TURKEY-US: OLD ISSUES, NEW STRAINS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000303280001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 18, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/10: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000303280001-2
.._ - U r i i
DOC NO r9/i /I f7-2-0077
OIR 3
P $ PD
en ,a Intelligence Agency
Washington, D C 20506
Directorate of Intelligence
18 May 1987
Turkey-US: Old Issues, New Strains
Summary
Recent developments in US-Turkish relations
have the potential to create what could be the
most serious row in US-Turkish relations in years.
These include Congressional consideration of an
Armenian Genocide Resolution, restrictions on
Turkish use of US-supplied arms on Cyprus, and
cuts in US aid to Turkey. To the Turks, these
Congressional actions underscore what they see as
the vagaries of the US political system, which
makes it impossible for the Executive Branch to
fulfill all of its commitments. We do not
believe, however, that this criticism will lead
Turkey's leaders to curtail US-Turkish defense
cooperation significantly. Thus far, Ankara's
dissatisfaction has been limited to less costly
diplomatic displays -- recalling the Turkish
ambassador and postponing President Evren's visit
-- and to the suspension of the side letters
accompanying the Defense and Economic Cooperation
Agreement (DECA), renewed in March. If the
offending legislation is passed without being
watered down, however, Ankara may respond by
refusing to permit the modest increase--in US
military operations called for in the new DECA and
may even cut US military operations somewhat.
More ominously in the long term, however, the
latest row is likely to strengthen Turkish forces
that favor a loo
i
sen
ng of ties to the West in
general and th
_ _ . .
e US
This memorandum, prepared by
European Analysis, updates and expands an artticleethat
appeared in the EURA Review on 8 May 1987.. Questions and
comments can be directed to
European Division
Chief, West
~~~~~~
EUR M87-20077
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The Issues
This new tension in bilateral relations has been caused
primarily by three old bones of contention that have
re-emerged in the last few months:
o The Armenian Genocide Resolution. A bill
commemorating the death of hundreds of thousands of
Armenians during and immediately after World War I
has made its almost-annual appearance in Congress,
proposing 24 April as a day of memory to honor those
who died at Ottoman hands during the forced migration
from their homeland after an unsuccessful attempt to
establish an Armenian Republic. This is perhaps the
most emotional and least substantive of the current
disputes. Turkish spokesmen claim that the atrocity
is yet to be proven, which makes it a matter for
historians, and that today's Republic should not be
held accountable for events that occured before its
time. In addition, Turkish officials claim that
passage of the resolution would only encourage
Armenian terrorism against Turkish diplomats abroad
and alienate the Turkish public.
o Amendments by the House and Senate Foreign Relations
Committees. These bills--prompted by the recent
augmentation and modernization of the Turkish tank
force on Cyprus--prohibit the use of US-supplied arms
on the island for offensive purposes. Particularly
galling to the Turks is the Senate version, which
cites only the Turks by name, a point-they believe
underscores the distorted view US legislators have of
the Cypriot problem. Both bills, however, touch a
raw nerve in Turkey by linking US aid to events on
Cyprus, apparently ignoring Turkey's legal rationale
for being there and the country's role in defending
Western interests in NATO. Many in Turkey even
equate these amendments with a new arms embargo.
Ankara also fears that one-sided restrictions on the
use of US equipment could lead to additional
prohibitions in the future.
o Foreign Aid Cuts and the 7-10 Ratio. The Turks claim
that the Senate and House Foreign Affairs Committee
cuts in foreign aid for Turkey--to meet the
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traditional 7-10 ratio in assistance to Greece and
Turkey, respectively--contravene assurances made by
the administration when the DECA was renewed that the
US Government would exert its "best efforts" to
acquire over $900 million in aid for the
modernization of Turkey's armed forces. The'Turks
also resent having their assistance tied to Greece's.
While most of these complaints sound familiar, the
confluence and timing of the three issues has created a more
serious rift. In the first place, Turkish expectations are
higher this year following renewal of the DECA. Moreover,
Turks are feeling particularly aggrieved because they
believe they have been more forthcoming than the Greek side
toward UN negotiation efforts on Cyprus. Another
complicating factor is that these Congressional developments
have emerged as the Turks have become even more sensitive
than usual to Western perceptions of their country and its
government. On 14 April, Turkey formally applied for
membership in the European Community, a move that is likely
to revive West European scrutiny of Ankara's human rights
record and the country's rollercoaster-like experience with
parliamentary democracy. At the same time, Turkey has been
competing with its archrival Greece in the courts of Western
opinion to assign blame for the latest flareup in the
Aegean.
Turkish Reactions
Initially, Turkish criticism was limited to the press
and opposition parties. Although the press directed most of
its criticism at the United States, much of the opposition's
attack was aimed at the government of Prime Minister Turgut
Ozal. Opposition spokesmen were quick to. point out, for
example, that they had criticized the government's
performance in the negotiations for the DECA's renewal from
the start for not safeguarding Turkish needs and interests
sufficiently. Party leaders will probably play this theme
repeatedly in coming months, and they are not likely to be
deterred by the government's rejection of their demand for a
parliamentary debate on the DECA. Some of the'criticism has
been extreme, either echoing the call of Social Democratic
Populist Party leader Erdal Inonu for Turkey to withdraw
from NATO or advocating the closure of Turkish bases to US
forces. Even the moderate critics have suggested
restricting US use of the bases or renegotiating the DECA
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should the US Congress pass the resolutions now before it.
