POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS FROM THE PALESTINE TRUCE
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Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP78-01617A003200140001-0
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S
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Document Creation Date:
December 27, 2016
Document Release Date:
February 28, 2013
Sequence Number:
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Case Number:
Publication Date:
July 27, 1948
Content Type:
REPORT
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FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
FOR REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
Err-
s4iti4 tiAot
POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS
FROM THE PALESTINE TRUCE
ORE 38-48
Published July 27,
This domment has been
approved for release through
tbe 8/STORICAL Milli PROGRAM of
th. Central Intelligence Agency.
Date 4j.:"StA 92.
RR? 92-4
Document
NO CHANGE i
DECLASSIFI
ass. CHANGED
1948 DDA Memo
Auth: DD REG.
Date:
40500
00
Class.
TS s
Apr 77
763
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the na-
tional defense of the United States within the meaning
of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended.
Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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DISSEMINATION NOTICE
1. This copy of this publication is for the information and use of the recipient
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tion for the performance of official duties may be authorized by the following:
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the Department of State
b. Director of Intelligence, GS, USA, for the Department of the Army
c. Chief, Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy
d. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force
e. Director of Security and Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Com-
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2. This copy may be either retained or destroyed by burning in accordance with
applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by
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DISTRIBUTION:
Office of the President
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ieLPLIV
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(At beginning of second U. N. Truce)
11023
PALESTINE
APPROXIMATE LINES BETWEEN
ARAB-CONTROLLED AND JEWISH-
CONTROLLED AREAS:
? During period of 1st U. N. truce
(11 June-9 July 1948)
--Beginning of 2nd U. N. truce
(18 July 1948)
JEWISH GAINS BETWEEN 1st
? AND 2nd TRUCES
? CONFIDENTIAL
Partition Boundary (as accepted by the United
Nations General Assembly, Nov, 1947)
--???? international Boundary
District Boundary
Standard Gauge Railroad (413a")
. Narrow Gauge Railroad 135111
First Class Road
Second Class Road
Oil Pipe Une
Intermittent Stream
Cze ' Jewish Communal Area
10 20 30 Mlles
10 ryt Kilometers
35.
35?37
En Napura
en on t484,1,8
HAIFA
II1ERIAS
NehersysZ
Humin
Nur as
\Shams
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US
A' R A
A R B
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.:1
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Sources: /
Onto*, 1:500.000. G.. Philip and Son. 1942
Sn4c N.,. Aber M.A. 1:5110.000 1939
P.N50.003. 0.0.0. 1509/12375. 1946
34.312
JEWISH
as.
35?3C/
11023 aiep.Breitch,,CIAM/137 ? 48 COyENTIAL .
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ORE 38-48
POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS FROM THE PALESTINE TRUCE
1. In response to a request from the Office of the Secretary of Defense regarding
the probable duration of the 18 July truce in Palestine and developments that may arise
as a result of it, CIA presents the following estimates:
a. The current continuation of he truce is for the most part nominal, and
sporadic fighting continues. Israel benefited greatly from the previous truce period
in improving its military potential. A continuation of the truce on the conditions of
the previous one would be to Israel's advantage, and the Arabs probably would not
long respect it. On the other hand, a really effective? and adequately enforced truce
would have a reasonable chance of being prolonged. Therefore, the Mediator's success
in prolonging the truce is in direct proportion to the support he is given in establishing
effective means of enforcement.
b. It is unlikely that the Mediator himself will be able to effect a settlement of
the basic controversy. Provided, however, that effective means of observation and en-
forcement are made available and utilized, it is probable than an unstable truce can be
maintained until the problem can be referred back to the United Nations General
Assembly in September or to the International Court of Justice.
c. The present intentions of the USSR are to promote instability and in-
security throughout the Middle East and to undermine the positions of the US and
the UK therein. To do so the USSR has given, and presumably will continue to give,
support in varying degrees to both Israel and the Arab countries. The collapse of
the truce and the intensification of hostilities would afford the USSR increased op-
portunities to pursue its aims. Conversely, any measures which might prolong the
truce would be detrimental to Soviet aims.
