REMARKS OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE QUANTICO, JUNE 20, 1958

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01009A001502520008-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 1, 2013
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: June 20, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

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Remarks of the Director of Central Intelligence
Quantico, June 20, 1958
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1. Gentlemen, the world situation today is not as favorable for the
United States as it was a few years ago. You will recall that in 1956
the Soviet bloc was suffering severe strains. Khrushchev made a speech
which exposed and repudiated Stalinist terrorism and brutality. This
speech, when its contents became known, created unrest in the USSR and in
the satellites, and it;shocked many Communists in Western countries. The
return of Gomulka to power in Poland and the popular. uprising in Hungary
created great difficulties for the Soviet leaders. Soviet authority in
the Communist world appeared to have been weakened.
2. During the past year and a half the Soviet Union has regained
much of its lost ground. The revolution in Hungary was suppressed. Poland
and Communist China have rallied to the Soviet cause. Tito, after being
assiduously courted,_refused to come to heel and has been isolated. The
USSR has gone through major changes within the leadership but has emerged
unruffled. Khrushchev seems to be in firm control. .
3. In the meanwhile, the US and its allies have suffered some setbacks.
Our superiority in nuclear weapons and in delivery capabilities has been
challenged by Soviet scientific achievements. The US is undergoing a
recession. More recently, the advances of the Communists in Indonesia
and Laos, the manifestations of anti-Americanism in Latin America, the
attempt to oust the pro-Western president in Lebanon, and the political
paralysis of France, have contributed to our problems.
i. I do not mean to convey an impression of unmitigated gloom. We
are still militarily stronger than the USSR. Our European friends still
consider the NATO alliance an indispensible element of their policy. We
retain enormous influence and prestige throughout the world. But there
are basic changes and trends in the world situation which confront us,
and we may suffer further setbacks in the future. Let me discuss these
major changes with you.
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First: Soviet Progress and Policy
5. The Soviet leaders probably look upon their present position in
the world as quite favorable. They have successfully fired long-range
missiles and placed heavy earth satellites into orbit. During the period
from 1960-1963 the USSR could develop a substantial ICBM capability,
increased submarine-launched missile capabilities, and a considerable
buildup of ballistic missiles with short and medium ranges. Between now
and mid-1960, the Soviet long-range air force will be principally a
medium bomber force, with probably no more than 100 to 200 heavy bombers
and tankers. By 1963 the Soviets could have 500 to 600 heavy bombers;
we think it more likely that they will not develop so large a force, that
it will be say about 200 to 300, and that by 1963 they will be placing
major reliance upon ICBM's for intercontinental delivery of nuclear
weapons. I have gone into these figures because it is evident that they
are developing a deterrent of their own which they believe will be as
effective as the one we have possessed.
6. They have the economic system to support, not only a substantial
defense effort, but also an extensive investment program at home and an
economic aid program abroad. Although their gross national product is
only two-fifths as large as ours and their per capita consumption only
one-fifth as large as ours, the USSR allocates its resources in such a way
that -- in terms of resources available for national policy --.its aggregate
effort already approaches that of the US. That is-to say, the total
amount the USSR spends, when converted into dollar values, for research,
defense, industrial investment, and foreign aid is almost as much as we
spend on all these things put together.
7. In these circumstances, the USSR has a wide range of policy choices
open to it. The Soviet leaders probably feel that they are in a stronger
position than they were in the past to engage in threats or in negotiations,
or alternatively to continue to try to win position and influence by
political and economic methods. We do not believe that the Soviet leaders
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have made a decision to follow any one line to the exclusion of others.
Their entire approach has been too pragmatic and flexible to justify
clear prediction. On the whole, we believe they will press rigorously
their campaign to gain influence in underdeveloped areas by political and
economic means and that they will try to avoid policies which they believe
would clearly lead to serious risk of general war. Nevertheless, they
probably believe that they can pursue somewhat bolder policies than in
the past without a corresponding increase in risk, and they probably
foresee that crises will develop from time to time as a result of Western
resistance to the expansion of their influence. In these circumstances,
we expect the Soviets to be firm, and even occasionally bellicose.
Second Major Change - The Psychological Impact of Soviet and US Policies
8. The prospective Soviet achievement of an ICBM capability has
brought into the minds of statesmen and peoples everywhere, for the first
time, a general sense of US vulnerability to attack. It is now generally
believed that the USSR -- within the next year or two rather than at some
time in the distant future -- will be able to inflict instant and crippling
damage on North America. Foreign peoples and statesmen now fear that the
US will become increasingly inhibited from threatening nuclear retaliation
in order to deter Soviet pressure or Soviet action in matters of vital
concern to them, and they fear that, even if the US did so, the Soviets;
would not necessarily believe it.
