LETTER FROM JOHN C. LAWN TO EDWIN MEESE III

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90G01353R000200190007-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 8, 2012
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: May 24, 1988
• Content Type: LETTER

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NATIONAL DRUG POLICY BOARD
Washington, D.C. 20530
MAY 2 4 1988
Honorable Edwin Meese III
Attorney General
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
Dear Mr. Attorney General:
As detailed in his April 29, 1988 letter to you, the Drug
Intelligence Strategy and Implementation Plan receives
relatively good marks from Congressman English. He urges
that we improve our strategy in two ways -- ascertain the
amount of "interdiction" resources devoted to intelligence
and produce better threat assessments, especially air threat
assessments. I think both suggestions have some merit.
Presumably Mr. English would have us increase resources
devoted to intelligence collection and analysis because of
the relatively high payoff from good intelligence.' This is
why the National Drug Intelligence Committee (NDIC) has
adopted the policy that "good intelligence....is the first
among priorities and must be developed to support each of
the major drug abuse functions..." (page 1 of the NDIC
Strategy.)
There are inherent difficulties in isolating resources
devoted to the apparently separate strategies of inter-
diction, investigation, and intelligence. These
strategies are in fact inextricably intertwined in field
bCl
EXEC
REG
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drug enforcement activities. Nevertheless, if we are to
determine what portion of interdiction resources are mostly
devoted to intelligence collection and analysis, I
recommend that the Policy Board Staff and OMB establish
definitional and budgetary guidelines.
On the issue of improved threat assessments, I would state
simply that threat assessments will improve as we
systematically address collection requirements, drug
information collection, analysis, and coordination of
finished drug intelligence reports. This will be true for
air smuggling as well as for all other modes of drug
smuggling. The NDIC Strategy requires systematic
improvements from collection of information to distribution
of finished intelligence, and it will lead to improved drug
intelligence products, including threat assessments.
A copy of this letter will be sent to all NDIC members
together with Congressman English's critique of the
intelligence strategy.
Sincerely,
n C. Lawn
airman, National Drug
Intelligence Committee
cc: NDIC Members
Mr. Pickens
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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congress of the United States
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GOVERNMENT INFORMATION, JUSTICE, AND AGRICULTURE
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WASHINGTON, DC 20515
April 29, 1988
The Honorable Edwin Meese III
Chairman
National Drug Policy Board
Washington, D.C. 20530
Dear Chairman Meese:
I am pleased to have finally the opportunity to comment
on the National Drug Policy Board's antidrug abuse
strategies in their entirety. As you know, I have been
critical of the Policy Board in the past for not taking the
leadership role assigned to it in the National Narcotics Act
of 1984. However, I think the development of a comprehensive
strategy is an important step, and the Board is to be
congratulated for this difficult achievement.
I would like to add, however, that I am disappointed at
the length of time it has taken the Policy Board to provide
these documents. At our breakfast meeting on November 18th,
I was given the impression that the long-term draft
strategies would be delivered in a timely manner for my
review and comment. Yet, it was not until after the repeated
threat of subpoena that the documents were finally provided.
My reasons for demanding the complete, long-term strategies,
rather than the fiscal year 1989 implementation plans
delivered on March 9th and March 15th, were explained at the
Subcommittee's March 24th hearing with Assistant Secretary
Keating. There is no need to dwell further on the issue;
instead, I would like to offer my comments on the individual
sub-strategies.
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The Honorable Edwin Meese III
April 29, 1988
The National Interdiction Strategy. In general, I am
very supportive of the interdiction strategy. Defense-in-
depth is a concept which, when implemented, I believe will
have a significant impact on narcotics smuggling. I
basically agree with the assets identified as required for
the strategy. However, there are still substantial gaps
which need to be filled.
For example, P-3 aircraft, which will be available along
the Southwest border, need to be committed as well to
surveillance off of the Colombian coast. The long-range
surveillance assets identified for that region are
inadequate. Over-the-horizon radar is not a realistic
alternative, and the Navy has already abandoned its
lighter-than-air program due to budget constraints.
Therefore, the P-3 aircraft is essential for that long-range
detection, and without adequate numbers of the aircraft on
station for the required hours, the rest of the air
interdiction strategy becomes problematic.
There are large gaps left in the Gulf Coast.
Intelligence analyses already identify the west coast of
Florida and the Gulf region towards New Orleans as an area
used by air smugglers. In addition, the current air traffic
there due to oil rig operations makes sorting even more
difficult. Do we not need aerostats for that region, as well
as additional apprehension aircraft?
There also appears to be little coordination with the
Federal Aviation Administration. FAA's participation in air
interdiction is essential in the sorting process. Yet, there
appears to be no integration of FAA into the strategy.
Both the Maritime and Land Interdiction strategies are
excellent. However, the Land strategy does not adequately
address the responsibilities and roles of the various
agencies involved in the land border strategy. This
Subcommittee has repeatedly urged that defined, formal
organizational structures be adopted for Operation Alliance
that delineate lines of authority. The land border strategy
states only that Operation Alliance coordinate with both the
Land Interdiction Subcommittee and the Southwest Border
Subcommittee of the Policy Board. This structure will not
resolve the problems identified during this Subcommittee's
review of Operation Alliance.
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The Honorable Edwin Meese III
April 29, 1988
I would also suggest applying the "Bold New Initiatives"
concept to all of the strategies. It is an idea which should
be elevated to the level of a third coordinating group of the
Policy Board, a recommendation made also by the Defense
Science Board in its study.
Finally, I believe it is essential to include milestones
in the strategies. While it is often difficult to
continually evaluate programs in terms of milestones, it
remains the only way to measure the success or failure of
specific programs. However, the target percentage increases
included in the interdiction strategies need to be defined.