d. A critical factor in the continuance of the truce will be the ability of the
Israeli government to control the activities of its extremist elements (Irgun Zvai Leumi
and the Stern Gang) and of the Arab governments to control popular outbreaks
directed against the maintenance of the truce. It is not believed that complete control
by their governments of either Jewish or Arab extremists will be possible, but the con-
ditions for such control will be much more favorable under a fair truce, rigorously
enforce-d, than under an inadequate truce, half-heartedly supported.
2. Further discussion concerning the possible outcome of the truce is in En-
closure A; of the current military situation in Palestine in Enclosure B; of Soviet in-
tentions in the area in Enclosure C.
Note: The information in this report is as of July 21 July.
The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force
have concurred in this report.
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Sirener-
- ENCLOSURE A
POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS FROM THE PALESTINE TRUCE
1. GENERAL.
The UN Mediator has two objectives: an effective truce of indefinite duration; and
a final compromise solution, between Jews and Arabs, of the Palestine problem. The
present truce was agreed to on 18 July and has been violated repeatedly by both
Arabs and Jews. The violations have resulted from the absence in Palestine of
UN observers and machinery for preventing infractions, and from the determination
of various Arab and Jewish groups to gain last-minute advantages which they feel
to be of vital importance. The Mediator's success in establishing an effective truce
will depend on the effectiveness of the machinery which is given him, the ability of
Israel to control its extremist groups (the Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern Gang), and
the reaction of the Arab peoples against the acceptance of the truce by their leaders.
2. POSSIBILITY OF AN EFFECTIVE TRUCE.
a. Observer Teams.
Current efforts to organize UN observer teams include plans for 300 observers?
three times as many as were sent to Palestine during the previous truce. The effective-
ness of the current truce will depend largely on the incisiveness with which these
observers carry out their duties and the forcefulness with which the Mediator deals
with violations. If violations are ignored to the same extent as during the previous
truce, the success of the current truce will be doubtful. The Jews will, as before, bring
in men, aircraft, and heavy military equipment; present Arab opposition to the truce
will then become intensified, and the Arabs will probably reopen hostilities.
b. Israeli Extremists.
It is probable that any concessions that the PGI might make to obtain Arab
agreement to permanent peace would be met by open and violent action by the Jerusa-
lem extremists. If, however, the Mediator attempts to establish a special UN regime
over Jerusalem before a final settlement is achieved or to revise the territorial boundaries
to what they consider detrimental to Israel, the extremist groups will almost certainly
resume fighting. At the present time it is believed that the PGI can control extremist
elements within the partition boundaries, but it may not be able to control them in
other parts of Palestine, especially in Jerusalem.
c. Reaction of Arab Peoples.
The Arab people were confident of victory and were assured by their leaders
that the truce would not be extended. Their bitterness may well erupt into violence
against their governments or the Western powers or both. If their wrath is turned
against their leaders, some of the Arab governments in an attempt to survive may
2
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etregrr"
well resume the Palestine war. Arab leaders, however, will first make every effort
to turn the anger of their people against the UN, the US, and the UK, or even against
one another.
The timing of such developments cannot be predicted because they depend
partly on spontaneous eruptions of popular feelings, which are subject to violent change,
and partly on organized agitation. Rioting, however, has already developed in Cairo.
Serious Jewish violations of the truce (particularly the bombing of Arab cities) would
further inflame Arab public opinion and would make it more difficult for the Arab
governments to continue the truce. Communist agents in the Arab countries will
probably exert themselves to stir up the people against their governments in order
to bring about the downfall of the present regime as well as to destroy the truce. The
rapidity with which the observer teams are mobilized and their effectiveness will ob-
viously have great bearing on this problem.