9. In this situation, many leaders of the free world are becoming
increasingly concerned with the problem of deterring minor thrusts and
local aggressions. No one can be certain about how to mix and to balance
nuclear and non-nuclear forces in order to gain the widest deterrent
effect, or how best to prevent limited engagements from expanding into
major war. In short, the new strategic situation which is developing
from the prospective Soviet achievement of an ICBM capability is creating
much confusion and hesitation throughout the free world.
10. This situation has not reduced the fundamental desire of most of
our allies to maintain their alliances with the US. However, it has
somewhat reduced the deterrent effect of US military power and therefore
reduced somewhat the value of an alliance with the US. Moreover, the USSR
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through its diplomatic offensive -- the talk of a summit conference,
proposals for nuclear free zones, a ban on nuclear tests, and so on --
has tried to cast doubt upon the necessity for alliance with the US.
These various Soviet proposals have struck a responsive chord in Western
European opinion and as a consequence the pressure for negotiations with
the USSR has been sustained. These changes in the Soviet diplomatic
posture, these changes in the strategic situation, and changes within
Europe and in the underdeveloped areas have led to much soul-searching
about the military and political adequacy of NATO. It seems likely
that over the next five years the Western European countries will
gradually develop greater military power under their own control, that
they will assert a more independent position within the alliance, and
possibly also adopt a more flexible position in their dealings with the
Soviet Union.
U. In general, the US will probably encounter increasing difficulties
in retaining overseas bases on terms assuring their availability and
effectiveness in case of need. In particular, the US will encounter new
problems in its attempts to increase allied military strength through the
establishment of missile bases or the further deployment of nuclear weapons.,
overseas. Especially among our allies in Asia and the Middle East, trends
toward neutralism will occur which may cause considerable changes in our
established relations.
12. Recent Soviet policies and achievements have caused the Communist
states to gain considerable ground in world opinion at the expense of the
US. By getting its earth satellites up first and by putting a dog in one
of them the USSR dramatized its scientific and economic progress. By
suddenly and effectively entering the foreign aid competition with the US,
and by its support to nationalist causes among colonial and ex-colonial
peoples, the USSR has, with some success, established itself as a symbol
of change, progress and development. The US, because it does not give
undiscriminating support to nationalist causes, because it is prudent in
extending economic aid, because it looks to the maintenance of its deterrent
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capabilities, tends to be regarded -- particularly among some of the newer
nations -- as too preoccupied with military security and indifferent to
social and economic progress. Unfortunately our shortcomings -- our race
problem, for example -- are more obvious to the world, and a higher
standard of behavior is expected of the US than of the USSR. Thus,
despite the intellectual and realistic justification of US policy, the
simple formulas proposed by the USSR -- nuclear free zones, nuclear test
bans, anti-colonialism, peace, and so on -- often have greater appeal.
Third - The Problem of the Underdeveloped Areas
13. Some of our most serious problems are in that great belt of
countries running from Southeast Asia on the east, across South Asia,
the Middle East, and Africa, to the west coast of South America. Most
of these countries are undergoing social and economic revolutions. Many
of them are the targets'of Soviet economic penetration and Communist
subversion. Many are politically unstable and all have grave economic
problems. Population growth is extremely rapid. In some cases it is
growing faster than the economies are growing. In the Asian and African
sectors of this belt of underdeveloped countries are a large number of new
states whose leaders frequently believe that the US and the USSR are engaged
in a world power struggle which is of little direct concern to them. They
tend to believe that the safest and most advantageous course for them to
follow is one of neutralism.
714. The USSR has played up to this tendency toward neutralism by
making no ostensible effort to recruit them into its camp. Offers of
foreign aid have been made without apparent strings. The US, on the other
hand, often appears to them as opposed to neutralism and as attempting to
force them into the Western alliance system. Because of their economic
weakness and political instability, many of these states are ripe for
Sino-Soviet political meddling .and subversive activity.
15. As a consequence of this, it appears to us that the conflict
within these countries will increasingly become a conflict -- not between
East and west -- but between neutralism and pro-Communism. Syria and
Indonesia are examples of this. In Syria a pro-Communist group was getting
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control of key positions; the neutralist elements, in an effort to head
off the seizure of full power by the pro-Communists., proposed the Syrian-
Egyptian union. The pro-Communists could not oppose greater Arab
nationalism and were obliged to support this merger. Nasser is now
engaged in effort to make his brand of neutralism dominant in Syria:
In Indonesia the Communist party has been growing and extending its
influence within the government. This has occurred despite the strong
anti-Communist views of many army officers and political leaders. The
creation of the Indonesian insurgent regime in Sumatra appears to have
shocked those who have permitted this slow Communist infiltration, and
there are now signs that an effort is being made to reduce Communist
influence. We cannot yet determine whether this effort will succeed.
