EAST ASIA REACTS TO GORBACHEV'S MERDEKA INTERVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000200840001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 7, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 31, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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. Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
31 July 1987
East Asia Reacts to Gorbachev's Merdeka Interview
Summary
East Asia, for the most part, has welcomed Soviet leader Mikhail
Gorbachev's global double-zero proposal on INF. Beijing and Tokyo are
applauding his offer to remove short- and long-range missiles from the
Soviet Far East, but publicly are remaining silent on his call for
corresponding cuts in Pershing missiles under West German rnntrnl
yongyang as not acknowledged the
proposal; Seoul has also maintained an official silence, but the South
Korean press has responded negatively by contending that the idea
complements North Korean security proposals. Hanoi is voicing strong
support for the scheme and giving it extensive media play
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This memorandum was prepared by
the Office of East Asia Anal
Analysis. Information available as of 31
Comments and queries are welcome and
Security Branch, China Division, OEA,
July 1987 was used in its preparation.
may directed to the Chief, International
Copy /L of 34
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Only China and Vietnam responded to Gorbachev's expression of
willingness to have the Cambodian problem solved politically. China's
official news agency on 26 July called for Soviet action rather than mere
rhetoric. We believe, however, that Beijing in private views Gorbachev's
comments as an extension of the greater Soviet flexibility exhibited at the
10th round of bilateral political talks in April. Beijing probably will seek
Soviet follow-up during the annual meeting of the Chinese and Soviet
foreign ministers at the UNGA in September and at the 11th round of
bilateral political talks in October. Hanoi, meanwhile, is concerned about
the prospect of a separate Sino-Soviet agreement on Cambodia,
Gorbachev Plays the Asian Card
Gorbachev used his interview of 21 July with the editor of Indonesia's widely
distributed Merdeka newspaper to review and elaborate on the good neighbor policy he
unveiled a year ago in Vladivostok. The principal focus of the interview was
disarmament, and Gorbachev announced Moscow's willingness to eliminate all short-
and long-range INF missiles from Asia as well as Europe if all Pershing missiles under
West German control are dismantled.' We believe Gorbachev had several reasons for
making his proposal public in an interview with an East Asian newspaper:
? The Soviets were able to portray their willingness to eliminate the missiles in
Asia as a bow to the sensitivities of the countries of the region -- a claim that
would have been less persuasive if the proposal had been announced in a
bilateral US-Soviet forum.
By highlighting the Asian angle, Moscow probably hoped that Beijing and Tokyo
will lobby Washington not to let a "minor" issue like the Pershings block the
elimination of Soviet INF in the Far East.
? The global double-zero proposal ensured maximum publicity in East Asia for a
second major conciliatory message on the anniversary of his Vladivostok speech.
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By announcing the proposal through an Asian newspaper, the Soviets
circumvented the interpretive filter of the Western press. 25X1
Beijing reported the global double-zero proposal in a straightforward manner.
Earlier US efforts to persuade Beijing that an agreement calling for the reduction of
Soviet INF warheads in the Far East to 100 was the best that could be expected
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probably fueled Chinese suspicions that Washington is more concerned about its NATO
allies than about its friends in Asia. Although Beijing has assessed that Washington
would not immediately accept Moscow's demand on the Pershings and that negotiations
therefore would continue, in our judgment Gorbachev's latest proposal has struck a
responsive chord with the Chinese and has planted the seeds of resentment if
US-Soviet INF talks break down over the Pershings.
the US Embassy in Tokyo reports that Japanese Foreign
Ministry officials are concerned that the Pershings represent a significant impediment
and a potential wedge to divide the West on arms control. Moreover, Tokyo has yet to
react to Gorbachev's suggestions of further steps -- such as freezing the number of
nuclear-capable aircraft in the Soviet Far East in exchange for a US agreement not to
introduce additional nuclear systems that can reach Soviet territory. Should Moscow
formally table these ideas in Geneva, we believe Tokyo would oppose restraints on US
forward-based systems, which the Japanese view as key to deterring Soviet threats
against Japan.
North Korea has neither reacted officially to Gorbachev's INF proposal nor
acknowledged it in the media. Although Moscow and P'yongyang have supported each
other's security initiatives in Asia over the past two years, it is not clear how well the
latest Soviet offer meshes with North Korea's concurrent proposal for staged force
reductions on the Peninsula. The Soviets have dropped their previous demand for the
withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from South Korea. But the North Korean initiative
repeats P'yongyang's traditional insistence on this point. It is possible North Korea is
pressing a demand the Soviets hoped to shelve pending an INF agreement in Geneva.