After hesitating briefly, the Ozal government joined the
fray. Turkish spokesmen, including the Prime Minister, have
vehemently criticized the Congressional measures in their
discussions with US officials, drawing on well-worn
arguments about Congress's failure to appreciate Turkey's
contributions to Western security. Ozal also decided
against forwarding the side letters accompanying the DECA to
the cabinet for ratification--although the impact this will
have on the agreement's legal standing remains an open
question. Foreign Minister Halefoglu has been more
explicit, threatening to delay fulfillment of the
obligations cited in the agreement until 1990, when it is
due for renewal. In addition, the Prime Minister has
written to American firms involved in. joint defense
projects, such as General Dynamics, saying that Turkey is
having second thoughts regarding the utility of such
A variety of factors are probably motivating the Ozal
government. The government may be seeking to boost popular
support for its policies by taking action now in order to
deflect criticism of itself--and the US--when next year's
national election campaign begins in earnest. At the same
time, the government clearly sees public indignation as a
handy tool for use in working a better deal with Washington
on the aid package, and for gaining a more sympathetic ear
on future aid requests. Ozal doubtless surmises that his
and the public's response will help--or prod--the
administration in its discussions with Congress,
particularly over aid. The decision to go public, however,
has added a new variable in the US-Turkish equation, and the
impact of public opinion will have to be assessed in this
and succeeding disputes as Turkey democratizes further and
its politics become more freewheeling. For his part, Ozal
may find that by raising popular expectations he has painted
L? gyn....1 F 4 -4- . LL_ _I .
Outlook
Turkey's response will depend mainly on the ultimate
fate of the offending legislation -- particularly the
Armenian Resolution and the one-sided reference to Turkey in
the Senate version of the amendment restricting use of US
arms -- and how actively the Executive Branch is perceived
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to have weighed in on Turkey's behalf.. nna opinion 0
which may be
partiy esigne to intluence thinking on these issues,
suggests Ankara will react vigorously if the legislation
becomes law.
More recent reporting from Ankara, as well as
government statements, however, suggest a more measured
approach. US diplomats believe that at present the Ozal
government has adopted a more cautious strategy pending
developments in Washington.
At this point, it is unclear what effect the.military
will have on the government's thinking
One high-level officer
told a US official recently that the military supports the
decision to defer ratification of the side letters.
`US
diplomats report, however, that they have not encountered
any moves by the Turkish military to restrict ongoing
projects, including those cited in the DECA side letters.
In view of the benefits the Turks derive from NATO
membership and the US presence, we believe it safe to
discount the more drastic moves, such as suspension of US
activities at bases in Turkey. The current dispute simply
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does not match the crisis engendered by the US arms embargo
following the 1974 Cyprus conflict, when the Demirel
government took such a step. And Ankara almost certainly
will agree to the joint defense production projects
currently under discussion with US firms for similar reasons
--they will bring sorely needed assistance to the Turkish
economy. Ozal is doubtless hoping, however, that these
firms will at least hel argue his country's case in
Washington. 25X1
The Turks still have several, less drastic alternatives,
which give Ankara the option of responding on a graduated
level. They have already postponed President Evren's trip
and recalled their ambassador for consultations. Other,
more costly, alternatives involve the DECA. Some Turkish
politicians have spoken of revoking it. SDPP leaders have
announced that any government they join--not an immediate
prospect, admittedly--will have to do just that. The Ozal
government is unlikely to go that far, however, and Defense
Minister Yavusturk has stated publicly that theDECA will
not be cancelled. But the decision to halt ratification of
the side letters and the hint at suspension of the agreement
suggest Ankara might be willing to demand its renegotiation
on the grounds that the US failed to live up to commitments
made in the letters accompanying the agreement.... This would
offer Ankara the opportunity of sending a clear signal
without committing itself to ending military cooperation.
If Ankara eventually feels compelled to act, the Turks
could proceed with some modest restrictions on US military
activity--with or without suspension of the DECA. The Turks,
for example, could place limits on US operations in the
country or the US use of Turkish facilities. Ankara could
also rescind agreements made on improving US military
operations in the letters accompanying the DECA.
If Congress fails to pass the bills under discussion or
makes them sufficiently anodyne by removing offending
references to Turkey, the retaliatory mood in Ankara will
pass and the dispute will fade. Yet, even if the Ozal
government does not take steps against the DECA or military
cooperation with the US, the controversy will reinforce the
Turkish belief that US commitments cannot be taken at face
value, given the persistent divisions in Washington over
these issues. While this does not mean that the Turks will
turn their backs on the West or the US alliance, the
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experience may tarnish the image of the US as a friend of
Turkey and those Turkish leaders who promote that image.25X1
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SUBJECT: Turkey-US: Old Issues, New Strains
Distribution:
External
1 -
Bruce
Rickerson, State
1 -
Barry
Lowenkron, State
1 -
Rusty
Ingram, State
1 -
Mark
Lissfelt, State
1 -
Col.
Mike McNamara, Defense
1 -
John
Kachold, Defense
1 -
Fritz
Ermarth, NSC
1 -
Peter
Sommer, NSC
Internal
DCI-DDCI Executive Staff
DDI
NIC/AG
CPAS/IMC/CB
MPS/PES
D/EURA
DD/EURA
C/EURA/WE
DC/EURA/WE
EURA Production Staff
EURA/WE Production File
EURA/WE Branch Production File
NIO/Econ
NIO/WE
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/10: CIA-RDP90T00114R000303280001-2