH SAFETY STANDARDS
SIMILAR TO THOSE NOW APPLIED TO AMERICAN GOVERNMENTAL
LAUNCHES. APPROPRIATE ELEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT MONITOR SPACE OBJECTS; PRIVATE OBJECTS WILL
NOT BE EXCLUDED FROM THIS MONITORING.
TELEG1?AM4
THE UNITED STATES WISHES TO REMIND THE SOVIET UNION
THAT THE PRIVATE SECTOR HAS ALWAYS BEEN AN INTEGRAL
PART OF THE UNITED STATES SPACE PROGRAM. THE DECISION
TO ALLOW THE PRIVATE SECTOR TO OFFER COMMERCIAL LAUNCH
SERVICES INVOLVES NO NEW ACCESS TO TECHNOLOGY, SINCE
AMERICAN COMPANIES HAVE ALWAYS BEEN DESIGNERS AND
MANUFACTURERS OF OUR SPACE SYSTEMS. IT IS INCORRECT TO
IMPLY THAT THE UNITED STATES IS ALLOWING NON-GOVERN-
MENTAL ORGANIZATIONS NEW ACCESS TO POTENTIALLY
DANGEROUS TECHNOLOGY, NOR WILL THIS DECISION AFFECT OUR
POLICY TOWARD TRANSFER OF LAUNCH OR SPACE-RELATED
TECHNOLOGY TO OTHER COUNTRIES. IT IS ALSO INCORRECT TO
STATE THAT THIS PRIVATE SECTOR ACTIVITY WILE POSE RISKS
TO INTERNATIONAL STABILITY. THE B;OADEIIING OF ACTIVI-
TIES BY THE PRIVATE SECTOR DOES NOT CARRY WITH ?IT A
LESSENING OF CONTROL BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT,
NOR DOES IT PROVIDE THIS SECTOR WITH TECHNOLOGY
PREVIOUSLY UNAVAILABLE TO IT.' WE TRUST THIS INFOR-
MATION ADEQUATELY ADDRESSES THE ISSUES RAISED DY THE
SOVIET UNION. END TEXT.
4. IN SUBSEQUENT REMARKS, PALMER EMPHASIZED THE USG'S
REQUIREMENTS FOR PRIOR APPROVAL AND OVERSIGHT OF
PRIVATE SECTOR LAUNCH ACTIVITIES AND NOTED THAT THE US
PRIVATE SECTOR HAS ALWAYS BEEN CLOSELY INVOLVED IN
DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF US SPACE TECHNOLOGY. HENCE THE
COMMERCIALIZATION OF LAUNCH ACTIVITIES GIVES THE
PRIVATE SECTOR NO ACCESS TO NEW TECHNOLOGY.
5. PALMER ALSO COMMENTED THAT A SENIOR INTERAGENCY
GROUP IS CURRENTLY REVIEWING COMMERCIAL LAUNCH
REGULATIONS; HE INFORMED SOKOLOV THAT THE APPROVED
GUIDELINES WILL BE PUBLISHED WHEN THE SIG FINISHES
HLLIUtKAIIUNS.
6. SOKOLOV CLAIMED THAT THE NONPAPER DID NOT ADDRESS
THE QUESTION OF ARMS CONTROL IMPLICATIONS OF COMMERCIAL
LAUNCH OPERATIONS, WHICH WAS RAISED IN HIS DEMARCHE.
PALMER REPLIED THAT THE NONPAPER ANSWERS THE ISSUE
IMPLICITLY, BY ASSURING THE SOVIET SIDE THAT THE US
WILL CONTINUE TO OBSERVE ALL ITS INTERNATIONAL
OBLIGATIONS. NE UNDERSCORED THAT THE US EXERCISES
STRICT SUPERVISION OVER THESE PRIVATE SECTOR
OPERATIONS. PALMER FURTHER NOTED THAT COMMERCIAL
LAUNCH ACTIVITIES ARE STRICTLY NONMILITARY AND AS SUCH,
UNRELATED TO ARMS CONTROL QUESTIONS. IN SUM, HE
STATED, SOVIET ARMS CONTROL CONCERNS WERE NOT RELEVANT
TO THE COMMERCIALIZATION ISSUE.
