WARNING WORKING GROUP DISCUSSION ON THE SWS ROLE IN WARNING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000500100011-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 19, 2012
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: December 1, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/19: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000500100011-4
.._ ., -
DATC: 1 Dec 80
REPLY TO
ATTN OF:
C-0659/JSW.
SUH~ECT: Warning Working Group Discussion on the SWS Role in Warning
Thru:
TO: J S
1. ~ At the 19 Sep 80 meeting the Warning Working Group discussed at
some length the appropriate role of the SWS in warning. Specific
recommendations as to the SWS role were not adopted. It was decided
that a sub-,rorking group under the chairmanship of the A/NIO-W would be
-- convened to further define the matter.
synthesis of tnii-itary, pofitt'I"cal and econa c intel~gence and i.ts
relati shi~S to strategic warning; conduct resear ~ and strategic warning;
2. ~To prepare for this eventuality, this office has studied both. the
func tonal and organizational aspects of the SWS.
a. Functionally there appears to be a choice between four tasks
upon ~t,~i the SWS could f~-.-= fitre~e tasks are; to serve as the
b. ~ Organizationally the choices as to the most appropriate o r
beneficial applications of their talents point to either the continuance
of their present semiautonomous mode or a more structured approach under
the NIO/W.
op~rocedures ~xad provide a substa _ a po nt for the national
warning s~ste
First the functions:
a. ro Serve as the Community "Conscience" with Regard to Strategy
Warnin ~ this role the primary mission of the SWS would be to develop
for the NIO/W alternate hypotheses on the course of major developments.
This could mean speculation and carrying analysis further than available
evidence can fully sustain. It could mean aggressive skepticism in the face
of too comfortable and acceptance of conventional wisdom. This approach may
be necessitated because important developments or larger implications of
developments can be overlooked or not given adequate consideration in
various publications--analytic presentation in those publications where
there is no attention given to reasonable, but less likely, alternative
short-term events.
(1)
(a) Less p
(b) Decisi
(c) Closer
25X1
25X1
25X1
LJ/~ I
25X1
25X1
opular or dissenting views surface to decisionmaf:e;?s 25X1
onmakers get a complete picture
coordination between analytic elements
nds Regularly orl tl~~yroil Savirlgs Plan OPTIUNALF:~R:~1 No 1:~
fREV. :-JG
GSA F"F'M F?'!`. _FF7: P'. `t.f-~
solo-llz
Advantages:
m~emoro~nc~_~~~
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/19.: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000500100011-4 .~
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/19: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000500100011-4
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(d)
~
A more structured and thought-out minority view 25X1
(2 )
~
Di sadvantages : 25X1
(a)
Possible confusion engendered among decisionmakers 25X1
(b)
Could significantly detract from the majority view
(c)
Will slow down the intelligence production process a
25X1
a time when it can east afford it.
b. (Provide Synthesis of Military, Political and Economic Intelligence
and Its Relationship to Strategic Warning. There are two kinds of strategic
warning: Recognition of developing situations that might lead to strategic
confrontations (generally Lang term predictions ), and analysis of indications
within such,a situation that help to.:measure an opponent's intentions and
capabilities (considerably shorter term).
(1)~
Advantages :
25X1
(a)
certainly be a
particular.
~ Long term analysis by a staff such as SWS would most
benefit to the Community as a whole and the I&W segment in
25X1
(b
This type of analysis would provide a forum/structure
25X1
for a truly to
ge warning estimate to be formulated.
(2)
~
Disadvantages:
25X1
(a)
The SWS is not structured to deal with short term warning
25X1
problems and it ven questionable whether they have the expertise to
addres
s long term political and economic warning problems.
(b)
n
As with recent attempts without proper guidance and in-
25X1
depth analytic e~'fort, the SWS may create more rather than less work and confusion.
c.~duct Research on Strategic Warning. Under this mssion it is
envisioned that the SWS would become a warning think tank which would only
work on substantive issues but also do futuristic work.
(1)u Advantages
(a) Provide the intellectual viewpoint of warning
(b) Provide intelligence on a problem prior to it becoming
a crisis.
(c) Provide an element within the Intelligence Community which
would have time to o indepth warning analysis.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/19: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000500100011-4
SWS impact on immediate problems would be diminished
With the current analytic overload, the expenditure.of
highly skilled ana cysts or altrustic problems is questignable.
d. ~ Develop Procedures and Provide a Substantive Focal Point for the 25X1
National Warning System. In this role it is envision uld devote
a portion of their effort in the development of the architecture o the US
national I&W System. At the same time they would the subst ve focal
point of the Intelligence Community for warning.
(1) (Advantages:
(a) ~By developing procedures the SWS would be taking the
first step towar ormalizing a national I&W System.
(b)~ Their being the substantive focal point for warning
would certainly expedite the flow of critical intelligence judgments to the
key decisionmakers.
(c)
nth this dual role they could provide a central guidance
25X1
mechanism for t
e nu
merous national level I&W products and systems.
(2~isadvantages:
25X1
(a)
There would have to be a redefinition of the SWS role so
25X1
as to devote
would defini
time to the procedural aspects of their new mission. This
tely detract from their substantive inputs.
present SWS
for the staf
(b) ~ There is a lack of I&W procedural experience on the
staf nd before it could be fully effective a training program
f would have to be implemented.
25X1
e.
~
Conclusion. Of the four functions outlined above, the fourth would
25X1
be the most
beneficial to the entire Community. Under this function the
SWS would co
of their exp
ntribute both procedurally and substantively, thus taking advantage
ertise.
4.~ With regards to the location and chain of command, it appears beneficia125X1
to relocate them back to CIA headquarters and under the direct supervision of
the NIO/W. In this position they could act as the coordinating element for
the national level system. Their present semiautonomous mode appears at best
confusing and detracts from their credibility. Also on the surface there seems
to be very little coordination between them, DIA, and the Services. If there
remains a concern to this latter point then one member of SWS can be left
behind at DIA so as to coordinate directly with the DoD I&W System. Space
would be provided in JSW.
- . ~ , . _.
V ii/i Yr,~~ac.~`I G ~~ i.s
(2) Disadvantages:
(a)
(b)
James J. O'Brien
Lieutenant Colonel, USA
Deputy Assistant Director
for I&4J Enhancement
3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/19: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000500100011-4