16. Lebanon is a case where there is a conflict between pro-Western
and neutralist elements. This conflict was touched off by indications
that the president intended to amend the constitution in order to succeed
himself. This antagonized pro-Western elements as well as neutralists,
and it provided Nasser with an opportunity to exploit the situation. Thus,
the opposition to the president includes a wide range of opinion and it
has been supported from Syria by weapons, supplies, and personnel. The
situation is now one of civil war, and there is serious doubt that the
President can survive.
17. This Arab nationalist movement, of which Nasser is the symbol
and to some extent the leader, seems to be here to stay. These people
believe they can accept a considerable amount of Soviet assistance
without danger to themselves. This.is matter on which we have serious
doubts. There are, however, some signs of hope. Nasser's recent trip
to the USSR apparently did not. go too well in some respects. Moreover,
the Yugoslavs, who recently discovered the strings on Soviet economic aid
when the Soviets cancelled a large credit to Yugoslavia, have not been
slow to tell everyone who will listen to them that the strings are there
and that the Soviets will try to tighten them.
18. Latin America is a somewhat different problem inasmuch as
neutralism and pro-Communism are not immediate issues. The Latin American
countries, however, like these other underdeveloped countries, are
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undergoing social and economic revolutions. The dominant political groups
of the past are being overthrown -- sometimes peacefully and sometimes
forcefully -- and rapid industrialization is taking place. These rapid
economic changes have produced serious economic problems, and these
political changes have sometimes produced very unpopular governments and
much political agitation. Unfortunately, we have been identified in the
popular mind with some of these economic problems and these unpopular
governments. In general, however, we believe that basic antipathy for the
US is limited and that Communism is not a serious present danger.
In Conclusion, I want to say a few words about over-all and long-range
prospects.
19. Despite the confidence with which the Soviet leaders view the
future and the pride with which they view their accomplishments, we believe
they are likely to retain a healthy respect for US power. They will continue
to entertain great uncertainties about their capacity to wage successful
w ill
warfare against the US. It is unlikely that they deliberately initiate
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general war or embark upon a course which they believe involves a serious
risk of general war.
20. Nevertheless, there will be a constant jockeying for position
between the US and the USSR. This will create the difficult problem of
calculating the risks involved in actions -- or inaction -- in particular
situations. Failure to calculate accurately could lead to various
conceivable forms of local war or even to a general conflict. We do not
see any easy way to determine whether local wars will break out and
whether if they do they can be kept limited. We are not persuaded that
they will be kept limited because it would be sensible not to allow them
to expand. The rapidity with which events often occur, the pressures upon
chiefs of government, and the great importance of time, can confuse and
distort the intentions of the parties involved. Thus, local wars could
be expanded even though it was the intention of the parties in'blved
to keep them limited.
21. Certainly one of the most important factors shaping the world
in the future -- aside from the question of general war -- will be the
manner in which the Soviet bloc evolves. Despite the Hungarian revolt
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and its aftermath -- including the execution of Imre Nagy and his
associates -- we believe there has been a significant change in the USSR
and in its relations with other bloc states. We think these changes will
continue. The Soviets can probably control the pace of change and thus
prevent any serious weakening over the short term. These changes in the.
long term might profoundly alter the content and structure of political
life in the USSR and in the Soviet bloc as whole.
22. This change in the Soviet bloc, though real, does not seem
likely to have a major effect for some-years to come upon the world
struggle in which we are engaged. Under the cover of a condition of
mutual deterrence, the USSR apparently intends to wage an intensive cold
war against the US. This cold war will have intermittent upsurges and
declines in intensity as'the Soviets shift their tactics and their
near-term objectives. The Soviet bloc will undertake vigorous economic
and political offensives. It will take advantage of world trouble
spots; it will exploit nationalist and revolutionary movements in
underdeveloped countries; it will exploit such profitable schemes as
disarmament and peace.
23. The USSR will probably have some success in these efforts
and th-Ut this will generate increasing nervousness in the West over
real or imagined losses of position. We do not think, however, that there
is an irreversible trend running against the West. The Sino-Soviet bloc
will become an increasingly formidable opponent, but its leaders must
also cope with major problems in exploiting their strength. We believe
the course of the East-West contest will dependmore than anything else
upon the manner in which the West mobilizes its political, economic, and
military resources.
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