7. SOKOLOV NOTED PALMER'S POINTS AND REPLIED THAT HE
WOULD REPORT THE NONPAPER AND DISCUSSION TO MOSCOW. DAM
CONFIDENTIAL
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'
INFO
OCT-09
COPY-01
ADS-00
ES-88
DOGE-00
H-01
NASA-Il
SSO-90
HA-08
OMB-I1
PRS-01
INNE-ID
/117 R
OES-09
DRAFTED BY EUR/SOV: LCNAPPER:CWR
APPROVED BY EUR: MPALMER
OES/SAT:GOJALENTO
EUR/SOV: RECOMBS
JIJC JI II I II I I IU Iif UIlI
ee ie e uJ ../ e1-4 a, V_
4867
WE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO LEARN HOW THE GRANTING OF THE RIGHT
TO PRIVATE COMPANIES TO LAUNCH BALLISTIC MISSILES THE
INR-10
SS-00
OIC-02
CIAE-00
CONDUCTING BY THOSE COMPANIES OF "DEMONSTRATION OR TEST
10-IS
NSCE-00
NSAE-00
ONE
FLIGHTS OF COMMERCIAL LAUNCH VEHICLES", ETC.ISS
L-03
DOE-10
PM-08
PA-01
CONSISTENT WITH THE OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED BY'THE US SIDE IN
ACDA-12
USIE-00
SP-02
SNP-01
THE AREA OF STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS OR WITH THE
?
CU T NEGOTIATIONS ON THESE MATTERS.
WE EXPECT THE U.S. TO GIVE APPROPRIATE CONSIDERATION TO
0 0800372 JUL 83
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
SUBJECT: SOVIET DEMARCHE ON U.S. DECISION ON PRIVATE
SECTOR SPACE ACTIVITIES
E.O. 12356: DECL: OAOR
TAGS: TSPA, UR, US
2. SOVIET EMBASSY MINISTER-COUNSELOR SOKOLOV CALLED ON
EUR OAS MARK PALM Y 7 TO DELIVER ORAL STATEMENT
CURMNING RECENT U.S. DECISIONS ON SPACE ACTIVITIES IV
PRIVATE U.S COMPANIES. TEXT OF ORAL STATEMENT FOLLOWS IN
PARA 3 BELOW.
3. BEGIN TEXT: THE SOVIET UNION HAS TAKEN NOTE OF THE
DIRECTIVE OF THE U.S. PRESIDENT AUTHORIZING THE TRANSFER
OF LAUNCH VEHICLES TO PRIVATE COMPANIES AND GRANTING THEM
THE RIGHTS TO USE LAUNCH RANGES AND FACILITIES FOR SPACE
LAUNCH OPERATIONS.
AS IS KNOWN, THE BASIC AMC PRIMARY ROLE IN SPA E
EXPLO N W FAR HAS BEEN PLAYED BY STATES WHICH, UNDER
THE SPACE TREATY OF 1967, BEAR THE INTERNA ?TONAL
RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATIONAL ACTIVITIES IN OUTER SPACE.
SOURCE OF DANGER IS BEING GIVEN HOWEVER. TO PRIVAT
INDIVIDUALS AND CORPORATIONS. ALTHOUGH THEU.S.
GOVERNMENT WOULD PROMISE TO MAKE ALL REASONABLE EFFORTS
TO MINIMIZE THE CONSEQUENCES OF COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS BY
PRIVATE COMPANIES IN OUTER SPACE, IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THE
INVOLVEMENT OF NON-GOVERNMENT LEGAL ENTITIES IN SPACE
ACTIVITIES N REASES THE RISK OF VARIOUS TYPES OF
INCIDENTS WHICH MAY HAVE UNPREDICTABLE CONSE S.
SUCH A SITUATION CANNOT BE CONDUCIVE TO STRENGTHENING
INTERNATIONAL STABILITY. IT IS KNOWN THAT THE U.S. SIDE
ITSELF FEELS CONCERNED OVER THE POSSIBILITIES OF
UNAUTHORIZED ACTIVITIES WITH REGARD TO THE SOURC F
SPECIAL DANGER ON THE PART OF NW-AOVERNttENTAL GROUPS.
IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, WE WOULD LIKE TO RECEIVE
APPROPRIATE CLARIFICATIONS.
IN PARTICULAR, WHAT SPECIFIC MEASURES ARE OR WILL BE
TAKEN BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS
INIERNA(I MAl m " a RLLAA iN6 !ME AERCISE uF
PERMANENT MONITORING AND CONTROL OVER THE USE OF LAUNCH
VEHICLES AND LAUNCH RANGES BY PRIVATE COMPA TIT WW AT
A I SPACE-OBJECT LAUNCHED
PRIVATE COMPANY BE GUIO A M ITORED-
SECRET
THE ISSUES RAISED ABOVE. END TEXT.
