PROSPECTS FOR NORTH-SOUTH KOREAN RELATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00100R000201160001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 31, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 25, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
Pitt
DATE
DOC NO fill- in 0-zoos9
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VVashington.D C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
25 April 1988
Prospects for North-South Korean Relations
Summary
Despite North Korea's bombing of a South Korean airliner last
November--with the loss of 115 lives--both Koreas have reasons to
pursue dialogue, although a renewed exchange of proposals for
North-South talks is unlikely until after the Olympics. Notwithstanding our
concerns about additional violence as Seoul prepares to host the Games,
P'Yonyang's continued attempt to project an image of moderation
suggests it recognizes the political costs of a bellicose policy--including
damaging relations with its allies, curbing its limited access to foreign
capital and technology, and circumscribing further the chances for direct
talks with Washington. Indeed, with South Korean President Roh Tae Woo
suggesting he is willing to renew dialogue with P'yongyang, and with a
change in US administrations in the offing, the North may emphasize the
"peaceful" side of its approach to the South over the next year.
This memorandum was prepared by Office of East Asian Analysis.
Information available as of 25 April 1988 was used in its preparation. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Korea Branch, Northeast Asia
Division, OEA,
EA M 88-20054
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Will P'yongyang Choose Diplomacy?
We remain concerned that the KA 858 bombing could foreshadow further violence
designed to portray South Korea as an unsafe site for the Olympics, but we do not
believe it portends a policy that will rely solely on this course. In fact, since the
incident, the North tried to appear the party most interested in tension reduction and
talks:
? In his New Year's speech, President Kim II-song called for a North-South
conference on tension reduction, to be attended by representatives of both
governments and all political parties. The proposed agenda encompassed familiar
items, including discussion of Team Spirit, the annual US-South Korean joint
military exercise, disarmament, and Olympics cohosting.
? Following up on the speech, in January and again in March, P'yongyang proposed
a series of joint conferences to discuss its ideas to be held in ie two capitals
after a preliminary session at Panmunjom.
North Korea's four-year-longattempt to use more diplomacy has not achieved -
direct talks with Washington, Olympic; cohosting with Seoul, or better access to Western
capital and technology, but we bepeve P'yongyang has few, if any, options. An
emphasis on violence will only widen the gap between the North :and South in their
competition for international prea#ge and, by alienating the Chinese and Soviets, could
accelerate the South' dealings.wittt Beijing,and Moscow. Beijing and Moscow have
avoided publicly blaming P'yongyang for the KA 858 bombing.
Chinese leaders, upset overthaincident, may try to dissua e t e 1ort from
further terrorist activities, and in January a Soviet
official commented that Moscow was angry a ou t e ? atant orth Korean sabotage.
The North could conclude:that-an emphasis on diplomatic norms could pay off in
the long run. P'yongyantia,enthusiastiowelcorne of the, relaxed US guidance on
contacts between US officlaisrand:Nortfr Korean counterparts in March 1987 suggests it
would seize on any US-poilayrshanges.that point,to the possibility of bilateral contacts.
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New Openingwin &mit J.) ! ' ,4
The coming year,rnampoffer P'yongyang other reasons to emphasize diplomacy--a
new administration.in Seaukiandfa new ,one in Washington in 1989. In South Korea,
President Roh Tae Woo has:,distanced.himself from his predecessor, Chun Doo Hwan.
Roh has projected an image, of'greater flexibility on policy, and his reported behavior
and public staternents'hint ataidifferent approach to the North. According to the US
Embassy in Seouk Ways& irnPOrrent role in formulating South Korea's restrained
response to the airliner bombing, apparently ruling out military retaliation. The Embassy
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also reported that Roh considered extending a conciliatory gesture, such as an offer of
food aid, despite KA 858.
In public, Roh has adopted a softer tone toward the North than his predecessor:
? Shortly after the airliner incident, he downplayed P'yongyang's culpability by
suggesting the terrorist suspects might either represent only "bellicose elements"
or be rogue activists. The remarks appeared intended to give Kim II-song a way
to extricate himself from the KA 858 fallout.
? In his presidential campaign, Roh broke with policy intended to ensure that
Seoul's allies did not get out ahead in relations with North Korea by publicly
stating Washington and Tokyo could recognize P'yongyang before Moscow and
Beijing recognized Seoul. Roh recently has hinted publicly at a "secret plan"
proposing increased contact among six nations--North Korea, China, the Soviet
Union, South Korea, Japan, and the United States?probably aimed at eventual
cross-recognition.
? He has also endorsed the North-South dialogue, including a proposal for regular
Cabinet meetings, and has called for a "big brother-little brother" relationship
between Seoul and P'yongyang more in line with South Korea's growing
economic, diplomatic, and technological superiority over the North.
And the North's Reaction?