Simply stating that mobile detection should increase by 25
percent does not adequately measure the progress of defense-
in-depth. Perhaps requiring that the probability of
detection reach a specific goal by a specific date would be a
more useful milestone.
Investigations Strategy. The Investigations Strategy is
much less reasoned and detailed than the Interdiction
Strategy, and thus is perhaps not very useful in terms of
being able to assess the progress of a strategy. It fails to
set priorities in any meaningful way, makes no attempt to
integrate the agencies besides FBI and DEA involved in
narcotics investigations (for example, INS, ATF, Marshals
Service, etc.), except in passing, and makes little attempt
to quantify the assets needed to implement the strategy. It
also fails to formally delineate the different
responsibilities of DEA and FBI.
Strategy 1, Program 1 is a useful guideline for
investigations. However, Program 2, "Priority Investigations
Targeting," makes no attempt to prioritize among its 27
objectives. Is Objective 1, "increas[ing] the percentage of
DEA Class I and !~I case.' to 50 percent," of a higher
priority than Objective 6, "ensur[ing] that 80 percent of FBI
investigations are directed at Colombian/South American,
Italian, Mexican and other major multinational Drug
Trafficking Organizations"? These are all worthy objectives,
but shouldn't a long-term strategy make judgments as to
which are more valuable?
Likewise, with Strategy 1, Program 3, "State and Local
Investigations," it is unclear what input state and local
governments have had in developing this program, nor does it
appear that any priorities have been indicated. And
Strategy 2, Program 1, "Cocaine Suppression Program," is
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The Honorable Edwin Meese III
April 29, 1988
essentially either an international program or an
interdiction program. The Program does refer to a section of
the International Strategy; however, I am not able to
evaluate it in that context since I have not yet been
provided that particular strategy.
Program 3 makes no assessment of the role of the Forest
Service in investigations stemming from the National Forest
System. The 1986 Drug Bill gives the Forest Service -
authority to pursue investigations. Is it, or should it be,
part of the Investigations Strategy to give the Forest
Service the authority to pursue cannabis investigations off
of National Forest land?
Program 4, "Domestic Clandestine Laboratory Program,"
makes no assessment of where the program should be targeted.
Is the priority nationwide, or just in Oregon and
California? What if the threat shifts? These questions
apply to marijuana eradication, as well.
Finally, Program 2, "Asset Removal," which I believe is
an integral part of the strategy, includes no plans of how
the funds accumulated in both the Customs and the Justice
Department programs should be used for antidrug abuse
programs. Nor is there a strategy to streamline the Marshals
Service fund even though some changes are desperately needed.
In addition, Objective 4 is unintelligible.
In sum, although the Investigations Strategy is
comprehensive and a good start, it needs work.
Intelligence Strateav. Since the Intelligence strategy
provided to the Subcommittee is not the complete strategy
(some of the classified sections have not yet been provided),
my comments are limited. I agree that the primary concern
with regard to narcotics intelligence is the timely
dissemination of tactical information. A significant portion
of the Intelligence Strategy deals precisely with.that
concern, and so I believe it adequately addresses those
issues which need to be resolved. It would be useful,
though, to include some sort of estimate of the percentage of
resources spent on interdiction which is devoted to
intelligence. Although intelligence gathering and analysis
accounts for a small part of the resources devoted to
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The Honorable Edwin Meese III
April 29, 1988
interdiction efforts, it is responsible for a substantial
share of the interdiction program's success in detecting and
apprehending drug smugglers.
I would recommend that at least some portion of the
Intelligence Strategy be devoted to producing better threat
assessments than are now available. For example, the
Customs Service air threat assessment is inadequate because
it depends on the use of threat indicators which are of
doubtful value. The indicators reflect Customs' operating
patterns and practices, such as the number of transponders
attached to suspect aircraft or the number of reported
intrusions detected with limited detection assets. Yet,
given the limited amount of strategic intelligence regarding
the air smuggling threat, the assessments appear to be the
best available. Part of the Intelligence Strategy, then,
should be devoted to improving the air threat assessments.
Prosecution Strategy. The Prosecution Strategy is a
model of a detailed strategy which will serve as a lon
blueprint. It identifies targets for prosecution, definesnge
those targets, explains why those targets have been chosen,
and assigns the amount of Federal resources to be devoted to
prosecuting those targets. It also recognizes the
prosecution resources needed for increased investigative
assets.
I am aware of the complaints by some U.S. Attorneys that
the strategy favors those in larger urban areas, since many
of the prosecutions in the West and Midwest may be against
mid-level targets. As a Member of Congress from Oklahoma, I
too am concerned that those U.S. Attorneys not be too tied
down to Priority Targets at the expense of mid-level yet
promising cases. However, perhaps all that is needed in the
strategy is to recognize that the 80 percent goal is an
overall, nationwide goal, and does not require each U.S.
Attorney to devote that percent of his resources to those
Priority i cases.
An aid in measuring progress towards this goal might be
the development of a quantitative tracking system to
determine nationwide the number of cases and attorneys
devoted to Priority Targets versus other targets.
I do agree, of course, that the number of prosecutions is not
an appropriate measure of progress for the reasons outlined
in the strategy.
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The Honorable Edwin Meese III
April 29, 1988
In addition, the Prosecution Strategy should include an
estimate of the number of additional attorneys as well as the
number of support staff required in the future for narcotics
prosecutions. Do we have the right number currently? Or are
100, 500, or 1000 more needed over the next five years.
In conclusion, none of my comments should be taken as
disparaging to the individual strategies. They are an
excellent beginning and will prove very useful in the future.
I will also provide comments on the demand reduction
strategies in the near future.
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