Soviet public comment on the North Korean proposal, while positive, is less supportive
than Chinese commentary and is expressed by relatively low-level officials.
South Korea has also maintained an official silence on the Gorbachev offer. As
with previous Soviet proposals, however, the South Korean media reaction has been
negative, contending that Soviet ideas complement North Korea's security policy. One
article in a conservative and generally progovernment newspaper claims Gorbachev has
put Washington on the defensive and doubts the United States would find it easy to
respond. At the same time, the article suggests the Soviet peace offensive could lead
to an new era of detente.
Hanoi has voiced strong support for Gorbachev's proposal. Vietnam has given it
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extensive media treatment, and Hanoi's ambassador to Moscow publicly lauded the
proposal in a meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze on 25 July.
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In his Merdeka interview, Gorbachev reiterated the Soviet view that the
Cambodian problem can only be solved by political means, and claimed that the idea of
a national reconciliation was gaining ground. By speaking about the possibility of a
coalition of national forces, Gorbachev again stressed the need for dialogue rather than
confrontation and avoided the issue of excluding Khmer Rouge elements from either
negotiations or a resulting coalition government. We believe his remarks on Cambodia
track well with an apparent Soviet effort over the past year to nudge Hanoi toward a
negotiated settlement -- albeit not so hard as to anger the Vietnamese and jeopardize
the Soviet naval presence at Cam Ranh.
Only China and Vietnam have sharply reacted to Gorbachev's Merdeka comments
on Cambodia. The New China News Agency roundup of 26 July on the Third
International Conference on Cambodia noted Gorbachev's expression of support for
solving the problem "politically," but predictably characterized apparent Soviet and
Vietnamese "flexibility" as empty words designed to split up the Cambodian resistance
coalition and to weaken its support in the international community. The article called on
Moscow to promote peace through action rather than words, and urged the backers of
the Cambodian resistance to increase their support.
We believe, however, that the Chinese may privately welcome Gorbachev's
remarks as the latest indication that Moscow is moving in the direction of an equitable
settlement in Cambodia.
Beijing probably
expects Moscow to follow up with concrete proposals when Chinese Foreign Minister
Wu Xueqian and Shevardnadze hold their annual meeting at the UNGA in September and
during the 11th round of bilateral political talks in October.
The Chinese probably do not expect a quick settlement in Cambodia, however,
and probably will hold out for one that includes a supervised withdrawal of Vietnamese
forces and participation in a coalition government by Khmer Rouge elements --
although not necessarily including the so-called "Pol Pot clique."
We believe the Vietnamese would be concerned if the Soviets were to follow up
on Gorbachev's interview by assuming a dramatically higher profile in the search for a
Cambodian settlement.
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DISTRIBUTION:
Copy 1 of 34 James H. Kelly, Jr., Special Asst. to the President
and Senior Director, NSC, Rm 302, OEOB.
Copy 2 of 34 Stapleton Roy, Deputy Asst. Secretary for East Asian
and Pacific, Rm 6205, New State.
Copy 3 of 34 Karl D. Jackson, Deputy Asst. Secretary for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs, Rm 4E817, Pentagon.
Central Intelligence Agency
Copy 4 of 34 D/DCI/DDCI Executive Staff, Rm 7D60.
Copy 5 of 34 DDI, Rm 7E44.
Copy 6 of 34 NIO/EA, Rm 7E62.
Copy 7 of 34 PDB Staff, Rm 7F30.
Copy 8 of 34 C/PES, Rm 7F24.
Copy 9 of 34 NIC/AG, Rm 7E47.
Copy 10 of 34 CPAS/ILS, Rm 7G50.
Copy 11-15 of 34 CPAS/IMC/CB, Rm 7G07.
Copy 16 of 34 Senior Review Panel, Rm 5G00.
Copy 17 of 34 C/EAC::]Rm 5E18.
Copy 18 of 34 D/OEA, Rm 4F18.
Copy 19 of 34 C/OEA/Production, Rm 4G48.
Copy 20-21 of 34 C/OEA/CH, Rm 4G20.
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Copy 23 of 34 C/OEA/CH/EA, Rm 4G32.
Copy 24 of 34 C/OEA/CH/PA, Rm 4G32.
Copy 25-34 of 34 C/OEA/CH/lS, Rm 4G32.
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