3. POSSIBILITY OF A COMPROMISE SOLUTION BETWEEN ARABS AND JEWS.
It is extremely unlikely that the Mediator himself will be able to persuade Arabs
and Jews to agree to a compromise solution for Palestine. The Jews, with a de facto
government and because of their military strength and the political support of the
US and the USSR, are in an extremely strong position. The provisions of the UN par-
tition scheme constitute for the moment their minimum demands. The Arabs, in
spite of their weakness, have given no official indication that they are prepared to
recognize Israel as defined in the UN partition plan. At the present time no Arab gov-
ernment feels it could survive if it consented to negotiate with Israeli representatives.
Israel and the Arab governments might accept some sort of international status for
Jerusalem or its de-militarization, but such a development might well be resisted by
the Israeli extremist groups.
If, after repeated attempts, the Mediator is unable to make any progress toward
a solution, he may recommend some further course of action to the Security Council.
Should the truce prove reasonably effective, he might as an alternate move recom-
mend the advisability of securing an advisory opinion from the International Court
of Justice. If, on the other hand, the truce collapses, he undoubtedly will recommend
sanctions against Arabs, or Jews, or both. One difficulty in the way of getting negotia-
tions started is the firm statement of the Arabs, frequently repeated, that under no
circumstances will they recognize an Israeli state, which they would appear to do if
they sat at a council table with Israeli delegates. Encouragement must therefore be
given to the present Arab governments as well as an excuse furnished to them to
give to their own people. This might well be secured through an advisory opinion of
the International Court of Justice; e.g. as to whether a government of Israel exists
with which the Arabs can negotiate.
4. CONCLUSIONS.
Unless strongly backed by the Security Council and efficiently enforced, it is un-
likely that the truce will be effective. Even with an effective truce it is unlikely that
3 IttfOlibBP-0?'"?1
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a compromise agreement will be reached between Arabs and Jews for a considerable
period of time. Judging from present events in Palestine and should the effectiveness
of the observer machinery be no better than during the first truce, it is probable that
sporadic fighting will continue and that the Jews will greatly increase their military
potential under the cloak of the truce. Thus the state of Israel would be aberturther
consolidated, and the Arabs would be further weakened and isolated. If, however, the
truce is effectively enforced and the present comparatively moderate Arab governments
can stay in power, the truce may be prolonged by the Arabs in the hope that a revision
of the UN partition resolution may be secured at the September meeting of the Gen-
eral Assembly or that the issue will be submitted to the International Court of Justice.
If, on the other hand, these governments are overthrown, the Arabs will resume the -
fight, be seriously defeated, break all contact with the US and the UK, and almost cer-
tainly (in one way or another) eventually find themselves open to Soviet exploitation.*
* If, however, a settlement is imposed upon the Arabs by force, it should be pointed out that
guerrilla warfare may be expected to continue for an indefinite period. Furthermore, resistance
to authority through well proved nuisance techniques, boycotts, and other political devices may
defeat ultimately the goal of permanent peace and security in Palestine and the Middle East.
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ENCLOSURE B
THE MILITARY SITUATION IN PALESTINE AT THE BEGINNING
OF THE SECOND TRUCE-18 JULY 1948
The military situation on 18 July, the beginning of the second truce in Palestine,
shows that the Jews have made substantial gains during the nine-day period of fight-
ing between 9 July and 18 July. (See map.) During that period the Jews captured
Lydda, Ramie, and Ras el Zin, thereby removing the danger of an Arab thrust on
Tel-Aviv. In the north they took the strategic Arab-Christian town of Nazareth and
consolidated their positions along the Lebanese border into which units had been
moved during the truce. In the south the Jews thrust southeast into the Egyptian-
occupied area near Isdud and widened and strengthened the strip of Jewish-controlled
territory along the roads between Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv. The only successful Arab
action during that period, the Iraqi advance north from Jenin toward Afule, was
halted by the truce before any significant gain was made.
