NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY MONDAY 12 MARCH 1984
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP87T00970R000200010011-8
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
15
Document Creation Date:
December 27, 2016
Document Release Date:
May 27, 2010
Sequence Number:
11
Case Number:
Publication Date:
March 12, 1984
Content Type:
REPORT
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J Director of Tt@6f9~-
Central
Intelligence F
?CPASIC1G
25X1
National Intelligence Daily
Monday.
12 March 1984
CPAS NID 84-059JX
Top Seelr
12 Marc W
Copy 235,
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Contents
Jordan: Parliamentary Byelections .......................................... 2
Latin America: Drug Smugglers' Propaganda Efforts ............ 4
Argentina-India: Cooperation on Arms Control .................... 6
EC-Hungary: Trade Talks Stalled ............................................ 6
Special Analyses:
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12 March 1984
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JORDAN: Parliamentary Byelections
Jordanian officials are concerned that the byelections being held
today to fill vacant seats in the lower house of parliament-the first
national elections in 17 years-will broaden the base of political
participation and possibly threaten long-term stability.
The key issue during the intense campaign has been Palestinian
representation. Palestinian residents in the East Bank are technically
represented by the 30 West Bank parliamentarians. They argue,
however, that the large Palestinian community deserves more
positions.
The government worries that East Bank Palestinians are trying.to
increase their political role and upset the East Bank-West Bank
balance by putting themselves forth as candidates.
Comment: King Hussein will view the byelections as a good
indicator of Jordan's ability to handle general parliamentary elections.
He may believe that his decision to recall Parliament and hold
byelections has quelled domestic disenchantment with the political
system. Hussein may hope to wait another four years-the longest
this parliament can legally sit-before holding general elections.
The intensity of the campaign, however, suggests that Jordanians
are no longer willing to accept a limited role in government. The
Palestinians in particular are seeking a larger political role in a society
where they are the majority. If they do not succeed, they may turn to
Islamic fundamentalism or leftist movements.
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LATIN AMERICA: Drug Smugglers' Propaganda Efforts
Narcotics traffickers in Latin America are making increasingly
successful use of the media to encourage wider public acceptance of
their activities and to discredit government countermeasures.
US Embassy and press reports indicate that some of Colombia's
major cocaine and marijuana traffickers recently have increased the
use of advertisements, interviews, and other media coverage to rebut
US and local criticism of their activities and to improve their image.
The smugglers portray US-backed antinarcotics programs as
meddling in internal affairs and promote themselves as seeking to
improve society and shore up the economy. Last month, however,
they murdered a prominent attorney who had pushed strongly for
enforcing the extradition treaty with the US.
In Bolivia, traffickers have sought to depict coca cultivation as an
economic necessity, and they have employed scare tactics to stir
public concern about purported health and environmental hazards of
herbicides used for eradicating drug crops. In addition, they have
produced and aired a television documentary defending coca
production, lauding cocaine use as therapeutic, and calling for the
government to legalize and nationalize the illicit drug industry.
Peruvian smugglers, however, have increasingly resorted to the use of
violence and intimidation against journalists and others trying to
investigate narcotics trafficking.
Comment: The media efforts clearly are eliciting greater local
public support for drug production and have complicated national
efforts to bring it under tighter control. For example, a US request to
extradite two major traffickers from Colombia late last year was
blocked, partly because of the public's perception that Washington
was interfering in an internal affair. Similarly, the influence of large
numbers of Bolivian coca farmers, who have been persuaded to join
pronarcotics labor groups, has helped to impede coca control
projects.
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ARGENTINA-INDIA: Cooperation on Arms Control
Buenos Aires recently publicized a letter from President Alfonsin
to Indian Prime Minister Gandhi concerning the need for the
Nonaligned Movement to focus international attention on the
deadlock in arms control negotiations. Alfonsin urged Gandhi, who
currently chairs the movement, to take the lead in this effort
Comment: Alfonsin's letter could be the first step in a
coordinated effort by the movement to condemn the US and the
USSR for failing to make progress on arms control as stipulated in the
Non-Proliferation Treaty. Many developing nations probably would
respond favorably to such a proposal at the conference reviewing the
treaty next year, because it would be a more visible public forum than
the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Although neither
Argentina nor India is a signatory to the Treaty, both attended the last
Review Conference in 1980 as observers. They used the Nonaligned
Movement's special nuclear coordinating committee to spur other
developing nations that signed the treaty to take a tough stand
against the superpowers on arms control issues.
EC-HUNGARY: Trade Talks Stalled
Preliminary discussions on a trade agreement between the EC
and Hungary have reached an early impasse. EC officials in January
proposed to begin negotiations this spring on a limited accord. In a
recent reply, however, Budapest reiterated demands that any
agreement be nonreciprocal and include substantial reductions in EC
tariffs and quotas on Hungarian goods, particularly farm products.