4. AFTER DELIVERING INSTRUCTED ORAL STATEMENT, SOKOLOV
ADDED THAT SOVIETS ARE PARTICULARLY GOMCERMFO AROUT
REPORTS IN U.S. PRESS THAT PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, SUCH AS
FEDERAL EXPRESS AND MARTIN MARIETTA WILL SOON BE GIVEN
ACCEZZ-TO LAUNCH FACILITIES AT CAPE CANAVERAL. SOKOLOV
NOTED THAT THESE MEDIA REPORTS SEEMED TO INDICATE THAT
USG HAD ALREADY MADE DECISION TO MOVE INTO "PRACTICAL
PHASE' OF GRANTING PRIVATE SECTOR ACCESS TO U.S. SPACE
FACILITIES. SOKOLOV ARGUED THAT THIS WOULD SET AN
UNFORTUNATE PRECEDENT BEFORE APPROPRIATE CONSIDERATION
NAO BEE N TO THE INTERNATIONAL IMPII TTS} OF
THE PLANNED U.S. ACTION. IN AN APPARENT REFERENCE TO THE
RR ENT U P OPOSAL FOR US-SOVIET CONSULTATIONS IN THE
EVENT OF AN INCIDENT INVOLVING NUCLEAR TERRORISM SOKOLOV
UNDERSCO THAT 5 IR DEMARCHE AS "SOMETHIN
OF A"NAILOGUS ", E.G. ONE INVOLVING PREVENTION OF
A C S TO "TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS CONSTITUTING A POTEI-I{IAI~
SOURCE OF DANG R" BY ENTITIES OTHER THAN STATES.
S. IN RESPONSE TO SOKOLOV'S PRESENTATION, PALMER SAID
U.S. WOULD CONSIDER SOVIET DEMARCHE CAREFULLY ANO PROVIDE
A RESPONSE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
DAM
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!II. 22 Aug 83 US SR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
DISARMAMENT/START/MBFR
PROPOSED SPACE ARMS TREATY SUBMITTED TO UN
Text of Gromyko's Letter
LD211718 Moscow TASS in English 1710 GMT 21 Aug 83
[Text] Moscow August 21 TASS -- Following the full text of a letter from Andrey Gromyko,
first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and minister of foreign
affairs of the USSR, to U.N. Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar:
"Esteemed Mr Secretary General:
"The Soviet Union suggests that the question 'On Concluding a Treaty on the Prohibition
of the Use of Force in Outer Space and From Outer Space With Regard to Earth' be includ-
ed in the agenda of the 38th session of the U.N. General Assembly.
"In tabling this proposal, the USSR guides itself by the desire to prevent the militar-
isation ?:
of outer space. A particular danger in this respect is posed by the plans to
develop and deploy different systems of space weapons capable of5hitting targets both in
outer space and on earth."
"The Soviet Union believes it imperative to raise a dependable barrier to these plans to
turn outer space into a source of mortal danger to mankind as a whole by urgently taking
effective measures to prevent the projection of the arms race to where there has so far
been none, namely, to outer space.
"Guiding itself by this objective, the USSR tabled at the United Nations in 1981 a pro-
posal on the conclusion of a treaty banning the deployment of weapons of any type in outer
space, a proposal approved by the General Assembly. However, work to draw up that
treaty has not yet begun in practice because of well-known reasons.
"Time is not waiting, however, and the USSR is now suggesting that a step further be
taken right away and agreement be reached to ban altogether the use of force both in
outer space and from outer space with regard to earth. It is submitting to the session
a draft of an appropriate treaty."
"An important characteristic of this draft treaty is a combination of the political and
legal obligations of states to refrain from the use of force against one another in outer
space and from outer space and substantive measures intended to prevent the militarisa-
tion of outer space.
"Specifically, the Soviet Union stands for banning altogether the testing and deployment
in outer space of any space-based weapons intended to hit targets on earth, in the
atmosphere and- in outer space. -
"It also stands for the radical solution of the question of anti-satellite weapons,
namely, for the complete renunciation by states of the development of new anti-satellite
systems and for the elimination of such systems already in their possession.
"The participants in the treaty would also undertake not to destroy or damage the space
objects of other states nor disrupt their-normal functioning or change their flight
trajectories in any other way."
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III. 22 Aug 83
USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
DISARMAMENT/START/MBFR
"In addition, a ban is suggested on the testing and use of manned spacecraft for
military purposes, including anti-satellite aims; their use should serve entirely the
solution of diverse scientific, technical and economic problems.
"The implementation of the complex of far reaching measures proposed by the Soviet Union
would mean a major tangible contribution towards the achievement of a goal approved by
the United Nations earlier, the: use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes.
"I ask you, Mr Secretary General, to regard this letter as a memorandum provided for by
the rules of procedure of the General Assembly and to release it jointly with the
appended text of the.draft treaty as an official document of the U.N. General Assembly.
