COMMUNITY -WIDE COMPUTER ASSISTED COMPARTMENTATION CONTROL SYSTEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B01354R000200250004-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 3, 2013
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: November 1, 1983
• Content Type: MISC

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/03: CIA-RDP89BO1354R000200250004-9
STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/03: CIA-RDP89BO1354R000200250004-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/03: CIA-RDP89B01354R000200250004-9
Cis
Ccnm~mity Wide Computer Assisted Ccaapartinentaticn Control Syst (4(C' s)
INTRODUCTION:
(C) The 4C's project is the Intelligence Community-Wide Computer Assisted
canpartmentation Control System centralized data base containing coanpartmented
clearance information on personnel within the Intelligence Cannunity as well as
contract personnel. The 4 C's project is an attempt to reduce redundant
background checks on people and to reduce the amount of paperwork necessary to
pass clearance information among members of the Intelligence Ccamiunity.
SECURITY DEPENDENCY: -
(C) Once this system is fully operational, individual records in the system
is classified no higher than SECRET, however, the aggregation of all the data
will be considered TS/SI. The database is divided into two portions; a
ccamunity file which is considered unclassified and open to all subscribers to
retrieve at least some data from, and several private SECRET files which are
available only to a limited subset of subscribers. The present system,
implemented on an IBM 370/158, has connections via dedicated, encrypted lines to
85 terminals spread throughout the Intelligence Ca munity. By 1985, there will
be approximately 100 - 110 terminals available. 4 C's uses IBM's Multiple
Virtual Storage (MVS) operating system with the GIMS 2 data base management
system. All terminal communications are through a dedicated Camten, and all
equipment for the system, with the exception of the remote terminals, is
contained in a separate room. The system runs in the System High mode of
operation. This system, when fully operational, will replace the largely paper-
based, man-power intensive manual system now in use.
RISK ASSESSMENT:
(C) 4 C's has several major problems which should ,e addressed:
(C) 1. Annual Accreditation Requirement: There is no clearly defined
accreditation process, nor a delineated accreditation authority for the project.
This is a direct result of the-fact that there is no clearly identified central
authority for this system. Each member of the Intelligence Conununity who is
connected to the system has the authority for entering and maintaining their own
data.
(C) 2. System Security Plan and Design Specification and Verification:
There are, no clearly defined system security requirements, nor a clearly defined
system security policy, or an over-all system security plan.
(C) 3. Labels: There is no consolidated internal file labeling scheme
for the system. It is questionable whether or not GIBS marks each file with a
security label.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/03: CIA-RDP89B01354R000200250004-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/03: CIA-RDP89B01354R000200250004-9
(C) 4. Audit: Because there is a lack of a consolidated audit package,
there is no convenient method to extract applicable audit information from all of
the individual audit trails currently being produced.
(C) 5. Object Reuse: There is no provision for mandatory internal or
external sanitization of unused storage objects.
(C) 5. A mandatory method for assuring that all internal and external
reused storage objects are cleared should be developed.
timely basis.
(C) 4. Funding for software, hardware, and personnel should be,made
available to create a process by which all audit trail information can be
consolidated and made readily available for system security officer use on a
be researched and implemented.
(C) 2. A Security Policy statement and a Management review should be
done to clearly define the security model, requirements, and practices for this
system. / one man-year of effort.
(C) 3. A scheme for creating and maintaining file and record labels
which accurately reflect the classification of the individual file or record must
consolidate the security focus for this project.
RISK REDUCTION:
(C) 1. The appointment of a central authority for the system would help
SHORTCOMINGS:
(C) 1. A full-time security officer should be hired whose only concern
is overseeing,system security. This person should be tasked to review audit
trail information on a daily basis and be able to have exception information
available on a real-time basis.
(C) 2. An on-line interactive backup capability should be available at
an alternate site in case of problems with the primary system.
(C) 3. The software which "sanitizes" data from records is untrusted
and should be formally validated and verified. This same software should be
placed under strict configuration management control, once validated and
verified.
arc
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/03: CIA-RDP89B01354R000200250004-9