Although the EC Commission had previously termed these conditions
unacceptable, EC members have vet to decide whether exploratory
Comment: Progress on a trade accord is unlikely in the near
future, but low-level talks probably will continue. Although Ireland and
Italy oppose dropping restrictions on Hungarian agricultural products,
West Germany and the UK want an agreement for political reasons,
and they are likely to persuade EC members to maintain the dialogue.
Budapest's apparent inflexibility probably reflects its belief that it
would benefit little if it were to accept the EC's terms. In addition,
Hungary may be sensitive to recent criticism by its allies about its
increased contacts with the West.
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Special Analysis
Chinese and Soviet negotiators are likely to make additional
limited progress on secondary issues when they meet in Moscow
today to begin the fourth round of their talks, but they are not likely to
achieve any breakthroughs. The USSR has been promoting increased
economic contacts and other exchanges in order to normalize
relations gradually without giving in to China's demands on territorial
and security issues. Beijing's response has been calibrated to reduce
tensions and put China in as favorable a position as possible in the
US-Soviet-Chinese triangle, without accommodating Soviet military
superiority in the region.
China uses its modest interchanges with the USSR to limit
bilateral tensions, increase its leverage with the US, and demonstrate
an independent foreign policy. Beijing scheduled Soviet First Deputy
Premier Arkhipov's visit in May to follow President Reagan's visit, and
it tentatively plans to send Defense Minister Zhang Aiping to the US
the following month.
Moscow is concerned about the possibility of closer Sino-US
military ties, but it seems generally satisfied with the gradual
improvement in its relations with Beijing. The Soviets, however, want
some sort of an agreement with the Chinese on bilateral security
issues, because it would contribute to the security of the USSR's
borders. Such an agreement could have a major impact on
assessments of the Sino-Soviet-US relationship in many world
capitals
Signs of Progress
Under the terms of accords reached last year, both sides are
increasing student, technical, and cultural exchanges at a modest
Arkhipov, who will be the most senior Soviet official to visit China
in 15 years, reportedly will discuss economic cooperation. The annual
trade agreement signed last month provides for $1.2 billion in trade
this year, an increase of 60 percent. In 1983 trade doubled.
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The Soviets claim the Chinese have agreed to host a fifth round of
normalization talks in October. In addition, they say that vice foreign
ministers will follow up their initial discussions on global issues last
September with a second round this June. Although the Chinese state
that they are still willing to meet with the Soviets at the foreign
minister level, no time or place has been set.
Continuity Under Chernenko
China was quick to probe for changes in Soviet policy following
Andropov's death by sending senior Vice Premier Wan Li to Moscow
for the funeral. Wan's reception was in keeping with protocol. The
Chinese were angered, however, when the Soviets did not single him
out for special attention at the funeral or arrange a meeting with
Premier Tikhonov the next day.
This treatment prompted Deng Xiaoping to tell US visitors on
22 February that the USSR is likely to remain "rigid" and incapable
of new initiatives under the "transitional" leadership of General
Secretary Chernenko. On the same day, Deng publicly insisted that
Moscow remove the three obstacles to normalization-Soviet
involvement in Afghanistan and Indochina and Soviet deployments
along the Sino-Soviet border and in Mongolia.
The Soviets have been more positive, telling US Embassy officials
in Beijing that Wan was interested in the idea of setting aside the
obstacles for later discussion while improving relations where.
possible. At the same time, the Soviets have stressed that they do not
intend to negotiate with China about Afghanistan, Indochina, or
Mongolia. They have been careful to assure their Asian allies that they
will protect their interests during the consultations with the Chinese.
Prospects for the Next Round
The Soviets do not appear ready to offer the Chinese any real
concessions. Chernenko's remarks since becoming General
Secretary suggest that he has not made improved relations a top
priority, and the Soviets still seem determined to stand firm on the 25X1
key issues.
Moscow continues to insist, for example, that relations have to
get better before it can even consider substantial troop cuts along
China's northern border. The Chinese maintain that the Soviets have
to reduce the threat to China before relations can improve
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Both sides, on the other hand, probably will point to their
developing contacts as evidence of some forward movement.
Moscow also may try to reformulate existing proposals for longer
term economic and technical agreements, if only to help create a
more positive atmosphere for Arkhipov's visit.
In addition, the Soviets could try to find some common ground in
the proposals that the two sides advanced last October for easing
tensions along their common border. At that time, they suggested the
creation of a joint military group on border issues, but the Chinese
The USSR may try to make the proposal more acceptable to
China, hoping this would create some movement in the talks toward
an agreement on "confidence-building measures." The Soviets may
hope this would eventually lead to broader agreement on security
issues.
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