During the period of the truce the Jews gained considerably from a military point
of view. They strengthened and improved their existing fortifications and built new
ones in the areas recently taken over from the Arabs. They improved the by-pass
road to Jerusalem, which skirts Arab-held Latrun and Bab el Wad on the main road
from Jerusalem to Tel-Aviv. They recruited and trained troops both abroad and in
Palestine, and reinforcements were flown in from abroad. They increased their supply
of tanks, aeroplanes, and artillery. The Jews brought heavy artillery into the Jerusa-
lem area and are reported to have acquired at least 13 German ME-109 fighter planes?
which can be converted into light bombers?and 3 B-17's. (They are now reported to
possess a total of 60 ME-109's, of which 24 are operational.) The food situation in
Jerusalem was greatly improved during the truce.
The Arabs made certain gains during the truce, but these were insignificant com-
pared to the Jewish gains. The Arabs received some Italian and Belgian arms and
brought more arms and ammunition to the front.
The truce resulted in so great an improvement in the Jewish capabilities that the
Jews may now be strong enough to launch a full-scale offensive and drive the Arab
forces out of Palestine. Events during the truce, and the enormous increase in Jewish
strength resulting from them, considerably change the previously held estimate of the
probable course of the war. in Palestine. The Arabs' logistical position generally is very
bad and their ammunition supply is exceedingly low. It is estimated that they could
not continue to fight, even on the previous moderate scale, for more than two to
three months.
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The Military Forces involved are estimated as:
Arab Forces in or near Palestine
ARMY
IN PALESTINE
NEAR PALESTINE
TOTAL
Transjordan
6,000
4,000
10,000
Iraq
9,000
1,000
10,000
Egypt
5,000
8,000
13,000
Syria
1,000
1,500
2,500
Lebanon
, 1,800
1,800
Saudi Arabia
3,000 (?)
3,000
Irregulars
3,000 (?)
3,500
6,500
Totals
27,000
19,800
46,800
Israeli Forces
Haganah
Mobile Striking Force
17,000
Semi-Mobile (Local operation) -
18,000
Garrison or Defense (settlers-urban militia)
50,000
Irgun Zvai Leumi
The Irgun has gradually increased from 7,000 to 12,000
during the past 4 to 6 months.
Stern Gang
A similar rise in Stern Gang numbers from 400-800
has been recently confirmed.
Total 97,800
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ENCLOSURE C
SOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST
1. SOVIET OBJECTIVES.
a. The ultimate objective of Soviet policy vis-?is the Middle East is the as-
sumption of the dominant role in the area.
b. To implement this main objective, Soviet policy is directed toward the ac-
complishment of four secondary objectives:
(1) Instability in the Arab world.
(2) A complete break between the US and the Arab states.
(3) Strained relations between the US and the UK concerning Middle East
policy.
(4) A complete break between the UK and the Arab states.
2. APPLICATION AND RESULTS OF SOVIET POLICY (29 November 1947-18 July 1948).
With the above objectives in mind, the USSR voted for the UN partition of Palestine.
From November to May it consistently supported partition but took no initiative, in
urging effective action to implement partition. Officially the Soviet position was un-
impeachable; unofficially, the Kremlin was content to sit back and watch matters go
from bad to worse in Palestine. The Soviet delegation loudly denounced and obstructed
the US proposals for a temporary trusteeship over Palestine, the one possibility which
might have prevented an Arab-Jewish war after 15 May. Since 15 May the delegation
has been lukewarm on truce attempts and has obstructed mediation efforts. On
7 July it abstained in the Security Council from voting on the resolution to extend the
four weeks' truce. Although it voted for the resolution on 15 July ordering the bellig-
erents to cease hostilities, it abstained from voting on the proposal to give the UN
Mediator authority to negotiate a settleMent between Jews and Arabs.