"Audrey Gromyko.
First deputy chairman of_the Council of Ministers of-the USSR, minister of foreign
affairs of the USSR."
Text of Draft Treaty
PM211953 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 Aug 83 First Edition p 4
["Draft Treaty on Banning the Use of Force in Space and From Space With Respect to the
Earth"]
[Text] The states parties to this treaty,
Guided by the principle whereby United Nations members refrain in their international
relations from the threat of force or the use of force in any form incompatible with
the objectives of the United Nations;
Seeking to prevent an arms race in space and thereby to reduce the danger of nuclear war
threatening mankind;
Desiring to contribute to the objective whereby the exploration and use of space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies, is effected exclusively for peaceful
purposes;
Have agreed as follows:
It is prohibited to resort to the use of force and the threat of its use in space, in
the atmosphere, and on earth with the employment for this of space objects orbiting the
Earth, stationed on celestial bodies, or deployed in space in any other manner as a
means of destruction.
It is also prohibited to resort to the use of force or the threat of its use with regard
to space objects orbiting the Earth, stationed on celestial bodies, or deployed in space
in any other manner.
In accordance with the provisions of Article 1 the states parties to this treaty under-
take :
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III. 22 Aug 83 AA 3 USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
DISARMAMENT/START/MBFR
1. Not to test and not to deploy by putting into orbit around the Earth, deploying
on celestial bodies, or in any other manner any space-based weapons intended to hit
targets on the Earth, in the atmosphere, or in space.
2. Not to use space objects orbiting the Earth, stationed on celeesti s bodies, ,Eorth,
deployed in space in any othermanner as a means for hitting any 8
in the atmosphere, and in space.'
3. Not to destroy, damage, or disrupt the normal functioning of other states'
.space objects, nor change their flight trajectories.
4. Not to test or develop new antisatellite systems and to eliminate such systems
already in their possession.
5. Not to test or use for military, including antisatellite, purposes, any manned
spacecraft.
Article 3
The state parties to this treaty agree not to help, encourage, or incite any states,
groups of states, international organizations, and also physical and legal persons
to engage in activity prohibited by this treaty.
Article 4
1. To ensure confidence in observance of the provisions of this treaty each
state orrespondineacrecongnizedfprainciplescofiinternationalelaw.it in
a way c corn p 8 to generally
2. Each state party to the treaty undertakes not to interfere with [chinit pomekh]
the national technical verification facilities of other states parties exercising
their functions in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article.
Article 5
1. The states parties to this treaty undertake to consult and cooperate with each
other in resolving any questions which may arise with regard to the objectives of
the treaty or in connection with the observance of its provisions.
2. Consultations and cooperation in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article may
also be effected on the basis of utilization of corresponding international procedures
within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter.
These procedures can include the services of the consultative committee of the states
parties to the treaty.
3. The consultative committee of the states parties to the treaty isaco ened by
the depositary within 1 month of the ripa t representative fromtan cstatetpa.
this treaty. Any state party may appoint Pr
Article 6
Each state party to this treaty undertakes to adopt any internal measures which it
considers necessary in accordance with its constitutional procedures to prohibit
and prevent any activity contravening the provisions of this treaty which
under Sts jurisdiction or control, wherever it may be.
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III. 22 Aug 83 AA 4 USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
DISARMAMENT/START/MBFR
Article 7.
Nothing in this treaty affects the rights and duties of states under the Charter.
Article 8
All disputes which may arise in connection with the operation of this treaty shall
be resolved by exclusively peaceful means through the use of procedures envisaged
in the UN Charter.
Article 9
This treaty is of unlimited duration.
Article 10
1. This treaty is open for signature to all states at central United Nations offices
in New York. Any state which does not sign this treaty prior to its entry into force
in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.
2. This treaty is subject to ratification by signatory states. Instruments of
ratification-and documents of accession shall be deposited with the secretary general
of the United Nations.
3. This treaty shall enter into force in relations between states which have deposited
instruments of ratification after five instruments of ratification, including the
instruments of the USSR and the United States, have been deposited with the secretary
general of the United Nations.
4. For states whose instruments of ratification or documents of accession are
deposited after the entry into force of this treaty it will enter into force
on the day of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or documents of
accession.
5. The secretary general of the United Nations shall promptly inform all signatory
and acceding states of the date of each signing, the date of deposit of each
instrument of ratification and document of accession, the date of entry into force of
this treaty, and also other notices.
This treaty, of which the Russian, English, Arabic, Spanish, Chinese, and French
texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the secretary general of the
United Nations, who shall transmit duly certified copies of the treaty to the
governments of the signatory and acceding states.
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