To be sure, the North will probably see thorns on Roh's olive branches. In itself,
his "big brother-little brother" analogy no doubt rankles?P'yongyang's demand for equal
cohosting status with Seoul in the Olympics testifies to the importance of such
symbolism. And in dealing with offers such as aid, P'yongyang would be unlikely to
admit it needs help, or that the South is better off economically. The North also has
steadfastly opposed cross-recognition in any form, considering it a ploy to permanently
divide the peninsula. P'yongyang probably recognizes that Roh is not risking much on
the issue, given Seoul's success already in expanding contacts with the North's allies.
If Rob's approach translates into a South Korean effort to seize the initiative on
the dialogue, North Korea may feel pressured to respond. P'yongyang may also see
opportunities to press its case on issues ranging from tension reduction to the
withdrawal of US troops from the peninsula. Still, substantive progress on reunification
issues, in our view, will be slow:
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? With the South in a position of strength?buoyed by its role as Olympics
host?P'yongyang probably will see Seoul as the party holding all the cards, and
therefore unlikely to offer real concessions during any negotiations.
? The South, for its part, has reason to proceed slowly. This year Roh not only will
be preoccupied with Olympics preparations but also must establish working
relations with a more vocal, freer opposition in the National Assembly. The
agenda will ensure that Roh focuses heavily on consolidating his position
domestically.
Assuming successful Games and Roh's consolidation of his political mandate,
Seoul could see room to press harder on North-South initiatives. For its part, North
Korea may see 1989 as offering a better chance for contacts with the United States as a
new US administration settles in. Washington will remain the key target in P'yongyang's
strategy to win withdrawal of US troops, and the North may regard continued pursuit of
a diplomatic track with the South as essential if it hopes to take advantage of any new
departures in Washington on Korea policy, such as occurred at the beginning of the
Carter administration.
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Selected Examples of the North's Dual Approach
North Korea's behavior over the past three decades--mixing acts of violence with
proposals for talks--suggests the KA 858 bombing does not represent a departure from
P'yongyang's longstanding two-track approach to Seoul.
August 1960: President Kim II-song proposes talks leading to a North-South
confederation, withdrawal of US forces, and mutual force reduction to 100,000 men each.
October 1962: Kim reiterates the confederation proposal.
December 1963: P'yongyang proposes a nonaggression pact, standing committee for
cultural exchanges, and a conference of North-South representatives.
July 1965: South Korean security forces apprehend a North Korean agent north of
Seoul. He confesses he was on a mission to assassinate President Park Chung Hee.
1966-68: North Korean guerrilla forces operate inside South Korea in up to
company-size strength. The forces seek to carry out swiftly executed attacks
against US and South Korean military forces and inflict heavy casualties.
September 1966: P'yongyang calls for a North-South conference of political parties and
social organizations.
January 1968: North Korean commandos attempt to attack the South Korean
presidential mansion to assassinate President Park.
Late 1968: A 120-man guerrilla force lands on the east coast of South Korea and
unsuccessfully attempts to organize a popular insurgency. The entire force is
eliminated as it travels overland to the North.
June 1970: A third North Korean attempt to kill Park fails when a bomb explodes
prematurely.
April 1971: P'yongyang issues a proposal for "peaceful reunification" that calls for a
North-South political consultative meeting involving representatives from political
parties and public organizations.
September 1971-August 1973: The two Koreas exchange presidential envoys, conduct
humanitarian contacts through the Red Cross, and establish a South-North Coordination
Committee. Intermittent working-level contacts in the SNCC channel continue until
1975--and in the Red Cross channel until 1978--with no substantive progress.
August 1974: A fourth North Korean attempt to kill Park fails when an assassin's
bullets strike Mrs. Park instead.
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January 1980: The North Korean Premier proposes a meeting with the South Korean
Prime Minister and for the first time officially employs the term Republic of Korea.
October 1980: Kim II-song proposes to form a Democratic Confederal Republic of
Koryo, although he subsequently rejects a South Korean proposal for summit talks.
July 1981: North Korean agents hire a Canadian assassin to murder President Chun
Doo Hwan, but the hit man absconds with the money.
October 1983: Chun narrowly escapes assassination by a North Korean-planted
bomb in Rangoon, Burma; 18 South Korean officials are killed.
October 1983: P'yongyang passes through Chinese intermediaries a proposal for
unconditional talks between Seoul, P'yongyang, and Washington.
November 1984: South Korea accepts the North's offer of flood relief supplies.
November 1984-January 1986: Bilateral talks progress intermittently on political,
economic, and humanitarian issues.
June 1986-July 1987: North Korea presents proposals for talks on political and military:
issues.
November 1987: A bomb planted by North Korean agents on a South Korean airliner
kills 115.
January, March 1988: North Korea calls for a North-South joint conference.
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PROSPECTS FOR NORTH?SOUTH KOREAN RELATIONS
DISTRIBUTION:
SENIOR POLICYMAKERS
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? FRANK C. CARLUCCI,
? WILLIAM HOWARD
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? Nb, EAST ASIA,
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