By pursuing the tactics outlined in the preceding paragraph, the USSR has in-
creased its prestige ,among Zionist groups throughout the world. Moreover, its sup-
port of partition has done little to impair Soviet-Arab relations, which could hardly
have been made worse in any case. (The retaliatory outlawing of the Communist
parties in Syria and Lebanon merely sent the Communists underground and, in view
of the ineffectiveness of Arab police and security measures, did not greatly impair the
capabilities of the Communists in these countries.) Soviet tactics in the UN have
also contributed directly to instability in the Middle East, the first secondary objective
of Soviet policy.
The inability of the UN to formulate a compromise solution of the Palestine
problem has contributed directly to the other three Soviet secondary objectives. US
support of partition immediately drove a wedge into US-Arab relations. This breach
in relations could never be mended unless a compromise was reached between Arabs
7 SET
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ST.
and Jews. By opposing a compromise solution, the USSR contributed directly to
increasingly strained relations between Arabs and the US, its second objective. As
the UK was compelled for strategic and economic reasons to support the Arabs,
strained relations between the US and the UK, the third Soviet objective, inevitably
followed. The Kremlin doubtless reasoned that UK dependence on ERP would compel
the UK to bow to US pressure. This would in turn lead to the fourth Soviet objective,
the rupture of UK-Arab relations. While the USSR was doubtless prepared to take
positive steps toward the attainment of its objectives, it has been unnecessary for
it to do anything beyond obstructing the possibility of a compromise solution between
Arabs and Jews. US support of partition, UK support of the Arabs, and UK economic
dependence on the US have combined to produce a situation favorable to the USSR
and one which they can be expected to exploit in the future.
3. FUTURE POLICY (after 18 July 1948).
The future policy of the USSR vis-?is Palestine will aim at consolidating the
objectives already partially attained. It will continue to be the Soviet plan to follow
a line of opportunism and readiness to exploit what the USSR considers US and UK
mistakes. While continuing to support the partition scheme, the USSR may be ex-
pected to abstain on or to block any UN action which is likely to bring Jewish-Arab
hostilities to a permanent end. This trend is forecast by the USSR abstention on the
7 July Security Council resolution calling on both parties to agree to an extension of .
the four weeks' truce, and subsequently on the question of granting Bernadotte powers
to mediate.
It may come about that the UK, as a result of US and UN pressure, would find
it difficult to maintain all its ties with the Arab states, which would contribute to the
fourth major objective of the USSR. In such an event it may be expected that the
USSR will shift the emphasis of its progaganda from "Jewish independence" to "US
imperialism in Israel" and under the latter slogan will woo the Arab governments
with promises of military advisers and supplies. It can be expected to "encourage"
its own candidates in the political turmoil which will follow Arab military defeats.
By such methods it will continue its drive toward the attainment of its basic objective,
the assumption of the dominant role in the Middle East.
4. SOVIET ARMS POLICY ON PALESTINE ISSUE.
There is a large body of evidence which indicates that arms shipments from the
Communist-dominated countries have been made both to the Arab states and to
Israel. The Israeli have received the bulk of these arms, which have included am-
? munition, small arms, automatic weapons, artillery and military planes.*
The major source of arms supply for Israel has been Czechoslovakia. Other
countries which have supplied arms are Yugoslavia and Poland, and possibly the
USSR. The governments of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia have actively cooperated
* There is no indication that any B-29 type aircraft are being used by either Arabs or Jews.
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in these shipments by furnishing protection, maintaining secrecy, or supplying gov-
ernment facilities, including airfields in the case of Czechoslovakia. Ports in Albania
and Italy have been utilized for transshipment purposes to provide additional secrecy
as to the countries of origin of these military supplies.
Some of the Arab League countries have purchased arms from Czechoslovakia;
the largest shipments to the Arabs from that country have gone to Syria and Lebanon.
Small shipments from the USSR or Balkan ports are also reported to have been landed
on the Syrian and Lebanese coasts; also, petroleum products are now being shipped
to Lebanon by Rumania.
9
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